The Reset in India’s Strategic Outlook

India is coming of age – already the world’s most populous nation and democracy, by 2030 at the latest it will become the world’s third largest economy. Prime Minister Modi has set the pace and has become the personal embodiment of India’s success. He leads a self-confident nation, albeit one facing many challenges, and has established his position on the world stage. Modi has shifted India from its old “non-alignment” of the Nehru era to “multi-alignment”. The decades-long links with Russia now include access to oil at discount prices while continuing as a major recipient of Russian defence equipment. But now France has become India’s second largest external defence supplier after Russia, while relations with the United States have steadily improved in the face of the rising challenge of China.

There has now been a complete turnaround in India’s relations with the USA. Previously “due to India’s ideological proclivities as much as strategic calculations” the US was long regarded with suspicion by India. In 2005 Modi, then Chief Minister of Gujarat, was misguidedly refused a visa to the USA. Eighteen years on he was being welcomed to the White House on a state visit, his eighth visit as Prime Minister. US-Indian bilateral trade has increased tenfold since 2000 – from $20 billion to over $200 billion today, making the US India’s biggest individual trading partner.

Four years ago, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi vowed to strengthen a United States-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, reaffirming the pledge to support the transfer to India of advanced U.S. military and civil technology and India’s permanent membership on a reformed UN Security Council. Last October, President Biden reemphasised this commitment, with cooperative ventures in defence manufacturing and a whole range of advanced civil high technologies.

Foreign Minister Jaishankar, who had been India’s ambassador to Washington 2013-15 following his time in Beijing, readily admits that the hard realities of today’s world mean that the US is now seen as a key partner. While India’s multi-alignment and quest for strategic autonomy mean that it will not bind itself as closely as the US may wish there will be ever-closer mutual commitment in the years ahead. The growing political investment in the Quad, the Indo-Pacific quadrilateral security dialogue embracing India, the US, Japan and Australia, is evidence of this new alignment of geo-political outlook.

In this increasingly transactional world, India will want to see what its friends bring to the table, what capabilities they have, and how reliable they will be. Instead of just talking about China, it is time that the West paid far greater attention to India and its growing capabilities. India is potentially the most vital ally of the West as the world becomes more clearly divided between old-fashioned, aggressive autocracies and the liberal democracies that seek peace with freedom and a better world.

England Loses HM Queen Elizabeth, The World Loses a Leader

How very deeply saddened we all are at the death of Her Majesty the Queen this afternoon at Balmoral. She has been the monarch and enduring and constant symbol of our nation, respected throughout the world, over much of the lives of so many of us. She has received or appointed 15 Prime Ministers from Churchill to Truss. She has met 13 US Presidents. On becoming Queen she ruled an empire across the globe which during her reign was transformed into a 54 nation Commonwealth. She finally remained as Head of State of 14 countries. We all feel a great sense of personal loss at this time. I was enormously privileged to meet and talk to her. She personified the confidence and stability of the nation and represented enduring values in an era of enormous change and challenges. Her selfless Christianity was imbued in all that she did and her life was a great example to us all – a constant reminder that above each of us, regardless of our station in life, there was someone above us that deserved our loyalty and respect. We mourn her loss. The modern Elizabethan era has now ended. We have great confidence that her steadfast values are in the safe hands of King Charles III.

God Save the King.

Obituaries: Lives remembered: Lord Trimble

Geoffrey Van Orden CBE, former leader of the Conservatives in the European parliament, writes: Over dinner in Brussels in January 2002, I put it to David Trimble (obituary, July 25) that one of the greatest strategic errors of the Northern Ireland Unionists and British government was to make little effort to rally those of Scots-Irish background in America to speak out against the Irish Republican caucus (those who support the Irish Republican cause – Sinn Fein/IRA for short) in Congress.

This left the field open to the IRA activists and their sentimental apologists and ignored the large number of Scots-Irish migrants to America — the largely Ulster-origin families, many of which had risen to leading positions in American political and industrial life — indeed, 17 Ulster Scots had become president. David agreed the point while observing that, generally speaking, the Protestant Irish migrants had assimilated more rapidly into the wider population and were more dispersed than their Irish Catholic counterparts and so were less easy to mobilise.

Indo-Pacific tilt: why the UK needs to up its game

This paper originally appeared in the Reaction.Life, https://reaction.life/indo-pacific-tilt-why-the-uk-needs-to-up-its-game/)

Over a year ago, in its “most radical assessment of the UK’s place in the world since the end of the Cold War”, the British government set out its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. It advocated for an “Indo-Pacific tilt” as a critical element in what was a fresh “Global Britain” strategy.

This was in the middle of the Covid pandemic and before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine urged a reappraisal of strategic threats and priorities. Russia was certainly identified as the most acute direct threat to the UK but the review’s emphasis on the need for an Indo-Pacific tilt also remains highly relevant.

Apart from the growing economic importance of the region, China’s increasing military power and assertiveness needs to be counterbalanced. This means securing and enhancing relationships with old friends, particularly within the Commonwealth, and seeking new partners.

When some other parts of the world held back from condemning Russian aggression, eight out of 10 of the vital ASEAN bloc voted with the Western democracies, including its most populous member, Indonesia. As one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and predicted to become the world’s fourth-largest in 2050, Indonesia has been a priority post-Brexit partner for the UK. A year ago, the UK and Indonesia concluded the first round of exploratory trade talks and committed to further strengthening their trade and investment links, which rose to a record £3bn of bilateral trade in 2019 through a new joint trade dialogue.

Yet while the Integrated Review set out the ambitious goal of Britain being “the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific,” the UK has struggled to make much of a visible impact in the region.

