In Britain, France, and Germany, the Radical Opposition Is Breaking the Complacent Power of the Center

Derk Jan Eppink

(This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in Wynia’s Week. In Groot-Brittannië, Frankrijk en Duitsland breekt de radicale oppositie de zelfgenoegzame macht van het midden)

With the electoral nosedive of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Britain has now become the third major country in Western Europe — after Germany and France — to find itself in a political deadlock. The popularity of the leading political figures — Starmer, Merz, and Macron — hovers around 15%. At the same time, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is recklessly bucking the trend, legalizing roughly 500,000 illegal immigrants. Spain really ought to be thrown out of Schengen.

The only larger, stable country in Western Europe is … Italy, led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. A rung lower sits the Netherlands, with its minority Jetten cabinet, in much the same boat as the big three.

The General Discontent Grew Too Great

The big three have electoral systems that keep the “extremes” out, each country in its own way. In Britain, the candidate with the most votes wins; the rest are gone. The Germans have an ingenious system with a 5% threshold to keep smaller, radical parties out of parliament. It took the German Greens decades to get into the Bundestag. In presidential elections, France ratchets the stakes up to the breaking point, with a runoff round between the two strongest candidates. A genuine clash.

The “self-protection system” produces the opposite effect when the general discontent grows too great. The radical opposition bands together to break the complacent power. That is what Nigel Farage demonstrated last week with his “Reform UK.” Starting from almost nothing, he became the biggest winner in the British municipal elections.

I watched Farage rise in the European Parliament. His opponents invariably made the same mistake: underestimating him. He was laughed off by the European mandarins because he advocated Britain’s departure from the EU. That sounded like a “joke.” He started out on the back benches with a single ally, won elections, and formed a group that brought him to the front row. He used that spot as a foxhole against the EU. Brexit came, and Farage seemed superfluous. He left for British politics.

There too he was laughed at. The British system was dominated by Labour and the Conservatives. Once again the laughter fell silent, because his Reform UK staked everything on “immigration,” the top priority of most voters.

Last week Farage drew many votes away from both Labour and the Conservatives: Reform UK even became the largest party. If a general election were held today, Farage would become Prime Minister of Britain.

Macron Squeezed Out by the Right and the Left

The same pattern in France. In the municipal elections this past March, Marine Le Pen’s “Rassemblement National” achieved a major breakthrough. The number of RN mayors rose from 827 in 2020 to around 3,000 this year. RN also made substantial gains in mid-sized cities. Large cities such as Paris generally vote left. In France, Macron’s incompetent “center” is being squeezed out by the right. And at the same time by the left, with a leading figure like Jean-Luc Mélenchon: a socialist out of the Stone Age, whose support base consists 70% of the “Muslim vote.” He essentially personifies “Islamo-socialism.”

Marine Le Pen’s participation in the presidential election is uncertain. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) accuses her of “misusing” European funds for national election campaigns. The French court will issue its ruling. If found guilty, she will not be able to run in next April’s presidential election. Marine Le Pen would be a strong candidate. Her biggest disadvantage is her surname.

Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon

The reserve is already standing by. Jordan Bardella, who comes from the suburbs of Paris, entered the Le Pen family through Marine’s niece, Nolwenn Olivier. The relationship lasted four years. In the meantime, Bardella became a well-known name. In April, Paris Match revealed that Bardella is in a relationship with Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies (22). The man from the Paris banlieue and his princess — a fairy tale. It may free Bardella from the “Le Pen stigma” that clung to Marine. But: last week the European Public Prosecutor’s Office announced from Luxembourg that it is also opening an investigation against Bardella over “misuse” of EU funds for media training. The timing is no coincidence.

The presidential election will be hard-fought, and especially so in the second round: “left versus right.” Excessive migration, cultural alienation, and collective impoverishment are the main themes. What threatens is a second-round result so razor-thin that the loser does not accept the outcome. Britain is a country of traditions; France is a country of revolution. The French political center has lost its legitimacy, and may reap a pitched battle in Paris.

Weimar Republic

And yet Germany is more worrying. Germans want to make everything todsicher — dead certain. Above all, no uncertainty. That is precisely what threatens. Germany is heading toward a situation resembling that of the Weimar Republic (1918–1933). That republic perished in chaos. The “political center” governing Germany (the Christian Democrats CDU/CSU, the Social Democrats SPD, and the liberal FDP) has shrunk sharply. The challenger is Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which draws its electoral support primarily in East Germany and is scoring ever better in West Germany. The AfD, like Farage and Le Pen/Bardella, makes migration its signature issue.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU/CSU) governs with the Social Democratic SPD. The liberal FDP did not return to the Bundestag because the party failed to clear the electoral threshold. Merz has ruled out the AfD and is dependent on the SPD, which obstructs stricter immigration policy and, above all, digs in its heels against socioeconomic austerity. In this way the SPD blocks Merz, who — by categorically excluding the AfD — has no alternative.

Voters Could Tear Down the “Firewall”

The AfD polls at 28%; the CDU/CSU sits at 23%; the SPD at 13%. The latter party, however, feels competition from the Greens (13%) and Die Linke (10%). It is caught in the splits: if the SPD moves too far toward the center, it loses voters to the Greens and Die Linke, but as soon as the CDU/CSU concedes too much to the SPD, the AfD grows across all of Germany. Merz is stuck fast, and his popularity rating has collapsed.

This autumn there are elections in the state of Saxony-Anhalt. There the AfD stands at 41%, the CDU at 26%, the SPD at 7%, and Die Linke at 12%. The 5% electoral threshold now works in favor of the radical newcomer and against the established parties. If the SPD ends up below 5%, it gets no seats, and the AfD — with the freed-up seats — could just barely obtain a majority. Then the voter tears down the “firewall,” the agreement among the established parties to exclude the AfD.

It could get even worse. The Bavarian CSU is, in the polls, only just above 5% at the national level. If this party — once led by the legendary Franz Josef Strauss — drops below 5% in Bundestag elections, it gets fewer seats and the CDU falls back to 17%.

At that point the system, with its corrective mechanisms, buckles under its own weight, because the electoral threshold works against the traditional parties. The extremes crowd out the center. Merz is powerless, locked in the SPD’s stranglehold. If the CDU does after all join forces with the AfD, it falls apart. The “social wing” of the CDU would then rise up in revolt. The liberal FDP cannot help, because it no longer clears the 5% electoral threshold. New elections will make the AfD bigger, while the CDU must go through a turbulent phase as it names a new chancellor candidate (Kanzlerkandidat).

Germany Is Adrift

In the corridors, the minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst (50), has been warming up for some time now. He comes from the area around the German town of Bocholt, close to the Dutch border. The CDU must, of course, win elections, and the CSU must hold up, in order to be able to lead coalition formation in Berlin. But from Bavaria, minister-president Markus Söder (59) could put himself forward, with a right-wing profile, to keep the CSU above the 5% threshold.

In short: Merz no longer knows what, how, or where to. Germany is adrift.

Derk Jan Eppink is a Distinguished Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.