Iraq’s PMF Law Is a Red Line—The U.S. Must Respond Forcefully

Iraq’s parliament is pushing forward a dangerous piece of legislation that would turn the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into a permanent part of the state. The law would formalize the group’s military structure, create a dedicated academy, and promote its leader—who’s under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses—to ministerial rank. It’s a move that would not only legitimize a powerful, Iranian-aligned armed force within Iraq’s official security system but also deepen Iran’s hold over the country’s institutions.

The PMF was originally formed in 2014 to help fight ISIS, but it has since evolved into a sprawling network of over 70 factions, including several that Washington designates as terrorist organizations. These militias have attacked U.S. forces, killed civilians, threatened religious minorities, and even launched drones at neighboring countries. Yet Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, backed by the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework, continues to support the bill—claiming it will bring the PMF under state control. In practice, it would do the opposite: protect them from oversight and further empower Tehran’s proxies.

The U.S. has every reason to be alarmed. Institutionalizing the PMF would effectively formalize Iran’s military presence inside Iraq, undermining the fragile sovereignty that Iraq still claims and throwing regional stability into further uncertainty. If this bill becomes law, Washington cannot afford to treat it as just another diplomatic concern—it must respond with clarity and force. That starts with accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Arab parts of Iraq, where American forces are increasingly exposed and unwelcome.

But withdrawal alone isn’t enough. The U.S. should hit PMF-linked companies with new sanctions, publicly release intelligence documenting militia abuses, and make it clear that political and economic engagement with Baghdad will come at a cost. Prime Minister Sudani’s long-sought visit to Washington should be taken off the table. And as Iraq drifts closer to becoming a client state of Iran, the U.S. should deepen its ties with more trustworthy allies by establishing a permanent military presence in the Kurdistan Region—a place where American interests and local leadership still align.

Nahro Zagros is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC based foreign-policy and defense think-and-do-tank.

March: A Defining Month for the Kurds

(This article originally appeared in the Kurdistan Chronicle at March: A Defining Month for the Kurds)

March always holds a great significance for the Kurdish people, as it commemorates historic agreements, political shifts, and events of deep cultural importance. This year is no different, but it is amplified by numerous political developments that are reshaping the outlook for Kurds.

Perhaps the most groundbreaking development is the recent agreement between Damascus and the administration in Western Kurdistan (northern Syria), also known as Rojava. For the first time since Syria’s inception, Kurdish rights have been officially recognized. While this milestone has been met with widespread optimism, questions remain: will the Syrian regime under Ahmad al-Sharaa genuinely uphold these rights in a post-Assad future?

Meanwhile, in Türkiye, the peace process has taken a dramatic turn. On February 27, Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to disarm and dissolve. His message has sparked cautious optimism among officials in Turkiye and the international community.

As these events evolve, the Kurdistan Region remains committed to working toward peace and dialogue with both nations. Recent meetings held by President Masoud Barzani with Syrian Democratic Forces Commander Mazloum Abdi and a delegation from Turkiye have reinforced the call for dialogue and reconciliation. As regional tensions fluctuate, the Kurdish leadership remains committed to fostering peace through negotiation and supporting talks between Kurds, Turkiye, and the emerging Syrian administration.

In Iraq, political and economic disputes are intensifying. The dispute over Kurdish oil exports has drawn international attention, with U.S. officials urging Baghdad to strike a balance between sovereignty and economic pragmatism. If Iraq intends to maintain strong bilateral relations with the United States, it must navigate these tensions carefully and limit external influence.

Another dramatic event occurred on March 14, when a U.S. airstrike executed with Iraqi and Kurdish support eliminated ISIS’s second-in-command, Abdullah Makki Muslih al-Rifai, also known as Abu Khadijah. U.S. President Donald Trump took to Truth Social, declaring, “PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH,” while commending U.S., Iraqi, and Kurdish forces for the joint operation.

Against the backdrop of these transformative events, this issue of Kurdistan Chronicle explores a range of topics – art, mythology, music, craftmanship, refugee support, sports, and the enduring legacies of influential Kurdish and American leaders – the entire spectrum of the rich cultural life of the Kurdish people is on display.

Key March events in Kurdish history

March 1: Kurds honor the legacy of General Mustafa Barzani, the father of the Kurdish revolution and a central figure in modern Kurdish politics. Barzani passed away on this day in 1979 in Washington D.C.

