(This article was written by Hermann Tertsch and appeared in El Debate. La razón frente a la histeria)

Last Wednesday, at the midpoint of the rotating Hungarian presidency of the EU, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán came to the European Parliament in Strasbourg to lay out its guiding lines. A debate on the grave problems afflicting the EU — problems that have already produced serious effects of impoverishment, the collapse of industry and agriculture, insecurity and regression in freedoms — proved impossible. The MEPs of the majority of the People’s Party, Socialists, Greens and communists turned the plenary into a grotesque farce.

Some brainless people in the hemicycle went so far as to compare Orbán to Hitler. There followed one intervention after another by deputies of parties with barely any representation, some of whom take part in governments as failed as Olaf Scholz’s German one, lecturing a ruler who has three absolute majorities behind him. Who governs successfully and with ever greater influence abroad. And who has predicted for years the problems that have been accumulating in the European Union because of the policy of greater centralism, greater socialism and greater arrogance which of course, under Ursula von der Leyen, has reached never-before-imagined levels. But no one wanted to hear about the real problems and the feasible solutions.

The day before, Viktor Orbán gave a two-and-a-half-hour press conference such as no European ruler dares to give today. He answered with patience, seriousness and good humor dozens of questions, the vast majority of them vitriolic and hostile and in large part coming from Hungarian media. Anyone who heard the journalists of the Hungarian media put questions of unusual aggressiveness to their prime minister will never again believe the lies of those who say that Orbán has the press under his thumb. What a joke to think of the press conferences at the Moncloa with Sánchez’s three obligatory henchmen facilitating, with their questions, the dissemination of the official lies.

The already very long campaign against Hungary for its firm conservative policy and its rejection of illegal and Muslim immigration has been exacerbated to unheard-of levels of aggressiveness by its disagreements with the way the EU is handling the war in Ukraine. That, no sooner had he assumed the presidency, he undertook on his own initiative a tour to meet with Zelensky first, then Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, generated infinite fury in Brussels and Berlin.

It was then that Orbán began to be treated as if he were an agent of Putin, which is a rigorous falsehood. The Hungarian leader has made clear that those who say Ukraine has to win without negotiating should have given it the weapons to do so much earlier. However, the large Western European countries and especially France and Germany, which egg the Ukrainians on to persevere, have always denied them the weapons to do it successfully. Orbán made clear once again in Strasbourg that if the EU and NATO — of which he declared himself a proud member (fortunately, Hungary was a member of NATO) — want Ukraine to win, they have to change strategy, because the current strategy, which is von der Leyen’s, is, he said, a resounding failure, a losing strategy in which Hungary does not want to take part.

On Wednesday the reputation of a parliament hit rock bottom, a parliament that looked like an assembly of leftist adolescents competing to be the author of the worst rudeness, insult or slur against Orbán. He came to propose changes that are increasingly necessary in European politics and in the way the European Union functions. They are the changes that Europeans are demanding, as was seen clearly from the results of the elections. But he ran into a president of the Commission who from the very first moment treated him as an enemy and who violated all parliamentary decorum, procedures and logic with a grotesque attack on the country that presides over the European Council for these six months. Von der Leyen has grown accustomed to despising and ignoring all the procedures that circumscribe her action and mandate. She arrogates to herself competences she does not have and behaves as the supreme authority in the EU, which she is not, with punitive powers over the nations, which she does not have.

Orbán once again displayed not only the seasoning of the most veteran head of government among the 27 current member states. Also his proverbial humor and how much he enjoys seeing his enemies unhinged. And in the hemicycle it was clearly perceptible how things have changed. It was no longer a small minority that applauded Orbán but a very substantial part of the hemicycle, in which the Patriots group — which includes Fidesz, Orbán’s party, and also Vox — is the third-largest in size. All the forces to the right of the PP were applauding.

Meanwhile, the PP and the left called him every name, accused him of everything and invented a nonexistent Hungary, little short of a concentration camp. The ridicule that so many made of themselves was cringeworthy, and there are many who suffered catastrophic reputational damage among the deputies. And Orbán, with all calm, not only responded with rationality to the cascades of ridiculous sentimentalism, pathetic anger and litanies of lies about Hungary that have become the “official truth” of the Commission. Beyond that, he responded, naming names, to some of the aggressors, in certain cases with refined cruelty, as with Manfred Weber. The latter, head of the European People’s Party — of which Fidesz, Orbán’s party, was a member until a few years ago — had permitted himself a perfectly contemptible intervention against a prime minister with an absolute majority and the overwhelming support of the Hungarian nation for fourteen years.

Lamentable and out of place was the speech of Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission who has already forgotten that she is at the service of the rulers of the EU’s member nations and is not the queen of Europe who can devote herself to disparaging and attacking her provincial governors. Von der Leyen has managed to keep the presidency of the Commission by leading the People’s Party to embrace all the losers of the elections and to persist obstinately on the failed course of the past legislature with its green and socialist social engineering. That is what the 188 seats of the European PP, harvested thanks to the general turn to the right across Europe, have been used for.

The parties that have grown the most are in the three groups to the right of the PP and make possible that new possible majority which needs neither the leftists and supposed liberals of Renew nor the Socialists. The alternative majority took shape in the resolution on Venezuela last month in Strasbourg. Since then the People’s Party seems to have entered a hysterical phase, aggravated by the elections in Austria where its people’s party lost 20 seats and the party to its right, the FPÖ — a member of Patriots along with Fidesz and Vox — grew by 26. European politics has entered into motion and the PP is sinking into a dilemma that will soon lead to internal tensions. The confrontation is scheduled between those who want to cooperate with the conservative and national parties to their right, where a viable majority exists, and those who want to continue with the left and the Greens down a path that has already proven to be a generator of poverty, socialism, massive interventionism, a legislative and regulatory jungle, bureaucracy, censorship and, as a reaction, every time there is a national election in a member country, massive growth of the parties to their right.

Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: VP Harris’ legacy is convicted murderers and sex offenders roaming U.S. streets)

Presidential candidate Kamala Harris repeatedly points to her record as a prosecutor “taking on predators” to mark a sharp contrast between her and her opponent, former President Donald Trump. But not only did crime rise by 41% during her administration, under her border policies, hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants with criminal histories –including murder and sexual assault – may right now be freely roaming U.S. streets.

As a result of her administration’s policies like “Catch and Release,” Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reports that it has (as of July 2024) released over 640,000 illegal aliens with criminal histories. This number includes over 425,000 convicted criminals and 222,000 with pending criminal charges.

Of the number of convicted criminals released, 13,099 were convicted of homicide, 62,231 of assault, 15,811 of sexual assault, and 14,301 of burglary. Shocked? What’s more, there is no publicly available data describing their current custodial status or whereabouts.

