(This article was written By Peter Huessy and appeared in the RealClearDefense. Do Nuclear Numbers Matter-realcleardefense)

Last year, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded that both Russia and China are increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons to achieve their national interests. Combined, they are projected to exceed the U.S. strategic nuclear force in numbers, creating a multiple challenger problem for the U.S. and raising the possibility of a dangerous collaboration between adversaries.

In short, the nuclear landscape does not look good. For the 400 land-based ICBMs that DIA forecasts for Russia, 50 are Sarmats, each capable of carrying 20 high-yield warheads (WHs) (500 kilotons to 1 megaton each), for a total of 1,000 WHs. The remaining land-based 350 ICBMs will be the Yars, carrying 4 (tested with 6) medium-yield WHs (300-500 kt) for a total of 1,400 WHs, giving a grand total of 2,400 land-based ICBM WHs. The Bulava submarine-based sea launched ‘s ballistic missile (SLBM) carries 6 WHs each, or 1,152 WHs, for a total of 3,552 ICBM/SLBM warheads. Russian strategic bombers can carry another approximately 1,000 WHs on various air-launch missiles. This implies a total Russian long-range strategic force of up to 4,552 WHs, exceeding the 2010 New START treaty limitations by 300 percent.

For China, the newly projected 700 ICBM figure for 2035 was a shock, given DIA’s historical underestimation of the growth in Chinese nuclear forces. Hopefully, this means an end to the agency falling victim to China’s ongoing strategic deception. China is currently producing 50-75 ICBMs per year. China has 400 ICBMs, so another 300 ICBMs by 2035, at 30 ICBMs/year, is feasible. In terms of warheads, the Chinese DF-31A can carry 3 re-entry vehicles (RVs) and the DF-41 up to 10 WH’s. Simple calculations indicate that China has the potential to deploy 2,100 to 7,000 ICBM warheads. Regarding Chinese SLBMs, the DIA forecast is for 132 SLBMs — 72 JL-3 SLBMs, each with 3 WHs, and 60 new SLBMs for the 3 new Type 096 SSBNs. Assuming the JL-3 carries 3 WHs, that gives China 216 SLBM warheads. Assuming the new SLBM carries at least 6 WHs, that gives China another 360 WHs, bringing the grand total to 576 SLBM WHs, for a range of 2,616 to 7,616 nuclear warheads on 832 SLBMs and ICBMs.

The DIA also predicts that China will deploy 60 fractional-orbit bombardment systems (FOBS) by 2035, a force that grants China a new, more dangerous, and heightened capability. The FOBS are likely to attack the U.S. early warning, C3, and leadership nodes, whose survivability is required to execute any U.S. retaliatory response. Also, of great concern are the additional 4,000 Chinese hypersonic speed weapons, which can largely evade current defenses and attack from any direction or altitude. It is possible that some of these could be tipped with a nuclear warhead. Especially given that China has the materials and manufacturing processes to produce large numbers of M10-20 hypersonic vehicles and does so at far lower cost than the U.S..

North Korea, with some 50 DIA-predicted ICBMs, exacerbates the multiple challenger problem and increases the possible collaboration between Russia, China, and North Korea during a crisis or conflict.

Now let’s look at the USA. The strategic modernization program of record consists of 400 ICBM Sentinel missiles to be deployed in silos through an estimated time frame out to or through 2045, with 400 but possibly 800-1200 warheads. Add to that 12 Columbia-class submarines, each with 16 missiles, and each missile with a maximum of 8 warheads or 1,536 warheads. That gives the U.S. a grand total of 2,736 total fast-flying warheads if all systems are loaded at their maximum. America’s strategic nuclear bomber force of 60 B-52 and B-21 bombers, each with between 8-12 cruise missiles or gravity bombs are in the mix and together could add upwards of 720 warheads for a hypothetical total of 3,456 strategic long-range warheads—although this may exceed the number of warheads available in our entire available stockpile and the USAF planned cruise missile acquisition.

