The Failures of the Intelligence Agencies and the Secret ServiceSecurity Planning for Major Presidential Events in 2025 and Beyond

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of President Trump’s decisive win of the White House and the successful GOP wins of the House and Senate, the political arena in Washington has shifted from preventing a Trump win to sabotaging his “Promises Made, Promises Kept” agenda. Ranking Democrats, donors, governors and mayors in many blue states are launching concerted offensives to thwart the Trump agenda as much as possible as outlined in The New York Times:[1] As of this writing, leading Democrats are working hard to “Trump proof” earlier liberal initiatives and delay the confirmation of numerous, key Trump cabinet positions and dilute the 2nd Trump administration’s agenda.[2] [3] Senator Tom Cotton described it as follows: “What this is really about is trying to drag out all of these nominations to play procedural games,”[4]

Looking forward to President Trump’s second term, the following concerns with suggested remedies are set forth in this article.

1. The benefits of robust integrated security preparation for official events to include the State of the Union and beyond;

2. Improving the Secret Service, its performance and future viability as the nation’s elite protective federal agency; and

3. Reforming the deep state to prevent sabotaging the current and future U.S. Presidents and implementing reforms identified by several Inspectors General reports.

The Need for Effective, Integrated Security Planning for the State of the Union (Joint Session of Congress) and Future Official Events

In an effort to provide context to factors that may fuel potential protests and unrest with upcoming events to include the Joint Session of Congress (scheduled for March 4, 2025) and beyond, the following is set forth.

Key in the security planning process is and will be trusting the Intelligence Community (IC). The Trump administration is in the process of installing its IC leader picks. It is expected the security planning processes and critically, the integrated representation among the law enforcement jurisdictions will be effective. (We have seen this play out for both the 2024 election certification and the 2025 Inauguration.)

Concern over providing security for presidential events moving forward is based on the recent history of intelligence failures.[5] [6] For example the intelligence provided by the FBI and the DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis (I&A) to Capitol Police Chief Sund and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) prior to January 6, 2021 was incomplete and omitted threats targeting the election certification.

The Capitol Police (USCP), DC Metropolitan Police (DCMP), the USPP, the U.S. Secret Service and the public all deserve accurate and complete information from these agencies with respect to anticipated crowd size, crowd composition and planned protests for major events. Scalable security planning requires this for every U.S. President. If existing intelligence warrants it, a National Special Security Event (NSSE) should be declared by DHS.[7]

Moving forward in 2025 the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies are collectively facing a disturbing quandary of mistrust across the board…discriminating fact from disinformation is becoming increasingly challenging as of this writing. The need for integrated, robust and effective operational planning with involved law enforcement jurisdictions is a serious concern.[8] Further, the critical and immediate need for the FBI and I&A to be transparent, diligent and forthcoming with ALL relevant intelligence (real time) impacting the Trump administration cannot be overstated.

These concerns during the current Trump administration are legitimate. The lack of the IC’s integrated planning with law enforcement is well documented in Chief Sund’s book, Courage Under Fire, Under Siege and Outnumbered 58-1 On January 6th. Notably, among other revelations, Sund’s book details: “An exposé of critical intelligence and military failures surrounding January 6 and the subsequent attempts to cover them up”[9]

Steps need to be taken immediately to ensure transparency of all agencies’ official preparations and actions.

What Can be Done Immediately?

Looking forward to the State of the Union, the USCP, Secret Service and FBI, the Senate leadership, the House of Representatives leadership and the Senate and House Sergeants at Arms need to support the following unified and unequivocal actions and message:

· There will be ZERO TOLERANCE for any disruption during the State of the Union Address and beyond;

· This official position needs to be unanimous and declared applicable nationwide;

· Prepare pre-recorded safety and security messages for dissemination to the public;

· For the Metropolitan DC area—The DCNG, the DC Mayor, the D.C. Metropolitan Police (DCMP), the Arlington Police Department (APD) and USPP will partner with the USCP and the Secret Service and craft Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) to devise integrated security plan(s);

· Establish a clear, chain-of-command communications security assets approval process among all concerned prior to any major events;

· Provide dedicated and tested communication links to the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) to facilitate immediate intelligence and incident reporting from all law enforcement sectors, local, state and federal; and

· Review prior event after-action reports, identify missteps and establish consensus for corrections among concerned law enforcement agencies.

The State of the Secret Service – Can it be Saved?

A serious concern that January 6, 2021 brought into focus, and more recently with the two assassination attempts of President-elect Trump in July and September of 2024, the competence of the Secret Service. Directly connected is its relationship with the IC and the Biden Administration. Equally troubling is the lack of protective resources, i.e. experienced protective agents, counter-sniper teams, technical security teams, counter-surveillance and intelligence teams and worse—weak leadership—have profoundly hampered the Secret Service mission. In addition, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policy initiatives, excessive demands to staff 35 protective details (for a variety of government officials), lack of mandated training, diluted hiring practices and very low morale have exacerbated the agency’s problems.

Today’s Secret Service finds itself in the midst of a cauldron of divisive issues that has been boiling in recent years. Given this, it is critical to identify strategies and plans to improve its protective competence and get ahead of any post-election potential unrest with growing domestic and foreign threat levels. This may prove to be a herculean task since successful mitigation is predicated on open and coordinated bipartisan support. This may be a naïve goal given the division in the nation’s populous, even now, post-election. It appears the basis of the contention up to the election and now, despite the clear Trump election victory, was to beat Trump. Now many Democrat leaders are vowing to sabotage the Trump administration’s proposed initiatives.

These factors and others continue to affect the effective protective operations of the Secret Service.

Considering these circumstances and alarmingly, two assassination attempts, the identification of Iranian assassination plots coupled with the recent operational failures of the Secret Service to implement basic protective security measures—their mission capability will require profound changes.

Reports continue among the Trump detail security agents, whistleblowers and former President Trump and now President Trump, the FBI has selectively and slowly released assassination plot and other threat information to the Secret Service. This has created distrust between the FBI and the Secret Service. On October 26, 2024, Business & Politics (BPR) reported “the DHS Office of General (OIG) admitted to Senator Grassley the DHS has a troubling history of obstruction, which Grassley cited as a “major red flag” for oversight.” Violations of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) are also being reported.[10] Other disturbing whistleblower reports allege “Acting Secret Service Director Rowe ‘blocked’ OIG auditors from reviewing former President Donald Trump’s security protocols.”[11]

Most disturbing, there is evidence of mistrust within the Secret Service ranks. For its mission to survive, the leadership must be overhauled, top to bottom. It will require a thorough assessment to redefine its mission and test its capability in the face of the emerging threats from enemy states. This cannot be accomplished in-house.

Following the Capitol protests in 2020, USCP Chief Sund implemented a pro-active intelligence gathering approach but received no threat intelligence by the FBI, Secret Service, DHS and DCMP. Sund stated “there was no indication that a well-coordinated, armed assault on the Capitol might occur on January 6.” This assessment was based on intelligence or the lack thereof provided to Sund. On January 4th and January 5th, Sund hosted two intelligence meetings with the USCP Intelligence and Inter-Agency Coordination Division and with a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from Washington, D.C., including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and the National Guard.[12]

Sund stated: “During both meetings, no entity, including the FBI, provided any intelligence indicating that there would be a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol by thousands of well-equipped armed insurrectionists.”

In the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General’s (DHSIG’s) Final Report: The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 dated July 13, 2024, by Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D., the Inspector General reported intelligence failures and policy related operational failures.[13] Six recommendations were made to improve preparedness between the Secret Service and the USCP. A few have been met.

The burning question—with this backdrop, how can the Congress and law enforcement officials adequately rely on intelligence agency reporting, the current administration’s support (or the lack thereof) and media reporting to prepare for potential disruptions in 2025? To effectively prepare for the State of the Union, the Secret Service should establish specific and stringent MOUs with the FBI and the I&A to ensure they share timely and thorough intelligence impacting their protectees and NSSE’s in the future. This was not done prior to January 6, 2021. For example, security planning for NSSE events in DC should include close collaboration with military counterparts. This will ensure the DCNG and the DCMP are able to more seamlessly expedite crowd control responses. Critically, an agreed upon communications (tested) protocol among these agencies is required.

It has been observed by many law enforcement authorities the Secret Service is operating under a flawed threat model, i.e. a 1960’s era lone assassination threat. Today’s Secret Service has not fully embraced emerging technologies. The agency has not studied terrorist threat methodologies to see its benefit in varying environments.

The Secret Service published its <a href=”https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usss-ntac-maps-2016-2020.pdf”> Secret Service Threat Assessment Centers Mass Attacks in Public Places Guidance in January 2023 through its National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). This guidance focuses primarily on behavioral threat assessment metrics based on meta-data gleaned from 173 shooting attacks. It appears the current protective training model does not fully incorporate this guidance and is based more on reactive threat responses rather than proactive threat identification. Very little, if any study and/or training focuses on terrorist pre-attack behaviors i.e. recognizing and mitigating Islamic radicalization, attack planning (target selection, probing, testing), the purchase of precursor bomb making materials and countering multi-coordinated attacks.

Matthew Crooks clearly defeated the Secret Service at its own game. How is this possible? Are the Secret Service advance procedures too canned, too predictable? Strategic planning organizations in the public and private sector, especially in high threat environments, employ Red Team planning. At a basic level this means considering the adversary’s perspective and attack plan. Protectors should simulate attacks as an adversary would and fortify against them with security planning. In other words, wear two hats—your “good guy hat and the bad guy hat.” This is fairly obvious to seasoned military planners and strategists, However, since this strategy appears to be absent from the security planning where two assassination attempts occurred in Pennsylvania and Florida in 2024, it requires review. In simple terms…advance planners need to ask themselves: If I were a shooter or bomber, how would I identify the security plan’s vulnerabilities? What weakness would I exploit? Security planners need to ask what are we doing to fix them? This needs to be an evolving, on-going process. The Army does this on a continuing basis.

There is no evidence the Secret Service conducts any substantive Red Team exercises. The irony is Crooks, the would-be assassin who shot at Trump in Butler, PA and Ryan Routh, who attempted an assassination from a sniper position along a fence line at the Trump International Golf Course at West Palm Beach, FL, conducted better pre-attack planning than the Secret Service’s protective (counterattack) advance security team. Routh’s ability to get within easy shooting range, and remain virtually undetected for12-hours, exposed many other security operational weaknesses. To be clear both assassination attempts, one an actual AK shooting and one pre-empted, were catastrophic failures. This is a jolting and tragic wake-up call. Crooks’ and Routh’s budgets were probably less than $500 respectively. The Secret Service Presidential Campaigns and NSSE budget is reported to be ~$73.3 million from the Office and Management and Data. Clearly the security failures are not due to a lack of money.

What if the attacks at Butler or West Palm Beach had been planned by well-trained terrorists using multiple, simultaneous attack methods as witnessed in the series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France? The Secret Service and the IC at large should be acutely focused on the possibility of diversionary, multitargeted attack scenario planning prior to any major event. Attack methods used by terrorists seen in many asymmetrical attacks seen recently worldwide should be planned for. Other salient examples include Mumbai (2009), Brussels (2016) and Barcelona (2017). DHS has published planning guidance to identify and prevent Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (2018). Would the Secret Service be able to detect an attack plan like these let alone respond to them?

Since the 9/11 attacks billions of tax dollars have been invested in defense strategy revisions, police, military and emergency responder training, communications upgrades and field exercises to better equip all concerned to address evolving threats. The National Response Framework (2019) defines five core capacities to guide the training of the response community: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover. The purpose is to “better integrate government and local response efforts.” Simply stated, all security partners need to focus more on prevention and work as a cohesive team. It appears these capacities were not incorporated in the security plan at Butler, PA or West Palm Beach, FL.

This guidance needs to be incorporated and operationally reinforced into all joint security efforts in the field; not only in training.

When operationally required, agents from other DHS agencies selected to support Secret Service protective details should be required to meet the same protective training metrics required of Secret Service agents. The required training hours should be increased as outlined in the Secret Service Fiscal Years 2021-2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

The Secret Service needs to redefine its protective mission. The current policies and procedures are based on dated threat models. The old threat models guiding the Secret Service culture are myopic and limit creative thinking. More effective proactive strategies, policies and training that match evolving attack methods are needed:

· Move the Secret Service back to the U.S. Treasury Department;

· Re-examine basic security procedures;

· Recognize and respond to lone shooter profile behaviors;

· Incorporate Red Team planning and training;

· Review lone shooter and coordinated terrorist attack methodologies;

· Develop security advance training to include preventive and deterrent attack strategies;

· Require the IC to proactively and thoroughly brief the Secret Service PID and protective details with ongoing and timely protectee threat intelligence;

· Develop specific integration protocols with public safety counterparts;

· Require a Secret Service supervisor partnered with the local jurisdiction law enforcement supervisor to review the security advance Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and visit each site to be visited prior to the protectee’s arrival.

· Conduct post event hot washes and train to correct missteps;

· Partner with elite military forces, i.e. Delta and Seal teams to revise a range of protective measures and training;

· Reinstate annual physical medical screening with a coronary emphasis;

· Reinstate mandatory quarterly physical fitness testing for all gun carrying personnel;

· Develop scalable protective training based on emerging attack methodologies with a terrorist focus; and

· Specifically study and create protective training scenarios that identify terrorist simultaneous attack planning targeting routes, site access/egress locations, command posts, agent and law enforcement personnel staging areas and respective equipment.