March 5: The 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime began on this day in Ranya. Spreading rapidly, the peshmerga and hundreds of thousands of Kurdish men and women reclaimed nearly all major cities, paving the way for the Kurdistan Region’s first democratic elections in 1992 and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

March 11: This day marks the Iraqi-Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of 1970, also known as the March Accord, when Baghdad formally recognized the political and cultural rights of the Kurdish people for the first time.

March 14: This date commemorates the 122nd birthday of General Mustafa Barzani, a key architect of the modern Kurdish struggle for liberation, democracy, and self-determination.

March 16: In a single attack using chemical weapons, the Ba’athist regime killed 5,000 innocent Kurdish men, women, and children in what is known as the 1988 Halabja massacre. This atrocity was part of the Anfal Campaign, which took the lives of 182,000 Kurdish people.

March 20: The 1991 uprisings culminated in the liberation of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, a defining moment in the Kurdish revolutionary movement.

March 21: Newroz! The Kurdish New Year brings joy, color, and tradition, as families gather to participate in vibrant festivities and rituals. Coinciding with the vernal equinox, it is a public holiday in the Kurdistan Region observed over three days.

Nahro Zagros is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and the Editor-in-Chief of Kurdistan Chronicle.

Gold Institute Senior Fellow Nahro Zagros Discusses the Middle East with Former National Security Advisor Amb. John Bolton

Dr. Nahro Zagros: ​​Joe Biden went to the Middle East after 18 months in power, do you think his visit was successful?

Amb. John Bolton: I don’t think the trip was successful. I don’t I don’t think he demonstrated the kind of leadership, the kind of grasp of the many issues that face the region. You know, there’s a theory in the United States that says that China is the big threat of the 21st century and we can forget about the Middle East, forget about Europe, and only concentrate on China. It’s a big mistake. America and its allies have interests all over the world and the Middle East remains a central focus for friends of the United States and for the US. And it requires leadership, requires doing things that help bridge differences among our friends. It means taking a tough stance against our adversaries, and you can’t shirk that responsibility.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Well, the meeting was devoid of any drama or excitement, but knowing that, you know what Biden said in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to say that America is not leaving the place and leave a vacuum for the Russians and Chinese to come over. That’s a powerful statement, right?

Amb. John Bolton:: Well, the statement was good now. Now the question is what he does about it, the principal threat in the Middle East today, as it has been for many years, comes from Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support of terrorism in the region and around the world. Its aspirations for hegemony. There are many other sources of tension as well. Erdogan and Turkey has Neo-Ottoman aspirations. And there are terrorist groups, the threat and many of our friends there. So this is something that for long term peace and security in the region and around the world, the United States does not participate actively. It only makes the day much further away when we can expect….peace

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So the previous administration, the Trump administration, and the Biden administration, it seems that they have something in common. They both wanted to get out of the Middle East and yet Biden came back. Like we said, less than two weeks ago. Do you think the visit was mainly to counter Iranian threat there or it’s related to the Russia Ukraine war? Or perhaps America doesn’t want to leave their friends behind in the Middle East?

Amb. John Bolton:: I think the President doesn’t fully understand the impact in the region and more broadly, of the American and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think it was a strategic mistake by the United States to do it. And I think it left all of our friends around the world worried about our staying power, and there was not much from President Biden’s trip to the Middle East that changed that impression.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So you think it was nothing to do about foreign policy about countering Iran about American leaving difference behind in the Middle East it was mainly about the price of oil and gasoline?

Amb. John Bolton: I think I think he wanted more production. Out of the Gulf Arab countries. They had agreed the month before and OPEC to a modest increase, but they didn’t agree to anything more. But of course, being in the region. President had to visit Israel and he had to say something about the American role, but I just think it reflects a lack of attention. And surprisingly, for Biden, who’s spent so much of his career in the Senate on foreign policy, he’s made really little difference in international affairs. The events have gotten beyond his control, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: What about the JCPOA? This administration promised that they will get the JCPOA back on the table. So do you think this is going to happen on the Biden administration?