ICE uses custody “ detainers ” to identify and remove criminal illegal aliens who are in local, state or federal custody. However, ICE also maintains a “non-detained” docket which describes the aliens released into the U.S. under a “case-management” process of (hopeful) compliance while their removal processes are pending. Because of an overwhelming workload on border security enforcement, who are now vastly undermanned compared to the number of immigrants flooding U.S. borders, the ICE non-detained docket has more than doubled since President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris took office in 2021.

At that time, the non-detained docket had only about 3.7 million cases; it now includes about 7.5 million . Contrast that with ICE’s current detention capacity at only 41,500 beds for Fiscal Year 2024, and only 34,000 in FY 2023.

ICE cites sanctuary city policies as another barrier to detention. ICE obviously relies on the cooperation of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to gain custody of an illegal alien. However, it cites that some “jurisdictions have reduced their cooperation with ICE, to include refusal to honor ICE detainer requests, even for noncitizens who have been convicted of serious felonies and pose an ongoing threat to public safety.” Ironically, these criminals often turn around and commit crimes in those same communities.

At the same time, crime in the United States has hit record levels. Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) uncovered a significant increase in violent crime under the Biden-Harris administration as compared to when former President Donald Trump left office.

According to the NCVS survey , total violent crime increased by 41% (2023) in the first three years of the Biden-Harris administration (since 2020, the last year of the Trump administration). It is “by far the largest percentage increase over any three-year period on record, more than doubling the previous record.” Violent crime actually fell 17% under the Trump administration, according to the Crime Prevention Research Center.

Contrary to mainstream media reports, the NCVS survey gives a more accurate number of total crimes committed in the U.S. as compared to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the report referred to by moderator David Muir, during the Trump-Harris debate on September 10th 2024, in his attempt to prove declining U.S. crime rates under the Biden-Harris administration.

Here’s why: the UCR measures the numbers of crimes reported to police each year, while the NCVS survey actually reports the number of people who have been victims of crime. The UCR is flawed as an indicator of actual crime because crime victims only report about 40% of violent crime and 30% of property crime to police.

In fact, the less faith that crime victims have that law enforcement can be trusted and criminals will be caught and punished, the less likely they are to report crime to the police. Ironically, the UCR shows that Americans are reporting less crime during the Biden administration, during a time of actual rising crime as reported by the NCVS survey, suggesting that crime victims have less faith today in America’s justice system under the Biden-Harris administration and Democrats’ “soft on crime” policies .

But is record-level crime under the Biden-Harris administration connected to the current mass illegal migration in the U.S.? Although U.S. crime statistics do not give researchers the information to determine how much illegal immigrants affect the rise of violent crime in the U.S., the answer is most likely yes. Besides the fact that over a half a million aliens with (known) criminal histories were released into the U.S. by ICE, European research shows a clear link between rising immigration in Europe and rising crime rates.

Has the U.S. ever had an administration that knowingly allowed mass illegal immigration with an increasing number of convicted burglars, rapists and murderers to walk U.S. streets? As Mark Green (R-TN), Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee remarked: “DHS law enforcement has been directed to mass-release illegal aliens whom they know have criminal convictions or are facing charges for serious crimes … How many more Americans need to die or be victimized before this administration is forced to abide by the laws they swore to uphold? This is madness. It is something no civilized, well-functioning society should tolerate.”

It is madness, indeed. God save this country from the administration that has tried to destroy it.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

(This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in Wynia’s Week. Derk Jan Eppink: Schreef doctor Thierry Baudet zijn proefschrift wel (helemaal) zelf?)

On 11 March 2022 a remarkable video by FVD appeared on social media. Party leader Thierry Baudet described his mentor, the British academic Dr. John Laughland, as a ‘unique figure’ and ‘a visionary man’ who writes ‘brilliant books’. He then said: ‘I am in the fortunate position of having come to know him in my life. That I was able to write part of my dissertation with him, and at his side’.

On 21 June 2012 Baudet obtained his doctorate at Leiden University with a dissertation titled The Significance of Borders: Why Representative Government and the Rule of Law Require Nation States. His supervisor was Paul Cliteur, professor of the encyclopedia of law. In the acknowledgments Baudet mentions Laughland among 39 others.

Laughland’s best-known book dates from 1997: The Tainted Source: undemocratic origins of the European idea. In 2007 he published the book Travesty about the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. Laughland advocates full sovereignty of nation states and, according to him, the European Union and tribunals such as those of Tokyo and Nuremberg do not fit that vision, nor does the international prosecution of Milošević and Saddam Hussein.

In this Baudet follows Laughland completely. They are in very regular contact, calling each other all the time. But of course a doctoral candidate must write his dissertation himself. It is not a co-production with scholars, neighbors or friends. Advice is always welcome but the doctoral candidate must be the ultimate author, in every respect.

An English-language dissertation is unusual for a doctorate at a Dutch university. Laughland is a ‘native speaker’, writes a fine ‘Oxford English’: short, compact, accurate. It is an English that Baudet does not command.

In the dissertation there are clear stylistic breaks between Oxford English and the Dutch-English of a non-‘native speaker’. The first is academically outstanding; the second is grammatically correct but often with a Dutch way of sentence construction. On the basis of those stylistic breaks (Oxford English versus Dutch-English) you can go through the dissertation with a fine comb and see which ‘part’ Baudet wrote with Laughland, or was written by Laughland.

It is striking that Part I (‘The rise of borders’), from page 7 to 77, has all the characteristics of Laughland’s style: clear, academic English. All the parts that have to do with tribunals (Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia) but also the International Criminal Court in The Hague are virtually anthologies from the works of Laughland.

There is a stylistic break with other chapters. Thus we read on page 109: ‘Nevertheless, as I said above, all such use of the term human rights is metaphorical’. This is a form of Dutch-English. Moreover Laughland does not use the word ‘I’ in his reasoning. ‘As I said above’ would become ‘aforementioned’. The stylistic breaks show that several pens made their contribution, instead of the one pen of the doctoral candidate. The ‘multiculturalism’ part too shows forms of Dutch-English: ‘Nevertheless, the debate goes on’.

I knew both Baudet and Laughland and also their different writing styles. My conclusion is that around 130 of the 245 pages of which the dissertation consists flowed from the pen of Laughland. That may have escaped everyone’s notice because no one knew Laughland. He was, however, the ‘missing link’.

The doctoral defense in the Academy Building of Leiden University in 2012 did not go smoothly. Professor of legal philosophy Andreas Kinneging called the dissertation ‘too journalistic’. He said: ‘Since when can you obtain a doctorate on opinions instead of facts’. Baudet dismissed some questions with a single sentence or a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Professor Tom Eijsbouts reproached Baudet for ‘a lack of knowledge’ and an ‘essential violation of the procedure of his doctorate’. In his column in NRC Handelsblad Baudet had written that his doctorate was ‘a formality’.

Baudet’s video of 11 March 2022 therefore raises questions.