Equally troubling, the recommendations set forth by the 435-page U.S. Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis from December 2014 (after serious security failures prompted this inquiry) as of this writing, have yet to be fully implemented. Conspicuously absent among them remains—the failure of protective detail agents to complete consistent training—“at least 12% of work hours by fiscal year 2025.” According to Jason Chaffetz, the agency has woefully failed to achieve this training target. He says the Secret Service has been on notice since 2015 to implement effective changes, namely training and accountability to prevent the failures. Many key recommendations have not been met.[14]

The collective observations and recommendations outlined above are further delineated, along with others, in the FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS completed by the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump, dated December 5, 2024. This report was issued by Chairman Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Jason Crow (D-CO).[15] These recommendations should be prioritized with elite military forces. Establish scalable protective survey plans that can effectively adapt to changing locales and environments.

The world of team sports provides a compelling metaphor for how games are won. Team members are assigned positions based on ability and experience. They rehearse their plays incessantly until they get it right. Success in the protective security arena requires the same focus.

If the Secret Service team expects to win their zero-fail mission, they will need to rebuild a foundation of trust—first. Leadership deficits, disparate experience levels, inconsistent training, dated technology and other security advance omissions are fixable. Restoring trust among their fellow agents and with their brothers and sisters in blue and critically with their prized asset—the protectee—poses their biggest challenge. Winning is impossible without trust.

Is the Country Being Effectively Protected by its Intelligence Agencies?

To fully answer this, a hard look at the intelligence agencies and their successes and failures need to be critically examined in 2025. There have been more than 70 successful terrorist interdictions since 9/11. Unfortunately there has been an increase of serious failures in the last eight years, many preventable, in the homeland that dilute these successes. Many observers and media outlets are reporting partisan politics has rendered the agencies responsible for investigating and preventing many attacks in the past four years less proactive and less effective. Congressional committees and Inspectors General reports conducted in response to whistleblower testimony and media reporting show the FBI reallocated its resources from its primary mission to protect the nation from domestic and international terrorism. Their focus has shifted from cyber-threats, organized crime, violent crimes, human trafficking etc. to lesser crimes with a political bent. This shift in focus by the FBI along with collaboration with DHS has added to the rise of Domestic Terrorism.[16] According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) there has been a 357% increase in domestic terrorism from 2013 – 2023.[17]

After the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001, a candid review of the nation’s intelligence failures—contributing causes, i.e. agency information sharing dysfunction and the “siloed” structure of the IC; namely the CIA, FBI, NIA, DIA and the NSA was reviewed. The 9/11 Commission Report, released on July 22, 2004 examined these failures in detail.[18] Notably, the consensus finding was and unfortunately remains today—the intelligence agencies lack imagination and do not effectively share domestic and foreign threat information, particularly with a terrorist nexus. Bureaucratic and administrative restrictions delay the release of “sanitized” threat information that is in large part, not immediately useful by its consumers. Among the 9/11 Commission’s many recommendations—create a DHS in an effort to centralize 22 different federal agencies into one department. The intent was to unify security operations to be more responsive and less siloed in its handling of, sharing and responding to threat information to the homeland.

Unfortunately, this has not happened. DHS has been widely criticized for being stymied by bureaucratic dysfunction. Many have observed the amalgamation of the 22 agencies, in many cases, has had the opposite effect…these agencies, many of which with a more than a 100-year history, were not fully on board to “play in one sandbox” and share their tools risking the loss of their respective agency eminence.[19] As a result some argue many agencies hold onto information to be able to control investigations, justify funding, etc. Several studies show the goal of more effective information sharing has not been achieved despite the creation of several Presidential Directives enacted post 9/11 and the creation of more than 80 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).[20]

The numerous recent intelligence failures we are seeing and continue to experience is alarming. The conclusions of many Inspectors General reports and House Committee Hearings have revealed the key intelligence agencies, CIA, FBI and others are not fully effective protecting Americans. It has been proven these agencies have been weaponized against conservatives and directly at Donald Trump and his family. This leads us to only one conclusion —our IC is broken. This is supported by the footnoted documents referenced in this writing. Among the many glaring facts: 51 former intelligence officials declared the Hunter Biden laptop, disinformation—later proven to be false. Further, the CIA admitted many of the 51 signatories were paid CIA contractors.[21] [22]

Several FBI, IRS and Secret Service whistleblowers including former FBI agents Richard Stout and Nicole Parker (and many others) have publicly called out the credibility of the FBI; specifically the leadership who have not prioritized the core mission of the FBI.[23] On December 9, 2024, Senator Grassley sent a letter to FBI Director Wray citing as many as 60 examples of the FBI’s blatant failures to uphold the rule of law and obstruct the work of the Congress. The letter stated, “the FBI has shown an outright distain for congressional oversight during your tenure.”[24] Instead, recent FBI Directors, Comey and Wray chose to violate their oaths denying fair and due process rights to several hundreds of citizens and Brady rule violations for political purposes. Whistleblower testimony corroborates the FBI leadership, at many levels, were aware of this but continued this blatant dereliction of duty anyway.

It has been empirically shown the FBI and the DOJ, under the Biden Administration, have implemented an ongoing two-tier system of justice strategy targeting Republicans at large, prominent conservatives and Donald Trump while ignoring instances of clear federal statute violations (with undeniable probable cause) by the Democrats and leftists. “These include pay-to-play schemes by the Bidens and the Clintons.”[25] Not the least of which are the 18 instances of arson and vandalism targeting pregnancy resource and other faith-based centers by the group Jane’s Revenge which the FBI has not addressed.[26]

Basically, the FBI has shifted its focus and resources from counter-intelligence, established terrorist threats, China hacking our nation’s IT infrastructure, sex trafficking of minors and organized crime to targeting Catholics, declaring parents attending school board meetings ”domestic terrorists,” investigating thousands of January 6th attendees and protesters and arresting pro-life demonstrators. Among the most egregious investigations and warrant executions was the unprecedented search of former President Trump’s residence, staging evidence and doctoring photos in August 2022 to justify prosecutions.[27]

Equally egregious, FBI failures identified by Senator Grassley included serious threats posed by foreign actors treated with tepid urgency if at all. For example, the FBI did not thoroughly vet Afghan evacuees under the Operations Allies Welcome (OAW), at least 50 of which were later flagged with “potentially security concerns.” This and the “open border” policy of the Biden administration, the dilution of ICE resources, restricting ICE’s arrest and deportation enforcement purview, defunding the police and weak enforcement of crimes committed by a high number of migrants entering the U.S. illegally has increased the nation’s vulnerability.[28] On June 25, 2024, DHS identified more than 400 crossed the U.S. border with an ISIS-affiliated network.[29]

Another disturbing example of the egregious failures and unlawful government oversight is documented in Senator Ron Wyden’s (D-ORE.) recent release of documents confirming the NSA and the FBI are unlawfully purchasing Americans’ internet browsing records and personal data.[30]

Restoring faith in America’s intelligence agencies to prevent what we have witnessed for at least the last eight (8) years will require significant reforms.[31] Essentially, there is a call for more transparency and bi-partisan oversight across the board.[32] Various national polls reflect more than 60% of Americans do not trust the government—especially the FBI.[33]

The GAO found the greatest number of domestic terrorism attacks are committed by either racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, (this includes homegrown violent extremism) many of whom have been radicalized since 2010.[34] A few notable examples include:

· May 3, 2024 – Two Jordanian foreign nationals attempted to force their way onto Marine Base Quantico. Both were in the country unlawfully;

· May 9, 2024 – Trevor Bickford of Maine received a 27-year prison sentence for attempting to kill police officers in Times Square in 2022. He claimed he wanted “to wage Jihad and kill as many targets as possible;” and

· June 9, 2024 – 8 Tajikistan nationals were arrested in New York, Philadelphia and Los Angeles with ties to ISIS plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S.

Recent intelligence failures are compounded by disjointed inter-agency information sharing, fewer proactive responses to threat intelligence, poor monitoring of social media posts and not responding to credible law enforcement reporting. A key policy failure is the open U.S. border and restricting the Border Patrol’s ability to identify illegal crossings and account for “gotaways.” Collectively, these intelligence failures have led to increases in a wide range of crimes as follows:

· A resurgence of terrorist attacks;

· Human trafficking;

· Drug trafficking;

· Attacks targeting law enforcement officers and their equipment;

· Homegrown violent extremism;

· Lone wolf attacks at mass gatherings;

· Hate crimes;

· Attacks on churches;

· Active school shooter attacks;

· Attacks on family planning centers; and

· Cyber-attacks/Ransomware attacks.

Fixing this will require honest, bipartisan commitment. The IC, above all, will need to be accountable to their staffs and the American people. The proposed remedies (some of which cited below) are required to ensure the respective intelligence agencies are transparent with the appropriate federal and local law enforcement agencies. This is needed to prevent a repeat of the abuses identified earlier that targeted a variety of individuals and groups by the Biden administration.

· Establish a special bipartisan committee with full access to all intelligence and threats to ensure proportional decisions and actions to protect the homeland are made above politics and reviewed before being implemented;

· Ensure the investigations conducted by the intelligence agencies are strictly within their jurisdictional purviews;

· Assess the effectiveness of the collaborative sharing information practices and formal agreements between the FBI and DHS. A 2023 GAO study shows threat information is not shared effectively by them and is not immediately useful. This GAO report identified a key reason for this serious information sharing dysfunction:[35]

“FBI officials told us they did not use the data DHS collects on domestic terrorism incidents because they weren’t aware DHS was collecting it. DHS officials in turn told us they didn’t share their incident data with their FBI counterparts because they weren’t asked for it.”

· Verify that any unmasking follow CIA & FBI rules. The names of many U.S. citizens were improperly released instead of or with foreign targets;[36]

· Enact strict verification processes to prevent using circular reporting by “creating” false and damaging information, leaking it to the press and then opening investigations based on that. It has been established the FBI under Director Comey and other FBI officials engaged in this practice; and

· Enact strict adherence to verification processes to ensure the basis of any Section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) application requests are factual. Rampant abuse of the FISA process by Director Comey and other FBI officials (from 2016 – 2017 and beyond) has been confirmed by the DOJ IG.[37]

On December 9, 2019, Attorney General William Barr stated the DOJ IG determined the evidence put forth to the FISA Court to secure warrants to surveil the Trump campaign and his administration “were not factual, omitted consistently exculpatory information.” AG Barr further stated: “ The malfeasance and misfeasance detailed in the Inspector General’s report reflects a clear abuse of the FISA process;”[38] [39]

Looking Forward

As we begin 2025 and we assess the state of our government, the state of our safety, the state of our security, our sovereignty and most important, America’s pre-eminence on the planet; now is a great opportunity to work to rejuvenate the bedrock principles that make us the sterling example of freedom and strength. It is possible to reignite the nation’s status as the “Shining City on a Hill” as President Reagan described it.

It will take an honest commitment for the new Trump administration to set things right. In the last several years many of our agency heads and politicians put egos and politics ahead of the nation’s guiding principles. How many of them were boy scouts and forgot the first point of the scout law?: “A scout is trustworthy.” How many attended military academies and committed to the credo?: “A cadet shall not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate anyone the does.” How many swore allegiance to the United States and their Oath of Office (5 US Code Sec. 3331)?: “I do solemnly swear I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…I take this obligation freely without purpose of evasion…”

If there was ever a time in the history of our nation when accountability, honest introspection and reform is critically needed…it is NOW!

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/us/politics/democrats-anti-trump-battle-plan.html

[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/20/democrats-trump-foes-governors-attorneys-general-interest-groups-00190177

[3] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/presidential/3238783/shell-shocked-democrats-struggle-mount-resistance-trump/

[4] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-nominees-confirmation-delay-senate-democrats/

[5] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[6] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/peters-report-finds-significant-intelligence-failures-by-fbi-and-dhs-in-lead-up-to-january-6th-capitol-attack

[7] https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing

[8] This basic requirement was not included or thoroughly implemented per USSS protective operational SOPs prior to two assassination attempts targeting Trump.

[9] https://www.blackstonepublishing.com/blogs/news/former-capital-police-chief-steven-a-sund-set-to-publish-a-new-book-about-the-attack-on-january-6-with-explosive-never-before-revealed-information

[10] https://www.bizpacreview.com/2024/10/26/whistleblowers-claim-secret-service-employees-working-with-trump-were-made-to-sign-ndas-1497932/

[11] https://nypost.com/2024/10/09/us-news/secret-service-blocked-watchdog-to-hide-inconsistent-security-protocols-at-trump-events-whistleblower/

[12] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/capitol-police-chief-steven-sund-entire-intelligence-community/story?id=75729882

[13] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/dept.-of-homeland-security-oig-releases-report-on-secret-service-s-response-to-jan.-6-attack-on-the-u.s.-capitol

[14] https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf

[15] https://taskforce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/july13taskforce.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/12-5-2024-Final-Report-Redacted.pdf

[16] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[17] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-104720

[18] https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf

[19] https://www.thoughtco.com/department-of-homeland-security-4156795

[20] https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/114425/witnesses/HHRG-117-JU08-Wstate-JonesS-20220217.pdf

[21] https://www.newsweek.com/hunter-biden-laptop-jim-jordan-facebook-disinformation-twitter-1767369

[22] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/cia-admits-some-signatories-of-hunter-biden-laptop-letter-were-paid-contractors/ar-BB1oVNjs

[23] https://ijr.com/richard-stout-how-to-reform-our-politically-weaponized-fbi-and-restore-public-trust/

[24] Letter from Chairman Charles Grassley, Se. Comm. on Fin., to Director Wray (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_fbi_-_failures.pdf

[25] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[26] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/zero-arrests-16-janes-revenge-attacks-pro-life-organizations

[27] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/house-judiciary-committee-investigates-alteration-evidence-seized-fbi-trump-classified-records-probe

[28] https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/10/02/dhs-2025-homeland-threat-assessment-indicates-threat-domestic-and-foreign-terrorism

[29] https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CHS-10.3.24-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf

[30] Senator Ron Wyden (D-ORE.) recent report by Ars Technica states the NSA has admiied to buying records

[31] https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-intelligence-community-is-broken-heres-how-we-fix-it

[32] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/3224584/how-trump-can-intelligently-reform-the-intelligence-community/

[33] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[34] https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-threat-domestic-terrorism-u.s.-and-federal-efforts-combat-it

[35] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[36] Lt. General Flynn and other Trump administration officials were improperly unmasked during 2016 – 2017.