Amb. John Bolton: I hope not because I thought it was a bad deal and 2015 and I think the concessions that Biden has made over the past year to the Ayatollah have made it worse. Iran has shown no strategic decision not to pursue nuclear weapons. Do they want relief from economic sanctions? Yes, they do. Are they willing to give up the pursuit of no nuclear weapons? I don’t think so. So I think they represent really a huge threat not just because of the nuclear program, but because of their support for terrorism, and it requires much more of a stronger position by the United States.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You advised Donald Trump about the JCPOA and you advised him to leave the pact. So he did. Do you think it was successful because it doesn’t feel that he has achieved anything?

Amb. John Bolton: I don’t think we went far enough. I think it was the right thing to do to withdraw to impose US sanctions on Iran to try for what we call maximum pressure. But, the problem will not be solved until there’s a new government in Iran, a government that represents the people of Iran, not the Ayatollahs … that didn’t happen. We didn’t pursue regime change, but we should have.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Well, he did advocate for preemptive strike on North Korea and Iran and regime change in the latter. But do you think it was lack of understanding from the perspective, from Trump perspective., that he didn’t go far enough with a plan?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I didn’t think he really understood what the implications were he was against the JCPOA because Obama had negotiated but not really appreciating that the regime in Tehran wanted nuclear weapons, and would have been prepared to negotiate at great length. If they could get free from the economic sanctions. It was the leverage the pressure that we put on the regime that caused them to want to negotiate but while they were willing to say they’d give up nuclear weapons, they never did anything to accomplish it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: In your book, you mentioned that Trump wanted to delete Iraq, and yet at the same time, he was criticizing Barack Obama for leaving Iraq in 2011, who created a vacuum for ISIS to come for. So, what was the narrative that we don’t understand? On the one hand, Trump is against staying in Iraq, on the other hand criticizing Obama for leaving Iraq in 2011?

Amb. John Bolton:: Well, I didn’t understand the narrative either. It’s not that Americans really want to have our troops deployed all over the world. That’s the really the farthest thing from their mind, but it’s better to take care of threats and dangers to the US and its allies, where the threats originate not in the streets or the skies of America. So, the presence in Iraq, which Obama should not have abandoned was a way to see if Iraq could succeed as a nation, and to keep troublesome outsiders like Iran, like Syria, like Turkey, at a distance while we tried to solve that problem.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You are one of the architects of the Iraq war, or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Do you think it was a success story?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think there are different parts of the saga. It was certainly a success in that it removes Saddam Hussein from power and he was a threat to international peace and security. He was a threat to his own people in particular, the Kurds. I remember after the first Persian Gulf War, in 1991, going with Jim Baker from the north of Turkey, just into Iraq and seeing 10s of 1000s (tens of thousands) of Kurds who had fled fearing Saddam Hussein’s wrath after the first war, they were without shelter. They were without food. It was a potential for a great humanitarian tragedy. Saddam didn’t care about that at all. So removing Saddam was an important thing to do. Did we accomplish the next step of building a new Iraq? No, I don’t, I don’t think we succeeded. I’m not sure we should have tried the way we did. I think ultimately it was going to be the peoples of Iraq who would decide whether there would be a new Iraq and how it would succeed. It wasn’t anything that we were going to impose. We could draw a ring around them, to give them the chance. And I think that’s all that we should have done.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So in other words, it’s America won the war, but what’s the peace in Iraq?


