The ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and larger US–China contestation are pressing issues the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) needs to address. With such diverse member states, the bloc’s ability to be an effective body on these major security issues in the region has been severely tested.

In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi

who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions, citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The US–based Carter Center, which had a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in ten states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on the election day. Per an Amnesty International report, over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the coup d’etat, including at least 1,345 people in 2023.

Reactions from fellow ASEAN Countries

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Association aims to promote regional peace and security, as well as economic growth. Due to the complex security dynamics in the region, the former design seems to be the group’s priority. ASEAN subsequently expanded and the numbers slowly grew, as Brunei became a member in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, Timor-Leste in 2022 was granted an official observer status and in principle approval by ASEAN countries to become a full member of the association at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN Centrality, a concept that relies on assumption that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the regional bloc. The concept was first used at the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explained that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and, in order to effectively function, the member states needed to be united.

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from the fellow ASEAN member states. The regional bloc has been chaired by four countries since the military coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been particularly successful in resolving the crisis as, three years after the coup, forging a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.

Most founding members were alarmed over the developments in Myanmar. Indonesia expressed a serious concern over the military take-over in Myanmar, calling for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore took the same stance, expressing grave concern and expressed hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and Singapore echoed these sentiments, viewing the developments with considerable unease. The Philippines followed the situation with deep concern, particularly over the personal safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, flatly described the coup as an internal matter and advocated no comment be made. Newer members generally shared Bangkok’s sentiment.

That member states were divided between expressions of serious concern and a hands-off approach illustrated that the regional bloc has lacked a united stance. Even as early as five months after the coup unfolded, the division were seen when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy, with only six ASEAN members voting in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar itself, who was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand abstained.

ASEAN consists of countries with significant differences, including their political systems – which may have played a role in the divided responses toward the overthrow of the democratically elected government, as well as their approach to the ongoing post–coup troubles. Only three members — Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — are considered to have democratic systems.

Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar for decades was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The United States and European Union states accused SLORC of human rights violations and suppression of democracy activists. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy was the way to secure regional security as well as the country’s socio-economic development. Despite objections from the United States, Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. Today, the bloc finds itself in a challenging situation where it needs to find a way to manage Myanmar’s membership amidst continued civil unrest.

In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (“FPC”), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special envoy of ASEAN; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.

In contrast to the West imposing sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders were united and opted to keep the communication channels open with the junta, balancing between engagement but carefully not to give legitimacy to the military regime.

In October 2021, the ten member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet the jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised an option, as the group has no mechanism of expulsion, let alone any specific mention about expelling its members in a situation when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.

Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, during his tenure as ASEAN Chair the following year, was criticized by ASEAN fellow members, Indonesia and Malaysia. His visit to Myanmar undermined what the group has agreed, which is to withhold the junta’s recognition until they start to cooperate.

As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This move constituted a different approach by the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed an individual as a special envoy to Myanmar. Jakarta favored a non-megaphone diplomacy, a quieter approach where not every diplomatic activity was disclosed and maintaining a position that, until there was progress on the implementation of the FPC, no representation from Myanmar at ASEAN meetings would be accepted, except at the non-political level. Still, the junta did not heed Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and with no punitive actions applicable under ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, nothing more was done.

During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo pushed back against the accusation of the division within the regional’s bloc by stating that differences of opinion didn’t mean there was no unity, a view that strains credulity.

This year’s chair, Laos, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, a similar move from Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022, which only highlighted once more the bloc’s inability to speak with one voice.

ASEAN and the South China Sea

As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members have also been divided with regard to Chinese encroachment in its naval backyard.

Looking at the dynamics between member states on South China Sea (“SCS”) concerns, the expectation of an ultimately fruitful South China Sea Code of Conduct (“CoC”) negotiation, which constitute guidelines created to ease the tension in disputed waters by defining rules of related parties, needs to be managed. A CoC is hoped to have a more meaningful impact than the previous non-legally binding document signed by ASEAN members and China in 2002, yet it remains a discussion whether a CoC will even be legally binding. ASEAN and China have been working on a CoC for over two decades but within the former, unity once more proves elusive. The claimant countries who often involved in incidents with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, support the agreement to be legally binding, while countries that are closer to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, prefer to avoid any conflict.