[37] Section 702 authorizes targeted foreign intelligence information collection related to terrorism. U.S. persons may not be targeted and their names indiscriminately used without a specific nexus to terrorism.

[38] https://clayhiggins.house.gov/2019/12/09/higgins-ig-report-confirms-obama-era-fbi-abused-fisa-process/

[39] https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/4012650-fbi-misused-surveillance-tool-fisa-section-702/

The Failures of the Intelligence Agencies and the Secret Service Preparing for 2025 Post-election Protests and Beyond

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of the ever-increasing Presidential campaign rhetoric from both the Democrats and the Republicans since the 2020 election, disturbing narratives have focused, fairly or unfairly, on the outcome and results of the 2024 Presidential election. The Republicans continue to be riled for numerous reasons—citing unfair MAGA characterizations, the vilification of anyone who attended the January 6, 2021 protests, the unfettered immigration of millions of unvetted multi-national migrants, inflation, lawlessness, escalating war(s) in the Middle East and numerous, disturbing examples of a two-tiered justice system targeting former President Trump and many of his former staff. The Democrats have been ignoring these claims or minimizing their effects stating these issues are being exaggerated for political purposes. Instead, the White House and their minions defaulted to women’s abortion rights, healthcare benefits, DEI ideology, defunding the police, supporting Palestinian sympathizers’ rights and “saving democracy.” The Democrats have continually defaulted to blaming Trump for “inciting” the violent protests at the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and an exponential array of problems plaguing America. These divergent positions have sparked outrage since then on both sides. As a result, the lead up to the 2024 election was contentious and the Trump win has law enforcement circles concerned that post-election events have the potential to be contentious and disruptive.[1] [2]

This article, written before the election, is being updated as of January 6, 2025 in light of the convincing Trump Presidential win and his Cabinet and officials’ selections. Ranking Democrats, donors, governors and mayors in many blue states have begun to launch concerted offensives to thwart the Trump agenda as much as possible as outlined in The New York Times:

The panels range from sweeping subjects — “Making Meaning and Meeting the Moment: Resistance and Reorienting” and “It’s Time to Resist: The Fight Against Project 2025” — to more focused discussions about abortion rights, immigration, racial justice, taxes, countering disinformation and other issues, according to a draft agenda.[3]

Several of Trump’s cabinet nominees and other White House team picks have already been targeted with bomb threats and “swatting.”[4] These efforts to disrupt the transition to the Trump administration has the potential to inflame supporters from both sides.

Prior to the election politically charged bi-partisan rhetoric fostered a remarkable awakening in the populus of the country. Given this and the convincing Trump win, the stage was/is seemingly set for potential unrest prior to the Inauguration of President-elect Trump on January 20, 2025. There were and are numerous overlapping concerns that contribute to this. Key among them are the intelligence agencies’ warnings that foreign enemy states, i.e. Russia, China and Iran are planning to wreak post-election havoc. The Trump campaign and Harris campaign had reported hacks and disruptions into its servers. Iran openly revealed assassination plots targeting Trump. As of November 8, 2024, the FBI had confirmed Iran was planning a Trump assassination with two suspects arrested in the U.S. and one other identified in Iran.[5] Adding to this disturbing threat information, intelligence and public media reporting indicates current enemy states: China, Russia and North Korea are partnering with the professed unifying goal of undermining the U.S. election process. Further, intelligence agencies have shared concerns these enemy states pose collective threats to the U.S. and in “multiple parts in the world simultaneously.”[6] Alarmingly, FBI Director Wray has acknowledged a dangerous influx of more than 100 known terrorists and thousands of dangerous criminals across the southern and northern borders, but admits their whereabouts are unknown.

Notably numerous congressional hearings, Inspectors General reports and media reports confirm the Department of Justice (DOJ), the intelligence agencies—especially the FBI, have failed to fulfill their respective missions. This includes misrepresenting the COVID origins, implementing a two-tired justice system targeting Trump and associated conservatives, targeting Right to Life advocates, proposing classifying parents as “domestic terrorists”…all while turning a blind eye to the criminal schemes of President Biden and the Clintons.[7]

In the context of what has transpired before the election and now post-election 2024; three key elements are being addressed accordingly:

1. The benefits of robust integrated security preparation as a deterrent to post election protests prior to the Inauguration;

2. Improving the Secret Service; its performance and future as the nation’s elite protective federal agency;

3. Reforming the deep state leading up to prevent sabotaging the current and future presidents and implementing reforms identified by the several congressional committee investigative and Inspectors General reports.

Factors Contributing to Inauguration Day Protest Concerns and Future Post Election Events

In an effort to provide context to factors that may fuel potential protests and unrest following the election and during the Inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States and beyond, the following, verified background is being set forth. It is important to understand the factors contributing to the ongoing vitriol, particularly from the Democrats pre and post the 2024 election. This includes disparaging political comments made by many former and current Democrat Cabinet level officials, many of their respective staff members, military officials, state and local officials, numerous media outlets and corporate leaders. This unprecedented level of divisive rhetoric, demonization, vilification (based on fabricated claims), has deteriorated to personal assaults and has infected large swaths of the populus. With the abandonment, in some cases, of any serious effort to clarify and fact check claims promulgated from both sides, the partisan division grew to dangerous levels in the country. Even more alarming, these circumstances have signaled opportunities for enemy state regimes to exploit the United States to gain economic advantage and power, especially during the presidential transition. There are innumerable examples of this. Salient among them are the withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Afghanistan, funding Iran with billions of dollars and the disinformation infecting the country’s social media outlets to include information concerning China, Russia and Iran. The resulting divisive political rancor has intensified since 2016 and there is no indication of any let up. All of this points to potentially dangerous unrest in the months to come.

Following the 2016 Donald Trump presidential victory, his 2020 presidential bid and now his second election as the 47th President of the United States, empirical and documented evidence show former President Trump, members of his family, his newly named staff members and other surrogates have been subjected to innumerable political assaults and threats. Historically these included frivolous claims of Russian collusion, accusations of improper collaboration with Ukraine, targeted entrapment investigations against his staff, mainstream media outlets promulgating false and damaging narratives and recruiting 51 intelligence officials to engage in election interference. This includes the fabrication of prosecutions and convictions based on tenuous legal grounds violating due process by the Justice Department—all in an effort to delegitimize the Trump presidency and his 2024 presidential bid.[8] Few media outlets have reported these politically damaging efforts. Many can be traced directly to the leaders and staffs of the Democrat party. They blatantly misrepresented Trump’s 2024 Campaign promises and voiced plans to derail Trump’s transition with a variety of tactics. Enemy states are expected to exploit this misinformation in manipulative ways. Many media outlets have reported ranking democrat efforts to “Trump proof” his administration with last-minute executive orders.[9]

The New Yorker reported Russia and Iran were using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to promulgate “deep fakes” ahead of the election to spread “conspiratorial narratives” and amplifying “divisive U.S. issues to denigrate the election process.[10] Now we can expect this to reimplemented, post-election, to disrupt the transition.

Prior to the decisive Trump re-election ranking Democrats, namely Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability and several senior Democrats in Congress would not commit to certifying the results of the 2024 Presidential election if former President Donald Trump won.[11] [12] [13]

These articles highlight the importance of preparing de-escalation measures to avoid a repeat of the disruption and protests of the January 6, 2021 experience

As of this writing it appears there are plans in the works by leading Democrats to “Trump proof” earlier liberal initiatives and dilute the 2nd Trump administration’s agenda.[14] [15]

The Need for Effective, Integrated Security Planning for the Inauguration and Future Events

Capitalizing on the January 6, 2021 protests/riots, Russia and Iran were considering a repeat in the event of a Trump lost.[16] The National Intelligence Council (NIC) in a memorandum dated October 8, 2024, reports several disruptive scenarios were and are being planned by Russia and Iran with the goal to denigrate the U.S. political process and transfer of power.[17]

There is a documented history of intelligence failures highlighting this concern. If the tepid intelligence provided by the FBI and the DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis (I&A) to Capitol Police Chief Sund and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) prior to January 6, 2021 of planned riots is any indication of what to expect during the Inauguration and beyond, there are legitimate concerns. (The vote certification on January 6, 2025 was conducted without incident). The Capitol Police (USCP), DC Metropolitan Police (DCMP), the USPP, the U.S. Secret Service and the public deserve accurate and complete information from these agencies with respect to anticipated crowd size, crowd composition and planned protests for major events. Scalable security planning requires this. This was not the case prior to January 6, 2021. In fact the January 6, 2021 vote certification was not declared a National Special Security Event (NSSE) by DHS despite the fact the existing intelligence fit the DHS vulnerability rating criteria to declare it. This designation is required when a planned major event is a potential target of terrorism or other criminal activity.[18] Had the Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division (PID) been included in the full disclosure of the existing intelligence regarding anticipated crowd sizes, planned protests and violence for January 6, 2021 they would have made the case to declare the vote certification an NSSE.

Several post January 6, 2021 after-action reviews have documented a myriad of intelligence and planning failures by the FBI, DHS-I&A and the Secret Service leading up to and after the 2021 protests.[19] [20] Worse, indications of disruptive protests by several groups known to the FBI and

I&A with active investigations were not shared with the USCP and other planners. Evidence of alarming social media posts and protest meetings documented in investigations by many FBI field offices were diluted and and/or simply not shared. Reports, studies and testimony of these failures have been drowned out by those that chose to use January 6th as a political tool to dominate the political discussion with a version that appeared to be used to suit a partisan agenda. Two post January 6th reports dated June 27, 2023 and July 10, 2023 document the investigations by U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee cite significant intelligence failures by the FBI and I&A leading up to the January 6, 2021 protest.[21]

Former USCP Chief Sund stated that January 6 was a ‘Cover-Up’ by intelligence officials in power at the time and “they were aware of the attack in advance and covered it up by failing to disseminate the information to those who needed it.”[22] In an interview with Tucker Carlson that never aired, Sund repeated this claim and subsequent congressional investigations corroborated this. In this interview and in his book: Courage Under Fire, Sund explains, with definitive chronological clarity, supported by documents, that he was denied access to the DC National Guard troops for 71 minutes after asking for them at 1 PM on January 6. Sund further stated it took more than three hours after that during an excruciating “approval process” for the District of Columbia National Guard (DCNG) troops to be mobilized. Major General William Walker, commander of the DCNG stated during a Joint hearing he was not given the authorization to deploy them. General Walker stated: “the delay was caused at least in part over concerns of the optics of sending uniformed troops to the scene.” General Walker further testified he received an “unusual” restrictive order to delay a quick troop deployment without the “explicit” approval of of then-Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.[23] On January 11, 2021, Sund told the Washington Post he disagreed with Nancy Pelosi’s claim that “Additional security could have been provided but no one from the Capitol requested it.” Sund maintains his six separate requests were denied. He also warned federal officials “if they don’t’ get their act together, it will happen again.”[24]

Reports of several requests for intelligence information, prior to January 6, 2021, by Chief Sund are well documented and are confirmed in the following congressional investigative reports. Numerous committee reports outline failures of the FBI and I&A to share intelligence with law enforcement preparing for the January 6, 2021 vote certification. These have been sparsely reported/referenced in media reporting of the January 6th Hearings and Investigations; among them:

· Anna Skinner, Ex-Capitol Police Chief Sounds Alarm That Jan. 6 Was ‘Cover-Up’, NEWSWEEK, (August 6, 2023);

· Alana Wise, DOD Took Hours To Approve National Guard Request During Capitol Riot, Commander Says, NPR, (March 3, 2021);

· Todd Spangler, Peters’ report details failures ahead of Jan. 6 attack, calls for changes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (June 8, 2021);

· HSGAC Majority Staff Report, Chairman Gary Peters, Planned in Plain Sight: A Review of the Intelligence Failures in Advance of January 6th, 2021, (June 2023);

· Committee on House Administration, Chairman Brian Steil, DoD Inspector General Concealed January 6 Evidence,(November 21, 2024); [25]

· DOJ OIG, REP-250-011, “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Handling of Its Confidential Human Sources and Intelligence Collection Efforts in the Lead Up to the January 6, 2021 Electoral Certification” (December 2024).

The key findings are as follows: [26] [27]

  • FBI and I&A received numerous early warnings, tips, and other intelligence about plans for violence on January 6th;
  • FBI produced only two limited raw intelligence documents related to January 6th, both issued the night before the attack, and I&A did not issue any intelligence products specific to January 6th;
  • Despite claims by some agency officials and analysts, FBI and I&A have authority to monitor open-source intelligence, including social media – and agency guidelines require them to report certain online threats; and
  • FBI and I&A failed to follow agency guidelines on the use of open-source intelligence.