Amb. John Bolton: Yeah, that’s why I say there are different phases to this. The war was a success. What came after was not a success, not because of bad faith by the United States. But because in large measure, we became another political party in Iraq. And that was not the path to success, also because of the intervention of Iran, and its effort to impose their kind of theocratic rule in Iraq as well.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So what led to the downfall of the plan and for the flat plan not to succeed because in five years, America lost 5450 service members as well. As 3793 military contractors only between 2003-2018.. So, what went wrong? Exactly?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, there were a lot of other things that were happening, not the least of which was the renewal of al Qaeda terrorism and a different kind of form a lot of developments that really were extraneous to the effort in post Saddam Iraq. I’m not going to tell a Kurdish audience how complicated the politics of Iraq are, but to have succeeded as a state to these three disparate provinces of the Ottoman Empire was going to require political compromises among ethnic groups and confessional groups. It’s possible it could have been done. But there was not good faith on the part of all of the players. There were external powers that were interfering in it. And there were not the circumstances where trust could be built up, especially after the United States withdrew in 2011. Our presence could not guarantee success. But our withdrawal, I think, hastened the failure [11:05]. And I think there had to come a point where reasonable people could say, this creation of post-World War One, European dealmaking wasn’t going to succeed, and we had to look at what the successor structures would be one of those would have been an independent Kurdistan and acknowledges the reality on the ground to say we tried to form a viable Iraq and for reasons not having anything to do with the Kurds. It wasn’t going to succeed. So there has to be an effective government for the people. And that’s what leads you to the conclusion that if Iraq can’t succeed as a country, you have to look at alternatives.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: I’ll come back to this. Talk about Kurdish independence. But first. Iraq is an important country in the region. One of the reasons America went there, it’s to get rid of Saddam Hussein and all the threats that his regime was posing, but also at the same time to counter Iran. And yet, Iraq is run by Iranians, thanks to the invasion, it’s in the hands of Iranians. So from that perspective, it’s a complete fiasco, right?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think as it worked out because of Iranian interference, you know, in the balance between the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs, the influence of Iran, even within the Shia community to build an Iraq that looked like Iran was quite small. And yet we were not able in the parties were not able to find a way to compromise so that you could have not a secular population but a secular government that could accommodate different interests. And I don’t think we gave the kind of support we could have, recognizing the threat from Iran. So that I would say the one of the reasons for failure was the American failure to see the threat that Iran poses, not just because of the nuclear program, not just because its support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen, but their interference and their desire not to have a success at creating an effective Iraqi government.

13:30 (KURDS MIDDLE EAST)

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Okay, I’ll move to another subject about the Kurds in the Middle East. In your book, you mentioned that Trump said he doesn’t like Kurds, and reading what you wrote. that made you furious. Right, because you have this people in the Middle East who are the most reliable American friends in the region and yet the President of the United States is saying he doesn’t like them. So, was it lack of understanding or, or something else?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, he disparaged the Kurds. I think he heard from people who said they’re great when they have American airpower. They’re not so great when they don’t. We tried to explain to him that the Kurds had fought valiantly for many years for their own independence and had been critical for decades against Saddam Hussein, who had resisted against all odds, who were helping us critically and against the Assad regime and against the Iranian and Hezbollah interference in Syria. And it was just one of these things that you couldn’t reason with him on what the facts were and it obviously made coming up with a sensible and fair policy for the Kurds. (it was) very, very difficult.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But during the campaign, Donald Trump, just before becoming President, when he was touring around the states, he was advocating for independent Kurdistan. And yet when he was the president, he disagreed with it. The reason I’m saying that it reminds me of something else, then that’s Joe Biden. When the invasion of Iraq happened, he wrote an article and he advocated for a three-state solution for Iraq. So now he’s the president, but he’s doing nothing for that reminds me of Trump, on one hand, saying he supports Kurdish independence. On the other hand, he saying he doesn’t like Kurds. So, do you think this administration can protect the Kurds in the Middle East?

Amb. John Bolton: I guess the lesson is that American politicians campaigning for office say a lot of things they may not fully understand. To be fair to them, or they just say things because they think that’s what their audience wants to hear. And so, everybody is well advised as Americans have learned painfully that the politicians’ promises don’t always come true. I’m very worried at the moment about the Biden administration because it remains convinced that if it can either revive the JCPOA or find some kind of accommodation with Iran, that that it can it can somehow bring the regime in Tehran out of the self-imposed exile that it’s in isolation from more civilized regimes around the region. And I think the Biden administration is reluctant to do anything that would distract Iran from that objective. So, the notion of an independent Kurdistan, which has been so hard to bring about for so many years, because the neighboring states don’t want an independent Kurdistan. It could interfere with their objective with Iran, as it could with Turkey. And so, it’s, as often happens to the Kurds, other priorities interfere with handling the issue of what kind of government the people of Kurdistan should have.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So, I’ll come back again to the referendum and that notion of independence, but before then, in your book, you also mentioned that Trump wanted to offer personal favors to dictators and the United States Justice Department, made Halk bank in Turkey, illegal for different reasons for money laundering, but also in it was participating in a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade US sanctions on Iran. So, do you think that was one of the reasons Trump was hesitating to support Kurds outright? Or? …because he wanted to get along with Erdogan. He was against all your advice, I think.