With China claiming almost the entirety of the SCS, there is also a question on what geographical areas that the code should cover and agreed by all parties.

Recently, China and the Philippines were involved in another incident located in Sabina Shoal, which lies

630 nautical miles from China. Manila and Beijing accused each other of ramming into each other’s vessels, marking the fifth incident in one month. The incident occurred just a month after a de-escalation effort from both sides, where both disputants agreed to a provision arrangement that allows Manila to resupply the outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. China makes no secret of its more assertive moves in pursuing its claims in the disputed waters, ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal concluded China’s claims had no legal basis. The tension in the disputed waters has been on the rise since last year and sparked a concern of a possible larger confrontation.

In his speech at the Shangri–La Dialogue this year, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, without mentioning a specific country, condemned China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea. He mentioned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a willful act was close to what gets defined as an act of war. He hinted that, in this case, Manila may ultimately invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States, stating that he believed that his treaty partner holds the same standard. The treaty consists of eight articles that requires both countries to defend each other if another party attacks.

Similar to the Myanmar crisis, the members are not united in addressing the SCS disputes. In 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique amidst tension in the disputed waters, a first since its establishment, with Cambodia blocked the consensus. Its leader at the time, Hun Sen, argued that the issues should be addressed bilaterally, similar to what China preferred. Cracks in the group’s facade were again reflected in July’s post–ministerial,meeting in Vientiane, when host Laos and Cambodia opposed the wording to be put in the joint communique, condemning the coast guard vessel belonging to China in a June collision with the Philippines’ resupply boat.

In next month’s ASEAN Summit, member states expect to remain divided on the issue of the Myanmar crisis, between those supporting vocal criticism toward the military government’s lack of commitment on the FPC, as well as rising violence and the junta deciding to again postpone its scheduled general election scheduled for 2025, and those advocating a markedly softer approach.

Member states also remain divided on how to address China’s more aggressive behavior in the disputed waters, particularly against the Philippines. Meanwhile, the CoC negotiation between ASEAN and China will still be a tough one, despite being scheduled to be concluded in the next two years. It’s important to note that not all ASEAN members are having territorial disputes with China; therefore, consensus isn’t easy to reach. The disunity may weaken its negotiation’s position and possibly allowing China to drive a wedge within the group.

There is doubt that China will agree to a legally binding CoC, given its more assertive behavior in the disputed waters, the use of water cannon, ramming incidents with other disputants, and the artificial islands equipped with military facilities, despite the existing but unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, where the disputed parties agreed to resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means and practice self-restraint from activities that would escalate the disputes. More importantly, China openly rejected the 2016 ruling by an international tribunal and sees it as null and void.

ASEAN was built based on a declaration, not a treaty. It provides a platform for discussions through forums over security issues aimed to maintain peace and stability in the region. It has a distinctive way in managing interstate relations, widely known as the “ASEAN Way,” relying on consultation and consensus. The style of diplomacy consists of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, preference of non-binding and non-legalistic approaches. Therefore, the CoC is less likely to be a legally binding agreement.

Further, ASEAN has no army in its disposal so cannot project any military power and consequently the group’s diplomatic influence is weakened without such enforcement capabilities.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, mentioned that the economy, including trade and investment will be the priority of Malaysia as ASEAN’s chair next year. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur has decided to join the Chinese – led regional bloc, BRICS, which suggests its approach towards the SCS dispute next year is unlikely to be assertive towards China.

ASEAN’s rotating chair changes annually. Learning from Indonesia’s term as a chair, which has experienced of fully transitioning from an authoritarian system to the world’s third largest democracy, a year wasn’t nearly enough to make a significant progress on the Myanmar crisis. Accordingly, the chances of success for any ASEAN chair to play a key role in finding a solution to the crisis is low.

The decision-making mechanism of ASEAN that consists of consultations and consensus have also raised question on its efficacy in managing current security issues. ASEAN as a regional group should prioritise the interests of the member states, not those of external powers. For that to happen, there is a need for the group to speak in one voice and to restore ASEAN Centrality.

Brief Historical Background

Southeast Asia is known as a region prone to territorial disputes, which present a serious challenge to regional stability. The experience of colonial rule was one of the contributing factors due to arbitrary demarcation. One security challenge of note in the region derived from complex territorial disputes centers around the South China Sea (SCS).