Aside from penning the AUKUS agreement, and its application to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), it has achieved few results so far. The principle behind the strategy remains sound. In what is a fast-moving environment, more of a priority must be placed on pushing through initiatives of substance, unless the UK is to be left behind by other competitors with poorer credentials.

Bottom of Form

The region is an ideal candidate for leveraging “post-Brexit freedoms”. But expansive new trade deals and deepened strategic ties have not been pursued sufficiently. Others, including the US with its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the EU, which has trade talks underway with the ASEAN bloc and many of its members, seem to be on the front foot in the region. But even these initiatives have not been as substantive as many Asian countries may have hoped. Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, Airlangga Hartarto, says these countries are merely asking for “equitable and comprehensive agreements which recognise the true potential of all parties.”

The potential for the UK is obvious. With over 270m people, already in the world’s top 10 largest economies, and current chair of the G20, Indonesia cannot be considered small fry by any government. It is an example of a country that should be a key piece of post-Brexit, Global Britain strategy.

Other major players in the region like the Philippines – where a new President looks set to actively pursue international engagement – Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam could also be vitally important for the UK. Equally, relations with ASEAN itself need to be expanded beyond Britain merely being a “Dialogue Partner”.

More concrete economic commitments and security partnerships, along with a more active information policy, must be at the heart of revitalised engagement if countries in Asia, and indeed elsewhere, are to take the UK seriously as a worthwhile international partner.

The importance of the Indo-Pacific, as outlined by the Integrated Review, in terms of the wider Global Britain vision is clear. Outside of its economic value (as a key market for British exports and a key supplier of British imports) there are other issues that loom large – climate change, defence, cyber security, democratic values, counter-extremism.

The leading role that Britain has taken in supporting Ukraine is an example that needs emphasis in other theatres.

Continuing along the generally slow path that it currently treads with regards to its Indo-Pacific engagement does nothing for its Global Britain credentials. The enormous post-2009 opportunity to assist and exert real influence in a country such as Sri Lanka lapsed into an unwelcome and often misconceived human rights critique. The disappointing results from failure to wean India from her over-reliance on Russia are clear from recent UN votes. The countries of South-East Asia and several Commonwealth countries are increasingly under the shadow of China, the primary trading partner for many of them.

Domestic political crises, the unhelpful attitude of some EU members, and the Ukraine conflict seem to leave little bandwidth for pursuit of vital British economic and foreign policy aims that would also greatly help the countries concerned. This is in spite of the British Foreign Secretary’s efforts. The “Indo-Pacific tilt” remains very much in the balance.

If Global Britain is to be anything more than a slogan, then there needs to be a more pragmatic, hard-headed and proactive approach to enhancing relationships in a crucial region of the world.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy. He was formerly a long-standing member of the European Parliament, where he was Conservative Leader and Defence and Security Spokesman, Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with India and member of the Parliament’s Friends of Indonesia group.

WHY AN EU ARMY IS A BAD IDEA – WE DON’T NEED A POLITICAL BLOC OF THE UNWILLING

This paper originally appeared in the New Direction, The European Journal at https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling)

By: Geoffrey Van Orden CBE, Distinguished Fellow

The re-election of president Macron will give a further boost to the idea of an “EU Army”. Over the centuries there have been many attempts to put together a multi-national European army, always under the leadership of one nation and for military purposes. Wellington’s army at Waterloo had more German-speaking soldiers than English. It also included Dutch, Belgians, and many other nationalities. But the current idea of an EU Army is an entirely different project. It has little military value. Its purpose is essentially political – to further European political integration. Far from being a multi-national coalition it is intended to absorb national capabilities into a single Defence Union under the auspices of Brussels. The idea of a European Army without American involvement has been a French obsession since the 1950s. To provide some additional justification,  President Macron developed the terms “European sovereignty” and  “EU strategic autonomy”- two essentially meaningless but inevitably divisive concepts that can only please Moscow.

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure? 

Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”

At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.

And imagine if the fate of the Ukraine had been left to the EU leadership in Brussels or the French or German governments with their ambivalent relationships with Moscow. Less than a month ago Berlin was refusing to send heavy armour to support the Ukrainians, while both France and Germany were found to have been supplying some €300 million of military equipment to Russia. It has taken the example of the UK, along with front-line nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic, to set an example by providing desperately needed military aid to Ukraine.

There may well be occasions when the US might not wish to get involved in some particular crisis but the best military and civil response should be discussed around the table with all NATO allies. In recognition of this and in order to encourage greater effort by the continental Europeans, the idea of a “separable but not separate” European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was floated at the NATO Ministerial in Berlin in 1996. At this time France was not part of NATO’s integrated military structure (which it left in 1966) but it remained a member of the NATO alliance and of the crucial North Atlantic Council where it continued to demand flattery of its vanities. It even retained a seat on NATO’s top-level Military Committee, albeit as an ‘observer’. It insisted that ESDI was inadequate and somehow managed to get its way. Nothing short of a separate military capability under EU political control would suffice. The WEU was soon absorbed into the EU.

Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.

But wouldn’t it make sense to seize the advantages of economies of scale and procure military equipment together? Again, that happens anyway for a variety of reasons.  You don’t need the EU to get involved. There are examples of both successful and failed collaborations. “Successes” might include the Anglo-French Jaguar and the Tornado and Typhoon fighter projects. Most spending on defence equipment in Europe has been by just five countries, most notably the UK, but the UK, of course, is not now an EU country. Collaboration is usually inefficient but it opens the way to a bigger defence market. That’s the key. But many in the EU would like to close off their defence market from outsiders. That would rapidly run foul of those countries who want to buy US or British or other equipment. Even Germany has just announced its intention to buy US F-35A  fighters.