A detailed review of all the findings were documented in the Planned In Plain Sight – A Review of the Intelligence Failures in Advance of January 6, 2021.[28] Specifically, this review by the United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs stated:

“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) – obtained multiple tips from numerous sources in the days and weeks leading up to the attack that should have raised alarms. Rather, those agencies failed to fully and accurately assess the severity of the threat identified by that intelligence and formally disseminate guidance to their law enforcement partners with sufficient urgency and alarm to enable those partners to prepare for the violence that ultimately occurred on January 6th. At a fundamental level, the agencies failed to fulfill their mission and connect the public and nonpublic information they received. Internal emails and

documents obtained by the Committee demonstrate the breadth and gravity of the threats these agencies received related to January 6th. For example, FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) received tips and information from multiple sources, including:”

· In December 2020, FBI received a tip that the Proud Boys planned to be in DC and “[t]heir plan is to literally kill people. Please, please take this tip seriously and investigate further.”

· On Jan. 3, 2021, FBI also became aware of multiple posts calling for armed violence, such as a Parler user who stated, “[b]ring food and guns. If they don’t listen to our words, they can feel our lead. Come armed”; plans to “set up ‘armed encampment’ on the[National] Mall”; and a tip about “a TikTok video with someone holding a gun saying, ‘storm the Capitol on January 6th.’”

· On January 4th, DOJ leadership noted multiple concerning posts, including “[c]alls to occupy federal buildings,”discussions of “invading the capitol building,” and individuals “arm[ing] themselves and to engage in political violence at the event.”

In addition, on March 22, 2022, the DHS Office of Inspector General (DHSIG) also noted in its report the I&A had identified viable threats prior to January 6, 2021 but did not issue any intelligence products before the U.S. Capitol breach.

On December 29, 2020, the I&A’s Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) sent a Request for Information (RFI) to the Open-Source Collection Operation for threat information concerning the January 6 events to include:

· Online calls by event organizers to bring weapons to lawful protesters to counter protests;

· An increase in lawful protesters / counter protesters in DC, carrying, brandishing or using lethal weapons, such as firearms or edged weapons;

· Specific, directed threats of violence towards…prominent ideological adversaries or figures associated with an ideological movement; and

· Violent extremists posing a threat to individuals to include law enforcement and government officials holding opposing views prior to scheduled events.

Further, collectors of the sources messaged each other with related concerns but did not issue intelligence reports. In sum, no warnings were issued claiming these threats and other direct threats “did not fit the guidelines.” They were not widely disseminated, until after January 6, 2021.[29]

These and other specific threats were not shared with the USCP despite Chief Sund’s intelligence requests and two (2) intelligence assessment meetings with the FBI and the I&A prior to the January 6, 2021 vote certification and subsequent riots.

These facts were further corroborated by Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector General in his report dated March 4, 2022: I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach. The direct responsibility and culpability of the intelligence agencies, namely the FBI and the I&A, has been conflated and in many cases conspicuously absent from media reporting and investigations to include the January 6th Committee.

The DHSIG in their report evaluating the Secret Service’s preparation and response to the events of January 6, 2021 determined the Secret Service PID prepared two (2) reports indicating the likelihood of violence based on various reports, sources and tips but did not take commensurate protective actions.

The facts cited above added to the concerns about the security planning prior to the 2025 vote certification and the upcoming Inauguration. Many leaders and rank and file members of the USCP, the DCMP, the DCNG, the Republican House and Senate and media outlets expressed this. There are valid reasons for this. It is noted the original DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) Report No. 2022-039, dated November 16, 2021 entitled: “Review of the DoD’s Role, Responsibilities, and Actions to Prepare for and Respond to the Protest and its Aftermath at the U.S. Capitol Campus on January 6, 2021,” was submitted as the final review of the DoD’s actions on January 6, 2021. Due to the numerous investigations, reports and testimony of officials with direct knowledge and roles prior to and during January 6 vote certification, conflicting facts were uncovered.

For these reasons, Barry Loudermilk, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight sent a letter to Inspector General Robert P. Storch, dated November 21, 2024 requesting “a full correction” to the DoD IG’s inaccurate findings and statements regarding the intelligence and security failures on January 6.[30] Numerous, key witnesses, eight (8), were intentionally not interviewed. Subsequent investigations determined their accounts of the DoD’s command responses to urgent requests directly contradicted the DoD IG’s report. Chairman’s Loudermilk’s conclusion: “The inability of the DoD IG to adequately review these and other DoD actions on January 6 has informed the Subcommittee’s finding that DoD IG is complicit in intentionally concealing DoD actions to delay the DCNG’s response to the Capitol on January 6.”

Additionally, recent some media outlets are reporting, due to these and other exacerbating circumstances, law enforcement may not be adequately prepared for the Inauguration on January 20, 2025. Tenuous relationships and the history of selective information sharing between the FBI and the USCP along with the Secret Service has fostered a level of skepticism regarding intelligence gaps. This distrust has further eroded the trust in the intelligence agencies, particularly with the FBI with the release of Senator Grassley’s letter dated December 9, 2024 to FBI Director Wray detailing the extent of FBI’s abuses.[31] In addition, the Secret Service is facing scrutiny due a “loss” relevant emails from January 6, 2021 and continuing into 2024 to include sparse information releases following the two Trump assassination attempts and related missteps. In the wake of the Chairman Kelly’s Final Report by the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump, the ability of the Secret Service to protect Trump and other protectees is being called into question.[32] This is in part being attributed to a lack of reliable intelligence, a lack of competence, lack of requisite funding, lack of training and as whistleblowers contend—partisan pressure from the current administration and DHS to dilute security resources for the Trump detail. Due to these and other facts, the ability of the USCP and the Secret Service to maintain order and security in its preparation for the Inauguration on January 20, 2025 and beyond is a concern and is being questioned.

Moving forward in 2025 the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies are collectively facing a disturbing quandary of mistrust across the board…discriminating fact from disinformation is becoming increasingly challenging as of this writing. The need for integrated, robust and complete operational planning with the USCP, the Secret Service, USPP, DCMP along with the DCNG is a serious concern. Further, the critical and immediate need for the FBI and I&A to be transparent, diligent and forthcoming with ALL relevant intelligence (real time) impacting the Inauguration and future events is mandatory.

These concerns in 2025 are legitimate based on documented facts of poor integration among law enforcement agencies, diluted threat information sharing and attempts to coverup the intentional, delayed responses of DoD resources to the Capitol riots on January 6, 2021. Specifically, the in-depth chronology of the preparations, miscommunications and intentional delays to release DCNG troops, DCMP police officers and crowd suppression resources are well documented in Chief Sund’s book, Courage Under Fire, Under Siege and Outnumbered 58-1 On January 6th. Notably, among other revelations, Sund’s book details “An exposé of critical intelligence and military failures surrounding January 6 and the subsequent attempts to cover them up.”[33]

These critical intelligence sharing omissions and others did not allow the responsible law enforcement authorities, i.e. the USCP and the DCNG to adequately prepare for and rehearse responses to large, unruly crowds that flooded the Capitol grounds and some entering the Capitol building. In view of all the above facts, the appointment of the January 6th Committee by Nancy Pelosi and the integrity of its subsequent investigation has been questioned by many. Steps need to be taken immediately to ensure transparency of all agencies’ official preparations and actions.

What Can be Done Immediately?

In addition to the USCP, Secret Service and FBI, the Senate and the House of Representatives leadership; Leader McConnell, Leader Schumer, Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries, the Senate and House Sergeants at Arms and the collective membership need to come forth with the following unified and unequivocal actions and message:

· There will be ZERO TOLERANCE for any disruption during the transfer of power and for any official post-election events ow and in the future.

· This official position needs to be unanimous and declared applicable nationwide;

· Enlist the media outlets to convey this message to the nation;

· Prepare pre-recorded messages for dissemination to the public;

· For the Metropolitan DC area—The DCNG, DC Mayor Muriel Bowser, the DCPD, the Arlington Police Department, and USPP will partner with the USCP and the Secret Service and craft Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and devise an integrated plan(s) based on prior events held on the Mall;

· Establish a clear, chain-of-command communications approval process among the Chief of the USCP, the DCNG and the respective Pentagon leadership to minimize any troop and other responder deployment delays to the Capitol/contiguous areas for crowd control needs;

· Provide dedicated and tested communication links to the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) to facilitate immediate intelligence and incident reporting from all law enforcement sectors, local, state and federal;

· Provide dedicated communication links with the FBI/Behavioral Threat Assessment Center to monitor terrorist threats and Russian, Venezuelan and migrant gang activity; and

· Establish consensus among law enforcement agencies via MOUs for timely information sharing of protest and/or riot planning and critically— response criteria and notifications.

Collectively these recommendations and the following examples underscore the critical need to implement effective integration and transparency during security planning for government sponsored events, especially MOU’s. The January 6 Select Committee proceedings did not include fair, bi-partisan representation. Subcommittee investigations into the committee’s findings and the DoD’s handling of their response to the Capitol riots uncovered evidence that show the following:[34]

· Thousands of hours of video footage taken at the Capitol on January 6th were hidden and some destroyed;

· Several key witnesses were not included or their testimony was not included in the January 6 Committee inquiry.

· “Liz Cheney colluded with “star witness” Cassidy Hutchinson without Hutchison’s lawyer’s knowledge.”

· The DoD intentionally delayed the deployment of DCNG troops when urgently requested;

· The DoD IG intentionally failed to disclose evidence contradicting their false conclusions;

· The actions of the highest senior DoD officials, i.e. Secretary of the Army’s failure to honor the DCNG repeated deployment requests;

· The DCNG were prepared, ready and able to respond with a timely deployment;

· The Secretary of the Army falsely stated to Congressional leadership that he told the sheltering Members of Congress: “We have the greenlight. We are moving” at 3:18PM; and

· The DCNG in fact did not leave the Armory until 1700 (5PM).[35]

The recommendations cited below by Senator Gary Peters need to be institutionalized and implemented now and for future events. [36]

  • Conduct internal after-action reviews on the intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes in the lead-up to January 6th;
  • Improve FBI and I&A policies, guidelines, and procedures for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to partner agencies;
  • Improve inter-agency coordination for significant events and consider designating a lead federal agency; and
  • Responsibly reassert Congressional oversight authorities over the Executive Branch.

The State of the Secret Service – Can it be Saved?

A serious concern that January 6, 2021 brought into focus, and more recently with the two assassination attempts of Trump in July and September of 2024, is the competence of the Secret Service. Directly connected is its relationship with the intelligence agencies and the Biden Administration. Equally troubling is the lack of protective resources, i.e. experienced protective agents, counter-sniper teams, technical security teams, counter-surveillance and intelligence teams and worse—weak leadership—have profoundly hampered the Secret Service mission. In addition, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policy initiatives, excessive demands to staff 35 protective details (for a variety of government officials), lack of mandated training, diluted hiring practices and very low morale have exacerbated the agency’s problems.

Today’s Secret Service finds itself in the midst of a cauldron of divisive issues that has been boiling in recent years. Given this, it is critical to identify strategies and plans to improve its protective competence and get ahead of any post-election potential unrest with growing domestic and foreign threat levels. This may prove to be a herculean task since successful mitigation is predicated on open and coordinated bipartisan support. This may be a naïve goal given the division in the nation’s populous, even now, post-election. It appears the basis of the contention up to the election and now, despite the clear Trump election victory, was to beat Trump. Now many Democrat leaders are vowing to sabotage the Trump administration’s proposed initiatives. Many Democrat representatives, current and former government officials (and former intelligence officials) have stated this through media outlets. With the upcoming Inauguration of President-elect Trump, these facts need to be addressed now and beyond the Inauguration into the next four years of the Trump administration.

These factors and others continue to affect the effective protective operations of the Secret Service.

Considering these circumstances and alarmingly, two assassination attempts, the identification of Iranian assassination plots coupled with the recent operational failures of the Secret Service to implement basic protective security measures—their mission capability will require profound changes.

Reports continue among the Trump detail security agents, whistleblowers and former President Trump and now President Trump, the FBI has selectively and slowly released assassination plot and other threat information to the Secret Service. This has created distrust between the FBI and the Secret Service. On October 26, 2024, Business & Politics (BPR) reported “the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) admitted to Senator Grassley the DHS has a troubling history of obstruction, which Grassley cited as a “major red flag” for oversight.” Violations of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) are also being reported.[37] Other disturbing whistleblower reports allege “Acting Secret Service Director Rowe ‘blocked’ OIG auditors from reviewing former President Donald Trump’s security protocols.” [38]

Most disturbing, there is evidence of mistrust within the Secret Service ranks. For its mission to survive, the leadership must be overhauled, top to bottom. It will require a thorough assessment to redefine its mission and test its capability in the face of the emerging threats from enemy states. This cannot be accomplished in-house.

Following the Capitol protests in 2020, USCP Chief Sund implemented a pro-active intelligence gathering approach but received no threat intelligence by the FBI, Secret Service, DHS and DCMP. Sund stated “there was no indication that a well-coordinated, armed assault on the Capitol might occur on January 6.” This assessment was based on intelligence or the lack thereof provided to Sund. On January 4th and January 5th, Sund hosted two intelligence meetings with the USCP Intelligence and Inter-Agency Coordination Division and with a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from Washington, D.C., including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and the National Guard.[39]

Sund stated: “During both meetings, no entity, including the FBI, provided any intelligence indicating that there would be a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol by thousands of well-equipped armed insurrectionists.”