The body of water is one of the largest semi enclosed seas in the world with an area of 648,000 square nautical miles and encompasses vital routes linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans with $5.35 trillion worth of trade passing its waters annually, almost one-third of all global maritime trade. Equally contributing to the significance of the SCS is what lies underneath: oil, gas and potential hydrocarbon reserves.

The SCS is highly contentious with China and four other Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — involved in disputes featuring the Spratly and Paracel Island chains being contested. Although most of the disputes involve China, Vietnam and the Philippines, recent tensions primarily have been between Beijing and Manila.

From eleven to nine – dash line

China claims almost the entirety of the SCS, popularly visualized as the “nine-dash line”. It was first shown on a Republic of China-issued map in 1947 with an 11-dash line and later the Chinese Communist Party adopted the map in 1949 with two dashes removed to give the Gulf of Tonkin to Communist North Vietnam.

In 2009, China reinforced the map’s international status by submitting a diplomatic note to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with the attachment of a nine-dash line map, the day after Malaysia and Vietnam submitted their joint submission, and claimed that Beijing has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS.

However, it hasn’t been clear what the nine-dash line signifies. Does China claim the bits of reef and land inside the line or does China claims all surrounding waters?

Geopolitical complexity in the disputed waters has become more apparent due to the intensified great power rivalry between China and the United States. The issue was brought up for the first time in 2010 at the multilateral platform that is internationally recognized as one of the world’s strongest forums when it comes to the SCS, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Vietnam brought up the issue at that time to then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She expressed that Washington has national interest in open access to Asia’s maritime commons, freedom of navigation, as well as respect for international law in the SCS, despite maintaining neutrality in the disputes. The attempt from Vietnam to internationalize the issue to get a solution was understandable, given the power asymmetry between China and other disputants. On the other hand, Beijing has always been clear about its preference in solving the disputes with direct bilateral negotiations and perceived the role of the U.S. in the disputes as an interference; this sentiment remains to this day.

Serious clashes from 1974 involving China, Vietnam and the Philippines

However, it is important to note that even before the statement from China that indicated the involvement from the U.S. will only make the matters worse, disputes have already involved serious clashes.

The deadliest of these incidents was the Sino–South Vietnam battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and Johnson South Reef skirmish in 1988. The Paracels, composed of 130 small coral islands and reefs, are presently claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan and China, but have been under the latter’s control when it forcibly ejected South Vietnamese troops from the chain, in the process killing 74 Vietnamese service members. The latter clash, located in the southwestern Spratly Islands, saw Chinese forces drive off the Vietnamese military presence and resulted in the deaths of 64 Vietnamese sailors and marines.

A significant incident without fatalities occurred in early 2012, when China and the Philippines were involved in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal located in the northern Spratlys. Both countries claim the shoal as a part of their national territory and accused each other of intruding on the other. Two years later, tensions rose over China’s placement of a giant state-owned oil rig inside Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This incident marked the first time that Beijing had sent one of its oil rigs into another state’s EEZ without prior permission. The clash featured the ramming of boats between the two and an explosion of large anti-China protests inside Vietnam.

Looking at the dynamic of the tensions, especially over the past decade, the disputants appear under no illusion that such incidents won’t be repeated in the future. As a result, closer defence cooperation between Vietnam and especially the Philippines with Washington has increased.

Tension between China and the U.S., however, was accentuated during the pandemic. The Trump administration insisted that China needed to be held accountable for the spread of the Covid–19 virus. While other governments were distracted with the outbreak throughout 2020, Beijing managed to build up activities in the disputed islands by establishing administrative districts on the Spratly and Paracel islands.

In the same year, the U.S. had toughened the stance by officially rejecting specific claims made by China in the disputed waters for the first time. The Biden administration adopted a similarly strong position. During her 2022 visit to Jakarta for the ASEAN summit, Vice President Harris stated that America was in the region to stay, giving reassurance to allies that Washington had their backs. One may argue whether Washington’s strategy has been effective in deterring Beijing’s increasingly aggressive moves, but the gradual change of tone was clear. The U.S. also has a major role in the region by conducting Freedom of Navigation operations and sent military aircraft and warships into the South China Sea.

