SITREP IRAN: The Past is the past—like it or not, America better focus on the future

SITREP IRAN: The Past is the past—like it or not, America better focus on the future

We can second guess all we want the decision for the United States to enter another war in the Middle East, this time in Iran. However, cutting to the heart of how geopolitical debates often get mired in rearview mirrors rather than what’s next, I want to break down the dynamics at play.

Why the Fixation on the Past?

People (policymakers, analysts, media, and the public) dwell on historical decisions for a few interconnected reasons, even as the current situation demands forward-thinking:

1. Accountability and Blame-Shifting: The Persian Gulf’s volatility, marked by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria, ballistic missile tests, and disruptions to shipping lanes like the Strait of Hormuz, stems directly from past U.S. and allied policies. Think the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War (with Western backing for Iraq), the 2003 Iraq invasion that empowered Iranian influence, or the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal and its 2018 withdrawal. These aren’t abstract history; they’re scapegoats. Critics on the left blame Bush-era neocons for destabilizing the region, while those on the right point to Obama-Biden appeasement or Clinton’s missed opportunities. It’s easier to litigate old choices than own new risks, especially in a polarized environment where admitting “we need to adapt” feels like weakness.

2. Lessons from History as a Crutch: The Gulf’s strategic importance (oil flows, U.S. naval presence via the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and alliances with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel) makes every misstep feel existential. Past events like the 1980s Tanker War or the 2019 drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities are invoked to justify caution or aggression. But this often turns into paralysis: “We can’t trust diplomacy because of the failed Algiers Accords” or “Military action backfired in Iraq, so let’s not repeat it.” It’s a valid way to avoid repeating errors, but it crowds out innovation, like exploring new deterrence models or economic levers.

3. Institutional Inertia and Media Cycles: Bureaucracies in Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh are staffed by veterans of those eras, so institutional memory biases toward hindsight. Media amplifies these headlines’ love “what if” retrospectives (i.e., “How the Iran Deal’s Collapse Led to Today’s Crisis”) because they’re clickable and don’t require predicting uncertain futures. In 2026, with ongoing Houthi disruptions backed by Iran and potential escalations post-any recent incidents, this backward gaze distracts from evolving threats like cyber warfare or Iran’s alliances with Russia and China.

Shifting to Future Decisions:

The real imperative RIGHT NOW is ensuring a proactive strategy. The situation today (escalating Iranian enrichment to near-weapons-grade uranium, proxy militia attacks on U.S. bases, and Gulf states diversifying away from oil amid climate shifts) demands decisions that aren’t just reactions. Here’s what could (and should) be prioritized:

Strengthen Deterrence Without Endless Wars: Build on Abraham Accords momentum by integrating Israel-Gulf defense networks, perhaps with AI-driven early-warning systems for missile threats. Future-focused: Invest in non-kinetic options like economic sanctions tied to verifiable de-escalation, or cyber defenses to counter Iran’s hacking prowess.
Energy Independence and Diversification: The Gulf’s oil chokehold is waning with global renewables push. Decisions now could accelerate U.S. and allied transitions to alternatives, reducing Iran’s leverage from asymmetric warfare on tankers. Think incentives for nuclear power or green hydrogen hubs in the region.
Diplomatic Off-Ramps with Teeth: Instead of rehashing JCPOA debates, craft a new framework that includes ballistic missiles and regional proxies, enforced by a coalition including Europe, India, and even cautious outreach to moderates in Tehran. But this requires bold leadership willing to risk short-term backlash for long-term stability.
Countering Broader Influences: Iran’s ties to the Axis of Resistance (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) and partnerships with Moscow/Beijing are accelerating. Future moves: Bolster Gulf cyber resilience, support proxy countermeasures, and use trade deals to peel away Iranian allies economically.
In essence, the past obsession is human nature, comfort in the known versus the gamble of the unknown. But America is a leader who’s navigated these waters before, we know victory comes from decisive action ahead, not endless autopsies. If we keep debating yesterday’s calls, tomorrow’s threats will outpace us. There are clearly emerging and unknown threats that we must consider and be prepared to address when they raise their ugly heads. Let’s not fall into the traps of staring at our strategic navels, instead, think geo-strategically, long-term, and use common sense and then move rapidly to end this war.