In the DHSIG’s Final Report: The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 dated July 13, 2024, by Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D., the Inspector General reported intelligence failures and policy related operational failures.[40] Six recommendations were made to improve preparedness between the Secret Service and the USCP. A few have been met.

The burning question—with this backdrop, how can the Congress and law enforcement officials adequately rely on intelligence agency reporting, the current administration’s support (or the lack thereof) and media reporting to prepare for potential disruptions in 2025? To effectively prepare for Inauguration Day, the Secret Service should establish specific and stringent MOUs with the FBI and the I&A to ensure they share timely and thorough intelligence impacting their protectees and NSSE’s in the future. This was not done prior to January 6, 2021. Further, security planning with the USCP and the DCMP, should include ongoing collaboration with military counterparts. This includes the DCNG and the DCMP to expedite crowd control responses. Critically, an agreed upon communications (tested) protocol among these agencies is required.

It has been observed by many law enforcement authorities the Secret Service is operating under a flawed threat model, i.e. a 1960’s era lone assassination threat. Today’s Secret Service has not fully embraced emerging technologies. The agency has not studied terrorist threat methodologies to see its benefit in varying environments.

The Secret Service published the <a href=”https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usss-ntac-maps-2016-2020.pdf”> Secret Service Threat Assessment Centers Mass Attacks in Public Places Guidance in January 2023 through its National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). This guidance focuses primarily on behavioral threat assessment metrics based on meta-data gleaned from 173 shooting attacks. It appears this guidance is not consistently followed in the current protective training model. The current training model is based more on reactive threat responses rather than proactive threat identification. Very little, if any study and/or training focuses on terrorist pre-attack behaviors i.e. recognizing and mitigating Islamic radicalization, attack planning (target selection, probing, testing), the purchase of precursor bomb making materials and countering multi-coordinated attacks.

Matthew Crooks clearly defeated the Secret Service at its own game. How is this possible? Are the Secret Service advance procedures too canned, too predictable? Strategic planning organizations in the public and private sector, especially in high threat environments, employ Red Team planning. At a basic level this means considering the adversary’s perspective and attack plan. Protectors should simulate attacks as an adversary would and fortify against them with security planning. In other words, wear two hats—your “good guy hat and the bad guy hat.” This is fairly obvious to seasoned military planners and strategists, However, since this strategy appears to be absent from the security planning where two assassination attempts occurred in Pennsylvania and Florida in 2024, it requires review. In simple terms…advance planners need to ask themselves: If I were a shooter or bomber, how would I identify the security plan’s vulnerabilities? What weakness would I exploit? Security planners need to ask what are we doing to fix them? This needs to be an evolving, on-going process. The Army does this on a continuing basis.

There is no evidence the Secret Service conducts any substantive Red Team exercises. The irony is Crooks, the would-be assassin who shot at Trump in Butler, PA and Ryan Routh, who attempted an assassination from a sniper position along a fence line at the Trump International Golf Course at West Palm Beach, FL, conducted better pre-attack planning than the Secret Service’s protective (counterattack) advance security team. Routh’s ability to get within easy shooting range, and remain virtually undetected for12-hours, exposed many other security operational weaknesses. To be clear both assassination attempts, one an actual AK shooting and one pre-empted, were catastrophic failures. This is a jolting and tragic wake-up call. Crooks’ and Routh’s budgets were probably less than $500 respectively. The Secret Service Presidential Campaigns and NSSE budget is reported to be ~$73.3 million from the Office and Management and Data. Clearly the security failures are not due to a lack of money.

What if the attacks at Butler or West Palm Beach had been planned by well-trained terrorists using multiple, simultaneous attack methods as witnessed in the series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France? The Secret Service and the IC at large should be acutely focused on the possibility of diversionary, multitargeted attack scenario planning prior to the Inauguration (or any future major event). There are many analyses of asymmetrical attack methods that should be studied. Other salient examples include Mumbai (2009), Brussels (2016) and Barcelona (2017). DHS has published planning guidance to identify and prevent Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (2018). Would the Secret Service be able to detect an attack plan like these let alone respond to them?

Since the 9/11 attacks billions of tax dollars have been invested in defense strategy revisions, police, military and emergency responder training, communications upgrades and field exercises to better equip all concerned to address evolving threats. The National Response Framework (2019) defines five core capacities to guide the training of the response community: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover. The purpose is to “better integrate government and local response efforts.” Simply stated, all security partners need to focus more on prevention and work as a cohesive team. It appears these capacities were not incorporated in the security plan at Butler, PA or West Palm Beach, FL.

This guidance needs to be incorporated and operationally reinforced into all joint security efforts in the field; not only in training.

Agents from other DHS agencies sed to support Secret Service protective details should be required to meet the same protective training metrics required of Secret Service agents. The required training hours should be increased as outlined in the Secret Service Fiscal Years 2021-2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

The Secret Service needs to redefine its protective mission. The current policies and procedures are based on dated threat models. The old threat models guiding the Secret Service culture are myopic and limit creative thinking. More effective proactive strategies, policies and training that match evolving attack methods are needed:

· Move the Secret Service back to the U.S. Treasury Department;

· Re-examine basic security procedures;

· Recognize and respond to lone shooter profile behaviors;

· Incorporate Red Team planning and training;

· Review lone shooter and coordinated terrorist attack methodologies;

· Develop security advance training to include preventive and deterrent attack strategies;

· Require the IC to proactively and thoroughly brief the Secret Service PID and protective details with ongoing and timely protectee threat intelligence;

· Develop specific integration protocols with public safety counterparts;

· Require a Secret Service supervisor, partnered with the local jurisdiction law enforcement supervisor, to review the security advance Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and visit each site to be visited prior to the protectee’s arrival.

· Conduct post event hot washes and train to correct missteps;

· Partner with elite military forces, i.e. Delta and Seal teams to revise a range of protective measures and training;

· Reinstate annual physical medical screening with a coronary emphasis;

· Reinstate mandatory quarterly physical fitness testing for all gun carrying personnel;

· Develop scalable protective training based on emerging attack methodologies with a terrorist focus; and

· Specifically study and create protective training scenarios that identify terrorist simultaneous attack planning targeting routes, site access/egress locations, command posts, agent and law enforcement personnel staging areas and respective equipment.

Equally troubling, the recommendations set forth by the 435-page U.S. Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis from December 2014 (after serious security failures prompted this inquiry) as of this writing, have yet to be fully implemented. Conspicuously absent among them remains—the failure of protective detail agents to complete consistent training—“at least 12% of work hours by fiscal year 2025.” According to Jason Chaffetz, the agency has woefully failed to achieve this training target. He says the Secret Service has been on notice since 2015 to implement effective changes, namely training and accountability to prevent the failures. Many key recommendations have not been met.[41]

The collective observations and recommendations outlined above are further delineated, along with others, in the FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS completed by the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump, dated December 5, 2024. This report was issued by Chairman Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Jason Crow (D-CO).[42] These recommendations should be prioritized with elite military forces. Establish scalable protective survey plans that can effectively adapt to changing locales and environments.

The world of team sports provides a compelling metaphor for how games are won. Team members are assigned positions based on ability and experience. They rehearse their plays incessantly until they get it right. Success in the protective security arena requires the same focus.

If the Secret Service team expects to win their zero-fail mission, they will need to rebuild a foundation of trust—first. Leadership deficits, disparate experience levels, inconsistent training, dated technology and other security advance omissions are fixable. Restoring trust among their fellow agents and with their brothers and sisters in blue and critically with their prized asset—the protectee—poses their biggest challenge. Winning is impossible without trust.

Is the Country Being Effectively Protected by its Intelligence Agencies?

To fully answer this, a hard look at the intelligence agencies and their successes and failures need to be critically examined in 2025. There have been more than 70 successful terrorist interdictions since 9/11. Unfortunately there has been an increase of serious failures in the last eight years, many preventable, in the homeland that dilute these successes. Many observers and media outlets are reporting partisan politics has rendered the agencies responsible for investigating and preventing many attacks in the past four years less proactive and less effective. Congressional committees and Inspectors General reports conducted in response to whistleblower testimony and media reporting have shown the FBI reallocated its resources from its primary mission to protect the nation from domestic and international terrorism. Their focus has shifted from cyber-threats, organized crime, violent crimes, human trafficking etc. to lesser crimes with a political bent. This shift in focus by the FBI along with collaboration with DHS has added to the rise of Domestic Terrorism.[43] According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) there has been a 357% increase in domestic terrorism from 2013 – 2023.[44]

After the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001, a candid review of the nation’s intelligence failures—contributing causes, i.e. agency information sharing dysfunction and the “siloed” structure of the IC; namely the CIA, FBI, NIA, DIA and the NSA was reviewed. The 9/11 Commission Report, released on July 22, 2004 examined these failures in detail.[45] Notably, the consensus finding was and unfortunately remains today—the intelligence agencies lack imagination and do not effectively share domestic and foreign threat information, particularly with a terrorist nexus. Bureaucratic and administrative restrictions delay the release of “sanitized” threat information that is in large part, not immediately useful by its consumers. Among the 9/11 Commission’s many recommendations—create a DHS in an effort to centralize 22 different federal agencies into one department. The intent was to unify security operations to be more responsive and less siloed in its handling of, sharing and responding to threat information to the homeland.

Unfortunately, this has not happened. DHS has been widely criticized for being stymied by bureaucratic dysfunction. Many have observed the amalgamation of the 22 agencies, in many cases, has had the opposite effect…these agencies, many of which with a more than a 100-year history, were not fully on board to “play in one sandbox” and share their tools risking the loss of their respective agency eminence.[46] As a result some argue many agencies hold onto information to be able to control investigations, justify funding, etc. Several studies show the goal of more effective information sharing has not been achieved despite the creation of several Presidential Directives enacted post 9/11 and the creation of more than 80 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).[47]

The numerous recent intelligence failures we are seeing and continue to experience is alarming. The conclusions of many Inspectors General reports and House Committee Hearings have further revealed the key intelligence agencies, CIA, FBI and others are not fully effective protecting Americans. It has been proven these agencies have been weaponized against conservatives and directly at Donald Trump and his family. This leads us to only one conclusion —our IC is broken. This is supported by the footnoted documents referenced in this writing. Among the many glaring facts: 51 former intelligence officials declared the Hunter Biden laptop, disinformation—later proven to be false. Further, the CIA admitted many of the 51 signatories were paid CIA contractors.[48] [49]

Several FBI, IRS and Secret Service whistleblowers including former FBI agents Richard Stout and Nicole Parker (and many others) have publicly called out the credibility of the FBI; specifically the leadership who have not prioritized the core mission of the FBI.[50] On December 9, 2024, Senator Grassley sent a letter to FBI Director citing as many as 60 examples of the FBI’s blatant failures to uphold the rule of law and obstruct the work of the Congress. The letter stated, “the FBI has shown an outright distain for congressional oversight during your tenure.”[51] Instead, recent FBI Directors, Comey and Wray chose to violate their oaths denying fair and due process rights to several hundreds of citizens and Brady rule violations for political purposes. Whistleblower testimony corroborates the FBI leadership, at many levels, were aware of this but continued this blatant dereliction of duty anyway.

It has been empirically shown the FBI and the DOJ, under the Biden Administration, have implemented an ongoing two-tier system of justice strategy targeting Republicans at large, prominent conservatives and Donald Trump while ignoring instances of clear federal statute violations (with undeniable probable cause) by the Democrats and leftists. “These include pay-to-play schemes by the Bidens and the Clintons.”[52] Not the least of which are the 18 instances of arson and vandalism targeting pregnancy resource and other faith-based centers by the group Jane’s Revenge which the FBI has not addressed.[53]

Basically, the FBI has shifted its focus and resources from counterintelligence, established terrorist threats, China hacking our nation’s IT infrastructure, sex trafficking of minors and organized crime to targeting Catholics, declaring parents attending school board meetings ”domestic terrorists,” investigating thousands of January 6th attendees and protesters and arresting pro-life demonstrators. Among the most egregious investigations and warrant executions was the unprecedented search of former President Trump’s residence, staging evidence and doctoring photos in August 2022 to justify prosecutions.[54]

Equally egregious, FBI failures identified by Senator Grassley included serious threats posed by foreign actors treated with tepid urgency if at all. For example, the FBI did not thoroughly vet Afghan evacuees under the Operations Allies Welcome (OAW), at least 50 of which were later flagged with “potentially security concerns.” This and the “open border” policy of the Biden administration, the dilution of ICE resources, restricting ICE’s arrest and deportation enforcement purview, defunding the police and weak enforcement of crimes committed by a high number of migrants entering the U.S. illegally has increased the nation’s vulnerability.[55] On June 25, 2024, DHS identified more than 400 crossed the U.S. border with an ISIS-affiliated network.[56]

Another disturbing example of the egregious failures and unlawful government oversight is documented in Senator Ron Wyden’s (D-ORE.) recent release of documents confirming the NSA and the FBI are unlawfully purchasing Americans’ internet browsing records and personal data.[57]

Restoring faith in America’s intelligence agencies to prevent what we have witnessed for at least the last eight (8) years will require significant reforms.[58] Essentially, there is a call for more transparency and bi-partisan oversight across the board.[59] Various national polls reflect more than 60% of Americans do not trust the government—especially the FBI.[60]

The GAO found the greatest number of domestic terrorism attacks are committed by either racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, (this includes homegrown violent extremism) many of whom have been radicalized since 2010.[61] A few notable examples include:

· May 3, 2024 – Two Jordanian foreign nationals attempted to force their way onto Marine Base Quantico. Both were in the country unlawfully;

· May 9, 2024 – Trevor Bickford of Maine received a 27-year prison sentence for attempting to kill police officers in Times Square in 2022. He claimed he wanted “to wage Jihad and kill as many targets as possible;” and

· June 9, 2024 – 8 Tajikistan nationals were arrested in New York, Philadelphia and Los Angeles with ties to ISIS plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S.