• What do the terms ‘with him’ and ‘at his side’ mean regarding the writing of a dissertation?
• Which ‘part’ is permissible? Or should one say: no part at all?
• What was Laughland’s role, and given the Oxford English in the dissertation, was his contribution not rather a matter of ‘parts’ written by Laughland?
• What role did Cliteur play? Baudet kept both Laughland and Cliteur close to his chest within FVD. Why?

I distill these questions from an analysis of the text of the dissertation, of the use of the English language and also in view of the intensive bond between Baudet and Laughland. It concerns, however, an academic matter about which I should not pass judgment. It is up to Leiden University to shed light on this issue.

Derk Jan Eppink is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

When we talk about the IRGC, we should separate its activities inside and outside the borders of Iran, or in other words, domestic and international terrorism, as it was intended when it was established by Ruhollah Khomeini’s direct order after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Domestic terrorism

As the name of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps indicates, its creation was seen as the protection of the Islamic Revolution, and the name of Iran is not even mentioned in the title of this organization. This terrorist organization views the Iranian people as a threat to the survival of the Islamic Revolution, which it believes will continue until it conquers the entire world and seeks to keep the regime alive through organized domestic terrorism inside Iran. Domestically, the IRGC plays a central role in the violent repression of Iranian citizens, systematically suppressing protests and dissent through brutal measures. It has been involved in the killing, kidnapping, and disappearance of thousands of protesters and opposition members over the past 45 years. Its subdivisions, such as the Basij and the IRGC Intelligence Organization, are instrumental in maintaining a regime of terror within Iran.

· IRGC and its Proxies in Domestic Terrorism

Iran has witnessed numerous bloody uprisings since the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC and the Basij, the IRGC’s domestic paramilitary volunteer militias, have always suppressed protests in Iran as long as they were confined to a few cities. The IRGC’s regional proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hashd Al-Shaabi, and Fatemiyoun, have contributed to the suppression of nationwide protests such as the Green Revolution, the 2018 Uprising, the 2019 Bloody November Uprising, and the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom Uprising. These proxies have been involved in regional conflicts and terrorist activities, spreading the Islamic Republic’s influence through violent means.

International Terrorism

The international terrorism of the IRGC itself is divided into two main branches, which are closely related to each other.

1. Regional Proxies

The IRGC has invested large amounts of money and energy in training its proxies in the Middle East, which began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War with a direct order from then-President Ali Khamenei to send IRGC forces to Lebanon to train the Lebanese Hezbollah. The main objective of creating the proxies under the Quds Force was to carry out the terrorist operations outside the borders without being mentioned in order to keep the name of the Islamic Republic clean and leave room for diplomacy. In the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the very existence of the Quds Force was denied. The proxy presence in the Israeli-Lebanese 1982-2000 war and the Lebanese civil wars 1975-1990, as well as the equipping and training of the Lebanese Hezbollah, should be considered among the first missions of the IRGC’s overseas branch. Although the Islamic Republic tries to deny its role in recent conflicts in the region, such as the October 7 massacre, Ezzatullah Zarghami, a former IRGC officer, discussed on Iranian state television how the IRGC provides military support to resistance forces and admitted to providing military training to Hamas, including the use of rockets, and that he himself spent some time in the underground tunnels in Gaza teaching Hamas how to build rockets.

The IRGC’s terrorist actions over the past four decades, especially the elimination of its opponents, have always been among the Islamic Republic’s priorities around the world. The Quds Force has established several bases in Iran and even in some neighboring countries, where it provides training in terrorist and espionage operations to facilitate intelligence cooperation with the Islamic Republic’s security institutions. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has its independent training bases in Iran and around the world to train its forces and proxies.

Meanwhile, some of its bases are specifically responsible for training non-Iranian forces for terrorist operations on the soil of other countries, forces selected from Iran’s proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain and Afghanistan. IRGC Intelligence is responsible for the final selection.

2. Worldwide Proxies

Since the IRGC is the most powerful entity inside Iran in various fields, whether it is financial or military, the Quds Force should be considered as the intelligence executive arm of the IRGC to establish companies to evade sanctions and finance terror operatives especially in Europe and America which also leads to terror attacks. It also establishes companies that operate in various fields from shipping to import and export. In essence, the Islamic Republic has found a new way of doing business to evade sanctions through the IRGC.

Terrorist attacks, especially on European soil, by the IRGC is a very clear issue. If we want to examine it more closely, we come to Unit 400 of the Revolutionary Guards. Unit 400 of the Quds Force is responsible for carrying out terrorist operations outside Iran by hiring local criminal gangs, drug cartels and other third parties who can be considered as members of its proxies living abroad to carry out its assassination plots. The establishment of Islamic centers to gather its agents abroad under the cover of religion has been one of the achievements of the IRGC, especially in European countries such as Germany, to carry out the operations organized by the military branches of the Islamic Republic in its embassies. Most of the kidnapping and physical extortion operations in Europe, America and other parts of the world are carried out through this method of the Quds Force’s Unit 400.

The Islamic Republic poses political, security, and economic threats to Europe. The Islamic Republic’s extensive network of proxy forces is believed to have sleeper cells in Europe capable of carrying out terrorist attacks. In recent years, the Islamic Republic has sponsored terrorist activities and assassination plots on European soil. In 2018, European intelligence agencies foiled an Iranian plot to bomb opposition groups gathering in Paris. In 2023, German police arrested an Iranian man suspected of planning a chemical attack motivated by Islamic extremism.

Iran’s nuclear program must be considered the most important threat specifically to Europe. Iran has long sought access to advanced European technology for its nuclear program. According to European intelligence agencies, much of the technology Iran has sought is classified as dual-use, it can be used for civilian purposes but also for military or nuclear weapons development.

The IRGC is the root cause of regional conflicts and exacerbates instability that directly impacts Europe, leading to the refugee crisis that has both economic and security implications for Europe. Millions of Syrian refugees have fled to Europe because of the IRGC’s involvement in Syria and its support for the Assad regime. Another economic threat to Europe is the IRGC’s ability to destabilize the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of Europe’s oil imports pass. Disruptions to global oil supplies could affect energy prices and economic stability in Europe.

The U.S. State Department officially announced in a May 2020 report that the Islamic Republic has carried out more than 360 assassinations and terrorist operations in 40 countries over 40 years. According to the State Department, “senior Iranian officials have stated that Iran tracks and constantly monitors Iranian dissidents in other countries in order to ‘crack down’ and ‘strike decisive blows’ against them.”

The 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the 1992 Mykonos terrorist operation in Berlin, the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina, and the 2012 bombings in Bangkok and New Delhi that killed Israeli citizens all have Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps footprints, according to documents released by security agencies in those countries. It is worth noting that the IRGC’s global terror campaign is not limited to eliminating the Islamic Republic’s opponents, assassinations, and bombings; these are not the only areas of IRGC terrorist activity in Europe. In recent years, this organization has planned several projects to kidnap opponents of the regime, which, although many of them failed, revealed that the terrorist operations arm of the IRGC has spread from neighboring countries to Europe. Recently, information leaked from the IRGC revealed another unit specializing in crimes abroad, Unit 700. According to the leaked information Unit 700 has extensive connections with senior officials in Iran, Syria and Lebanon. This unit was established secretly by the Quds Terrorist Corps overseas. Unit 700 provides supplies and military equipment to Quds Corps-affiliated forces in the region.