IRAN UPDATE – THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENT IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

Trent Franks, Fmr Congressman & Vice Chair of HASC – Toppling the Iranian Regime & Ending the Nuclear Threat

This past week we’ve begun to see indicators that suggest an increasing number of elements within the regime are fearful that defeat is inevitable. We’re not yet talking huge numbers, but the trend is building in the right direction. This follows previous analysis that the regime had already psychologically isolated itself from the Iranian citizens. Both of these developments, when they arise at compelling levels and combine, are two conditions favorable to successful revolution. A third belongs to the citizens (as irregular operators), who must reach the point where they’re convinced there’s no going back to the way things were before the uprising…that life can only improve after the regime is toppled. This reflects the reality that the psychological component in irregular warfare contributes at least 50% toward ultimate victory.
So, consider the following:
In the last few days alone we’ve seen several reports of Iranian diplomats requesting asylum in the west. In Denmark, Australia, Switzerland and Austria…probably others, too. (BTW we’ve put a $10M bounty on the heads of several other listed senior leaders in the Regime).
Also, we continue to see increasing reports of IRGC members and basij, and police failing to report for duty.
Other reports suggest desertions are rising amongst Iran’s various security forces.
And we’ve disrupted the logistics for the regime’s security forces, and that has produced acute shortages for them…And the shortages, in turn, have led to tension between the IRGC and the Artesh (the conventional Army), because now they’re competing against each other for resupply.
And this supply problem’s only going to get much worse….because a few days ago we destroyed the main data center for Iran’s largest bank, Bank Sepah, which, until now, paid the salaries for all government workers, police, IRGC and basij. I can tell you from first-hand experience that when indigenous forces can’t get money home to their families, bad things happen.
On the other hand are the citizens. So, a few days ago we hit a cyber-company in Tehran, named Sahab Pardaz. That’s the company that the regime used to shut down the internet. So, clearly the intent of our strike was to enable turning the internet back on for Iranian citizens. That’s important, because until the regime blacked out the internet over Iran, the protestors had been relying on social media and other online capabilities to communicate and coordinate. If the internet comes back on, the citizens will regain their ability to organize…and when conditions in the streets ripen…we’ll likely see an increase in organized opposition activity. BTW renewed/re-energized opposition activity is kinda typical in irregular warfare. It’s common that resistance activity goes…let’s say…dormant for a period, and then pops up again, re-energized and with renewed intensity. My guess is we’ll see this when conditions become optimal. Keep watching for it.
Another thing to watch is the shifting priority to our targeting. Why? Because folks on the ground in Iran report that they’re starting to see our targeting shift to local security forces. Until recently we’ve largely been targeting fixed assets of the national-level security forces, air defenses, radars, missile stockpiles, launchers, HQs, bases, armories, airfields, aircraft, storage facilities, training facilities, motorpools, ammo storage bunkers, etc. However, as those have been largely addressed, folks on the ground are now reporting that our targeting is transitioning to other, more local elements of the regime….They’re seeing us hit neighborhood police patrols, snap traffic control points, snap personnel checkpoints…even private automobiles where security forces are sleeping, because they have no patrol base to return to..…these are local levers of repression the regime has relied upon to control the population. Destruction of enough of these local security forces is a necessary condition to enable to citizens to return to the streets. Oh, and much of this targeting is the result of Iranian citizens themselves identifying for us the hide sites and geographic locations of police, baij and IRGC operating in their villages and towns.
We discussed all of this AND the “closing” of the Straits of Hormuz on our show this week. My guest is Arash Saleh, member of the KDP-I (Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran), the oldest Kurdish resistance group inside Iran. It traces its history back to 1945 in the days leading up to Qazi Mohamed bravely stepping onto the park at Chwar Chira in Mahabad and declaring history’s first, so far only, and sadly short-lived independent, sovereign, Kurdish state…the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Threatened by Tehran, the Republic ended one year later. Click on the link to hear our discussion: https://frontlinesoffreedom.com/frontlines-03-07-2026