The most profound case against a single EU Army comes back to the degree to which the nations of Europe wish to retain their national independence. You cannot get closer to the bone of national sovereignty than over the status of national armed forces. I doubt that the citizens of many EU countries would be willing to see decisions about conscription, about the deployment and use of their troops, about fighting on or surrendering, indeed about life and death –  handed over to Brussels. Remember, a highly significant distinction between NATO and the EU is that NATO decisions are inter-governmental, they are taken consensually by representatives of the governments of the NATO members. The EU is a hybrid organisation where governments have handed over certain powers to the EU Commission. At this moment EU defence and military matters are still largely in the hands of member country governments who can exercise a veto. But there is now strong pressure for such military decisions to be taken by a majority vote. If this were to be conceded then Brussels would rapidly be in the driving seat and national capitals would be increasingly side-lined. Certainly the European powers need to increase their spending on defence. But this does not mean handing over strategic decision-making and their military to the EU. What is needed is a revitalised and reinforced NATO, an enhanced coalition of the capable, resilient and willing, not a political bloc of the unwilling.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, former British Conservative Leader and Defence Spokesman in the European Parliament and Founding President of New Direction. As a former senior military officer he was a counter-terrorism specialist, served in the front-line of the Cold War including 5 years in Berlin, and at NATO headquarters.

THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE WEST

This paper originally appeared in the New Direction, The European Journal at https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/the_ukraine_crisis_and_the_west)

The Ukraine crisis could be the greatest boost to restoration of Western unity and the reinvigoration of NATO or it could deepen the transatlantic divide and further weaken the West’s standing in the world.

The crisis deepens

Since the seizure of the Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 the build-up of Russian troops encircling the Ukraine has been in progress for over a year.

In the past four days, the danger of attack has been declared “imminent”. The military procedures, the drills, for changing to combat readiness are well known at both the strategic and tactical levels and well monitored by countries with sophisticated intelligence capabilities such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

The alarm cries from Western governments, predicting the imminent attack by Russia on Ukraine, would have been triggered by clear intelligence indicators. These would include evidence that Russian troops were setting up field hospitals; carrying out final fuel replenishment; loading live ammunition into tanks and other armoured vehicles; pre-positioning artillery ammunition; adjusting artillery fire plans; putting air defence and ground-attack aircraft on a higher alert stage; route marking by military traffic control units; combat units moving from their rear assembly points into tactical pre-battle formations closer to the Ukrainian border; electronic warfare and reconnaissance assets intensifying their activities; changes in the pattern of radio traffic; and overall readiness states reduced from days to hours. These are among the many attack indicators that analysts will note to warn of attack, passing their assessments immediately to war rooms and Governments. They will also know as soon as these measures are put on hold or genuinely go into reverse. But regardless of military capabilities, the missing piece of evidence is locked in President Putin’s head. We do not know his intentions.

Moscow’s claims that it is acting in response to a threat from NATO expansion fall into the category of ‘the big lie’, knowing that there will be sufficient people in Russia and among its allies and client states who will believe this.

The serious enlargement of NATO took place years ago and there has been no change in respect of Ukraine’s status, which lies dormant.

The last major eastwards expansion of NATO took place in 2004. Poland, Hungary and what is now the Czech Republic had already joined 5 years beforehand – that’s 23 years ago. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 there was indeed recognition of the Ukraine’s aspiration to become a NATO member. Over the years since, there have been repeated assurances concerning membership but acceptance of the Ukraine’s application would have to be a unanimous political decision of NATO’s 30 member states, and there is little likelihood of this, given the political sensitivities. Last year’s NATO Summit in Brussels maintained this deliberately ambiguous position.

So what does Russia want – and why now?

Putin wants to re-unite the Soviet imperial sphere – only in this way, he thinks, can Moscow be taken seriously as a great power again. This would be his historic legacy. It could take many forms but a key element would have to be the Ukraine whose loss Putin regards as the greatest strategic disaster to befall Russia.

He wants a compliant Ukraine, ideally under full suzerainty of Russia, but if not, then under Russian influence and certainly not part of any Western military or economic bloc. He will not be satisfied with Ukraine merely withdrawing its application to join NATO. He has a wide range of options that might satisfy his appetite at this stage including: rigorous and rapid implementation of the Minsk Agreements, according to Putin’s interpretation (which would effectively give Moscow a say in the government of Ukraine); neutralisation of Ukraine; recognised secession of all Donetsk, Luhansk and the Crimea from Kyiv rule; or at the more extreme end, occupying all the majority Russian-speaking coastal areas including Odessa. Putin believes that now is the moment to achieve his wider ambition to restore Russian greatness after what he sees as the humiliations of thirty years ago.

As in a very serious game of chess, Putin sees the position as a Zugzwang – it is your turn to move and whatever you do will be bad for you.

He sees the West as weak, riven with domestic crises and the economic consequences of the Covid pandemic and ‘Wokeism’ eating away from the inside and casting doubt, particularly among many young Westerners, over the very foundations of the West.

The United States is reeling from the Afghanistan debacle and President Biden is seen to be indecisive and distracted by domestic issues. Boris Johnson’s position is in question. The new left-leaning German leadership hasn’t had time to settle in and would be prone to a soft option, strongly influenced by its energy dependency on Russia.

President Macron has his eyes on the French presidential elections just 4 months away and in any case has another, EU, agenda in play.