Deploying such an expanded or uploaded warhead force would require at least an additional four years, according to nuclear Triad experts. When compared to a potential and projected Russian and Chinese deployed force of over 11,000 long-range strategic warheads, the USA could be left with at least a 3-to-1 numerical disadvantage. Of critical importance is to note that the USA’s total deployed force described here is the maximum number the USA can build, as the Sentinel and D-5 missiles would be “maxed out” under the assumed numbers used in this hypothetical force.

While the USA could add additional strategic bombers to our planned nuclear force, those bombers would probably be necessary for other conventional purposes, as the USA is the only country in the free world with such capability, and current planning is for 100 new B-21 strategic bombers although there is growing support for upwards of 150-200 such aircraft. If additional ICBMs, submarines, or bombers are to be produced, current USA acquisition schedules would probably add such platforms, but at the end of the current build schedule or generally after 2040. The USA does have 50 additional ICBM silos (now empty) that could bolster its arsenal. Even so, this projected new window of vulnerability may not close for decades.

One could argue that relative levels of nuclear warheads don’t have a strategic impact. Such an assumption may apply to possible USA strategic assumptions, but not necessarily for our adversaries. Arms control deals from SALT in 1972 to New Start in 2010 began with the proposition that parties to these treaties would be operating under the same rules and warhead limits. That is the underlying basis for sound inspections and verifications, and for President Reagan laying down the key requirement— “Trust but verify.” If warhead levels don’t matter, why require verifiable limits in arms control deals? Why worry if no arms deals are in place?

History tells us that nuclear superiority may have significant value. President Kennedy believed superiority enabled the USA to stare down the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis, declaring the newly deployed Minuteman ICBM force was “my ace in the hole.” Not dissimilar to his previous belief that the newly deployed Polaris submarine force enabled the USA not to yield to Soviet blackmail over Berlin in 1961.

Having such superior military capability doesn’t eliminate the need for sound diplomacy and strategy in the nuclear age. The USA must be mindful of Dr. Kissinger’s explanation that while military force without a sound diplomatic framework is but bluster, diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect.

If the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission is correct that Russia and China are in the nuclear blackmail and coercion business, then the USA cannot assume Russia and China have the same strategic assumptions or altruistic goals regarding nuclear weapons numbers and arms control as the United States.

While the USA and Russia curbed nuclear warheads by some cuts of 4,500 each under the Moscow and New START agreements (down from 10,000 actual allowed warheads under START I), the decline under both deals was down to the neighborhood of as low as 1,700-1,800 deployed strategic warheads. This may indicate Russia wanted to limit USA-deployed nuclear forces to fewer than 2,000 warheads for about 24 years (2002-2026), while Russian nuclear modernization was eventually completed, and the post-Cold War economic decline in Russia could be overcome.

Superior nuclear weapons numbers for China and Russia could translate into tangible strategic leverage and altered international behavior. Meanwhile, recent proposals from nuclear abolition advocates urge the United States to unilaterally abandon its long-standing deterrence strategy, including extended deterrence and leave the U.S. with markedly lower strategic nuclear forces than our adversaries. Such a move could signal a weakened U.S. commitment to its NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, undermining confidence in existing deterrence arrangements and potentially compelling allies to seriously consider developing their own nuclear capabilities.

This is highly ironic, as this very outcome was what many critics of the Trump administration assumed would happen when the administration pushed for more defense spending for non-U.S. NATO nations. A stronger NATO, including the U.S. as a NATO anchor, is better for everyone’s security, especially a conventional buildup that encompasses all NATO members rather than most defense spending being primarily centered in the USA.

There is an adage that says the enemy always gets a vote. While the USA may wish for our adversaries to see nuclear forces as a deterrent against the use of force, the reality is starkly different. The enemy has voted. Escalate to win it is. For our enemies, nuclear force is an adjunct of military blackmail and aggression as well as serving as a handmaiden to the unrestricted warfare the U.S. now faces.

