Floating Vanity: The Gaza Flotilla and the Performance of Moral Narcissism

There are moments in international affairs when moral theatre overtakes moral substance, when the currency of outrage outpaces the discipline of diplomacy, and when performance, rather than principle, dictates the tempo of political action. We live in a time in which visibility has become the new virtue, and self-exposure the principal tool of advocacy. In such an environment, it was perhaps inevitable that a group of itinerant moralists would cast themselves adrift -quite literally- on the tides of global suffering in search not of resolution, but of relevance.

Such was the spectacle of the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla, a vainglorious maritime procession of self-anointed humanitarians led by that indefatigable paragon of climate sanctimony, Greta Thunberg, and accompanied by a cast of activist dilettantes and virtue entrepreneurs. The vessel ‘Madleen’ embarked on what can only be described as a pilgrimage not to Gaza, but to the self.

To the discerning observer, the affair resembled less an act of international solidarity than a floating Instagram feed. The stated objective -to deliver a parcel of humanitarian aid- was drowned beneath a deluge of photographic posing, social media agitation, and moral theatre. The cargo manifest, laughably meagre in both weight and consequence, included approximately 100 kilograms of flour, some rice, baby formula, and prosthetics. One is tempted to ask whether this was a charity mission or an especially sentimentalised picnic.

The geopolitical theatre surrounding Gaza is grave. Since 2007, Israel has maintained a maritime blockade, a policy rendered legally defensible by international law under the San Remo Manual when applied in the context of ongoing armed conflict. That blockade has been subject to scrutiny, yes, but it has also been acknowledged by serious legal scholars as a permissible, if harsh, security measure given the region’s entanglement with non-state militant actors. To challenge such a blockade is to wade into a contested legal and strategic space. Yet one must be equipped with more than hashtags and hemp sandals to do so credibly.

The flotilla participants, by contrast, arrived not as diplomats, aid professionals, or conflict mediators, but as preening avatars of moral exhibitionism. Their mission was not to change the facts on the ground, but to become facts themselves: visible, clickable, shareable. To watch them, one was reminded of Oscar Wilde’s caution that “charity creates a multitude of sins”, chief among them the self-congratulatory impulse to posture over the suffering of others, all while accomplishing precisely nothing.

The history of humanitarian intervention is replete with examples of quiet, dignified sacrifice, from Raoul Wallenberg’s forged passports in Hungary, to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s discrete wartime negotiations. The Gaza flotilla, by contrast, was constructed not in the spirit of discretion or sacrifice, but as a pageant. It was, as one commentator aptly put it, “an exquisitely curated tableau of moral vanity.”

Indeed, one cannot fail to notice that the flotilla’s cargo held more media personnel than medical kits. The ratio of cameras to crutches was inversely proportional to the utility of the voyage. The humanitarian value of the mission, if measured by weight or need, was effectively nil. It was political theatre, low in substance, high in symbolism, but tragically bereft of strategic foresight.

And what of risk? Much has been made of the alleged peril faced by the flotilla participants as Israeli naval forces intercepted the vessel in international waters. Yet these were not freedom fighters or clandestine resisters; they were activists with European passports, confident in the knowledge that they would be detained politely, processed bureaucratically, and released promptly. Risk, for them, was as curated as their Instagram captions. They ventured into a conflict they neither understand nor endure. Theirs was not solidarity; it was safari.

It would be bad enough if this were merely an act of misguided idealism. But the flotilla represents something more insidious: the transformation of activism into performance art. The spectacle is the point. Gone are the days of moral seriousness, of strategic clarity and consequence. In their place we find the “activist-influencer” hybrid, a creature of the postmodern moment, always ready with a slogan, always ready for their close-up.

There is, too, a deeper harm inflicted by such frivolity. By reducing grave geopolitical dilemmas to emotive photo opportunities, these activists corrode the very notion of humanitarianism. They render aid indistinct from advertisement. They feed off the moral capital of true suffering to elevate their own brands. And in doing so, they exhaust the public’s patience for genuine, painstaking diplomacy and relief work.