The impact of EU misplaced ambitions on Western unity

The EU is adept at turning a crisis into an opportunity and undoubtedly we shall now hear fresh calls for an EU Army. Far from strengthening the unity of the West and its ability to defend itself, the EU-effect, under French leadership, has been to weaken Western capabilities and the NATO alliance. Historically, both France and Germany have, at different stages of history, had special relationships with Russia. French policy since 1940, has been suspicious of the US and, under de Gaulle, often actively hostile. The Gaullist ambition has been to create a united Europe under French leadership without interference from ‘les Anglo-Saxons’, i.e. America and Britain. The latest evolution of this policy has been the idea of EU “strategic autonomy” – by definition separate from America , and by extension NATO, and therefore able to develop its own relations with Russia. This is precisely the Russian intention – to separate Europe from the US.

It is the power of the United States that gives credibility to Western deterrence through NATO, the only alliance capable of defending our democracies and resisting hostile powers such as Russia. So any policies which create divisions in NATO and the transatlantic alliance play into the hands of aggressors and make conflict more likely.

The UK’s Roles

British policy makers do not forget the reference to the 1938 Czech crisis as a “quarrel in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing”. Today they know nowhere is far away and that Britain is still expected by many countries to lead by example. Russia is a threat to NATO allies such as Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, where Britain has played a key role in providing military reinforcement in recent weeks.

We should not forget Britain’s particular responsibilities to the Ukraine resulting from its role as one of 3 co-signatories to the December 1994 Budapest memorandum. This followed Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish nuclear weapons inherited from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ironically, along with the United States, the other co-signatory was Russia, undertaking “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”. The co-signatories also committed to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine if Ukraine should become a victim of aggression.

Nevertheless, Britain was not involved in the 2014 “Normandy Format” (France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine) and did not therefore take part in the negotiations in 2015 of the so-called Minsk 2 Agreement that was supposed to bring conflict in the Ukraine to an end. This agreement has have never been fully implemented largely because of fundamentally different interpretations of what exactly it means.

Britain’s obligations to Ukraine are primarily as the leading European NATO member, aware of how threats to peace in Europe, beyond the immediate coverage of the NATO shield, will have major economic, security and humanitarian repercussions that would rapidly spill over into the NATO area.

The key position of Turkey

Certainly more attention in this crisis should have been given to the role of countries such as Turkey, strongly committed to the Ukraine but with a unique pragmatic relationship with Russia. In spite of her very active NATO membership since 1952, Turkey has been badly treated by her allies for some decades, with hostile EU attitudes led by France and Greece. The United Kingdom has been more positive but has not tried hard enough given the opportunities it seeks for new partnerships, and the importance of Turkey to Western interests. The US showed little sensitivity to Turkish concerns over Iraq; over the Kurdish groups operating in northern Syria; in its handling of Turkish involvement in the F35 combat aircraft programme; and in its response to the 2016 coup attempt against President Erdogan. All the Western players have accepted a bogus and hostile narrative concerning the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. This has corrupted their approach to the issue ever since and has become a serious obstacle to improved relations with Turkey.

If we didn’t think we needed wholehearted Turkish engagement as a Western ally before, we certainly do now. For a start, after Russia, Turkey has the largest armed forces in the region, and is the foremost NATO ally on the Black Sea with a very capable and growing naval inventory. She also holds the key to warship movements in and out of the Black Sea through her control of the Straits, albeit regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Turkey has become a strong political and economic supporter of the Ukraine and a leading trade partner. In recent months Turkey has moved to strengthen the strategic aspects of this relationship, condemning the Russian annexation of the Crimea, bolstering Ukraine’s defence industry and, crucially, providing the very effective Bayraktar TB2 drone, which has already seen action in the breakaway Donbas region.

However, spurned by the West, there should be no surprise that Turkey has triangulated its policies to build other relationships, not least with Russia, while remaining true to its NATO commitments. Turkey needs Russian tolerance of the new situation Turkey has created with its ally Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Idlib province of Northern Syria. There is also strong Turkish reliance on its energy relationship with Russia. It is both a major importer and pipeline facilitator of Russian gas supplies.

But this could change. With major new gas fields discovered off its northern coast Turkey has a vested interest in a peaceful Black Sea. And its claim, along with Northern Cyprus, to be included in exploitation of gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean could be met if there was a sensible shift in Western attitudes. It may not be too late for Turkey to play a pivotal role in the Ukraine crisis. If we expect little from the EU, the UK should certainly be working more closely with Turkey

On the brink of conflict?

We still stand on the brink of conflict in Europe, in spite of the mixed messages from Moscow – deception or maskirovka being a classic technique of Russia at the tactical and strategic levels. It is perhaps premature to review the mistakes that have already been made and what needs to change.

What is clear is the importance of a unified response by the West and its international partners and the need to improve the understanding and support of our own people in time of threat. And we have to invest more in defence. This is certainly about our ability to field sustainable and credible military forces but also about greater national resilience at a time when conventional warfare may take place in the context of entirely new weapons and techniques on many fronts.

If the crisis passes, all this will again be forgotten, until next time it is too late.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, former British Conservative leader and Defence Spokesman in the European Parliament. As a former senior military officer he served in the front-line of the Cold War including 5 years in Berlin, and at NATO headquarters.

The West must stand firm to combat Russia’s threats to Ukraine

(This article first appeared in the EuroNews at https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/28/the-west-must-stand-firm-to-combat-russia-s-threats-to-ukraine-view)

Updated: 28/12/2021

Distracted by Omicron and Christmas, only a few can now recall US President Joe Biden’s video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 7 December, when Biden voiced deep concerns of both the United States and its European allies about the threat of Russian troop movements to Ukraine.