In early 2021, the U.S. government revealed that the Islamic Republic’s proxies and its operatives were actively plotting against U.S. military personnel and diplomats in the Middle East. This was not limited to the Middle East, however, and most recently, former U.S. President Donald Trump was briefed by the ODNI on suspected Iranian assassination plots. To date, the Islamic Republic has planned several plots to assassinate or harm current and former U.S. officials. These plots reflect the IRGC’s strategy of using proxies and covert operations to target individuals it considers enemies.

The Islamic Republic no longer tries to hide its terrorist nature. The IRGC commanders and Islamic Republic security officials have repeatedly and proudly mentioned this widespread influence in European countries, America, and the countries of the region. Therefore, the European Parliament can push for the official designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, like the U.S. designation, in response to its involvement in terrorist attacks and regional instability.

Strengthening sanctions against the Islamic Republic by targeting its key sectors to limit its access to international markets and financing, including companies or countries that facilitate the Islamic Republic’s arms smuggling or missile development and expanding sanctions against individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses, terrorism, and regional destabilization, such as the IRGC and its subdivisions are some of the most important steps the EP could take. The EP should crack down harder on Islamic Republic agents involved in terrorism, arms smuggling, and espionage in Europe. The European Parliament can increase its support for civil society organizations and NGOs working on human rights and democracy in Iran. Engagement with Iranian civil society, particularly the Iranian diaspora in Europe, would strengthen grassroots movements challenging the authority of the regime. The EP should recognize Iranian opposition groups in exile to gain a deeper insight into the regime’s internal weaknesses and ensure that these voices are reflected in international diplomacy.

Sheina Vojoudi is an associate fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank.

(This article was written by Derk Jan Eppink and appeared in Wynia’s Week. Derk Jan Eppink: FPÖ trekt met zege in Oostenrijk Europa verder naar rechts)

The leader of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Herbert Kickl (55), has dealt ‘the system of established parties’, as he calls it, an enormous blow with his election victory. Above all the Christian Democratic ÖVP, in power for 37 years in various coalitions, is up against the wall. Team up with the FPÖ, against the wishes of the established powers, or team up with the socialists and greens, with the danger that the party ends up in a CDA scenario.

For Europe the signal is clear. With the FPÖ, Austria will lean more closely toward the policies of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, on immigration and the war in Ukraine.

Profit warning: Kickl may be the big winner, but whether he also becomes chancellor is another matter.

On the Friday evening before the elections Kickl gave a speech during the FPÖ’s closing rally, right next to the Stephansdom of 1578, the cathedral that defines Vienna. Before a crowd of several hundred people he sketched his political agenda. He sees himself as an ‘anti-system’ politician who puts an end to the backroom dealing of, above all, Christian Democrats and socialists who still control a real ‘pillar’, as once existed in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Through cronyism with the business world, the ‘Freunderlwirtschaft’, the steering of the media and the system of clientelism in the distribution of government jobs. The right party membership can be decisive. Kickl wants to break that system. ‘The other parties have the wind of the system at their backs, but feel the headwind of the population’. He sees the FPÖ as leader of a ‘war of liberation’ and himself at the head of Austria as ‘Volkskanzler’ who ensures the ‘Festung Österreich’.

Immigration is the FPÖ’s trump card. Kickl: ‘We demand zero tolerance for immigrants who commit crimes’. And he advocates remigration. FPÖ policy barely differs from the policy Hungary already has: handling asylum requests at the border, deportation upon rejection.

Austria is not a member of NATO, neutral like Switzerland. Kickl: ‘Neutrality is a model for the future, no weapons deliveries to Ukraine.’ This too means that Kickl has the same position as Hungary, which is a member of NATO but received an ‘opt-out’ on Ukraine in exchange for its consent to Mark Rutte as secretary-general of NATO.

In style Kickl differs greatly from his notorious predecessors Jörg Haider and Heinz-Christian Strache. Both were glossy narcissists, eloquent and extravagant. Kickl comes across as a grey mouse, does not immediately stand out at 1.72 meters, has a bearded face and dresses ‘not elitist’. That outward dullness is his weapon. But his inner conviction is tenacious, terrier-like.

Kickl comes from the southern state of Carinthia, where he was born in 1968 in the village of Radentheim, of, as he himself says, ‘modest origins’. At the gymnasium in Spittal an der Drau he became impressed by the coming ‘strong man’ from the region: Jörg Haider, founder of the FPÖ and for years its figurehead.

Kickl studied politics, philosophy and history at the University of Vienna. But he never finished his studies. When confronted about this his answer is invariably: ‘I may not be able to do anything, but I can learn everything’. The real reason is that in 1995 he came to know Haider, and joined his party’s ‘Akademie’, the think tank. Kickl became a speechwriter for Haider; he stood out for his knowledge of marketing, especially the devising of slogans.

The two were totally different. Haider brazen and provocative; Kickl rather calm and level-headed. Haider loved parties with young men, the ‘Buberl parties’; Kickl a devout Catholic, a family man about whose personal life little is known. In 2005 it came to a split in the party, because a new star appeared on the firmament: Heinz Christian Strache (55). Only one rooster could rule the dunghill.

Because of the unpredictable conduct of Haider, who spoke apologetically about the Waffen-SS (‘no collective guilt’), the FPÖ was excluded from participation in government. Haider had brought his party from 5% in 1983 to 27% in 1999, but became a stumbling block himself. He left and founded his own party. Haider assumed that the loyal Kickl would come along. That did not happen. Kickl stayed and Strache made him secretary-general of the party. Thus he maneuvered himself into the center of power. In 2008 Haider died in a traffic accident, returning under the influence of alcohol from his notorious party.

All the squabbling did the FPÖ no good. The FPÖ is a party whose fortunes are very dependent on the migration question. In 2015 it was boom time when a wave of asylum from the Balkans appeared at the Austrian border. Strache and Kickl smelled their chance, because voters flocked en masse to the right. In the 2017 elections the FPÖ was back in the league of the big parties. The Christian Democrats, with their young lead candidate Sebastian Kurz, achieved 31.5%, the socialists 27% and the FPÖ 26%. Kurz entered a coalition with the FPÖ, Strache became vice-chancellor and Kickl came silently into the cabinet, as minister of the interior.