Amb. John Bolton: No, it’s an interesting theory, but I don’t think it crossed Trump’s mind, I think he saw it in very simple direct terms. Erdogan was concerned about Halk bank. Trump wanted to do him a favor. We tried to explain that Erdogan’s family used Halk bank as a kind of personal financial vehicle and there were many other problems that Halk bank was violating our Iran sanctions. It was committing financial fraud. It was proven already in one criminal prosecution. Now, there was another ongoing. I think it was much more superficial on Trump’s part. 18:47

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So, the referendum for independence took place in Iraqi Kurdistan, or in the Kurdistan Region on September 25 2017. We didn’t get support from the United States. And yet when the United States wants Kurds to fight ISIS, we were the first one to go to the battle and defeat ISIS on behalf of the world. So this bond was created between the United States and Kurds, yet when 99% of the population of Kurdistan voted for independence, the United States didn’t want to support this. What was the reason? [referendum]

Amb. John Bolton:Well, it was a mistake on the part of the United States. I don’t think people fully appreciate what the implications would be, they didn’t see what the government of Iraq might do in response or how others in the region would respond. You know, you can attribute some of the problem I think to divisions among the Kurdish people.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But the threat was realistic from neighboring countries?

19;42

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think I think the problem was not so much the evaluation of the threat as understanding that when Kurds voted on independence, there wasn’t much question what the answer would be and yet in the US and elsewhere in the West, people didn’t think through what those implications meant. Now, in hindsight, a lot of people who said the referendum was therefore a bad idea. I don’t agree with that. I think there’s a lot of responsibility to allocate here. But we collectively did see that others would not simply accept the referendum and we weren’t prepared and among the Kurds, there wasn’t adequate preparation for the response. But the notion of asking people how they want to be governed is fundamental. And whether this referendum resulted in a concrete achievement or not. There will be another referendum in due course.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: To be fair, the Kurdish leadership never wanted to break up from Iraq, but it became unlivable. And it became a difficult reality of the whole environment in Iraq the way the government’s been hijacked, the way the militias rule in different parts of Iraq. So because the Kurds had no choice but to break away or to decide to break away. But do you think a better administration would have supported independence during the Trump administration when Tillerson was in charge of the State Department? 20:50

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think that should have been the US policy and it was a great lost opportunity and very difficult and painful for the Kurds when we didn’t follow through on it. Look I’ve watched this issue for over 30 years now, but going back to Operation Provide comfort after the first Gulf War. And I have to say, no set of leaders. No political unit ever operates perfectly but in terms of cooperation of trying to find concrete solutions to problems of putting up with a lot of unnecessary diplomatic grief. I think the Kurds and their leaders have behaved in an exemplary fashion for a long time, and it’s to be disappointed as they were at the time of the referendum. It was really tragic. Unfortunately, the Kurds have a long history and in finding themselves on the wrong end of the of an arrangement like that and their subsequent behavior, as you just said, in in playing a critical role in the anti-ISIS coalition is proof of the merit of giving the Kurds a government that allows the people to control their own destiny.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Knowing who we are right now, knowing how chaos and how chaotic Iraq and the Middle East is. Do you think we should count on America?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I’m worried about the Biden administration. I mean, I have to be straight about this. I’m not sure their focus is there. I’m not sure their level of attention is there or their energy to make sure that they have solid support from the American people for another effort in the Middle East. There’s a narrative in this country unfortunately about endless wars. The leadership of the United States has not argued effectively that a forward presence by the United States in very difficult situations can be to our advantage not just to the advantage of the people involved, although that’s an important factor, but ultimately can lead to stability in a place like the Middle East that benefits the United States [23:06]. So you need American leaders who can explain a complicated situation in a faraway place to the American people. I think that’s something that can be done. I’m worried at this point, that it’s not the Biden administration that can do it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: What happened in Afghanistan? You know, you left Afghanistan and the Taliban came back. And do you think you might also leave Iraq and Syria and leave the Kurds behind?

Amb. John Bolton: You know, anything is possible, but I can tell you that there’s a very widespread feeling in (US) Congress and I think increasingly around the country that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a mistake.