To call this escapade a “humanitarian gesture” is to do violence to the English language. Humanitarianism requires humility, endurance, and practical efficacy. It is not a costume one dons for relevance, nor a stage upon which to strut one’s superior morality. The flotilla participants claimed the moral high ground while contributing nothing to the relief of those whose suffering they appropriated. Their moral indignation was matched only by their logistical incompetence.

That anyone still mistakes this grotesque charade for bravery is a testament to how thoroughly our political discourse has been colonised by aesthetics. Appearances now precede consequences. Gestures supplant results. Feeling good is confused with doing good.

What is left, then, is the bitter spectacle of Western privilege masquerading as empathy. The voyage to Gaza was not about Gaza. It was about the pilgrims’ own need to be seen doing something about Gaza, preferably in high-definition, with captions pre-written. It was less Florence Nightingale, more Narcissus afloat.

Strategy must be informed by outcomes, not optics. This flotilla served no strategic function. It alleviated no suffering, opened no political channels, secured no negotiation, and delivered no material good. It did, however, secure headlines, trigger diplomatic protests, and provide an all-too-perfect case study in 21st-century narcissism masquerading as internationalism.

In an age starved of seriousness, perhaps the greatest tragedy is not that this flotilla failed, but that it succeeded; succeeded, that is, in distracting attention, distorting reality, and degrading the dignity of true humanitarian work.

Let us, then, learn the correct lesson. The suffering of Gaza’s civilians is real. The complexity of Middle Eastern geopolitics is immense. And the pursuit of international justice demands more than selfies on a sailboat.

It demands knowledge. It demands seriousness. It demands, above all, that we stop mistaking moral theatre for moral action.

Yvonne Marie Antonoglou is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy.

COVID-19: The Revenge of the Pangolin?

Recently, the World Health Organization and other sensitive souls have instructed the media (and the West in general) to stop referring to the new strain of coronavirus as the “Wuhan” or “Chinese” flu because of the racist connotations that this may entail.

It is common practice to often name diseases after the people who first described the condition -Asperger’s syndrome after Hans Asperger, Parkinson’s disease after James Parkinson, Alzheimer’s disease after Alois Alzheimer, and so on. Relatedly, naming viral diseases after a population or the site of their first major outbreak is also a customary modus operandi; West Nile Virus, Guinea Worm, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Ebola etc. Admittedly, viruses “come” from someplace, after all, thus people tend to gravitate towards disease-naming structures, which reference place names; on this note, I doubt we came up with “Lyme disease” because of some deep animosity towards Connecticut. Not to mention that “COVID-19” or “H1N1” do not exactly roll off the tongue. The latter was, until very recently, widely referred to as the “Spanish flu,” the world’s worst pandemic on record, killing an estimated 50-100 million people worldwide. The term “Spanish flu” has now retroactively fallen into disfavor as well, and to be fair there is some historical evidence that suggests that the virus may have actually originated in France or…China, but tracing the origins of another deadly virus back to China (!) is rather unfashionable right now. Spanish it is, then.

It is no secret that the Chinese government has been far more effective in stopping the spread of information about the coronavirus than in stopping the spread of the coronavirus itself. It was recently revealed that government officials destroyed samples and suppressed vital information that could have helped mitigate the impact of this new strain of coronavirus. The government reportedly silenced doctors who warned about the disease. Some were censured for “spreading falsehoods” or sharing test results with colleagues, and some were forced to write apology letters admitting that they ‘disrupted the social order’. Then again, the practice of punishing whoever reveals embarrassing truths has been the order of the day since at least the time of Confucius, in the sixth century B.C. and is an effective means of coercing stability in China. Now, however, muzzling the messenger has helped spread the deadly COVID-19, which has infected some 75,000 people.

But why did both SARS and the current epidemic break out in China? Well, eating game animals has a long history in China and supports a massive industry that has been encouraged by the state as a source of income for poverty-affected areas. Until January, breeding exotic animals had been a thriving business. Additionally, in recent years, the consumption of wild animals had also become associated with higher social status and wealth. For years, the Chinese government encouraged the commercial use of wild animals, promoting the practice as a way to “accelerate the growth of farming”. So, as news of the Wuhan virus spread online, videos showing Asian people eating bat soup started circulating widely on social networks, with captions suggesting that eating bats was a possible source of the Chinese coronavirus outbreak. A specific video showing a young Chinese woman, supposedly in Wuhan, biting into a virtually whole bat as she held the creature up with chopsticks soon became viral and thousands of Twitter users blamed the supposedly “dirty” Chinese eating habits -in particular the consumption of

wildlife- for the outbreak. Nonetheless, it was later revealed that the video was not set in Wuhan at all, where bat isn’t a delicacy. It wasn’t even from China. Instead it showed Wang Mengyun, the host of an online travel show, eating a dish in Palau, a Pacific island nation.

