Developments in Iran can no longer be treated as a domestic political issue. What is unfolding there is already reshaping the security environment confronting Europe, the United States, Israel, and the broader region. Whether the Islamic Republic survives through force or whether a political transition takes shape will have direct external consequences. Suppression is unlikely to restore calm. It is far more likely to deepen existing military, political, and security threats. A managed transition would remove the primary sources of these threats and substantially strengthen the international order.
The current revolution is not comparable to earlier rounds of unrest. Protests have spread across 400 cities, with more than 100 protest points in Tehran alone. This is not a single social group or political faction mobilizing temporarily. Workers, students, middle-class professionals, political activists, and even athletes have taken part. What is striking is not only the scale of this mobilization, but the consistency of its message across cities and social groups. Protesters are demanding a complete break with the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a transitional government with recognized leadership. These demands have been reinforced by Iranian expatriate communities and international civil-society networks. The result is a movement that challenges the regime itself rather than its policies.
The state’s response has been uncompromising. More than 40,000 people have reportedly been killed, over 50,000 arrested, and tens of thousands injured. Domestic legitimacy, already limited, has collapsed to its lowest point in 47 years. The regime now survives primarily through coercion. Historically, even its base of support extended little beyond a narrow circle of loyalists. Widespread repression has weakened that circle as well. Under these conditions, internal weakness does not produce caution. It pushes the leadership outward, toward military force, external pressure, and proxy warfare.
This shift is visible in Iran’s foreign behavior. Deterrence has given way to destabilizing assertiveness. When under strain, Tehran has repeatedly exported crises, activating proxy networks in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and escalating indirect attacks on Western interests. These actions threaten global energy routes and trade flows. They also have consequences closer to home for Europe, from migration pressures to energy exposure and the risk of covert operations. Iran-backed proxies, including the Fatemiyoun Brigade, have become visible on European soil. In the February 2025 attack in Munich, Germany, the perpetrator, an Afghan national, shared a speech by Khamenei online, prompting questions about possible links to the Fatemiyoun. Members of these networks often maintain direct ties to Tehran while presenting themselves as refugees, extending Iran’s threat into Europe’s security space.
Missile and military capabilities remain central to the regime’s calculations. Investment in medium-range missiles and drones continues, while long-range missile claims serve a psychological function. According to MEMRI, Iranian expert Mehdi Seif Tabrizi reported that Iran tested an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of approximately 10,000 kilometers, reportedly launched toward Siberia with Russian approval. Confirmation of such a test would mark a significant expansion of Iran’s strategic reach and raise serious questions about coordination between Tehran and Moscow. Even without fully operational ICBMs, approaching this threshold complicates U.S. defense planning, strains European and NATO systems, and increases the risk of miscalculation. Domestic repression, in this context, amplifies Iran’s external threat rather than containing it.
Israel faces particularly acute risks. The Islamic Republic has long treated Israel’s destruction as a legitimate objective and has justified the development of its proxy infrastructure on that basis. Continued suppression at home would likely harden this posture, strengthening Hezbollah and other aligned groups and reinforcing a cycle of escalation that undermines regional stability. This hostile framing also extends internally: during the Iranian revolution, authorities labeled protesters as agents of Israel, portraying them as legitimate targets, even those wounded in the streets, who were later executed in hospitals. Many of those arrested were subsequently executed en masse under the same accusation of being Israeli agents, yet the regime counted them among those shot in the streets to conceal the killings. Protesters awaiting execution have likewise been charged with cooperating with Israel and espionage.
Europe is not insulated. Following the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, Tehran warned that retaliation against European policymakers was possible, arguing that such measures would harm European interests and further strain relations. In a retaliatory and ironic move, the Islamic Republic’s parliament subsequently designated all European military forces as terrorists, effectively framing them as legitimate targets. Even before these developments, Germany’s Ministry of the Interior reportedly warned that Iranian dissidents faced serious and aggressive intelligence operations on German soil. What began as domestic repression in Tehran has thus evolved into a tangible European security challenge, affecting political freedoms and placing sustained pressure on security services.
While the West faces these immediate security challenges, concerns about state collapse in Iran are often overstated. Iran retains a strong national identity, lacks the deep ethnic and sectarian fractures seen elsewhere, and possesses a substantial middle class alongside an active civil society. Its history as a centralized modern state matters. The destabilizing role played by the IRGC in Syria and Iraq, where it helped sustain conflict and enable terrorist groups, reflects conditions absent inside Iran itself. The revolution underscores this distinction. Protesters have increasingly rallied around a single alternative leader, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, chanting his name in the streets and expressing support for his 100-day transitional plan.
A successful transition would carry clear security benefits. Missile and military threats would recede. Proxy networks funded by the IRGC would weaken. Migration pressures and regional instability would diminish, while security and economic cooperation with Western states would replace the previous threats. Supporting such an outcome aligns directly with Western strategic interests.
Western governments now face a strategic choice. Managing recurring crises is no longer sufficient. Supporting structured transition planning, protecting Iranian dissidents in Europe, and strengthening coordination among the United States, Europe, and Israel on intelligence, military, and threat assessment are necessary steps. Beyond the IRGC designation, measures such as closing Iranian embassies across the EU, expelling regime diplomats and their families, recalling European diplomats from Iran, and recognizing a transitional authority should be considered as part of a coherent strategy.
Iran’s trajectory will shape more than its own future. It will influence European security, U.S. deterrence credibility, and stability across the region. Continued suppression is unlikely to resolve the crisis. It is more likely to produce a longer and more dangerous phase. A controlled transition, by contrast, represents one of the few realistic opportunities for lasting threat reduction. Ignoring that possibility would carry costs far higher than the deliberate management of change.
Sheina Vohoudi is a associate Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C. based foreign policy and defense think tank.