In July 2023, Vietnam, in a display highlighting just how important it considers territorial integrity matters, preemptively banned the Hollywood movie Barbie over a scene featuring the disputed nine–dash line on a cartoon map. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report showed that Hanoi has accelerated its land reclamation and dredging activities some seven-fold over the past three years. However, the ramping up to approximately 2,360 acres pales in contrast to China’s activities, which measure some 4,650 acres since 2013.

A month later, prior to the ASEAN Summit, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources unveiled its “standard map” with a tenth dash added to the east, which includes eastern part of Taiwan. Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines subsequently rejected the new map while Indonesia insisted that the drawing of territorial lines must be in accordance with international laws. By the end of last year, China and the Philippines involved in a dispute on Scarborough Shoal where Chinese vessels blasted water cannons to prevent Filipino fishing vessels from reaching the shoal.

More recently, the more noticeable tension has been between China and the Philippines. The larger power was less than pleased when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was elected in 2022, embraced closer ties with the U.S. During this past June’s standoff which featured Chinese vessels engaged in ramming and towing of Filipino boats in the Spratly Islands’ Second Thomas Shoal, Washington warned that it’s obligated to defend Manila in any major conflict with an external actor under a 1951 mutual defense treaty.

In March 2024, China and the Philippines involved in another incident at the shoal. The Philippines had grounded a World War II-era warship in 1999 and has maintained regular rotation and resupply missions to deliver supplies ever since, while China has deployed regular coast guard patrols since 2013. The shoal has been the spot of contention between the two, as China has sought to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the grounded vessel. Both countries stated that they were protecting their sovereignty.

However, it is important to remember the tribunal’s South China Sea in 2016 found that China’s nine-dash line were without legal claims. The International Permanent Arbitration in the Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines. The panel also concluded that Beijing does not have a right over the resources within the nine-dash line that covers almost the entire disputed waters. It also ruled that Spratly Islands are not islands in a legal sense, rather rocks or low tide elevations. (For example, Second Thomas Shoal is identified as a submerged reef.)

Beyond a regional issue

The SCS disputes have also become an issue affecting relations between the U.S., China and to certain extent, Washington’s western allies.

The future trajectory of the tensions very much depends on not only the level of commitment of the claimant countries to regional stability and its impact of global economy, but also America’s willingness to prioritise the issue amid the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

President Biden was noticeably absent from the 26th ASEAN summit in Jakarta last September, which seemed to participants and observers to contradict Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s statement that Washington’s long term focus remains in the Asian Pacific.

The rivalry between the U.S. and China is affecting ASEAN’s role in facilitating dialogue in order to seek for a solution. Additionally, the organization’s centrality may be difficult to keep, since some member countries may be closer to Beijing than others. For example, Cambodia, a close ally to China, blocked a 2012 ASEAN consensus statement on the SCS and did so again four years later. There is no guarantee that this behavior will not be repeated in future deliberations, even as forging a consensus on what steps need to be taken to prevent further incidents becomes increasingly necessary. ASEAN members may also need to balance demands of great powers with their commitments to the organization.

NATO summit and Indo–Pacific

At the most recent NATO Summit in Washington, the alliance couldn’t ignore the Indo-Pacific issue. Despite the focus of discussion about issues within the member states, such as the election in France and United Kingdom, as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine, the alliance’s communique acknowledged that the Indo-Pacific developments have affected Euro-Atlantic security. This view was also reflected by incorporating the Indo-Pacific (IP-4) countries of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the third time they were invited to a summit.

The involvement of NATO members and allies in the region isn’t new. In 2021, Germany sent its first warship to Indo-Pacific region for the first time in 20 years to support other western countries and object to Beijing’s territorial claims. That same year, the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, along with naval vessels from the U.S., Japan, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands, conducted combined exercise in the west Philippine sea.

Since the stability of the SCS waterways is related to prosperity in Europe, other NATO member states are expected in the future to engage more with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region via the conducting of freedom of navigation operations to send a message to China that challenging the rule-based order doesn’t only mean going against Washington, but also its western allies.