Unsurprisingly, at a time of heightened fear over a viral pandemic, images of Chinese people or other Asians eating insects, snakes, or mice made clickbait headlines, effectively re-introducing the old narrative that the Chinese and their so-called ‘disgusting’ eating habits were at the epicenter of the virus. Indeed, scientists suspect, but have not proven, that the new coronavirus passed to humans from bats via pangolins, a small ant-eating mammal whose scales are highly prized in traditional Chinese medicine. Wet markets where live animals are sold, mostly for medicine or food, still exist in most Chinese cities, and the Huanan Seafood Market was originally believed to be the source of this outbreak. China temporarily shut down all such markets in January, warning that eating wild animals posed a threat to public health and safety.

Generally speaking, many Chinese people would probably gourmandize dishes that most Westerners would consider unusual if not repulsive, but our dietary cultures and what kind of animals they include vary a lot and are quite arbitrary. Vegetarianism is ethically congruent but deploring the eating of dogs, while feasting on amiable pigs, isn’t really. And it goes both ways: A lot of East Asians, for instance, find the taste of lamb revolting. Dietary habits are as broad inside China as they are outside; the Cantonese habit of eating “everything with four legs save the table and everything that flies but the airplane” is a standing joke in the rest of the country. Now, when it comes to the much-dreaded Covid-19, it is not what is being eaten that matters as much as the poorly regulated conditions of China’s wet markets i.e. workers inadequately trained on public health management or food safety standards, the lack of hygienic practices and barriers at markets, and the absence or bribing of regulators and health inspectors. The H1N1 virus, after all, started not in any rare, uncommon species, but in pigs.

Actually, what lies beneath all that is a deeply-engraved cultural imperative; many wild animals in China are killed not for culinary reasons but due to folklorish or esoteric beliefs. Traditional Chinese medicine is based on the premise that certain foods have healing powers, a notion that encourages some hazardous habits. There is, for instance, the concept of jinbu, which roughly means ‘nourishing by taking in (food)’. This holistic theory rests on the assumption that food is not only fuel, but medicine for the body. Well-known kinds of jinbu include tiger bones for ulcers, typhoid, dysentery, burns etc; dried pangolin scales are used to treat malarial fever and deafness, while gallbladders and bile harvested from live bears are good for treating jaundice; bats, which are thought to be the original source of both the current coronavirus and the SARS virus, are believed to be able to cure eye diseases -especially the animals’ granular feces. Recent field studies suggested that masked palm civets (a mammal native to Asia and Africa) might have served as intermediate hosts between bats and humans. When stewed with snake meat, apparently, palm civets are said to cure insomnia. As a matter of fact, in many people’s eyes, animals are living for man, not sharing the earth with man. It is also thought that animals killed just before serving are more “jinbu” potent, which is one reason the more exotic offerings in wet markets tend to be sold alive (“wet” because the meat sold was only recently slaughtered, which also makes it more virus-friendly). To top it all, the government has been heavily promoting traditional Chinese medicine, especially under President Xi Jinping’s new nationalistic

undercurrent, and while officially pharmaceutical companies following this model eschew the wildlife trade, these beliefs have become firmly embedded in the Chinese collective consciousness.

Nevertheless, these practices are not legion across China. Nor are they uniquely Chinese. But the avian influenza was likely transmitted to humans from chickens in a “wet” market, too. Scientists have been warning for years that the eating of exotic animals in southern China “is a time bomb.” The Chinese government is perfectly capable of enforcing policies in wet markets to make sure that there is no food safety risk (and by extension that it is not killing everyone in the world with preventable zoonotic diseases); but is it truly willing?