Putin’s dismissive response has been to intensify cyberattacks on Ukrainian government agencies, including the national police and electricity infrastructure.

One expert has described this as ‘preparation of the battlefield’.

For months now the Russian people have been subjected to a massive, perverse government propaganda campaign to strengthen their resolve in the face of the ‘threat’ from the West.

We can expect mobilisation of ‘peace movements’ in Western countries as Putin escalates his military posture.

Months of ground-laying by Moscow

After Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its proxy war in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, NATO sent symbolic reinforcements to member countries that are regarded as most vulnerable to Russia.

Twenty-two years after the first of the former Warsaw pact countries joined NATO, Putin has now demanded a reset and wants all NATO forces withdrawn. In effect, he wants recognition that these nations are within Moscow’s sphere of influence.

At the same time, Putin is adept at gradually creating and promoting divisions between Western states: the EU’s constant vilification of the Polish and Hungarian governments, the threat by Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia’s wooing of Turkey, are all examples.

What is Putin really up to? He is testing Western resolve. He wants recognition of his gains in the Donbas region and Crimea, full control of the Sea of Azov coastline, domination of the Black Sea, and ultimately the return of Ukraine and other former Soviet bloc countries to Moscow’s sway.

Ukraine has warned that an attack could be as imminent as early January.

Putin will not listen to the West’s concerns unless he sees a united front against his designs and US moves to reinforce a strategic posture in Europe, and also faces serious financial pressure, including from a crash in crucial gas exports.

The need for targeted sanctions against Russia, alongside the provision of equipment and expert cyber assistance to Ukraine, cannot be understated.

Could Ukraine join NATO?

While American officials have had extensive discussions with European partners on coordinating the response to Russian military activities, NATO is revealing little of how it would react to Russian territorial aggression.

The EU, of course, has no credible military capability separate from those of its own members that are already in NATO, although it does have powerful economic tools at its disposal.

NATO has said it is monitoring the situation closely and will continue to offer “political and practical support” for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and its right to decide its own future, free from outside interference.

At the last summit in June, NATO also reiterated a pledge that Ukraine would become a member of the alliance in due course.

Like any democratic country, Ukraine is free to apply. For its part, NATO will balance political and strategic considerations before it extends its massively powerful umbrella over another country. Russia is determined to ensure that this threshold is not crossed.

Given Putin’s ambition to reincorporate Ukraine into the Moscow bloc, he will go to enormous lengths to prevent Ukraine from exercising free will and joining the Western clubs.

The West must demonstrate resolve – and fast

Parallel to the aggressive military threats and cyber abrasions, Russia is applying pressure in other areas. Ukraine is currently battling a $3-billion (€2.65bn) Eurobond case in the UK Supreme Court: a loan Russia forced on it shortly before the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, and which Ukraine fairly argues it shouldn’t be required to pay back under the circumstances.

This is an example of a prolonged campaign of legal and economic Russian belligerence that threatens to undermine Ukraine at a critical moment. Ukraine needs tangible support.

Russia thinks, after the Afghanistan debacle, that the West is on the back foot and unwilling to get embroiled in another messy military situation. Deterrence will not work unless the West demonstrates its resolve. It must minimize its internal differences and act with unity and solidarity over Ukraine.

For the EU, that means downplaying any idea of separateness from the US or UK in pursuit of its ideas of ‘strategic autonomy’, and strengthening its economic and political support for Ukraine, including for enhanced military capabilities.

In parallel, the West should consider further economic and political sanctions against Russia as credible deterrents. Escalatory options could include full blocking of major Russian state banks and investment agencies.

Sectoral sanctions could be broadened to areas such as mining, metals, shipping, and insurance. And maybe a cyber-shot across Russia’s bows would serve as a warning.

Both NATO and the EU now need to demonstrate a concerted effort in addressing Russia’s dangerous military build-up on Ukraine’s border and its steadily escalating cyber-attacks.

The significance of Russia’s actions and the need for resolute action should be clearly explained to the Western public as well as Moscow. It would be a tragedy if conflict were to break out on Eastern frontiers because of any failure of deterrence. Garbled messages and misunderstandings are how wars start.

Geoffrey Van Orden is currently a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy. He was formerly a senior British military officer and long-standing member of the European Parliament, where he was Conservative Leader and Defense and Security Spokesman

British foreign policy in America’s absence

LETTERS@THETIMES.CO.UK

Friday September 03 2021, 12.01am, The Times

Sir, Further to Nathalie Loiseau’s Thunderer (“Britain and the EU must forge strong foreign policy bond”, Sep 2), it is France that determines the EU’s foreign policy. There cannot now be a call for a new and strong EU-UK partnership on foreign, security and defence policy when we cannot trust France as a friend.

In spite of our bilateral defence treaty and our support for France’s efforts to defeat terrorism in the Sahel, France was a poisonous influence throughout the Brexit negotiations. It exploited the Irish border and fisheries issues and sought in every way to undermine the City of London. France has also allowed the Channel migrant scandal to be a running sore for 20 years. It seeks access to our technology for its own advantage and has blocked our continued involvement in projects in which we had massively invested.

In this small, dangerous world, there should of course be close co-operation in all policy areas with our continental neighbours. But it is paramount for all who seek to protect our freedom, prosperity and way of life to revitalise the transatlantic alliance (Iain Martin, “The end of Pax Americana leaves us all in the cold”, Comment, Sep 2) in a reliable and meaningful way. Trust is at the heart of all friendships.