Then the hard side of Kickl also became visible to the outside world. He says little, but what he says counts. Kickl has something ascetic about him: he once completed an extreme triathlon in Scotland – 2.4 km swimming, 200 km cycling and a full marathon: in 16 hours. Few Austrian politicians will match him at that. During the Austrian presidency of the EU he launched proposals for a stricter asylum policy, supported by Italy and Hungary, such as the handling of asylum procedures at the external borders, including on ships off the coast. He spoke reproachfully about ‘die deutsche Dummheit in der Mitte’.

But the FPÖ ruined everything in 2019 when a video appeared showing Strache speaking at a holiday location in Ibiza with a supposed niece of a Russian oligarch, who also claimed to hold Latvian nationality. She wanted to do business with Strache, who floated an idea: to buy the Kronen Zeitung, by far the largest newspaper in the country, and prompt it toward positive coverage of him and his party. The video dated from 2017, but its makers released the footage just before the elections. Kurz broke the coalition, Strache left the cabinet voluntarily, but Kickl was thrown out immediately. Kurz continued to govern with the Greens. The FPÖ was back to square one.

After much internal turmoil Kickl became ‘Bundesparteiobmann’ of the FPÖ in June 2021, after he had campaigned fiercely in the Austrian parliament against the Corona policy of the Kurz government, which he called ‘criminal’. Kickl turned out to be a dogged fighter, a persister who wanted his revenge. Slogan: ‘Kurz muss weg’. The apple fell ripe into his basket when it became known that Kurz, as prime minister, had also been guilty of bribing the media in the so-called ‘Inseraten affair’. Once again: extra government advertisements for certain media, in exchange for positive coverage and favorable polls. Kurz left.

Kickl stands at the top of his power, made the FPÖ the largest party in Austria for the first time. Breaking the Austrian system is not easy and he remains dependent, above all on the ÖVP. The left already demands a ‘Brandmauer’ against the FPÖ, the exclusion of that party from coalition negotiations. That forces the ÖVP to become a prisoner of the left. The sitting Austrian chancellor Karl Nehammer (ÖVP) does not want to team up with Kickl. But what will his party do?

Derk Jan Eppink is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

(This article was written by Hermann Tertsch and appeared in El Debate. El trauma de Estrasburgo)

The European Parliament resolution on Venezuela approved in Strasbourg last week has had collateral effects of great impact. Of shock. Certain political groups are traumatized by what happened. But let no one believe it is because of the content of the resolution. It is because of the majority that made it possible. The majority that formed changes the outlook of many for the entire legislature. Because they now see that Ursula von der Leyen’s operation — to ignore the result of the elections and, in the PPE’s alliance, embrace the whole of the left that lost the elections of 9 June — has an enormous Achilles’ heel. True, it served her to shape a European Commission tailored to her own measure, hijacking the vote received by no fewer than 188 People’s Party MEPs with the intention of continuing the centralist, socialist and radically ecologist social-engineering project of the past five years.

But, as is now evident, she cannot deactivate a new reality that has emerged all at once in this Strasbourg plenary and is already shaping up as the great threat to those plans of von der Leyen to go on making left-wing policy with right-wing votes as if nothing had happened.

Many things have happened on 9 June and afterward, and it was seen in that vote on Venezuela. The composition of the majority that managed to impose the original text — once the attempts of the European People’s Party to water down the content of the first points and to seduce the Renew group to its left had been frustrated — represents a resounding message that terrifies both the left and many within the European People’s Party.

The resolution, which demands the recognition of Edmundo González Urrutia as the democratically elected and legitimate president of Venezuela on the grounds that his victory is considered proven, was approved by 309 votes in favor and 201 against thanks to all the forces of the right, from the European People’s Party, the Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE), to Sovereign Nations (ESN), which includes the German AfD. From the PP to the AfD. It will frighten some, but it is a fact. And, as the resolution demonstrates, a very positive one. The attempts of the Socialists, Greens and communists to protect the criminal dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro and his electoral fraud were frustrated.

And the fact is that the European People’s Party, in the Venezuela resolution, blew up that so-called “cordon sanitaire” — rather an anti-democratic harassment — that has been self-imposed from Germany and France especially and that obliges the People’s Party always to ally with the left. Because while the Socialists can always ally themselves even with the most criminal extremists, the People’s Party cannot ally itself with those who occupy the space that the People’s Party fertilized in its eternal drift toward social democracy.

The reality is that there exists a majority that is an alternative to the de facto “single social-democratic party” made up of the People’s Party, Socialists, Renew liberals and Greens, which has always governed in a fusion of the two-party system with add-ons. And the alternative is a strong majority of the right, from which the People’s Party will not be able to withdraw in the legislature that is beginning. Many of its members are going to try. But it will prove impossible for them, and quite a few others will be glad that it is so. In fact, as soon as the legislature began, it became clear.

When the People’s Party feels committed to certain principles for some reason of opportunity or necessity, they will find themselves forced to be in that majority which breaks the cordon sanitaire and creates the real majority that the European elections have generated. In the case of Venezuela it was the necessity for the Spanish PP to maintain a firm policy in the face of the obvious complicity of socialism, shepherded by the PSOE, with Maduro’s dictatorship. Because it could not leave Vox as the solitary defender of the cause of María Corina Machado, which this party had been until little more than a year ago. The PP had always preferred other, more “flexible,” negotiating and less “Trumpist” opposition figures.

In spite of everything, the PP tried to lower the tone when it got vertigo on seeing that the so-called Renew liberals, who are in reality social democrats and radical wokeists, were staying with the Socialists, communists and Greens. That morning they came to think within the PP that the resolution would not be approved. And it was the Patriots group, whose relations with the ECR are excellent, that also managed to mobilize ESN, a group that on principle tends to ignore these resolutions on political questions foreign to the EU. The PP’s attempts — with its legs trembling — to water down the resolution on Venezuela were knocked down, that majority was won by blowing up the cordon sanitaire, and it was shown to Europeans and to the world that there is now a conservative and national majority in the European Parliament. And thus was managed the first appearance of a reality that, much sooner than some believe, is going to pull the EU out of its suicidal drift, restore common sense, sobriety, rationality, competence and freedom to political discourse, and change the future of Europe. For the better.

Hermann Tertsch is a Distinguished Fellow (Honorary) at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: If Kamala wins, Ukraine will be another ‘forever war’)

In her first election debate, U.S. presidential candidate Kamala Harris made it clear that she has neither plans nor strategy to end the Russia- Ukraine war – an ongoing crisis for which the U.S., under her administration, has promised $175 billion to-date. As vice president, she pledges ongoing (and long term) U.S. financial support for a war of over one million casualties, saying that “America cannot retreat.”

Indeed, the Biden-Harris administration, D.C.-NATO Warhawks and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy insist that “winning” the Russia-Ukraine war by flooding (mostly U.S. taxpayer) money and weapons into Ukraine is the only answer to Russia’s unlawful invasion.

But is it? And if so, what would winning look like?