If the fallout from the Wuhan outbreak changes anything for the better, it may be that it gives a push towards reform and streamlining of the control and management of wet markets. Unified management, along with thorough hygiene and regulation standards could also help prevent the next catastrophe. But as with so many past disasters in China, it could also mean a brief period of change before profitability and entrenched interests take precedence once again. Nonetheless, it is necessary to investigate the real causes behind this deadly epidemic, whatever their nature -because if we don’t, we will only be inviting the next one; and soon.

Yvonne Marie Antonoglou is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, D.C. based think tank. The Gold Institute actively engages in the discussion of foreign policy and defense concerns by those who have not only thought deeply about them, but who have actively participated in efforts to affect them. By providing both coherent thoughts, and recommended actions to address various issues, the Gold Institute aims to bring real solutions to real problems in real time

Are Counter-Terrorism Measures Effective?

Introduction

Looking back on the past 15 years, there is little doubt that the 9/11 attacks profoundly altered the landscape of international security. Over the last decade and a half, there has been a tremendous multiplication of counter terrorism measures, laws, policies at regional, national and international levels. The events of 9/11 and -more recently- the phenomena of ISIS, “homegrown terrorism” and “foreign fighters”, set states and international bodies on an accelerated path of law making and institution-building, (Kaunert & Leonard, 2012). Domestic and international counter terrorism initiatives include specific provisions to permit, require and fund technologically innovative measures to counter terrorism; thus smart borders, (smart) surveillance, data retention/collection and sharing, passenger name record exchange etc., feature heavily in the hyper technologized operational continuum of contemporary counter terrorism, “where the production, retention, processing, and deployment of data has taken centre stage”, (De Londras, p.1., 2017). Although an array of difficult questions stems from the current risk prevention rationale regarding counter terrorism practices and the balancing act between security and democratic oversight, this study will take a step back from the specifics of technological advancements (in relation to counter terrorism measures) to focus on a more structural, ethical and deontological aspect: effectiveness. It is no secret that research conducted to evaluate the actual effectiveness of counter terrorism measures is worryingly insufficient or outright non-existent. Taking into account that the adoption of certain counter terrorism practices can potentially have implications with regard to human rights, institutional liberties, core democratic principles and the Rule of Law, it is crucial that engaged and systematic efforts in researching the effectiveness of counter terrorism measures are implemented in a rigorous way. The lack of empirical research is -by no means- a problem exclusive to counter terrorism but empirical evaluation is vital in clarifying and debunking prevailing beliefs regarding counter terrorism practices, (Jackson, 2016). It must be noted, however, that one can discern a number of challenges and technical difficulties when attempting to measure the effectiveness of counter terrorism. Van Um and Pisoiu argue that a major point of contention is the lack of a universally accepted notion of what an effective counter terrorism policy is supposed to bring about, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). In other words, there is a need for a solid conceptual framework that could provide a critical overview of effectiveness -understood in terms of the extent to which objectives for the measures implemented have been achieved-.

Framing Context

It is perhaps trite to remark that terrorism –and counter terrorism for that matter- did not begin on 9/11; rather, terrorism has long been employed as a modus operandi by organizations and individuals, attempting to achieve sociopolitical and/or other goals. For certain countries, violence associated with terrorism has long been a fact of life and many of these countries have had relevant anti-terrorism legislation in place for years, (Sunga, 1997). Thus, in effect, laws, policies and regulations (occasionally with a plethora of implications for the social equilibrium) pursuant to a risk prevention/securitization rationale are nothing new at the domestic level, (de Londras, 2017).

It is also not the case that the concept of “transnational terrorism” is fundamentally or qualitatively new. Standard terrorist operating procedures -i.e. shopping center bombings, assassinations, suicide bombings, hijackings, civilian aircraft bombings, spree shootings etc. – were repeatedly observed far before 9/11, (Jarvis, 2008). Nevertheless, 9/11 did represent a significant, path-breaking moment in a broader historical trajectory, since it was collectively perceived as an unfathomable trauma, ushering in a qualitatively new time of fear and insecurity, (Jarvis, 2008). Yet, for all of that, it is safe to say that the September 11 attacks certainly marked the end of an era and the beginning of another, mainly because they sketched the contours of contemporary counter terrorism and shaped the context in which the notions of justification, effectiveness and impact (of counter terrorism measures) are analyzed.