Geoffrey Van Orden, a distinguished fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, is a former leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament.

Gaza Crises 2021

This article first appeared in New Direction The European Journal: https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/gaza_crisis_2021

By: Geoffrey Van Orden

Since 1948, Israel has had to fight for its existence in at least four major conventional wars, defending its small and vulnerable territory, half the size of Denmark, while surrounded by hostile neighbours. In living memory of the horrors of the Holocaust, suffering years of terrorism, Israelis have every right to feel under threat and defend themselves. Above all, Israel seeks recognition by Palestinians of its right to exist as an essentially Jewish state if progress is to be made in the creation of a viable and internationally acceptable Palestinian state. The Hamas leaders that in June 2007 seized from the Palestine Authority de facto control of Gaza, vacated by Israel in 2005, fundamentally oppose this.

Ordinary Palestinians feel aggrieved that, from the start, they have had a raw deal, particularly over land. They want peace, security and prosperity for their children but have been ill-served by their political leaders who have been weak or oppressive and more interested in power, money and their purist political legacy, than in their people’s future. For years, Israel has sought a reliable and effective Palestinian leader they could talk to and who had authority throughout the Palestinian areas. As one member of the Knesset put it to me, “the Palestinian leadership never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity”. This failure costs lives, always disproportionately more by the Palestinians. Years ago it was put to me that everyone knows the shape of a future peace settlement. It is just a question of how many tragic body bags between now and then.

All the time that Palestinian extremists and terrorists were tolerated, often supported, by Arab governments, they felt legitimised and able to blame the people’s plight on Israel.  Their target is public opinion, in the West, in Israel itself, and in the wider Muslim world. Gradually there has been a shift in attitude by arab governments, conscious that their own people also want a more prosperous future and that Israel was not the threat and could even be a key to that better future. In quick succession, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, and Bahrain  all recognised Israel in 2020, following the example of Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.  This has been a massive strategic gain for Israel, potentially at risk if civilian casualties of the current counter-attack against Hamas and its close relative, the even more murderous Islamic jihad, were to grow and provoke an international reaction. Nevertheless, these same countries share Israel’s concerns about Iran. They also have worries over the influence within their own populations of the Moslem Brotherhood, to which both Hamas and Islamic Jihad have foundational affiliation, and which supports terrorism and subordination of the state to its own extreme interpretation of the doctrines of Islam.

No one doubts the ability of Israel to win a war with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but it has been less successful at winning the propaganda battle. In any case it will see diminishing returns from its military interventions. Its objectives need to look beyond the destruction of terrorist offensive capabilities and the previous festering status quo, and move towards a better future.

The unstable domestic political situation in both Israel and the Palestinian areas have contributed to the current crisis. The elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, originally scheduled for 22 May, followed by a Presidential election in July, provided inspiration for Hamas to stir trouble. I observed the last elections to the PLC in January 2006, which saw a victory for Hamas  (winning 74 seats to 45 for the ruling Fatah party) which apparently surprised some but not those of us on the ground. Faced with a similar outcome in 2021, and in the midst of another crisis, the hapless Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, has again postponed elections, but he can’t put them off for ever. The fact is, his authority does not extend to Gaza, that half of his domain where Hamas has imposed its rule.

Following an inconclusive General Election in March, the fourth in two years, Israel’s government is in limbo. Yair Lapid has been given until early June to cobble together a coalition for government otherwise there will be another General Election. Benjamin Netanyahu, still on trial on corruption charges, remains as interim Prime Minister. The latest Gaza crisis throws all this up in the air. Netanyahu’s tough stance will strengthen his hand in an election. And that election becomes more likely as Lapid may now face difficulties securing a key potential coalition partner, Mansour Abbas’s United Arab List.

The paradox of violent crisis situations is that the people want peace but put their trust in those they think most robustly defend them. They buy the propaganda of their own side. We saw this in Northern Ireland where the softer Unionist politicians were squeezed out and a harder-line loyalist DUP found itself coming to power with the terrorist political front that is Sinn Fein. Fatah is entrenched in corruption and ineptitude and is kept in power by the generosity of Western and Arab governments, mainly because it is not Iranian-backed Hamas. Palestinian voters often remarked to me that they had no idea where all that foreign money went because they never saw any benefit from it, “Fatah were those people in big black cars and fancy villas”. Meanwhile, Hamas, in familiar Moslem Brotherhood fashion, were showing their welfare side, providing medical and schooling for the people and their own harsh brand of law and order, while keeping up the war against what they portrayed as the “little Satan”, Israel.

Israel prospers as a nation, with world-leading research capabilities and inventiveness, not least in provision of water desalination and irrigation that could be of enormous value in lifting the prospects of the poverty stricken Palestinian areas. There is hope for the future if certain steps are taken.

Without external political, financial and humanitarian support, neither Fatah nor Hamas can sustain their positions. The Hamas terror campaign relies on Iran for finance, training and weapons and on the international media and extremists within the Muslim diaspora for propaganda. These links need to be broken. Neither the US nor the Europeans should weaken sanctions on Iran until it ends support for terrorism. Substitute sponsors must be discouraged. And greater effort needs to be made to communicate to the arab street – through broadcasts and social media – to explain the realities behind the continuous turmoil and poverty in the Palestinian areas.

Israel needs to act with generosity in relation to its borders and the definition of the Palestinian areas without compromising its security. It should support a novel status for East Jerusalem. It would also participate in an international programme for reconstruction – that elusive “Marshall Plan” for the region  – to which the Arab nations and the democracies would contribute.