Because nuclear weapons underpin America’s overall deterrent strength and provide the umbrella under which U.S. military and diplomatic power operates, it is urgent that the United States complete its planned nuclear deterrent modernization programs which now goes beyond the previous program of record and adds important theater/tactical nuclear capability. These forces now and will serve as a critical firewall against the use of force directed at this nation. There is no substitute for this capability, regardless of how strongly abolition advocates may wish otherwise.

(This article was written By Peter Huessy appeared in the RealClearDefense. Restraint or Escalation: America’s Nuclear Future? – RealClearDefense

 

Some analysts argue that a new international arms-control framework is the best path forward, contending that the only alternative to contrived restraint is escalation and global instability. But does this paradigm actually make sense?

Consider first the U.S. Program of Record (POR)—the congressionally approved and funded modernization of America’s land-based, sea-based, and cruise missile forces, along with new ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers. Under the assumptions of some arms-control advocates, this modernization effort would constitute an arms race and therefore represent an unnecessary escalation that should be avoided.

This is a peculiar conclusion. When both the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and the POR were adopted in December 2010, it was widely understood that New START fully accommodated—and, in practice, endorsed—the forthcoming U.S. nuclear deterrent modernization program. Even supporters of arms control described the POR as consistent with New START. That treaty with Russia reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 1,700–1,800, down from the 1,700–2,200 levels established under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

How can the retiring New START framework—now under a new administration yet retaining the same modernization elements—or any future treaty be characterized simultaneously as arms control and as an arms race? Such a conclusion requires a deft sleight of hand, one that conveniently discards or forgets much of the history of arms control itself.

First, arms control with Moscow has not necessarily been beneficial. During the 1972-77 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreement and the subsequent 1979 SALT II framework with the Soviet Union, Moscow could increase its long-range strategic nuclear weapons by 600-1,200%, according to a 1983 Net Assessment of Soviet nuclear strategy. This included deploying over 3,000 high-yield, accurate warheads specifically designed to preemptively attack America’s key nuclear triad assets. This “window of vulnerability” widened dramatically during this period, leading to a sharply deteriorating strategic balance between the USA and the Soviet Union, as described by General Richard Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, in striking testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 1981.

Second, the U.S. must always keep in mind that Moscow has routinely cheated on every arms control agreement that it ever signed, including the SALT agreements of the 1970s.

Third, many assume that restraint works. But history is not on their side. President Reagan, not Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, acquired and deployed Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile missiles in Europe, which the arms control community widely opposed. Only with these deployments did the US gain the leverage to secure the elimination of all Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in Europe and in Asia.

In December 1987, the United States and the USSR signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated thousands of SS-20 warheads. The agreement was historic in that it abolished an entire class of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Yet even at the time, opponents of the treaty continued to advocate a nuclear freeze, opposed U.S. counter-deployments of regional nuclear weapons, and lobbied for American restraint and retrenchment—restraint that was not reciprocated by the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the START I reduction proposals, officially announced by the Reagan administration in a November 1981 address at the National Press Club, called for the first 50 percent reduction in U.S. long-range strategic nuclear forces. Ironically, when President Reagan first advanced these proposals, they were widely ridiculed by arms-control specialists, who insisted that Moscow would inevitably reject such deep cuts. Instead, the Soviet Union favored agreements like the 1972 and 1979 SALT accords, which permitted substantial growth in Soviet nuclear forces—particularly heavy, first-strike warheads—while relying on U.S. restraint.

President Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” ultimately turned the tables on Moscow, particularly after it was fully endorsed by the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission in its 1983 report. Moreover, Reagan’s March 1983 missile defense initiative—known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—further pressured the Soviet leadership to enter negotiations. This approach was reinforced by Reagan’s clear-eyed understanding of the nature of the regime he confronted, articulated in his March 1983 address to the National Association of Evangelicals, in which he famously described the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.”