Conceptualizing Effectiveness

The conceptualization of effectiveness (of counter terrorism measures) has been complicated by the variability and multidimensionality of the empirical phenomenon it seeks to describe. In other words, the understanding of effectiveness is largely dependent on the perspective, priorities and broader purposes of the person or entity making the assessment, (SECILE, 2016). In the abstract, effectiveness could be positivistically equated with “the achievement of general objectives”. In the context of counter terrorism, however, this simple methodological continuum is complicated by three exogenous variables: i) the fact that particular counter terrorism measures are part of a broader operational framework and may have both meta objectives (relating to overall security matters) and specific objectives (relating to the measure in particular), ii) the fact that both the meta- and specific objectives may not be lucidly elaborated iii) the possibility of certain measures devised for one purpose being applied to other issues or having unexpected effects in relation to other areas, (SECILE, 2006).

As already suggested, a universally accepted definition or framework of counter terrorism effectiveness does not exist in the literature to date, (Van Dongen, 2009). The literature is currently limited to a hypothesized conceptual self- evidence or specific indicators regarding stand-alone terms such as impact, success, effects, etc., (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Subject-matter expert Martin Mazé defines effectiveness based on whether the measures “actually make a difference” and particularly focuses on the societal impact as an effectiveness indicator. He expressly notes that ex post facto evaluations rely heavily on outputs rather than impact per se; subsequently the effectiveness analysis “risks excluding key societal indicators”, (Martin-Mazé, p.5, 2013). It is worth noting at this point that the societal perception regarding the effectiveness of counter terrorism measures is also largely determined by three different arguments, central to the rationality of the Western political discourse: the exception argument, the balancing metaphor (between security and liberty) and the trade- off model, (de Londras, 2015). These conceptual continua are the ideological backbone of the societal perception of CT effectiveness. This (societal) approach of CT effectiveness is often analyzed through an output-outcome-impact trichotomy, an epistemological framework originally developed by Young (2001), (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011, Martin-Mazé, 2013). Generally speaking, output effectiveness would refer to the adoption of a measure, policy instrument, or regulation in response to a threat; in this instance, effectiveness is assessed in relation to the behavior of the policy makers charged with the implementation, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Outcome effectiveness, contrarily, would examine the direct and measurable effects that a given policy framework has in real life; as in, it would also take into account the behavior of the targeted group (in addition to the policy-makers) in relation to the short-term objectives of the specific CT policy implemented, such as disrupting the financial flows or the recruitment process of a terrorist organization, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). Finally, impact-effectiveness depends on the behavior/reaction of the targeted audience alone, with regard to the long-term objective of the CT policy, namely its success or failure in reducing or stopping terrorism, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011).

It is interesting to note that the effectiveness denominator is not something that most legal analyses tend to focus on, in general; they rather focus on the necessity, legality and proportionality of CT measures, (Vermeulen et. al., 2013). Vermeulen, Deering and McCarthy argue that effectiveness is predominantly evaluated in a factual sense and is assessed by reference to the intended results a CT measure is supposed to produce, (e.g. “expedition of the prosecution of suspected terrorists or the freezing of suspected terrorists’ assets”), (Vermeulen et. al., p.16, 2013). The legal perspective may not directly make out a prima facie case of effectiveness but it does consider other variables such as whether a CT measure is compliant with democratic values and principles and/or whether it is “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”; thus, implicitly taking effectiveness into account as well, (European Commission Report on CT measures, p.6, 2010).

Measuring Operational Effectiveness (from a Law-Enforcement Perspective)