The tensions will continue to ebb and flow and likely between China and the Philippines with the Spratly Island chains being the focal point. China will likely continue to ignore the 2016 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruling and stick with the “indisputable sovereignty” since “ancient time” as the basis for its claims. ASEAN members will remain divided on their response to China’s more assertive moves and sooner or later have an impact on ASEAN’s centrality in dealing with regional security issues, including the SCS.

While the Vietnamese land reclamation brings more militarisation to the disputed waters, it is less likely to create serious tensions. Hanoi’s move seems to be more about boosting its presence in the SCS amid the rising tensions.

De-escalation attempts through the expected legally binding document Code of Conduct of the South China Sea is less likely to be signed by both China and ASEAN members anytime soon.

The conflict is unlikely to be resolved, but conflict management is possible. Recently, China and the Philippines held talks, in which they agreed to defuse ongoing tensions. However, de-escalation is unlikely to be permanent.

China and the United States are likely to keep the status quo in the disputed waters in the near future, despite their intensified rivalry.

Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation in the world, the third largest democracy, held its general election on 14 February 2024, marking the fifth round of presidential and legislative elections in the nation’s democratic era. The country is known as a diverse archipelago with some 300 ethnic groups and a population size that stood at 278.696 million in 2023.

The democracy isn’t without challenges and complications.

The declared winner, Prabowo Subianto, received 58.58% of the votes cast. Prabowo, a former army general, was a two-time contender in previous presidential elections. He lost both times to Joko Widodo, popularly known as “Jokowi,” before joining the victor’s cabinet as the defence minister. In the earlier elections, he portrayed himself as a nationalist and strong figure, although some questioned his mental fitness due to a temper. His image subsequently shifted to a more benign grandfatherly figure, and went so far as to show off dance moves during the most recent campaign which became popular on social media. These images contrasted sharply with those from his 2014 and 2019 campaigns and seemed to allay some of the concerns about human rights violations he had been accused of in the past — allegations that he has long denied.

Initially, Jokowi was thought to support Ganjar Pranowo, the candidate from his ruling Democratic Party – Struggle (PDIP), a former Central Java governor, who has a similar image to himself: a believer in pluralism, engaging, and modest. These are characteristics that would ideally win the hearts of the Indonesian public. According to a survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) released in May 2023, however, 81.7% Indonesians were satisfied with Jokowi’s performance as President and from this number, 40% the satisfied respondents would have supported Ganjar with 30% backing Prabowo.

Jokowi eventually threw his support behind his former rival, Prabowo, while the president’s eldest son, Gibran, the mayor of Solo in Central Java, was picked to be the running mate. The Prabowo–Gibran administration is expected to continue Jokowi’s signature mission not yet accomplished: construction of the new capital city, Nusantara, in East Kalimantan. Indeed, Subianto has made no secret that the continuation of Jokowi’s policy is what he intends to do as head of state. The constitutional court chief justice, who coincidentally was Jokowi’s brother-in-law, was removed by the ethics panel for allowing the last-minute change in candidacy’s age limit — but the court’s verdict was deemed binding regardless.

The two other contenders decided to challenge the result to the Constitutional Court, citing widespread irregularities. The contenders also challenged the 36-year old Gibran’s inclusion on Prabowo’s ticket, claiming that he should have not been allowed. Additionally, the government in the lead-up to the election disbursed a hefty social aid in amount of Rp 496.8 trillion which is almost equal to the social aid being disbursed during the COVID-19 pandemic, Rp 498 trillion, and 12.4% higher than the allocation the previous year at Rp. 493.1 trillion.

The constitutional court on the 22nd of April sealed the victory for Prabowo, rejecting the petitioners’ appeal entirely and ruling there was no evidence of fraud or state intervention that materially shifted the election result. Moreover, the court also found no evidence that Jokowi and his administration bent the laws to support Prabowo.

The dynamics during the campaign season, however, point to a direction of democracy backsliding. It is understood that the rising popularity of Prabowo rooted from Jokowi’s support, as the latter, the first president from outside the Jakarta elite, remains widely popular in the country yet could not run for the third term. Some have argued that Jokowi’s eldest son as a vice president effectively serves as Jokowi’s power by proxy, but the question is that how committed Prabowo, 72 years old, as the role of vice president is often called a “spare” and its influence normally determined by the president.