President Reagan—and later President George H. W. Bush—proved highly successful, with the first arms-reduction treaties, START I, adopted in January 1991 and START II in January 1993. In particular, START II represented a major breakthrough by banning multiple-warhead land-based missiles—the very Soviet force elements that had created the destabilizing “window of vulnerability” identified more than a decade earlier. By that point, after engaging in sustained economic and strategic competition with the USSR, the United States had made the continuation of the Soviet empire—and the massive military forces required to sustain it—untenable.

Years later, while the arms control community was actively working to dismantle the American-proposed missile defenses, Moscow’s Duma in 1996 rejected the START II treaty despite a plea from US Secretary of Defense Perry to ratify it. Moscow claimed ratification was “problematic” and suggested it should be “set aside.”

Members of the Duma criticized START II as favoring the United States and weakening Russia’s nuclear deterrent by requiring the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs, which they viewed as essential to maintaining parity. Supporters of ratification acknowledged these concerns but argued that Russia lacked the resources to sustain such forces. Many in the Duma also raised broader economic concerns and linked START II to U.S. missile defense plans, warning that missile defenses would further erode Russia’s deterrent once MIRVed ICBMs were eliminated.

Today, the alternative being offered to nuclear modernization—a congressionally mandated effort tied directly to the 2010 ratification of New START—is effectively unilateral disarmament. Under this approach, arms control constraints on adversaries such as Russia and China are ignored or rejected, while unilateral U.S. restraint is enthusiastically embraced.

The clearest example is a proposal advanced by Senators Sanders, Warren, and Markey, which would unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces from the 800 missiles and bombers permitted under New START to just 182—a reduction of more than 77 percent. One is left to ask: where are the corresponding proposals from Beijing or Moscow? Were any such commitments even sought before advancing this plan?

Arms control requires deploying measures that the reluctant party opposes. The brothers mayhem—North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia—have no interest in nuclear restraint. They believe in the coercive use of nuclear weapons—to blackmail their geopolitical adversaries into inaction—as aptly described by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission of the United States.

Restraint does not work. In 1991, for example, President George H. W. Bush unilaterally withdrew tens of thousands of U.S. regional, or theater, nuclear weapons. Russia did not reciprocate, despite promises to do so. Today, Russia is assessed to possess between roughly 1,900 and 4,000 such theater warheads, while the United States maintains only a few hundred gravity bombs, deployed in limited numbers in certain NATO countries—and none in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, China fields hundreds of theater-range missiles capable of carrying low-yield nuclear warheads. The 2025 report to Congress on China noted that Beijing has shown little willingness to engage in nuclear risk-reduction discussions, whether bilaterally or multilaterally.

Given the minimal deterrent being proposed by Congressionally based abolitionists, there is no possibility of securing any kind of arms limits with China and Russia. With the USA having such a reduced force, these autocratic nations have no reason to pause their own massive force modernization, and it would actually embolden them to serially threaten the use of conventional or nuclear force, free from being challenged by any countervailing US nuclear military capability.

This article was written by Peter Huessy and appeared in the RealClearDefense. (https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/01/06/protecting_our_national_sovereignty_1156957.html)

A key thesis of the recently published National Security Strategy of the United States is that this country should get down to serious business in this Western Hemisphere especially about our borders. The important message: protect and restore our sovereignty, with control over immigration being at the top of the list along with stopping trafficking and drug dealing.

Here, a new essay by Andrew Sullivan, a Never Trumper subscriber, and regular writer for the New Yorker and National Public Radio, argues that the administration is losing ground among previous supporters due to the too aggressive enforcement of immigration law.

Sullivan appears to support stopping illegal aliens at the border but not those working inside the country. President Obama deported 250,000 annually but these were stopped at the border and never came into contact with most working Americans. That is the kind of law enforcement Sullivan seems to like.

Those in the interior were deported 150,000 a year under Mr. Obama and they were arrested by ICE after an immigration judge issued an order of deportation.

What is different today?

Well, the same judges are issuing the same deportation orders. Except open border enthusiasts are going outside the immigration court system and judge shopping to stop the regular enforcement of immigration law.