A wide spectrum of different methods has been put to use in the study of CT operational effectiveness, with qualitative methods and impact effectiveness being the most prevalent epistemological approaches, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). This “clinical” analysis is somewhat understandable, since the ultimate objective of any CT measure or policy is to actually have an effect on terrorism and numbers tend to offer clearer policy-relevant indicators, (LaFree, 2006; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). However, measuring operational effectiveness practically can be a frustratingly tedious task, given the large number of quantitative studies in the field and the difficulty to clearly establish the reliability and validity of the relevant indicators, (Van Um & Pisoiu, 2011). One basic factor that influences the overall validity and reliability of indicators and complicates the structured and systematic consideration of CT measures, is the fact that most studies focus only on individual measures -i.e. the increase in law enforcement powers or legislation, criminalising acts as terrorism, racial profiling or data mining (Omotola, 2008; Harcourt, 2006; Jonas and Harper, 2006) -, or on a preferential selection thereof i.e. disrupting terrorist financing, roving patrols, security/defensive barriers, infiltration of terrorist organizations (Morag, 2005); arrests, sweeps/searches, confiscation of goods/funds, entering enemy territory, detaining or questioning, foiling attacks, sting operations, hostile actions (strikes/killings), (Pratto et. al., 2009). Along similar lines, Hewitt proposes a classification scheme albeit with largely unspecified criteria; from a law-enforcement stand point, he looks at anti-terrorist legislation, emergency powers, ceasefire and negotiations and the use of security forces, (Hewitt, 1984). Occasionally, there is no specific mention of concrete counter terrorism measures; they are rather evaluated as a whole in cost-benefit assessments, (Stewart and Mueller, 2009; Zycher, 2009).

From a law enforcement perspective, operational effectiveness is -quite often- approached in the literature through the outcome-effectiveness basis. The study of outcome-effectiveness, in this sense, can be quite problematic due to the lack of systematization, convenient selection of indicators and a certain haziness as to “whether certain elements should be considered indicators or side effects”, (Van Um & Pisoiu, p.9, 2011). Most authors tend to systematize indicators through a dichotomous categorization; the root causes of terrorism and the operational ability of the targeted organization (resources, public support, recruitment, etc.), (Della Porta, 1992). Most studies fall into the second category and take one or more operational aspects into consideration. Della Porta, for instance, argues that “the number of terrorist…arrests (can be taken) as an indicator of state success” and therefore its effectiveness, (Della Porta, p.160, 1992). Byman focuses on the “level of domestic support for counter terrorism operations, operational freedom and the disruption of the adversary’s command and control structure”, (Byman, p.413, 2003), while Perl suggests that operational effectiveness should be measured by reference to the degradation of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure, (Perl, 2007). Relatedly, Malvesti provides a comprehensive set of indicators and notes that one needs to take into account the “critical nodes” in a terrorist infrastructure, such as: the political base, financial networks, communication channels, sanctuary, intelligence network, weapons, cells and leadership, (Malvesti, p.21-25, 2002). Spencer proposes a more holistic approach, stating that the operational effectiveness of counter terrorism measures may also be purposively understood; if the implemented law enforcement measures manage to reduce the popular fear of terrorism, they can be considered effective, (Spencer, 2006).

In their report regarding the operational perspective, de Londras, Downing and Doody stress that operational effectiveness is directly proportional to “the satisfaction at operational level(s) of the original objectives that were to be achieved by the introduction of a CT policy or measure”, (de Londras et al, p.17, 2013). Nevertheless, they stress that a clear rationale for the policy and/or measure in question needs to be accurately defined along with an adequate monitoring mechanism so that effectiveness –for all intents and purposes- can actually be assessed, (de Londras et al, 2013).

It is worth noting that certain studies place a very high premium on impact effectiveness as well, with respect to the operational effectiveness of relevant (law enforcement) CT measures. Impact effectiveness is usually evaluated in relation to indicators associated with terrorist activity, i.e. a. number of attacks, recidivism rates for deradicalisation programmes of individuals (Noricks, 2009) and the degree to which group radicalization programmes are capable of preventing further terrorist activity (Ashour, 2008). In this context, Horgan and Braddock propose a more comprehensive assessment scheme, the Multi Attribute Utility Technology, consisting of two sets of indicators: a. the rate of terrorism, subordinated domestic terror rates and recidivism and b. the popular support for the government, “boosted morale and political capital”, (Horgan and Braddock, p.283, 2010). Noricks, however, notes a major difficulty within this category of effectiveness: the limited amount and reliability of data, such as the accurate reporting and tracking of re-arrests in the case of recidivism (Noricks, 2009). Numerous scholars tend to use instead of impact, outcome indicators i.e. the number of killed/arrested terrorists and the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure (Floros & Newsome, 2009, Schmid & Sing, 2008). It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that this particular indicator could lead to faulty assumptions, since operatives are easily replaceable, thus the arithmetic analogy does not necessarily reveal the potential or the size of a terrorist organization; therefore, any assessments regarding the impact, dynamics or future attacks would -at best- be probabilistic, (Probst, 2005; Spencer, 2006; Stohl, 2006).

