In The Nuclear Age, Is A Victory Worth It?

Nuclear age and the Doomsday Clock

(This article was written by Michael T. Flynn and appeared on GeneralFlynn.com. In The Nuclear Age, Is A Victory Worth It?)

The Doomsday Clock reads 89 seconds to midnight.

Reflecting growing concerns about multiple risks, including:

  • Nuclear weapons and increasing geopolitical tensions.
  • Biological threats and advances in biotechnology.
  • Failures of international leadership and cooperation.
  • Artificial Intelligence.

Nine nations are widely recognized as possessing nuclear weapons, yet many of the major Cold War-era nuclear arms control agreements have either expired, been terminated, or are no longer being implemented. This is the reality we face, and we must be prepared to navigate it with resolve, adaptability, and purpose.

What we are witnessing leaves no room for complacency. This is a defining moment that calls on all of us, across the globe, to awaken to the challenges before us and respond with the urgency they demand.

In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired. For fifteen years, that treaty capped Russian and American deployed nuclear warheads at 1,550 each. The treaty was imperfect and compromised by counting rules that permitted ambiguity. But it existed. It provided communication channels between Moscow and Washington. It established red lines that both sides understood. It reflected an assumption that both superpowers feared nuclear war more than they feared each other.

That framework no longer exists. There is no successor agreement in place. The United States and Russia are not engaged in arms control negotiations. There is no bilateral dialogue on nuclear doctrine, escalation thresholds, or crisis management. Moscow is modernizing its arsenal without constraint. Beijing is doing the same. Washington is debating whether nuclear weapons should even be part of American strategy.

This represents strategic malpractice at the highest levels.

The reality we face is stark and demands clarity. Russia maintains approximately 5,977 nuclear warheads, with over 1,700 deployed on active systems. The United States possesses roughly 5,044 warheads, also heavily deployed. Together, these two nations control 87% of the world’s nuclear inventory. China operates about 600 warheads and is expanding aggressively, with projections placing its arsenal at over 1,000 by 2030. France maintains 300 warheads. The United Kingdom holds 225 warheads. India and Pakistan each possess roughly 160 warheads, locked in a rivalry that erupted into open military conflict in May 2025 and could escalate to nuclear war at any moment. North Korea has assembled roughly 50 warheads and is receiving technological assistance from Russia. Israel maintains approximately 90 warheads under a policy of deliberate strategic ambiguity.

That is the picture confronting the United States. Nine nuclear powers collectively control 12,200 warheads without an international framework constraining deployment or use.

Five flashpoints demand American attention and immediate strategic focus:

  • Russia and NATO. Moscow’s military doctrine explicitly permits nuclear first-use in response to a conventional attack deemed to threaten Russian territory, and with New START expired, Russia operates under no numerical ceiling on warhead deployment.
  • Iran and the Middle East. The Trump administration correctly assesses that Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, yet significant uncertainty remains regarding Iran’s intentions, the status of its nuclear program, and Tehran’s willingness to escalate regional conflict in ways that could trigger miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation between American, Israeli, and Iranian forces.
  • India and Pakistan. These two nations clashed militarily for 88 hours in May 2025, involving drones, missiles, and active nuclear brinkmanship, and the boundary between controlled conflict and uncontrolled escalation remains razor thin.
  • North Korea. The regime is actively developing intercontinental ballistic systems and receiving technological assistance from Russia in exchange for troops deployed to Ukraine.
  • China and Taiwan. China is preparing military options for the unification of Taiwan, while the United States has committed to Taiwan’s defense, creating a scenario where escalation from conventional conflict to nuclear exchange becomes plausible.

These are not theoretical exercises or academic scenarios. These are operational contingencies that military planners in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi, and Seoul are actively preparing for.

The non-proliferation regime that successfully prevented nuclear proliferation for decades is collapsing. Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement with Pakistan in recognition of shifting regional security dynamics. South Korea and Japan are publicly discussing weapons programs. Turkey and Poland are questioning the credibility of American nuclear guarantees and considering whether domestic nuclear capability is necessary for security. France has announced plans to expand its nuclear arsenal. When the political leadership of allied nations concludes that America’s nuclear umbrella cannot be relied upon, they pursue their own deterrents. This proliferation cascades. When one regional power acquires nuclear weapons, others inevitably follow. Proliferation becomes self-reinforcing, creating instability that benefits no one.

The collapse of the international framework that managed nuclear risk for fifteen years demands strategic reckoning at every level of American leadership and society. The absence of successor agreements, the silence on bilateral communication channels, and the decision to permit two decades of arms control progress to evaporate represent a fundamental departure from the strategic discipline that defined the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

American forces must be prepared for contingencies that we hope to avoid but must nonetheless plan to manage or defeat. The assumptions that governed military planning for the past thirty years are no longer valid. Doctrine, training, force posture, and strategic communication must reflect the world as it exists, not as we wish it to be.

American citizens must understand that this is not a foreign policy abstraction debated by specialists in think tanks. It is a foundational question about whether the nation can sustain the principles and institutions that have governed its survival. The nation has a Constitution that limits executive power and preserves civilian control over matters of war. The nation has inherited from previous generations a strategic position earned through military sacrifice and strategic discipline. The nation has a responsibility to the generation that will inherit the consequences of today’s choices. That responsibility cannot be outsourced or delayed.

For eighty years, since Hiroshima, no nuclear power has employed a nuclear weapon in anger. Not once. That record is remarkable and reflects deliberate decisions made by political and military leadership to constrain escalation and fear the consequences of nuclear war more than they feared each other. Those decisions are no longer being made. The political will to restore strategic frameworks has evaporated. The sense of shared vulnerability that once unified adversaries around mutual survival has dissolved into competitive posturing and strategic ambition.

The moment to rebuild strategic stability is here. American leadership, military and civilian alike, must act now with the clarity and urgency that characterized the Cold War generation.

The price of delay is incalculable and irreversible.

Michael T. Flynn is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.