Recent intelligence failures are compounded by disjointed inter-agency information sharing, fewer proactive responses to threat intelligence, poor monitoring of social media posts and not responding to credible law enforcement reporting. A key policy failure is the open U.S. border and restricting the Border Patrol’s ability to identify illegal crossings and account for “gotaways.” Collectively, these intelligence failures have led to increases in a wide range of crimes as follows:

· A resurgence of terrorist attacks;

· Human trafficking;

· Drug trafficking;

· Attacks targeting law enforcement officers and their equipment;

· Homegrown violent extremism;

· Lone wolf attacks at mass gatherings;

· Hate crimes;

· Attacks on churches;

· Active school shooter attacks;

· Attacks on family planning centers; and

· Cyber-attacks/Ransomware attacks.

Fixing this will require honest, bipartisan commitment. The IC, above all, will need to be accountable to their staffs and the American people. The proposed remedies (some of which cited below) are required to ensure the respective intelligence agencies are transparent with the appropriate federal and local law enforcement agencies. This is needed to prevent a repeat of the abuses identified earlier that targeted a variety of individuals and groups by the Biden administration.

· Establish a special bipartisan committee with full access to all intelligence and threats to ensure proportional decisions and actions to protect the homeland are made above politics and reviewed before being implemented;

· Ensure the investigations conducted by the intelligence agencies are strictly within their jurisdictional purviews;

· Assess the effectiveness of the collaborative sharing information practices and formal agreements between the FBI and DHS. A 2023 GAO study shows threat information is not shared effectively by them and is not immediately useful. This GAO report identified a key reason for this serious information sharing dysfunction:[62]

“FBI officials told us they did not use the data DHS collects on domestic terrorism incidents because they weren’t aware DHS was collecting it. DHS officials in turn told us they didn’t share their incident data with their FBI counterparts because they weren’t asked for it.”

· Verify that any unmasking follow CIA & FBI rules. The names of many U.S. citizens were improperly released instead of or with foreign targets;[63]

· Enact strict verification processes to prevent using circular reporting by “creating” false and damaging information, leaking it to the press and then opening investigations based on that. It has been established the FBI under Director Comey and other FBI officials engaged in this practice; and

· Enact strict adherence to verification processes to ensure the basis of any Section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) application requests are factual. Rampant abuse of the FISA process by Director Comey and other FBI officials (from 2016 – 2017 and beyond) has been confirmed by the DOJ IG.[64]

On December 9, 2019, Attorney General William Barr stated the DOJ IG determined the evidence put forth to the FISA Court to secure warrants to surveil the Trump campaign and his administration “were not factual, omitted consistently exculpatory information.” AG Barr further stated: “ The malfeasance and misfeasance detailed in the Inspector General’s report reflects a clear abuse of the FISA process;”[65] [66]

Looking Forward

As we begin 2025 and we assess the state of our government, the state of our safety, the state of our security, our sovereignty and most important, America’s pre-eminence on the planet; now is a great opportunity to work to rejuvenate the bedrock principles that make us the sterling example of freedom and strength. It is possible to reignite the nation’s status as the “Shining City on a Hill” as President Reagan described it.

It will take an honest commitment for the new Trump administration to set things right. In the last several years many of our agency heads and politicians put egos and politics ahead of the nation’s guiding principles. How many of them were boy scouts and forgot the first point of the scout law?: “A scout is trustworthy.” How many attended military academies and committed to the credo?: “A cadet shall not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate anyone the does.” How many swore allegiance to the United States and their Oath of Office (5 US Code Sec. 3331)?: “I do solemnly swear I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…I take this obligation freely without purpose of evasion…”

If there was ever a time in the history of our nation when accountability, honest introspection and reform is critically needed…it is NOW!

[1] https://www.gpb.org/news/2024/10/21/law-enforcement-officials-prepare-for-possible-post-election-violence-in-dc

[2] https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2024/10/law-enforcement-officials-prepare-possible-post-election-violence-dc/400374/

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/us/politics/democrats-anti-trump-battle-plan.html

[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj6kj383k4ko

[5] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/08/donald-trump-iran-assassination-plot-00188498

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/24/asia/russia-china-north-korea-iran-new-axis-intl-hnk/index.html

[7] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[8] https://nypost.com/2022/03/18/intelligence-experts-refuse-to-apologize-for-smearing-hunter-biden-story/

[9] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/12/14/biden-trump-laws-judges-regulations-legacy/76865964007/

[10] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/10/28/the-us-spies-who-sound-the-alarm-about-election-interference

[11] https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/02/democrats-congress-trump-january-6/677545/

[12] https://americanmilitarynews.com/2024/08/video-democrat-congressman-calls-for-civil-war-conditions-to-disqualify-trump-if-he-wins/#google_vignette

[13] https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/10/20/trump-overturn-2024-election-plan-00184103

[14] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/20/democrats-trump-foes-governors-attorneys-general-interest-groups-00190177

[15] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/presidential/3238783/shell-shocked-democrats-struggle-mount-resistance-trump/

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/22/us/politics/election-warning-russia-iran.html

[17] https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf

[18] https://www.dhs.gov/publication/special-event-assessment-rating-sear-events-fact-sheet

[19] https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/25-011.pdf

[20] OIG-24-42-Aug24-Redacted copy.pdf

[21] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[22] https://www.newsweek.com/ex-capitol-police-chief-sounds-alarm-jan-6-cover-1817365

[23] https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973292523/dod-took-hours-to-approve-national-guard-request-during-capitol-riot-commander-s

[24] https://www.npr.org/2021/01/11/955548910/ex-capitol-police-chief-rebuffs-claims-national-guard-was-never-called-during-ri

[25] https://cha.house.gov/press-releases?ID=1E353E41-4087-428A-A477-B70E5FD46FA1

[26] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[27] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/peters-report-finds-significant-intelligence-failures-by-fbi-and-dhs-in-lead-up-to-january-6th-capitol-attack

[28] https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/230627_HSGAC-Majority-Report_Executive-Summary_Jan-6-Intel.pdf

[29] https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-04/OIG-22-29-Mar22-Redacted.pdf

[30] https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/2/2/22c7bff3-c7be-4ba9-b539-767ec0fda0ac/DA74D6968E28C88C7160A0ED12148C84.11.21.2024-loudermilk-dod-ig-letter.pdf

[31] Letter from Chairman Charles Grassley, Se. Comm. on Fin., to Director Wray (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_fbi_-_failures.pdf

[32] https://taskforce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/july13taskforce.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/12-5-2024-Final-Report-Redacted.pdf

[33] https://www.blackstonepublishing.com/blogs/news/former-capital-police-chief-steven-a-sund-set-to-publish-a-new-book-about-the-attack-on-january-6-with-explosive-never-before-revealed-information

[34] https://cha.house.gov/press-releases?ID=1E353E41-4087-428A-A477-B70E5FD46FA1

[35] https://cha.house.gov/2024/12/chairman-loudermilk-releases-second-january-6-2021-report

[36] https://www.peters.senate.v/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[37] https://www.bizpacreview.com/2024/10/26/whistleblowers-claim-secret-service-employees-working-with-trump-were-made-to-sign-ndas-1497932/

[38] https://nypost.com/2024/10/09/us-news/secret-service-blocked-watchdog-to-hide-inconsistent-security-protocols-at-trump-events-whistleblower/

[39] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/capitol-police-chief-steven-sund-entire-intelligence-community/story?id=75729882

[40] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/dept.-of-homeland-security-oig-releases-report-on-secret-service-s-response-to-jan.-6-attack-on-the-u.s.-capitol

[41] https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf

[42] https://taskforce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/july13taskforce.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/12-5-2024-Final-Report-Redacted.pdf

[43] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[44] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-104720

[45] https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf

[46] https://www.thoughtco.com/department-of-homeland-security-4156795

[47] https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/114425/witnesses/HHRG-117-JU08-Wstate-JonesS-20220217.pdf

[48] https://www.newsweek.com/hunter-biden-laptop-jim-jordan-facebook-disinformation-twitter-1767369

[49] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/cia-admits-some-signatories-of-hunter-biden-laptop-letter-were-paid-contractors/ar-BB1oVNjs

[50] https://ijr.com/richard-stout-how-to-reform-our-politically-weaponized-fbi-and-restore-public-trust/

[51] Letter from Chairman Charles Grassley, Se. Comm. on Fin., to Director Wray (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_fbi_-_failures.pdf

[52] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[53] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/zero-arrests-16-janes-revenge-attacks-pro-life-organizations

[54] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/house-judiciary-committee-investigates-alteration-evidence-seized-fbi-trump-classified-records-probe

[55] https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/10/02/dhs-2025-homeland-threat-assessment-indicates-threat-domestic-and-foreign-terrorism

[56] https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CHS-10.3.24-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf

[57] Senator Ron Wyden (D-ORE.) recent report by Ars Technica states the NSA has admiied to buying records

[58] https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-intelligence-community-is-broken-heres-how-we-fix-it

[59] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/3224584/how-trump-can-intelligently-reform-the-intelligence-community/

[60] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[61] https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-threat-domestic-terrorism-u.s.-and-federal-efforts-combat-it

[62] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[63] Lt. General Flynn and other Trump administration officials were improperly unmasked during 2016 – 2017.

[64] Section 702 authorizes targeted foreign intelligence information collection related to terrorism. U.S. persons may not be targeted and their names indiscriminately used without a specific nexus to terrorism.

[65] https://clayhiggins.house.gov/2019/12/09/higgins-ig-report-confirms-obama-era-fbi-abused-fisa-process/

[66] https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/4012650-fbi-misused-surveillance-tool-fisa-section-702/

The Failed Assassination of Former President Trump in Butler, PAHow did the Secret Service Miss the Warnings?

The Failed Assassination of Former President Trump in Butler, PAHow did the Secret Service Miss the Warnings?

The country and the rest of the world are still incredulous—how could a 20-year-old lone gunman manage to defeat the nation’s elite protectors and fire 8 rounds from an AK that nearly inflicted a fatal skull injury on a Presidential nominee? By divine intervention and the momentary distraction of the shooter by a Butler, PA police officer, Former President Trump escaped an assassination at a rally in Butler, PA on Saturday, July 13th. Now, more than three weeks later, despite two Congressional Oversight hearings with now former Director Cheatle and Acting Director Rowe there are still many unanswered questions and very troubling facts continue to emerge. Former Director Cheatle’s vacuous responses to the Oversight Committee’s questions and Acting Director Rowe’s equally indirect answers and misinformed statements on July 30th (including the FBI’s limited statements) have allowed serious questions to linger. Numerous theories, some supported with facts and other less credible, have been developing. Numerous articles have been published. Senator Grassley, as reported by Real Clear Politics, RCP on July 22nd, has received agency whistleblowers’ information, audio and texts from Butler law enforcement officers. These have exposed many disturbing, negligent lapses and security omissions contradicting many claims made by Cheadle and Rowe.

As of this writing, the Secret Service has been guarded with their responses to the Oversight Committee’s inquiry and to the public. Rowe’s limited statements seem to contradict evidence from Butler law enforcement authorities and video evidence obtained from the public.

In an effort to set the record straight and in the spirit of urging critical reforms, the following factual information supported by video evidence and statements from Butler Police officers and SWAT officers assigned to the rally on July 13th with direct operational knowledge, is set forth. It is critically important to bring clarity to the information being reported.

This review will highlight key omissions of protective advance procedures during the security planning of the July 13, 2024 rally. . Many recommendations set forth by the 435-page U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel’s report from December 2014 (after serious security failures prompted this inquiry) were not fully implemented. Conspicuously absent among them was and remains—the failure of protective detail agents to complete consistent training—“at least 12% of work hours by fiscal year 2025.” According to Jason Chaffetz, the agency has woefully failed to achieve this training target. He says the Secret Service has been on notice since 2015 to implement effective changes, namely training and accountability to prevent the failures like those seen in Butler, PA.

The intent is to fact check the numerous statements and theories put forth by self-proclaimed experts and balance those with some credible authorities. In the spirit of separating facts from theory—context, background and explanations of the facts as we know them are sorely needed. Effective, tested protective strategies and advance procedures will be presented as a basis of comparison.

Normally I would not comment with this amount of detail on related matters. However, this assassination attempt has exposed systemic operational failures of the Secret Service’s protective arm and the advance team’s preparations. For example Real Clear Politics, RCP on July 30 referenced CNN reports and admissions by Rowe that expose the fact that security resources were denied for the Trump detail despite repeated requests by the detail agents. This has been an on-going complaint by detail agents and whistleblowers for at least two years. Denied resources for Trump rallies include counter sniper teams, drones, canine teams, metal detection equipment and other matériel. Further, documents show where Rowe decided unilaterally to restrict counter sniper teams to any Trump event beyond driving distance outside of D.C. While Cheatle, Rowe and the Secret Service spokesman initially denied this, whistleblower reports has forced them to confront their denials. RCP further reports the Butler rally was not allocated any counter sniper teams but Secret Service management reversed the decision and sent two teams to Butler with one day to conduct a survey that normally takes two to three days to complete.