Finally, a comparatively smaller body of literature uses output effectiveness for the evaluation of counter terrorism measures. This method is relatively unproblematic because its indicators are easily delineated. These include the production of strategies, organization reform and legislation (9/11 Commission report, 2006), the establishment of authorities or the implementation of legislation, (Alexander, 2006; Keohane, 2005).

De Londras observes that the introduction (and subsequently the effectiveness evaluation) of counter terrorism policies -particularly in the European Union- is generally structured around ex ante impact assessments, which basically “can only ascertain predicted impacts and thus estimate the proportionality, effectiveness and appropriateness of the proposed technology or measure”, (de Londras, p,12, 2017). So, in essence, ex ante impact assessments are purely speculative and they cannot determine effectiveness as a matter of fact. She proposes instead an “ex post facto” review, (currently rare in the context of counter terrorism), of how the measure or technology is actually working, how it is widely perceived, what its real impact is, how much it is costing and so on, so that effectiveness can be assessed “in the broad and vital sense”, (de Londras, p,12, 2017).

In sum, academics have used a wide variety of methods to assess the overall effectiveness of counter terrorism responses and have reached very different conclusions regarding how effective counter terrorism policies actually are.

Conclusion

While effectiveness could be regarded as one of the most essential aspects of any counter terrorism policy, its study is cumbered by both epistemological underdevelopment and a lack of a canonical scientific basis. Conceptually, there is a wide variety of indicators/measures/techniques taken into consideration, and in numerous categorizations, from comprehensive strategies to a set of measures and/or individual ones. The incremental methodological complexity is directly analogous to a series of validity and reliability issues, which explain the –partly- divergent results obtained. Another major hindrance is the data availability and quality as well as the lack of empirical data, the limited nature and/or manipulability of statistics and the “impossibility of capturing some disruptive successes in statistical form”, (SECILE, p.25, 2013). The limitations of a statistical and/or qualitative evaluation should also be born in mind, as statistics are not necessarily objective and/or exhaustive indicators of effectiveness, (SECILE, p.27, 2013). In designing mechanisms for evaluating effectiveness, qualitative empirical research should be conducted, in order to identify potential conditions that could be operationalized in assessment variables. Furthermore, policy makers must bear in mind that much of counter terrorism is -in effect- mutative in nature (shifting threats, priorities, geopolitical realities) and effectiveness itself may change over time, depending on the particular circumstances; hence, the effectiveness of CT measures requires constant re-evaluation, occasionally beyond a statistical and/or quantitative basis.

References:

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– De Londras, F. (2017), “Evaluation & Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism”, Forthcoming in Wim Hardyns, Koen Ponnet, Genserik Reniers, Wim Smit, Luc Braeckmans & Barbara Segaert (eds), p.1, Socially Responsible Innovation in Security: Critical Reflections. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2801994 Accessed: 11/03/2017

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– Harcourt, B, (2006), “Muslim Profiles post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling An Effective Counter Terrorism Measure and Does It Violate the Right to be Free from Discrimination”, Chicago: The University of Chicago Law School

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https://books.google.gr/books?id=IZ_7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA218&lpg=PA218&dq=it+is+crucial+that+the+evaluation+of+counter+terrorism+effectiveness+is+conducted&source=bl&ots=lh3JnVgqrv&sig=h3aGMCW2ZXDDCOflfpDCcP9FgqM&hl=el&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwianOLBw97SAhWG7xQKHajfAw4Q6AEINjAE#v=onepage&q=it%20is%20crucial%20that%20the%20evaluation%20of%20counter%20terrorism%20effectiveness%20is%20conducted&f=false Accessed: 1/03/2017

– Jarvis, L. (2008), “Times of Terror: Writing Temporality into the War on Terror”, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1 (2): pp.245-262

– Jonas, J & Harper, J, (2006), “Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining”, CATO Institute, Available at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/effective-counterterrorism-limited-role-predictive-data-mining Accessed: 13/03/2017

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