The success of the administration is no one is trying to get across the border—which means at least 250,000 of our potential “neighbors” are annually not getting into the US. Same result as under Mr. Obama.

Why then does enforcing immigration law qualify as fascist? Which is what some never Trumpers and their friendly judges have described even though it is all sound legal law enforcement.

True, the US government is now deporting 600,000 illegal aliens a year but almost entirely from the interior. Some of these people are criminals, some have been unlawfully working in the country, and some are relying (illegally) on our social welfare programs. And some, including those here legally are apparently fraudulently ripping us of for literally billions annually.

So, what is it progressives and apparently some previous Trump supporters object to?

Well, progressives call these illegal aliens “our neighbors;” although the term previously used was “undocumented.” Why? In at least the 1970’s, supporters of open border immigration wanted to soften the crimes these illegal aliens committed—unlawfully entering the country, working here illegally, stealing someone’s identity, the fraudulent use of a social security number; and often evading income taxes. (Why else offer them amnesty that requires paying back taxes?)

But all these crimes are somehow to be overlooked because these people do landscape, agricultural or household chores and are our “neighbors.” Some argue that since LEGAL immigrants commit criminal acts at a rate less than that of native Americans, we somehow should be allowed to lump all legal AND illegal immigrants together and ignore the huge number of illegal aliens sitting in various prisons and jails around the country!! No one can ignore that ICE finds and arrests thousands of illegal aliens guilty of violent crimes every week.

Even those illegal aliens “working” in the country are in professions where 95% of the jobs are held by American citizens or legitimate guest workers, also “our neighbors.” Ignored is the fact that some of these neighbors are also killers— one arrested 70 times who knifed a young Ukraine woman legal immigrant. And indeed, the illegal alien shooters, rapists, traffickers, and killers are also “our neighbors.” Do they get to stay in America too?

But if arrested by an ICE officer, which the ICE officer has been sworn to do, opponents of ICE contend that is somehow beyond the pale. And because the “optics” make folks uncomfortable—like academic microaggressions—interfering with such law enforcement, which itself is against the law, is universally condoned or even undertaken by members of the Democratic party, blurring completely the distinction between lawful immigrants—which this President in 5 years in office has brought in over 5 million—vs those not here lawfully, particularly career criminals and cartel members attracted to the sanctuary status they enjoy in major US cities and some key states.

And “Oh Sacre bleu,” Mr. Sullivan is mad the ICE officers are masked! Why is this the case? Because the criminal cartels are offering bounties to have them identified and killed.

At issue is a simple issue. Should immigration laws be enforced elsewhere than at the border? And should ICE agents publish their own names and addresses to facilitate the cartels, criminals, and rioters to harm them and their families? And should their vans be gayly decorated so they can be easily rammed and the agents inside harmed or killed?

What is the difference between those impeding the work of ICE and the activities of those seeking to sway the judiciary—such as the thug who threatened to kill Judge Kavanaugh following Senator Schumer threatening the judge with “you won’t know what hit you.”

Getting serious about our sovereignty means going beyond just border enforcement. Taking down sex traffickers of children and drugs is not a pretty business. That is why the administration is taking such tough measures to take Venezuela out of that business, (which Sullivan opposes).

Deliberate interference with law enforcement is a serious crime. But the fiction that only the border needs to be defended is simply a political fairy tale that our drive-by media, academia, and entertainment community have subscribed to for the last half century.

Then as early as 1975 illegal immigration was largely dismissed as just a few “undocumented workers” crossing the Rio Grande. Or some seasonal fruit pickers occasionally working in America. All part of the normal demographic landscape.

But then as the former Attorney General told Congress at least 8.5 million additional unvetted migrants were let into the country between 2021-4, including an estimated ten thousand Chinese men of military age according to Brian Kennedy, the founder of the Committee on the Present Danger-China.

Getting rid of potential terrorists and cartel gangs requires internal law enforcement, not just border patrols. That is the job of ICE. We have to stop pretending such law enforcement is mean spirited and that American sovereignty means little to the American people, because after all we are all neighbors.