The Biden-Harris administration’s Ukraine “strategy” this year gave up on the idea of gaining back territory , instead focusing on strengthening Ukrainian forces and the economy against future attacks. Despite the newest U.S. $61 billion aid package, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan believes Russians will continue to advance, and Ukrainian forces should just “hold the line.”

Sullivan even expects another counteroffensive will be necessary in 2025. At the cost, of course, of billions more U.S. taxpayer dollars and thousands more Ukrainian lives.

An estimated over 34,000 Ukrainian civilians and almost 500,000 Ukrainian troops have already become casualities of this war. Last year’s counteroffensive failed and this year, Russia continues making “rapid” advancements in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian troops deployed to the Kursk region of Russia (for reasons somewhat ambiguous), leave Ukraine undermanned .

With an eye toward the presidential election, the Biden-Harris administration also wants to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid by signing a long-term commitment with Zelenskyy, with fixed levels of support over the next ten years . NATO has similar plans to protect Ukraine aid against both a Trump presidency and right-leaning political shifts in European member states.

When will it end? Under a president Kamala Harris, Americans will continue to support war indefinitely.

In 2023, the U.S. State Department announced the U.S. had already given Ukraine the largest U.S. foreign assistance package since the end of WWII and the Marshall Plan. In spite of U.S. economic and border security crises, assistance to Ukraine – military, security, economic, and finanicial – continues to grow significantly.

Supposedly, enormous levels of U.S. support are necessary to push back Russian forces occupying Ukraine’s east and south provinces. “More money, more weapons, are crucial to American interests,” cry the Warhawks, “because Russian forces will continue to roll West!” The cry comes despite the fact that Putin repeatedly communicated that NATO enlargement initiated his invasion, not an intention to expand into Central Europe; despite the fact that invading further west would directly pit Russian forces against thirty-two NATO countries. How absurd.

Diplomacy and security assurances to Russia could have ended this war before it began. Instead, the Biden-Harris administration repeatedly backtracked on previous U.S. policies to increase the number and lethality of weapons sent to Ukraine, even lifting restrictions on U.S. weapons to allow strikes inside Russian borders, risking a U.S.-NATO direct conflict with Russia.

Putin promised a response, warning of “serious consequences.” But Biden-Harris pays no heed; in fact, the administration dangerously justified Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region using U.S.-NATO weapons and killing and injuring Russian civilians.

No matter the cost or risk to the U.S., Ukraine is no closer today to “winning;” it has neither gained back territory nor pushed Russian forces out of Ukraine. But the real cost of the war, the futility of which was predicted but few acknowledged, is hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties, millions of refugees, and devastation of cities and critical infrastructure.

Does the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) line pockets to such a degree that the deadly and mounting costs of indefinite war can be so easily overlooked?

When will it end? Who will end it? The supposed goal to weaken Russia necessitates long-term war and destruction against an enemy that “will fight for as long as it takes.” Hardly anyone says it, but American and Ukrainian citizens bear enormous costs for a futile war only (barely) of secondary interest to U.S. national security — and which could end with diplomacy and negotiation.

Until Ukraine invaded Kursk in August 2024, Putin often indicated he was open to negotiations based on Ukraine neutrality and NATO non-enlargement – an offer repeatedly rejected by the Biden-Harris administration. Yet Ukraine, rife with corruption, dependent on the West, and led by a near-dictator who outlaws political opposition, suspends elections, closes churches, and nationalizes media, is not ready for NATO membership.

Sadly, Biden-Harris’ insistence on making Ukraine a NATO member, subsequently enabling an ongoing full-scale war, “has made Ukraine a victim of misconceived and unachievable U.S. military aspirations .” The U.S. remains by far the largest donor of military assistance, without which Ukraine arguably could not “hold the line” at all.

Though no U.S. troops have yet fought in Ukraine, the current scenario is reminiscent of D.C. Warhawks’s proclivity for foreign “forever wars” – from Vietnam to Afghanistan – born by generations of American citizens. Today our grandchildren are being committed to staggering debt for a war in Eastern Europe that cannot be won.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has even alluded that if the U.S. does not continue to do more, U.S. troops likely will fight in Ukraine.

Guaranteed, if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the presidency in November, American citizens will indefintely continue to support a “forever war” in Ukraine — and the increasingly greater risk of a world-wide, possibly nuclear, war.

Let’s pray that wiser leadership prevails.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

The ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and larger US–China contestation are pressing issues the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) needs to address. With such diverse member states, the bloc’s ability to be an effective body on these major security issues in the region has been severely tested.

In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi

who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions, citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The US–based Carter Center, which had a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in ten states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on the election day. Per an Amnesty International report, over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the coup d’etat, including at least 1,345 people in 2023.

Reactions from fellow ASEAN Countries

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Association aims to promote regional peace and security, as well as economic growth. Due to the complex security dynamics in the region, the former design seems to be the group’s priority. ASEAN subsequently expanded and the numbers slowly grew, as Brunei became a member in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, Timor-Leste in 2022 was granted an official observer status and in principle approval by ASEAN countries to become a full member of the association at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN Centrality, a concept that relies on assumption that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the regional bloc. The concept was first used at the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explained that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and, in order to effectively function, the member states needed to be united.

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from the fellow ASEAN member states. The regional bloc has been chaired by four countries since the military coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been particularly successful in resolving the crisis as, three years after the coup, forging a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.

Most founding members were alarmed over the developments in Myanmar. Indonesia expressed a serious concern over the military take-over in Myanmar, calling for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore took the same stance, expressing grave concern and expressed hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and Singapore echoed these sentiments, viewing the developments with considerable unease. The Philippines followed the situation with deep concern, particularly over the personal safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, flatly described the coup as an internal matter and advocated no comment be made. Newer members generally shared Bangkok’s sentiment.

That member states were divided between expressions of serious concern and a hands-off approach illustrated that the regional bloc has lacked a united stance. Even as early as five months after the coup unfolded, the division were seen when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy, with only six ASEAN members voting in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar itself, who was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand abstained.

ASEAN consists of countries with significant differences, including their political systems – which may have played a role in the divided responses toward the overthrow of the democratically elected government, as well as their approach to the ongoing post–coup troubles. Only three members — Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — are considered to have democratic systems.

Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar for decades was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The United States and European Union states accused SLORC of human rights violations and suppression of democracy activists. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy was the way to secure regional security as well as the country’s socio-economic development. Despite objections from the United States, Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. Today, the bloc finds itself in a challenging situation where it needs to find a way to manage Myanmar’s membership amidst continued civil unrest.

In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (“FPC”), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special envoy of ASEAN; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.

In contrast to the West imposing sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders were united and opted to keep the communication channels open with the junta, balancing between engagement but carefully not to give legitimacy to the military regime.

In October 2021, the ten member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet the jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised an option, as the group has no mechanism of expulsion, let alone any specific mention about expelling its members in a situation when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.

Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, during his tenure as ASEAN Chair the following year, was criticized by ASEAN fellow members, Indonesia and Malaysia. His visit to Myanmar undermined what the group has agreed, which is to withhold the junta’s recognition until they start to cooperate.

As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This move constituted a different approach by the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed an individual as a special envoy to Myanmar. Jakarta favored a non-megaphone diplomacy, a quieter approach where not every diplomatic activity was disclosed and maintaining a position that, until there was progress on the implementation of the FPC, no representation from Myanmar at ASEAN meetings would be accepted, except at the non-political level. Still, the junta did not heed Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and with no punitive actions applicable under ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, nothing more was done.

During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo pushed back against the accusation of the division within the regional’s bloc by stating that differences of opinion didn’t mean there was no unity, a view that strains credulity.

This year’s chair, Laos, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, a similar move from Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022, which only highlighted once more the bloc’s inability to speak with one voice.

ASEAN and the South China Sea

As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members have also been divided with regard to Chinese encroachment in its naval backyard.

Looking at the dynamics between member states on South China Sea (“SCS”) concerns, the expectation of an ultimately fruitful South China Sea Code of Conduct (“CoC”) negotiation, which constitute guidelines created to ease the tension in disputed waters by defining rules of related parties, needs to be managed. A CoC is hoped to have a more meaningful impact than the previous non-legally binding document signed by ASEAN members and China in 2002, yet it remains a discussion whether a CoC will even be legally binding. ASEAN and China have been working on a CoC for over two decades but within the former, unity once more proves elusive. The claimant countries who often involved in incidents with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, support the agreement to be legally binding, while countries that are closer to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, prefer to avoid any conflict.

With China claiming almost the entirety of the SCS, there is also a question on what geographical areas that the code should cover and agreed by all parties.

Recently, China and the Philippines were involved in another incident located in Sabina Shoal, which lies

630 nautical miles from China. Manila and Beijing accused each other of ramming into each other’s vessels, marking the fifth incident in one month. The incident occurred just a month after a de-escalation effort from both sides, where both disputants agreed to a provision arrangement that allows Manila to resupply the outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. China makes no secret of its more assertive moves in pursuing its claims in the disputed waters, ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal concluded China’s claims had no legal basis. The tension in the disputed waters has been on the rise since last year and sparked a concern of a possible larger confrontation.

In his speech at the Shangri–La Dialogue this year, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, without mentioning a specific country, condemned China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea. He mentioned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a willful act was close to what gets defined as an act of war. He hinted that, in this case, Manila may ultimately invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States, stating that he believed that his treaty partner holds the same standard. The treaty consists of eight articles that requires both countries to defend each other if another party attacks.

Similar to the Myanmar crisis, the members are not united in addressing the SCS disputes. In 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique amidst tension in the disputed waters, a first since its establishment, with Cambodia blocked the consensus. Its leader at the time, Hun Sen, argued that the issues should be addressed bilaterally, similar to what China preferred. Cracks in the group’s facade were again reflected in July’s post–ministerial,meeting in Vientiane, when host Laos and Cambodia opposed the wording to be put in the joint communique, condemning the coast guard vessel belonging to China in a June collision with the Philippines’ resupply boat.

In next month’s ASEAN Summit, member states expect to remain divided on the issue of the Myanmar crisis, between those supporting vocal criticism toward the military government’s lack of commitment on the FPC, as well as rising violence and the junta deciding to again postpone its scheduled general election scheduled for 2025, and those advocating a markedly softer approach.

Member states also remain divided on how to address China’s more aggressive behavior in the disputed waters, particularly against the Philippines. Meanwhile, the CoC negotiation between ASEAN and China will still be a tough one, despite being scheduled to be concluded in the next two years. It’s important to note that not all ASEAN members are having territorial disputes with China; therefore, consensus isn’t easy to reach. The disunity may weaken its negotiation’s position and possibly allowing China to drive a wedge within the group.

There is doubt that China will agree to a legally binding CoC, given its more assertive behavior in the disputed waters, the use of water cannon, ramming incidents with other disputants, and the artificial islands equipped with military facilities, despite the existing but unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, where the disputed parties agreed to resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means and practice self-restraint from activities that would escalate the disputes. More importantly, China openly rejected the 2016 ruling by an international tribunal and sees it as null and void.

ASEAN was built based on a declaration, not a treaty. It provides a platform for discussions through forums over security issues aimed to maintain peace and stability in the region. It has a distinctive way in managing interstate relations, widely known as the “ASEAN Way,” relying on consultation and consensus. The style of diplomacy consists of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, preference of non-binding and non-legalistic approaches. Therefore, the CoC is less likely to be a legally binding agreement.

Further, ASEAN has no army in its disposal so cannot project any military power and consequently the group’s diplomatic influence is weakened without such enforcement capabilities.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, mentioned that the economy, including trade and investment will be the priority of Malaysia as ASEAN’s chair next year. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur has decided to join the Chinese – led regional bloc, BRICS, which suggests its approach towards the SCS dispute next year is unlikely to be assertive towards China.

ASEAN’s rotating chair changes annually. Learning from Indonesia’s term as a chair, which has experienced of fully transitioning from an authoritarian system to the world’s third largest democracy, a year wasn’t nearly enough to make a significant progress on the Myanmar crisis. Accordingly, the chances of success for any ASEAN chair to play a key role in finding a solution to the crisis is low.

The decision-making mechanism of ASEAN that consists of consultations and consensus have also raised question on its efficacy in managing current security issues. ASEAN as a regional group should prioritise the interests of the member states, not those of external powers. For that to happen, there is a need for the group to speak in one voice and to restore ASEAN Centrality.

(This article was written by Shea Bradley-Farrell and appeared in Human Events. SHEA BRADLEY-FARRELL: When will enough be enough on Ukraine?)

“It’s not enough,” said Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently after deploying U.S.-made F-16s against Russia’s drones and missiles, a theme he uses repeatedly since Russian’s unlawful invasion into Ukraine. Zelenskyy even blames his August 2024 incursion into Russia’s Kursk region on a U.S.-NATO “ naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia” that (so far) restrict him from using U.S. and others’ long-range weapons to strike inside Russian territory.

However, the Biden-Harris administration recently did a major policy reversal to allow Ukraine to use shorter range missiles to strike inside Russia. But no matter how far the U.S. dangerously creeps toward direct confrontation with Putin, no matter the billions donated, Zelenskyy continues to push, cajole, and guilt , into “more.”

When will it be enough to end this war? And who has done more than the U.S.? The U.S. is the largest state donor of aid to Ukraine.

As of August 2024, U.S. Congress passed five bills to appropriate a total of $174.2 billion for Ukraine assistance since Russia’s invasion. This includes: over $55.5 billion in military assistance (weapons, equipment, supplies), $30 billion in security assistance , (law enforcement, intelligence, training), $3.2 billion in humanitarian assistance (healthcare, shelter, food), about $23 billion in financial assistance (grants to purchase weapons) and $65 billion in multiple funding streams for direct economic aid (humanitarian, military, government budget).