This is appalling given the thousands of on-going death threats directed at Trump and the Iranian assassination plot discovered before the Butler rally.

All of us need to avoid feeding into conspiracies. Fair-minded folks want the forensics experts to complete their investigation and analysis based on facts. Hopefully this will minimize theories that are gaining attention. Additionally, when unsupported theories are not checked, there is a risk of feeding into them and they seemingly become more credible. The other risk is people tend to lose their objectivity and unintentionally get drawn into these conspiracies. With the cascade of information bombarding us, we have difficulty discriminating credible facts from fiction and “exciting” and “dramatic” theories. Everyone needs to be reminded to take a deep breath, pause and consider verified facts. To do this effectively, it is important to understand context and known factors.

The following is set forth based on what has been reported by credible, law enforcement agencies and other official sources on the ground at the Butler rally site, information from a closed-door Oversight Hearing, others familiar with the facts (as best that can be determined) and video evidence leading up to, during and after the assassination attempt. The FBI is continuing their investigation.

Tragedies as serious as a nearly successful assassination resulting in injuring a Presidential nominee, the death of one spectator and serious injuries of two other supporters is not an isolated event. There were and are a host of diverse factors at play at the Butler rally before and during that impacted the attack. Contributing factors are multi-factored and complex. Agency mission, leadership, federal statutes, intelligence information, agency policies, training, security resources, physics, human factors, political tension and others play a role.

Isolating these elements and assigning a predictive value of each poses a near impossible challenge.

Suffice it to say the collective circumstances (as we now know) at play leading up to, during and immediately following the attack are very disturbing and are indicative of the Secret Service’s negligent execution of their protective plan. Before we can move forward, key omissions and departures from established protective procedures need to be identified. This will give insights on factors that contributed to the security vulnerabilities and failings at the rally. Hopefully, this will help guide our understanding and conclusions based on fact and verified evidence. Most important, the ultimate goal is to learn how we can collectively, from our respective vantage points, do everything possible to prevent attacks like this from happening in the future.

While rare (the last assassination attempt of a president occurred 43 years ago), none of us are naïve enough to think a breakdown in security would never occur again. However, ensuring that effective, scalable security procedures are consistently implemented will minimize the possibility of a repeat (as much as humanly possible), is the goal moving forward. Hopefully this review will ensure a more diligent focus on preventive security measures. If a response is needed, it will be immediate and effective.

What we do know now is the earlier blame shifting of security responsibility, communications breakdowns and serious omissions of basic security advance operating procedures are worse than originally reported. The security missteps point to profound negligence in the execution of the security plan. Key to understanding the egregious breakdown in security is answering how the shooter slipped through the cracks after being observed by local counter snipers at a picnic table on July 13th at 4:26 PM. A Beaver County counter sniper’s text message released by Beaver County officials reported initial sightings of a suspicious individual about 100 minutes before the shooting. He was observed by a Pennsylvania State Police Officer with a range finder exhibiting suspicious behavior. His photo was reportedly sent to the Police Command Post. Apparently this information was not passed to the Secret Service Security Room at this first sighting. A video taken more than an hour before the shooting, at about 5:06 PM, shows Crooks in front of the AGR building. This sighting of a suspicious person was reported to police by spectators. Police on the ground were looking for him up to the time of the shooting.

On July 23, 2024, the New York Times reported the FBI determined a local SWAT team spotted Crooks on the roof of a warehouse about 18 minutes before Trump took the stage (about 5:44 PM) and 27 minutes before the assassination attempt (6:11:33 PM). Why was this report of a man on a roof lost and/or not reported to the Secret Service and the other officers at the rally?

On July 19, 2024, CBS News reported information from three sources that closed door meetings between Secret Service/FBI officials and law makers the Secret Service was aware of a suspicious person 20 minutes before the shooting began. At 5:51 PM State Police alerted the U.S. Secret Service about a suspicious person within a minute of this sighting.

Why were the Trump protective detail agents not immediately notified? Why was Trump not informed? Trump took the stage at 6:02 PM, a full 17 minutes after multiple reports of a suspicious person with a range finder were received and passed to law enforcement radio channels? The Secret Service treated this as a generic suspicious-person-notice until minutes before the shooting.

The delayed, ineffective response to these warnings violates the Secret Service’s core protective responsibility to notify the protective detail and the post agents of potential threats when the behaviors fit the lone shooter profile. Crooks’ behavior was not “merely suspicious.” The first sightings of Crooks alarmed police officers. To deem Crooks’ behavior as merely suspicious is irresponsible. Further, in the context of the thousands of documented threats received by the Trump detail, the Secret Service Intelligence Division and the Iranian assassination plot received before the rally, an urgent and heightened alert and response to the reported behaviors were clearly in order. The Secret Service’s own threat assessment center provides guidance to employees and law enforcement agencies to assist in the detection of would be attackers (See Planning-page 12-18). Why were these lone shooter profile behaviors, that fit those being exhibited by Crooks, not considered when these reports were received?

Crooks exhibited many of the predictive behaviors identified by the Secret Service and other numerous post shooting attack studies associated with lone shooters. The investigation to date shows Crooks visited the rally site at least twice before the rally and once (leaving and returning) the same day before the attack. Crooks evaluated the rally site two hours before the rally with his own drone, probed security at various locations, brought a range finder and paced nervously before leaving, apparently eluding officers trying to locate him. All of these behaviors, sightings and notifications by local police officers and spectators, were not prioritized as a threat by the Secret Service until Crooks was seen with a rifle on the AGR building. Why didn’t the Secret Service agents and the Secret Service counter sniper teams link these behaviors to the behavioral profile known to be typical of lone shooters? Cheatle lamely claimed to the Oversight Committee the suspicious behavior was only “suspicious” and not deemed a threat until Crooks was seen with a gun on the roof of the AGR building. Not prioritizing this as a threat and alerting the Trump detail immediately about Crook’s’ early behaviors, known to be linked to the behavioral profile of known shooters, is nothing short of negligent. On July 30, 2024, at the Oversight Committee hearing, Rowe gave an equally evasive answer to Senator’s Lee’s question as to why Trump was allowed on the stage with the behaviors cited above. Rowe stated (0-:27) a threat needs a weapon “it comes to weapon, a potential threat, is he carrying an IED…? To be characterized as a threat, Rowe’s statement that Crooks needed to have been seen with a gun or IED before decisive intervention should be taken is naïve. This exposes his lack of understanding and failure to link Crooks’ behavior as more than suspicious despite sightings of Crooks with a gun well before the shooting.. Assessments like this chill decisive decision making. Similar indecision allowed Omar Gonzalez to scale the White House fence on September 19, 2014, overpower a Uniformed Division Officer and enter the Diplomatic Entrance of the White House.

The behavioral profiles cited in the Secret Service Threat Assessment Centers Mass Attacks in Public Places Guidance recommendations, published in January 2023, define behaviors displayed by Crooks’ as threatening. Similar pre-attack behaviors are clearly linked to shootings and have been validated in published metadata summarizing the conclusions of studies of mass shootings in the past 40+ years. Crooks’ behavior should have been linked to the lone shooter behavioral profiles. Crooks exhibited many of these behaviors before Trump took the stage. To attempt to ”dilute” these disturbing behaviors that exceed the baseline of normal spectator behaviors, is negligent. If the Detail Leader and shift agents protecting Trump were notified after the first sightings (they were not), Trump would have been held in the limo or holding room or taken off the stage until the suspicious person was located.

Not informing the Detail Leader, Trump and the rally security agents about the suspicious person from the early sightings, especially his nervous movements, possessing a range finder and evading police is among the most egregious failures at the Butler rally. The Police Command Post and the Secret Service Security Room should have informed the Secret Service detail protecting Trump—immediately.

The FBI investigation has now confirmed Crooks exhibited many other pre-attack behaviors, i.e. using aliases to purchase precursor bombmaking materials and researching the DNC schedule in Chicago and historical assassination details.

The most important protective tool required to effectively protect people and assets are competent security team members, a thorough security advance and a diligent review of the security measures before the visit of the protectee. The security advance elements, resources and physical response protocols need to be rigorously applied and continually refined to match evolving threats and be scalable to adapt to changing circumstances.

Any effective dignitary security advance requires teamwork by developing a cohesive team with ALL partners in the city and jurisdiction being visited, especially the public safety responders.

Presidential advances and Presidential campaign advances with heightened political tension with thousands of protectee death threats require diligent attention to every facet of the security preparations. Commensurate manpower, resources, a scalable security plan and oversight that match threat levels is required! This is a tall order but needs to be done.

Information gleaned from the Butler County law enforcement agencies assigned to the rally site, whistleblowers and members of the public to include videos taken, before, during and after the shooting are detailed below. All point to the fact many immutable tenets of protection were not followed, not implemented and/or ignored.

U. S. Secret Service Legal Authority

Before the deviations from and omissions of well-established Secret Service advance procedures are identified and explained, the legal protective authority needs to be referenced. Very few media outlets are reporting this.

The jurisdictional investigative and protective authority of the Secret Service is defined in the United States Code, Title 18 Section 3056. As it relates to Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, the following section of the Code specifically applies.

Title 18 U.S.C.’ 3056(a)(7) authorizes the U.S. Secret Service to provide protection for major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.

This authority cannot be abdicated to local law enforcement. Former Director Cheatle and Acting Director Rowe erroneously stated it could be. Cheatle claimed local law enforcement were responsible for the security of the AGR Building in Butler, PA. Crooks fired eight (8) AR rounds from the roof in the direction of the stage hitting Trump and three others. Cheatle specifically stated the AGR building was outside the security perimeter and the building was not swept. Cheatle essentially blamed local law enforcement for the security failure.

On July 30, 2024, Acting Director Rowe testified: “We made an assumption that there was going to be uniformed presence out there, that there would be sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be the local counter sniper teams.”

These claims fly in the face of the statements of the local police officers assigned to support the sectors and posts at the Butler rally. Cheatle and Rowe attempted to shift blame and responsibility to local law enforcement. This is not supported by law nor precedent. It is simply not tenable.

The USSS is always responsible for identifying and preventing any threat regardless of its origin; inside or outside established “secure” perimeters during an official event. This has never been proffered as a defense for absolution of protective responsibility in the history of the Secret Service. The Secret Service is the overall lead agency responsible for all Presidential candidate security arrangements. This is not delegable.

On July 20, 2024,The New York Times reported that several local officers, including Butler County Sheriff Michael Slupe, stated:

None of the law enforcement agencies that assisted the Secret Service that day — the Pennsylvania State Police, the Butler Township Police Department, the Butler County Sheriff, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police or the multicounty tactical teams—say they were given responsibility for watching the zone outside the Secret Service’s fenced security perimeter…More specifically, the local law enforcement officials stated that none of them were assigned to safeguard the complex of warehouses just north of the farm show grounds including the AGR building.

Alarmingly, statements made by the local agencies indicate the majority of their assignments were to provide security inside or along the perimeter fencing leaving the outside perimeter beyond the fencing exposed. The only outer perimeter police presence were officers assigned to direct traffic. There were however, three local counter snipers assigned to use the 2nd floor window from inside of a building adjacent to the AGR building. They were instructed to monitor the inner perimeter crowd only.

Butler Township Commissioner Edward Natali stated unequivocally:

“There were seven officers all assigned to traffic detail. Period!! The BTPD was NOT responsible for securing AGR or any other location…“Anyone who says so, reports on it, implies it, etc… is uninformed, lying, or covering their own backsides.”

The seven Butler Township police officers were assigned traffic posts but once there was a suspicious person notification, four of the seven officers left their posts to look for him.

Anyone familiar with basic security understands that limiting exposure requires creating strong, integrated and functional perimeters. Limiting your focus on the inner perimeter is just plain myopic, especially in an environment with upswept and unposted buildings in the outer perimeters less than 150 yards away from the protectee. It appears the Secret Service advance team forgot one of the most basic security perimeter concepts—all rings of security need to be fortified and integrated into the overall security plan. It needs to be one team, one fight. An absence of security or weakness in the outer security perimeters reduces the time needed to respond to a threat and shortens the distance between the attacker and the protectee—all factors favorable to the attacker.

Security Advance Omissions Leading to Critical Failures

Normally a Presidential and/or Presidential candidate security advance, especially one conducted for a candidate nominee of Trump’s stature and threat level, should include tested advance protection procedures that have been implemented consistently by the Secret Service for decades. These are well documented in Candidate Nominee Operations directives and manuals. Terminology of these may vary but their security function is clear. Omissions of these could lead to catastrophic consequences. In Butler there were key omissions and an assassination nearly occurred as a result.

Credible sources, whistleblower reports, local police agency statements and Oversight Committee hearing testimony identified negligent deviations and omissions of standard Secret Service protective operation procedures.

It is noted many of the security omissions have been acknowledged by Cheatle and Rowe. Other missteps have been denied despite local police officer statements/texts, whistleblower reports, Secret Service emails and media reporting.

Security Advance Omissions/Oversights:

· Assigning an inexperienced agent to lead the advance in Butler, PA.

· Middle perimeter security manpower included 1-2 Secret Service agents, far fewer than comparable size rallies.

· The security plan was inner perimeter focused with less emphasis on the outer perimeters.

· Local police officers were too siloed and not integrated with the overall security plan.

· Unclear radio communications reporting procedures.