They understand that America’s less safe now the terrorist attacks from the territory of Afghanistan are again possible. Hopefully they don’t occur. But we gave up an enormously strong position and are now in a more vulnerable position. This is not the time for further withdrawal from the Middle East. We’ve seen dramatic changes in the region with the Abraham accords with the extension of full diplomatic relations between Israel and some of the Arab states. The threat of Iran has brought former adversaries together. There’s a lot of potential in the Middle East, still dangerous and difficult, but this is exactly the wrong time for the United States to reduce its involvement.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You think in a few years we might see an Iran who is part of the international community or there will be a war between Israel and the US? 24:47

Amb. John Bolton:I think people should understand, Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons and in fact won’t allow Iran to get very close to nuclear weapons if they need to do that. I do believe that the regime in Tehran is weaker today than any point since the Islamic Revolution of 1970. I think people don’t see it because Western reporters don’t go out of Tehran or the other big cities, but out in the countryside. Among the farmers, the small business people, the shopkeepers, they’re not shouting death to the United States or death to Israel anymore. They’re saying death to the Ayatollahs. Now, the Revolutionary Guard and the military still have a monopoly on force. But I believe there’s splits even within the regime. And this is a time, I think, to put real pressure and support behind the people of Iran and give them a chance for self-government. And if we could resolve that we won’t solve all the problems of the region, but solving other problems I think will be significantly easier.

Nahro: In other words, you’re saying if this JCPOA is not resolved, if the Iranian regime is not changed, then Israel will attack?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons. There’s no doubt about that.

They’ve shut the IAEA.

Nahro: So if they continue to pursue, Israel might attack?

Amb. John Bolton:Israel is attacking now and other states in the region. And I think that the people of Iran that is something that they’re increasingly understanding. They’re not safer, because Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. They’re more in danger. And I think that is undercutting the regime as well.

Nahro: In your opinion, how optimistic are you that in a few years we will see a peaceful Middle East, knowing what’s going on around the world with the Russia Ukraine war, and knowing who the actors are in the Middle East? (26:53)

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think we’ve moved beyond the ideological warfare of the Cold War. We’ve been through war on terrorism. We’re back in a period where there’s enormous great power competition. Again, this is not something America looks forward to. But it’s a world we live in and the Middle East for thousands of years has been the center of great power competition. I think if we can keep external forces outside, we can deal with the principal internal problem, which is Iran. There’s a lot of potential in the region…

And again. The reconciliation between Israel and some of the Gulf Arab states and other Arab countries, shows that part of the world can change very dramatically. And we’ve just got to keep applying our effort to it. Because progress is possible. I’m not saying it’s easy, it won’t be it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But what we need in the Middle East is strong leadership, American leadership boots on the ground, and that’s what it’s lacking at the moment. So without that nothing can be achieved?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think that’s why I think the Biden administration it’s not going to provide the leadership, there’s no indication that it’s of interest to them. They’re more interested in climate change than a lot of American strategic interests. But we’re now in a period in our country where we’re in an election campaign. For Congress, by November there will be an election campaign , for 2024 for the presidential nomination. It seems like we’re always in an election campaign, but it’s important for aspiring leaders in the United States to explain to the people that our best interest here comes from having a strong presence internationally, especially in regions that are important to us and where the risk of conflict is high. So if we’re not present, we’re not going to have influence, if we are then we’ve got a chance to make progress.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Ambassador Bolton, do you think the future administration’s of the United States will realize that Kurds are the only supporters of the United States and only friends of the United States? Therefore they have to support Kurdish independence?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think there’s a large number of people in the United States who have dealt with the Kurds over the years and the American military, the diplomatic corps, American business community, who are the strongest friends of an independent Kurdistan and if you want stability and a difficult and unstable region, there are ways to do it and one of them is to continue to find ways to achieve the long side goal of an independent Kurdistan.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Ambassador Bolton, many thanks for your frank talk, as always.

Amb. John Bolton: Glad to be with you.

Federal court ruling setting conditions for electing Iraq’s president influenced by Iran: Expert

(This article first appeared on Kurdistan24.net, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/28692-Federal-court-ruling-setting-conditions-for-electing-Iraq%E2%80%99s-president-influenced-by-Iran:-Expert)

ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – The February ruling by the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, which stipulated that two-thirds of lawmakers in Iraq’s parliament are needed to elect the country’s president, was made “under the influence of Iran”, argued an expert on Iraqi politics on Monday. 