The sclerotic Fatah will need to find a new leader, willing to enter into negotiations, eager to reach agreement, and credible in both the West Bank and Gaza. He will need to renounce violence and the promotion of hatred, and, above all, recognise the state of Israel (more or less the conditions for international recognition of a Palestinian government set by the Quartet of US, UN, EU and Russia).

Distasteful as it may be, this search for a new leader may include the likes of 61-year-old Marwan Barghouti, who has spent the last 17 years in Israeli prisons following conviction for murder. Rejected by the Fatah old-guard, he retains popularity across all the Palestinian areas. He is no Mandela. International comparisons are never wholly accurate and outcomes from talking to terrorists are mixed. Turkey was prepared to negotiate with PKK terrorist leader Ocalan while he was imprisoned. The Colombian government came to terms with the FARC guerrilla movement in 2016.  Britain accepted former Irish Republican terrorist leaders into government in Northern Ireland.

An end to violence and rapid movement towards a sustainable peace settlement would obviously be good for Israel, the Palestinians and the wider Middle East. It is also in all our interests as the situation there becomes steadily more dangerous and as we confront so many other major threats to the security of the democracies.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy,  former British Conservative leader in the European Parliament and founder of New Direction. He has been visiting Israel and the Palestinian areas for over 40 years.

International Challenges for the Biden Presidency

In international relations, and in politics more widely, perception is often more significant than reality. In many overseas countries, Donald Trump was widely seen as an unsuitable, even dangerous, President – unpredictable and narcissistic, acting on instinct and unnerving friend and foe alike. Yet nearly half of Americans continued to vote for Donald Trump. Foreigners don’t vote and for all the harm Donald Trump was seen to have done to the US image abroad, clearly many Americans had a different view, or at least didn’t like the alternative. The fact is, he shook up the international system, caused rethink of the Iran nuclear agreement, and pressured western allies into spending more on defence. His unblocking of the situation in the Middle East, dangerously frozen for decades, opened the potential for massive and benign change with far-reaching consequences – a succession of Arab states have now recognised the state of Israel. Clearly, these are substantive gains that have to be separated from the rhetoric and built on by the new administration.

We know something of President Biden’s personal attitude to foreign policy issues from his eight years as Vice President from 2009, from his chairmanship before that of the Senate foreign relations committee, and keynote policy statements that he has made over the years. There is a moral thrust to his approach, underpinned by a belief in consensus, in multilateralism and working closely in partnership with allies. He also has a sentimental emphasis on his Irish roots which now add to his enthusiasm for what many Americans imagine the European Union to be. He would err on the side of caution before committing the military to robust action. But he must take care that any efforts to cast himself as the polar opposite of Donald Trump do not compromise his calls for American bipartisanship and unity or indeed, the advances made by his predecessor.

Within 3 weeks of taking office in 2009, Vice President Biden spoke at the Munich Security Conference where he deployed the phrase “the example of our power must be matched by the power of our example”, repeated in his Presidential address 12 years later. He made it clear that Obama and Biden were determined to “reset” America’s relations with a number of hostile or difficult countries.

The consequences of this approach were at best, disappointing. A power vacuum was created which was rapidly filled by others who were less judgemental. And new challenges exist to add to the threats identified in 2009, most of which persist in a worsened state. Iran’s nuclear weapons programme may have been delayed but it remains in being and can rapidly be upgraded. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya are unstable and significantly controlled by forces not aligned with the Western democracies.

Russia continues to be dangerous. She has a declining economy and population but has invested disproportionately in upgrading her military capabilities and does not shrink from using them. She seeks control of European gas supply and has intervened to weaken potential rival sources of supply. Germany in particular is dangerously reliant on Russian energy. Russia’s submarine presence in the North Atlantic has returned to Cold War levels, she has a formidable Arctic capability unmatched by any other country and is extending her reach with bases not just in Syria but also in Sudan. In both Eastern Ukraine and in Libya she has used proxy forces against those aligned with the West. She maintains an intense cyber assault on Western economic, security and political institutions and actively sows disinformation among our citizens through social media – all to create instability and weaken attachment to Western governments.

China has extended her reach and relative power massively over the past ten years. Ironically, as the source of the Covid-19 pandemic, China almost alone has experienced continued GDP growth while western economies have taken a massive hit. China’s defence spending has almost doubled in a decade. It now has the world’s largest navy, passed a carrier strike group for the first time through the Taiwan Strait, has developed effective anti-ship missiles and is putting massive resources into AI and into offensive capabilities in space. There is now a Chinese military base in Djibouti in addition to port facilities in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Previously the West, led by the United States, has framed the economic and legal institutions accepted internationally. China is now challenging this system through parallel institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). It has become a massive, often primary, trading and investment partner in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as making inroads into Europe. These developments create real dilemmas for many friends and allies who may understand the dangers but cannot resist a desire for involvement – a classic poisoned apple.

There has been no halt to the development of weapons of mass destruction and the Covid pandemic can only have excited the dark imaginations of those bent on apocalypse for the West. In spite of setbacks, hydra-headed Islamist fundamentalists such as ISIS and AQ remain a potent threat with tacit support from rogue states. They occupy ungoverned spaces, are not short of volunteers from the angry and hopeless, and can draw on the sympathy of radicalised citizens, often dormant, in our own countries.

While we do not see queues of migrants trying to get into China or Russia, their power is respected. The western model of freedom, liberal democracy and free-market capitalism has lost its automatic appeal in many parts of the world. Outsiders see our countries divided and racked with self-doubt. Our economies have stalled. We no longer monopolise innovation. It is not just Covid that has led to restrictions on freedom and loss of self-confidence but self-inflicted ‘wokeism’, brewing over decades. And the nature of many foreign interventions undermined the West’s moral high-standing as well as its record of inevitable success. The vectors of subversion have been extremist groups and conspiracy theorists in our own societies, feeding fake news from internal and external sources, their influence hugely amplified by social media.