· No officers were assigned to monitor the perimeter beyond the rally perimeter fence to include the AGR building and other warehouses.

· Secret Service did not attend a police meeting with local police counterparts. This prevented functional pairing of Secret Service agents and police officers.

· No helicopter surveillance was provided.

· The Secret Service did not deploy a drone and declined one offered by local law enforcement.

· No Counter Surveillance Unit or Intelligence Unit were available.

· The Secret Service counter sniper team was deployed one day before the rally.

· Four local counter sniper units were located inside the rally perimeter fence; three others inside an adjacent building (next to the AGR building) to monitor the rally

· Secret Service agents did not monitor the AGR building.

· The Secret Service counter sniper teams were not operationally integrated with the local sniper teams.

· No supervisor site review or walk-thru was conducted before the rally.

Resulting Operational Failures:

There were numerous failures resulting from not following established security advance procedures. On July 19, 2024, Breitbart reported nine critical, interconnected planning failures. These are all the result of a negligent failure to follow established advance procedures. These are valid but deserve more context. The following failures are identified to date.

Collectively these oversights led to critical operational failures, the most egregious of which was not communicating Crooks’ threatening behavior to the entire security team when it was first noted by the police at least an hour before the shooting. There were several opportunities after the first sighting of Crooks that should have been communicated to all the police officers and the agents assigned to the rally and critically, to the Trump detail agents.

Given the number of police agencies assigned, the potential for disjointed communications, coordinated through two separate communications hubs, should have been anticipated. A dedicated emergency reporting channel should have been set up and tested. These communications and related technology updates to include drones have been acquired but the Secret Service has been slow to adapt and implement them.

The Secret Service advance agent should have requested the local snipers to take positions outside the AGR building.

The Secret Service drone was not utilized in Butler. Inexplicably, the Secret Service turned down a drone offered by the local police.

A counter-surveillance agent or roving intelligence team should have been available to respond to reports of a suspicious person.

The advance agent should have met with the Secret Service counter sniper teams and local sniper teams to establish a joint workable operations plan. The Secret Service counter sniper survey should have been jointly reviewed with the local sniper teams. This would have identified vulnerable areas and clarified the rules of engagement and statutory authorities. This would have provided would have provided for better sector surveillance and a more cohesive operational team. This would have made life and death split-second decision making more accurate. The fact the Secret Service counter sniper teams did not have communications with the local sniper teams. Collectively, these factors and others contributed to delays.

Secret Service emails reported by Real Clear Politics obtained by Senator Grassley determined 1 – 3 Secret Service agents were assigned to support the Butler rally. Whereas 12 Secret Service agents were assigned to First Lady Dr. Jill Biden for a function in Pittsburgh the same day. The majority of security posts were assigned and held by Homeland Security agents. Current and former Secret Service personnel expressed concern over this and similar disparate resource allocations, i.e. giving Biden more resources than Trump. Trump detail agents have reported this disparity for at least two years prior to the Butler assassination attempt. At the July 30th Oversight hearing Senator Cruz asked Rowe about these and other documented discrepancies, Rowe’s stated rationale was “the sitting president holds national command authority to launch a nuclear strike, sir.” Rowe’s answer (4:30-7:34) did not address threat levels against Trump and how that would affect security resource allocations and the actual numbers disparity.

Senator Grassley, Real Clear Politics and whistleblower reports exposed that Cheatle and Rowe were directly involved in denying requests for needed crowd screening equipment, additional agency manpower, counter sniper teams and other resources for Trump rallies.

It is noted that Rowe was evasive and did not answer the question: “Did you directly approve withholding security resource allocations for Former President Trump vis à vis President Biden events?” This disparate resource allocation exposes more vulnerability to Trump. Notably, no Secret Service counter sniper teams were given to support Trump’s rallies prior to the Butler, PA rally. To rely on local sniper team(s) as the sole sniper resource, with admitted radio interoperability problems between the local police and the Secret Service, poses numerous operational risks.

Two Secret Service counter sniper teams were assigned to the Butler rally a day before the event. Normally, counter sniper teams are deployed 2 – 3 days prior to an event for the current sitting president. At the Butler rally two Secret Service counter sniper teams and local sniper resources were used. At the July 30th Oversight Hearing, Senator Lindsey Graham asked Rowe if the Iranian assassination plot factored into the security footprint. Rowe replied: “Secret Service does a threat based protective model.” Whistleblower reports, Real Clear Politics and Representative Mike Waltz dispute this since the Trump detail agents claim additional security resources have been historically denied. denied and prior to the Butler rally by Secret Service managers, (i.e. Cheatle and Rowe). Secret Service spokesman Anthony Guglielmi and Rowe claim otherwise. In fact Rowe testified these assertions are false.

Nowhere in the U.S. Code, Title 3056(a)(7) is there a caveat for less effective or fewer security resources when there is a clear, on-going death threat level which Trump clearly had and continues to have. The mission of the Secret Service requires it to deploy resources commensurate with the protectee’s threat level as much as possible. Every Secret Service protectee deserves this. To do otherwise invites an attack as we saw in Butler. It is well documented, supported by decades of metadata, that many would-be attackers, especially lone attackers study their targets, note and exploit vulnerabilities.

Approximately a week after the assassination attempt, several local law enforcement officers from Butler, PA appeared on ABC News and asserted the Secret Service advance team did not coordinate or meet with them before the rally. Jason Woods, the lead sniper stated: “We were supposed to get a face-to-face briefing with the Secret Service members whenever they arrived, and that never happened.” Further, Woods stated: “So I think that was probably a pivotal point, where I started thinking things were wrong because it never happened,” Woods said. “We had no communication.”

Investigations have determined the Secret Service detail agents protecting Trump were not notified of this suspicious person at any time from the first sighting up to the time he was sighted on the roof. It is noted other Secret Service agents were informed at least 20 minutes before the first bullets were fired. The detail agents should have been notified immediately as soon as a suspicious person was spotted on the roof of the AGR building, at the very least at 5:53 PM. At this point, the suspicious person was no longer “suspicious” by any definition.

There is no way this can be excused. This was now an imminent threat! This notice should have given the detail at least during the 17 minutes and 30 seconds (when Crooks was seen on the roof of the AGR building) to inform the Detail Leader to make the decision to remain in the limo or in the holding room until the threat had been resolved.

There are many hundreds of examples in Secret Service history when a protectee has been moved to or held in a holding room or removed from a site when threats and vulnerabilities are identified.

During the hearings, Rowe acknowledged some radio transmissions were and lost and not relayed. He attributed the miscommunications and delays to the Secret Service’s encryption algorithms. He stated integrating the encrypted system would take many weeks. Certainly that is not a reasonable solution during an emergency and cumbersome since each jurisdiction has their own radio technology. Radio interoperability has long been a problem for responders. It was cited in the 9/11 Commission Report following the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Since then, significant government resources have been provided to law enforcement agencies to achieve better radio interoperability technology among agencies. Notably, following the Oversight Committee Report – U.S Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, infrastructure investments were made starting in 2017 to facilitate the integration of radio communications between Secret Service and local police. This technology was available but not implemented at the Butler rally.

To blame secure radio encryptions for the delay in getting immediate messages from police officers to the Police Command Post and the Secret Service Security Room is not an excuse.

Creative and imaginative thinking including using common sense solutions like cell phones, jointly staffing Command Posts and or Security Rooms with local police radios would have minimized urgent threat notification delays. Simply having someone physically dispatch to the Command Post to personally deliver urgent messages during the approximately 20-minutes Crooks was sighted on the roof might have saved the day.

The Secret Service Presidential candidate advance teams are normally staffed by agents assigned to the field offices within the jurisdictional, geographic boundaries of the closest field office. Agents are also detailed from other offices as manpower needs and availability dictate. The security advance procedures for a Presidential and a Presidential nominee should have equivalently experienced personnel, resources and technology vis-à -vis for a sitting president’s advance. There should be no qualitative difference—the same protective standards should remain consistent. Whistleblower reports indicate the site advance agent assigned to the Butler rally was not experienced with large-scale advances.

For example, the middle perimeter was staffed with Homeland Security Investigative Agents reportedly with little to no experience with Secret Service protection assignments.

Strategic Failures

Among numerous burning questions: How could a lone 20-year-old with relatively cheap equipment, i.e., a drone, range finder and his father’s AR rifle defeat the Secret Service with 22 agents and approximately 80 additional law enforcement officers assigned to secure the Buller, PA rally site?

Obviously money and supposedly years of sophisticated dignitary protection training, state-of-the-art security surveillance technology, access to classified threat intelligence, an expensive array of assault weapons, encrypted communications systems—all failed. What was missing? Was it leadership? Was it a flawed security strategy? Was it incompetence? Was it an inability to assess risk? Was it an inability to communicate? Was it an inability to craft an effective protective security plan? Was it a combination of all of these?

Or…was it a lack of imagination? The experience and millions of dollars’ worth of equipment available to the Secret Service appeared to be no match for understanding and effectively implementing these tools to counter a lone 20-year-old shooter. Was the Butler, PA attack a one-off or does this expose profound weaknesses of the protective arm of the Secret Service?

Matthew Crooks clearly defeated the Secret Service at its own game. How is this possible? Are the Secret Service advance procedures too canned, too predictable? Strategic planning organizations in the public and private sector, especially in high threat environments, employ Red Team teaming. At a basic level this means considering the adversary’s perspective and goals. Simulate an attack as an adversary would and fortify against it with your security planning. In other words, wear two hats—your good guy hat and the bad guy hat. This will be fairly obvious to seasoned military planners and strategists, However, since this strategy appears to be absent from the security planning at Butler, it deserves to be mentioned. In simple terms…advance planners need to ask themselves: if I were a shooter or bomber, where are the vulnerabilities in this plan? What weakness would I exploit? Then as a security planner I need to ask what am I doing to fix them? This needs to be an evolving, on-going process. These are basic strategic security planning questions. The Army does this on a continuing basis.

There is no evidence the Secret Service conducts any substantive Red Team exercises. The irony here is Crooks did it for them by exposing the security plan’s egregious weaknesses. This is a jolting and tragic wake-up call. Crooks’ budget was probably less than $500. The Secret Service Presidential Campaigns and National Special Security Events budget is reported to be ~$73.3 million from the Office and management and Data. Clearly the security failures are not due to a lack of money.

It is as though Crooks had the Candidate Nominee Operations advance manual and observed the security advance planning. Crooks visited the site, researched Trump’s schedule, surveyed the site and stage with a drone and probed and tested security.

Leadership should have given the security advance team the training and tools needed to at least be on par with Crooks. Clearly the planning should have expanded the security footprint well beyond the security perimeter defined by the fence. Assuming the outer perimeters were covered by local law enforcement without the requisite police meetings was negligent.

What if the attack had been planned by well-trained terrorists using multiple, simultaneous attack methods as witnessed in the series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France?

Homeland Security published planning guidance to prevent Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (2018). Other salient examples include Mumbai (2009), Brussels (2016) and Barcelona (2017).

Would the Secret Service be able to detect an attack plan like these let alone respond to them?

Since the 9/11 attacks billions of dollars of government resources have been invested in defense strategy revisions, police, military and emergency responder training, communications upgrades and field exercises to better equip all concerned to address evolving threats. The National Response Framework (2019) defines five core capacities to guide the training of the response community: prevent, protect mitigate, respond, recover. The purpose is to “better integrate government and local response efforts.” Simply stated, all security partners need to focus more on prevention and work as a cohesive team.

This guidance needs to be incorporated and operationally reinforced into all joint security efforts.

Goals Moving Forward

To learn the Secret Service systematically failed to protect one of the nation’s Presidential candidate nominees is extremely troubling. The implications are staggering. Given the assassination attempt of Trump at Butler, PA and the security vulnerabilities this has exposed, restoring the pre-eminence of the Secret Service is critical. The highest priority needs to be given to finding long-term solutions. This has national security implications.

Solutions moving forward are challenging since the security failures are a multi-factored problem. Among the most important—stronger leadership, better recruiting, balanced funding allocation, refining intelligence sharing, consistent training, accountability and continuing oversight. The implementation of key protective training initiatives and procedures require review. These include simulated attack exercises, 4th Shift Training field scenarios and practicing advance agent procedures and protocols. It appears many were omitted and/or not followed during the security planning of the July 13th rally.

Immediate recommendations should include committing to a thorough review and implementation of existing protective security policies and procedures. The budget allocations should be balanced more equally for investigations vis à vis protection. The current Secret Service allocations are approximately 70% for the investigative arm and 30% for the protection arm respectively.

Importantly, manpower supplementation for protective details from Homeland Security, should require protective training on par with the protective training metrics required of Secret Service agents. The required training hours for all protective agents should be increased as outlined in the GAO January 2022 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

The Secret Service needs to bring clarity to the remaining questions surrounding the assassination attempt more than three weeks later. Their protectees, the American public, and government legislators deserve it.

The world of team sports provides a compelling metaphor for how games are won. Team members are assigned positions based on ability and experience. They rehearse their plays incessantly until they get it right.

If the Secret Service team expects to win their zero-fail mission, they will need to rebuild a foundation of trust—first. Leadership deficits, disparate experience levels, inconsistent training, dated technology, and other security advance omissions are fixable. Restoring trust with the brothers and sisters in blue and with your prized asset—your protectee poses your biggest challenge. Winning is impossible without trust.

J. Lawrence Cunningham is a Senior Law Enforcement Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank. Prior to joining the Gold Institute he served as special agent-in-charge in the U.S. Secret Service.