With what happened during the campaign and election, another question would be how the corruption that remains rampant in the country will affect potential foreign investment? To date, the newly elected administration has yet to offer plans to tackle the issue.

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Indonesia’s position remains unchanged at 34 and the country’s global ranking dropped by five positions to 115th place in 2023, and this issue may pose additional challenges for foreign investors to pursue large-scale opportunities.

Prabowo is also expected to lead a different possible approach in dealing with current regional security challenges.

With the increased tensions in the hydrocarbon-rich South China Sea, the result of the recent presidential election is not only important for the country’s trajectory, but also of interest to both the United States and China. The latter has engaged in aggressive behavior in the region, particularly against the Philippines.

Additionally, Prabowo will be expected to continue the focus on sustaining economic growth, which suggests friendly relations with both the United States and China will be of paramount importance. If so, it is expected that Indonesia will pick no sides or formally align with either major power.

Prabowo will likely continue the popular policy of Jokowi, as he vowed to do during the campaign. His predecessor known to avoid making criticism of either Washington or Beijing, managed to balance defence cooperation with the former and foreign investment with the latter. In his administration, Jokowi managed to score a copious amount of Chinese investment, including a $11.5 billion commitment from one of the world’s largest glass makers, Xinyi, for the construction of a manufacturing plant in the country, and the already popular $7.3 billion high-speed railway, which connects Jakarta and the capital of West Java, Bandung, cutting commute times from four hours to forty minutes.

Not surprisingly, Prabowo paid a visit to China soon after the election, a sign that the bilateral relationship will remain robust.

In recent months, the United States has been increasing its diplomatic activities and engaged in joint military exercises with its allies in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. However, different challenges for the bilateral ties loom for the new government. While Jakarta indicates a desire to engage in more cooperation on joint military exercises, the fallout from the October 7th attack by Hamas on Israel may potentially affect the relationship with Washington. Indonesia has expressed strong support for a Palestinian state, and thanked Spain, Norway and Ireland for extending formal recognition to Palestine. The government also made appeals to European countries for a permanent ceasefire during a ministerial meeting in Brussels. The ongoing war in Gaza, as well as the Biden Administration’s continued, if qualified support for Israel may cast a pall over relations between the two if the fighting continues indefinitely.

Alternatively, an incident from March of this year between China and the Philippines at the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef within the Spratly Islands highlights that concerns remain about China’s aggressive behavior. China claims sovereignty in the area despite a United Nations Convention on the Law and Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal in 2016 finding that China’s claims lacked legal merit. The tribunal also ruled that the Spratly Islands are not islands in a legal sense, rather rocks or low tide elevations. The tensions may be seen as a microcosm of Beijing’s more assertive moves in the South China Sea. Therefore, while currently Sino-Indonesia relations are on good terms, there is no guarantee that disputed South China Sea claims won’t be an issue in the future. One such challenge could bet Beijing’s claims overlapping with Indonesia’s in the gas-rich Natuna Sea area.

It is important to emphasize that the tension in the South China Sea is unlikely to abate anytime soon and the new elected government needs to be cautious while maintaining a delicate balance between the United States and China. Despite ongoing commitments from Washington and Jakarta to cooperate on military matters, unlike with the Philippines, it remains doubtful that Indonesia will join the United States in countering China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea by hosting an American military base in the country. Under successive governments, Indonesia has maintained a free and active foreign policy, non-aligned with any major powers and supports Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) centrality amid the great power rivalry — and is most likely to remain this way.

To be sure, Prabowo’s historical stance showed quite a different picture. In 2019, he was very critical on Chinese investment in Indonesia and said at the time he would review these transactions if elected, as he strongly opposed any foreign influence in Indonesia. In contrast, after joining Jokowi’s administration as the defence minister, his response to the presence of Chinese fishing vessels in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea, a clear sovereignty issue, was rather lacking in firmness.

Prabowo will be sworn into office in October so how his administration will look has yet to be finalized. Whomever he chooses to be in the cabinet will play a very important role for the country’s direction: Indonesia’s role in ASEAN that will indirectly affect its policy towards China amid existing South China Sea tensions, as well as bilateral relations with both the United States and China. Whether Jokowi’s foreign policy practices will carry over and be reinforced will depend on how committed Prabowo is in continuing the policy, as he promised he will.