It is not just the potential aggressor states that will present difficulties for the new American administration but troublesome allies as well, bruised over trade and tariff issues and with their public opinion no longer well-disposed towards America. Confidence even in NATO was shaken by doubts raised by President Trump over the automaticity of Article 5 – the vital underpinning of deterrence – and the continued commitment of the US to the defence of Europe. This was in spite of subsequent assurances from President Trump, an enhanced forward presence of US forces and increased investment in the European Deterrence Initiative.

Both the American and British foreign policy establishments have long cherished a romanticised view of the European Union based on its founding motives. Many mistakenly compare the development of the EU with the American national story. The welcome enlargement to the east following the fall of communism also fits the dream of a “Europe whole and free”. But the motives of the past are no longer relevant to the world today. The EU has changed. That’s why Britain left. It will no longer be an automatic partner to US-led endeavours and has already revealed its vindictive and protectionist features through its handling of Brexit and the Covid vaccination issue.

President Biden will have to shake off the habit of equating “Europe” with the EU – great European nations such as Britain, Norway, Switzerland and for that matter Turkey, are not EU members and Poland is treated by the EU as a pariah because its government does not wholly toe the EU line on ‘ever closer union’. He should remember Madeleine Albright’s insistence that EU defence ambitions “must avoid preempting Alliance decision by de-linking from NATO; avoid duplicating existing efforts; and avoid discriminating against non-EU members”, as 20 years later this is exactly where it is heading.

For a long time Britain was a restraining hand on French ambitions to absorb continental European countries into an integrated, protectionist state as a “strategically autonomous” global actor. Britain’s departure from the EU has enabled these ambitions to be fuelled.

In the Far East, the Trump overtures to Kim Jong Un had little impact on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme but unnerved regional allies. This at least had the effect of encouraging stronger defence commitment by those allies and a readiness for more effective alliances in the Indo-Pacific region but it sowed mistrust.

The most negative overall consequence of American foreign policy during the previous Obama/Biden years was the erosion of American leadership which created a vacuum soon filled by others. Russia re-emerged as a force in the Middle East. China’s economic statecraft has given her a strong foothold, not just across east Asia but in Africa, in south Asia and even in parts of Europe and she now has military capabilities able to challenge automatic American dominance.

What is to be done?

President Biden will have to reassure key allies such as Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE, and continue to broker reconciliation between them. He should acknowledge the advances made by the previous administration in advancing Israel’s security and regional cooperation. His moves to reassure the Palestinians must be conditional on their cooperation in ending and suppressing terrorism and on return to the conference table in a positive spirit. There is great scope then for initiatives such as a ‘Middle East NATO’ and regional “Marshall plan” to include Lebanon and the Palestine Authority areas, to which Arab countries and others would also contribute.

In the Indo-Pacific region there are already moves to expand regional alliances such as the Quad which should be given more substance. Britain, with regional bases, a newly deployable carrier group and long-standing connections in the region can be a key ally in this and also in enhancing the relationship with India, an emerging superpower. We need to do far more to support India’s economic development and demonstrate that a Western alliance is both reliable and consistent so that she does not continue to feel the need to rely on Russian support.

Russia despises weakness and seeks great power recognition. Her strategic aim of separating Europe from America has not changed but it is not in our interests to stoke endless hostility. Any efforts at an accommodation with Russia will have to be carried out from a position of strength and Western unity. The worst development would be separate EU overtures which would only play into Russia’s hands.

Unlike the old Soviet Union, China is becoming an economic as well as a military superpower. Its huge, increasingly prosperous and aspiring, population represents the world’s largest potential market. And it is the world’s largest single contributor to carbon emissions. These three facts mean that policy towards China should be marked by engagement from a position of strength, rather than hostility or indeed, neediness. The West will have to push back against Chinese influence in Africa, which contrary to EU views, is clearly not some uniquely European preserve. It is in the interests of the democracies to assist the security and development of the major African countries and to help them overcome the many obstacles on their path to economic prosperity and stability.

President Biden looks out of the windows of the Oval Office facing enormous challenges beginning with the pandemic and the need for rapid economic recovery. He knows that America’s relative position in the world has weakened but that the intrinsic strengths of individual and national freedom, of free market economies, and the rule of law will continue to give the democracies and their allies overwhelming advantage, provided they work together. Previous remedies haven’t worked particularly well and there is some urgent repair work to be done.

While a “Democracy Summit” may seem a marvellous idea, taking the moral high ground, care needs to be taken. There will be an immediate problem in deciding who among America’s friends and allies qualify for attendance and how to avoid undue influence of NGOs with their own political agendas.

The Biden administration should inject fresh pragmatism into its international relations. In mending fences with the EU it should continue to insist on NATO’s role as the primary Western defence alliance and forum of crisis management. It should discourage initiatives which distract from this core commitment. It should actively develop a global network of other regional alliances. It must encourage and support and listen to its reliable allies, and first amongst these is the United Kingdom – not only the preeminent military power in Europe but with global reach. Significantly, this year the UK will chair both the G7+ and the UN climate change conferences.

The new US administration faces great challenges but enormous opportunity as the world seeks recovery from the disruption of the pandemic. The democracies and their allies are fundamentally strong. Our hopeful expectation is that the US will not just engage, but lead – not by unilateral initiatives but in consultation with those it can most trust.