The remark was made by university lecturer and Iraqi politics expert Kamaran Palani during a panel in Istanbul, Turkey, titled ‘MENA Regional Dynamics: De-escalation and Challenges’ and organized by the Kurdistan 24 Research and Survey Center and the Al Sharq Strategic Research think tank. 

In early February, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (FSC) ruled that a two-thirds majority of Iraq’s 329-seat parliament is needed to elect the President of the Republic. 

Issued “under the influence of Iran,” the ruling made it impossible for the Oct. 10, 2021, election winners to elect a president by themselves, Palani noted.

“I would make a strong argument [or] statement,” he said, adding that the neighboring country made the decision. 

The panel also shed light on the role played by the Kurds in the Iraqi political process since last fall’s parliamentary elections and the “significant and unprecedented” political impasse that ensued. 

Palani outlined the three main challenges the Kurdistan Region faces due to the present political crisis in Iraq. These are rocket and drone attacks on its capital Erbil, the FSC’s ruling (also in February) against its oil and gas law, and domestic political divisions. 

Erbil requires international support to withstand these threats, particularly the rocket attacks that intend to destabilize the capital, Palanai argued. 

Iraq’s current political impasse has the potential to lead to armed confrontations and civil unrest, according to Nahro Zagros, a Kurdish academic and the panel’s moderator. 

Zagros believes Turkey’s role, along with that of the international community, is “paramount” for enabling the Kurds in Iraq to confront the current challenges. 

The energy potential of the Kurdistan Region was another topic the panel discussed.

Howri Mansubeg, an energy expert, also participated in the panel. He focused on the potential of the Kurdistan Region’s natural gas resources to be exported to Turkey and other countries.

He argued that it is in the “national security interest” of Turkey to support the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as Erbil is one of Ankara’s most “trustworthy” allies in the region. 

A private panel titled ‘KRG and Turkey: Strategic Alignment or Tactical Arrangement’ was later held. It focused on Turkey-Kurdistan Region relations in light of the evolving world and regional order.

To watch the

Nahro Zagros is a Distinguished Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington DC based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Senior Fellow Nahro Zagros Quoted in VOA Article: Turkey Launches New Offensive Against PKK Rebels in Northern Iraq

This story originated in VOA’s Kurdish Service (https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-launches-new-offensive-against-pkk-rebels-in-northern-iraq/6536148.html)

WASHINGTON — Turkey announced the start of a new ground and air campaign in northern Iraq Monday, targeting the armed rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Dubbed Operation Claw-Lock, the Ankara government says the offensive is a pre-emptive measure to prevent the PKK from using Iraq as a base to carry out attacks in Turkey.

Founded in 1984 to fight for Kurdish self-rule, the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

The new operation comes days after Iraqi Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara. The two leaders discussed ways to improve security, business and trade ties, according to a statement by Barzani’s office.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar was quoted by the state-owned Anadolu news agency as saying, “Our operation is continuing successfully as planned. The targets identified in the first phase have been captured.”

Meanwhile, in a statement, the PKK fighters claimed to have downed two Turkish helicopters and killed more than two dozen Turkish soldiers.

VOA cannot independently verify the conflicting reports.

The Turkish military has carried out several operations against the PKK in recent years, both inside Turkey and in northern Iraq. The latest operation targets areas near Amedi city’s Shiladze district.

Amedi’s mayor, Warsheen Mayi, told VOA by phone that the operation has not targeted civilian areas. But Iqbal Omer, a freelance journalist, said civilian properties had been damaged in the most recent airstrike.

Turkish interests in northern Iraq go beyond combating the PKK. Turkey has a significant economic stake in the region, particularly the energy sector. Turkey is also seeking to expand its influence in the region as a counterbalance to the growing power of Iran.

Some experts have suggested that Kurdistan, which is estimated to have 700 billion cubic meters [25 trillion cubic feet] of natural gas, could become a major energy supplier to Turkey and Europe as the world tries to wane itself off its dependence on Russian gas.

“Europeans are searching for new potentials to supply gas to Europe,” said Nahro Zagros, a non-resident senior fellow at the Washington-based Gold Institute for International Strategy.

“The KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) can be one of these potentials. Having said that the KRG cannot fill the whole vacuum that Russians will leave in Europe, but it can help in some ways, and this cannot be achieved without Turkish support,” he added.

Safeen Dizayee, head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, said that after meeting domestic supply, his government was open to the notion of exporting natural gas to Europe.

“The Kurdistan region is not trying to become an alternative to other countries,” he told VOA. “That is why it will in the first stage use most of its extracted gas to supply domestic needs. Later on, some portion of the gas can be exported to other parts of Iraq if they have a need for it. In the coming years, when the Kurdistan region opens up more to the world, no doubt it might export some of the gas.”

Dizayee added that Turkey, which serves as a bridge for the landlocked Kurdistan region to the outside world, will be a major partner in the exportation of gas.

Others, such as Sulaymaniyah-based Izzat Sabir, an economist who led the Finance and Economic Committee in the Kurdistan parliament, say the region first needs to resolve its internal political issues and meet domestic demand before it can focus on becoming an exporter.

Not every Kurdish politician is on board with the idea of exporting the region’s gas through Turkey.

“I think it’s my party’s official decision that we will not allow natural gas to be sold through Turkey the way oil is being sold,” said Rekawt Zaki, a senior leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls some of the region’s largest gas fields in Chamchamal.

“The future of the Kurdistan Region is natural gas, not crude oil. Crude is depleting in many fields,” economist Sabir said.

“Iraq imports billions of dollars’ worth of natural gas from Iran and other neighboring countries. While the domestic demand for gas has not been met, we in the Kurdistan region should not think about signing agreements to export natural gas,” Sabir added.

Mutlu Civiroglu, Zhiyar Mohammed, and Rikar Hussein contributed to this story from Washington.

This story originated in VOA’s Kurdish Service.

Abraham Accords and the Anti Iranian Bloc

The Israel-UAE agreement to normalise relations is a historical peace accord in the region. It is a bold and courageous move by both sides, which could lead to further Arab countries in the region to follow suit and recognise the state of Israel. Whilst a number of Arab and Islamic countries already have secret relationships with Israel, the current accord is only the third Israel-Arab peace treaty in the Middle East after Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). The international community has welcomed the move, except for Palestine, Iran and Turkey who have  lashed out against it; the fact that other Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia, have not denounced the agreement is generally positive.
It is worth paying attention to the timing of the agreement. Arab countries have been hostile to the Jewish State since its establishment. For many years, the idea of recognising Israel was unthinkable; and most Arab states, including the UAE, have financially and militarily supported various Palestinian groups against Israel. Now the political landscape and geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East are changing. A united front to fight economic problems and military threats from Iran is needed. Whilst we do not know the exact details of the agreement just yet, here are 12 positive points that we think are important for the understanding of the impact of  this peace agreement and for the overview of its geopolitical, social and economic effects for the whole region:

  1. Iran is growing militarily in the region. A united anti-Iranian front is essential to combat the Iranian danger; the  deal will signal the official formation of an anti-Iranian bloc. 
  2. Israel is the region’s superior military force which the UAE and other Gulf states can rely on.
  3. This move will encourage other Arab and Gulf states to engage with Israel. (It is understood that Sudan, Oman and Bahrain are interested in finding ways to normalize their relationships with Israel).
  4. In the past, most people believed that the road to peace with the Arab world must go through Ramallah, but now the road to peace is going through Cairo, Amman and Abu Dhabi and might soon go through new locations in the Gulf and North Africa.
  5. The deal firmly highlights American leadership in the region and demonstrates how the role of the US can be paramount in controlling current political troubles. 
  6. The agreement is no longer about the ’land for peace’ mechanism but, as Netanyahu said, ’peace for peace’ formula. 
  7. Whilst the deal has the potential to change Arab-Israeli relations and begin a new path for the future; it moves the Arab and Gulf states away from the Palestinian question. 
  8. Israel makes peace with the Arabs without returning to the 1967 borders.
  9. It appears that recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital is not an issue for the UAE leadership.
  10. Israel is now less secluded and isolated, not just in terms of political connections but also in the commercial, social and geostrategic importance with its neighbors. 
  11. Apart from the geopolitical repercussions from the deal, which antagonizes Iran, it is a warning sign to Hezbollah, Syria’s Al Assad, Turkey’s Erdogan and some of the Iraqi Shia militias.
  12. The deal has significance for those who fight terrorism in the region and is damaging for the Shia and Sunni terrorist groups, such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra and the Houthis in Yemen.

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