The U.S. remains by far the largest donor of military assistance, without which Ukraine arguably could not hold off Russian forces at all. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, is Ukraine’s second largest donor of military assistance at about $31 billion .

The world considers the U.S. an unending source: arguments abound that billions in U.S. aid are not a “dispropportionate burden” on American taxpayers as compared to European partners. But some states, arguably more vested in a regional war than the U.S. – France, Italy, Spain – contribute relatively little, although they are (respectively) the second, third and fourth largest economies of the European Union (EU). Germany, France and Italy account for more than half the EU’s GDP .

France has contributed about $4.2 billion in military support and Italy, between $1-$2 billion . Until Spring 2024, Spain’s contribution to Ukraine military aid was only about $332 million; recently Spain pledged $1.2 billion.

Is reluctance to fund Ukraine’s military an indication these states believe winning the war is futile? Or, like former President Donald Trump has said, do they believe the U.S. will supply whatever NATO members will not?

For further context, U.S. financial aid commitments to Ukraine have been grants, not requiring repayment, whereas almost all the $40 billion pledged (as of June 2024) by the largest donor of financial aid to Ukraine, the EU institutions of the European Commission, Council, and European Investment Bank, have actually been loans .

Some even assert “U.S. aid to Ukraine” is a “misnomer,” and that 61% to 80% of the $175 billion appropriated really benefits U.S. citizens by supporting our “defense industrial base’s decline,” and funding U.S. factories, labor, and service members. This analysis describes U.S. aid to Ukraine as much less ( $107 billion or less) and excludes billions of U.S. dollars that support Ukraine, but are not directly spent in Ukraine , including Ukrainian refugee assistance, programs funded to procure weapons and resources sent to Ukraine, economic assistance to Ukraine through the Office of U.S. Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (ACE), and emergency funds for Ukraine and other countries impacted by its war.

This analysis is misleading, at best. All of the above activities benefit Ukraine fighting their war against Russia, whether money is spent directly in Ukraine or indirectly, including in the U.S. production of weaponry donated to Ukraine.

Besides being misleading, the analysis promotes a non-competitive, non-capitalistic, socialistic economic model. Critical funds – supplied through U.S taxpayers – are diverted to respond to an ongoing war in Central Europe, of only secondary interest to U.S. national security.

Portions of these taxes would be better used to further crucial U.S. interests– such as incentivizing entrepreneurial efforts and competitive companies to innovate, design and build modern weaponry for U.S. national security and defense.

Supplying weapons to Ukraine has blatantly demonstrated that U.S. current weapons systems and tactics are being radically challenged by a new generation of warfare, with a massive shift in warfare techniques, logistics and weapons systems. Yet Congress pays the same defense contractors for weapons quickly becoming obsolete. The “misnomer” narrative, however, reflects routine propaganda sold by the Biden-Harris administration, Zelenskyy, and the D.C. Warhawks. It says that American citizens, despite committing almost $200 billion, including paying salaries and pensions of Ukraine’s public servants during U.S. record-high inflation and border security crises, still haven’t done enough. We must do more, they say. The media barely notes rampant corruption in Zelenskyy’s defense ministry, or that he fired top defense officials for “massive procurement fraud” including of ammunition and military food supplies . As one commentator noted “when does a never-ending supply of taxpayer money begin to resemble “fraud, waste and abuse?”

A new vision for foreign policy is needed in 2025 — one promoting U.S. global leadership and collaboration, but refocusing the (finite) resources of American citizens on priority U.S. national security interests.

Shea Bradley-Farrell is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.

(This article was written by Maria Maalouf and appeared in Arab News. How will Afghanistan feature in the race for the White House?)

Three years after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, both Democrats and Republicans are revisiting the incident. Neither side is providing a credible or comprehensive explanation as to why Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban on Aug. 15, 2021. Instead, the lack of an Afghan strategy on the part of both the Biden and Trump administrations is being filled with mutual accusations of “you lost Afghanistan.” The issue now is how the Afghan problem will fit into the 2024 presidential election campaign.

Republicans believe that Democrats are vulnerable on the issue of Afghanistan. It was the Biden administration that failed to stop the Taliban’s onslaught on Kabul and protect the government of then-President Ashraf Ghani. More problematic was the Daesh suicide bombing attack on Kabul airport that killed 170 Afghans and 13 American military personnel during the evacuation.

Republicans in Congress last week released a report, which was the culmination of a three-year investigation into the factors and circumstances that led to the US failure in Afghanistan. Among its findings were: “(The Biden administration) had the information and opportunity to take necessary steps to plan for the inevitable collapse of the Afghan government, so we could safely evacuate US personnel, American citizens, green card holders and our brave Afghan allies.”

Days earlier, as the report on Afghanistan was being finalized, House Republicans subpoenaed Secretary of State Antony Blinken, requesting his testimony on the Afghan withdrawal. So far, he has not responded to their demands. Instead, a State Department spokesperson said: “The secretary has testified before Congress on Afghanistan more than 14 times — more than any other Cabinet-level official. It is disappointing that, instead of continuing to engage with the department in good faith, the committee has issued yet another unnecessary subpoena.” Additionally, a White House spokesperson described the Republican report as “cherry-picked facts, inaccurate characterizations and preexisting biases.”

The timing of the report on Afghanistan holds significant weight in the 2024 election race, but it remains unclear if it will influence voters. The report aims to blame President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris for failing to maintain the pro-Washington government in Afghanistan. According to Texas Republican Rep. Michael McCaul, who chaired the investigation as a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, “at each step of the way, the administration picked optics over security.”

The report itself is a thorough attempt to uncover what happened in Afghanistan. It spans more than 350 pages and includes testimony from numerous senior military officers at the Pentagon. Seven lengthy public hearings were held and about 20,000 pages of State Department documents and correspondence were examined. Among the key sources was retired Col. Seth Krummrich, who was the chief of staff for the Special Operations Command Central. He noted: “I called their advance ‘the red blob.’ We tracked the Taliban advance daily, looking like a red blob gobbling up terrain.”

Additionally, the report made several good recommendations, such as emphasizing the need for future noncombatant evacuation operations to succeed and calling on Congress to establish standard operating procedures for such drawdowns. It also urged the State Department and Department of Defense to brief Congress on plans for noncombatant evacuation operations when an embassy has been designated a high-threat post.

However, such a policy option will likely not establish foreign policy consensus or national security reconciliation between Republicans and Democrats. The Biden administration and the Harris campaign have placed the blame on the Trump administration for the deal it signed with the Taliban in February 2020. On the other hand, the Trump campaign argues that Biden botched the Afghan deal and that his administration could have followed its schedule to ensure a safe American pullout from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was discussed in last week’s presidential debate between Trump and Harris, but without reference to the report. Trump attempted to use the strategic retreat from Afghanistan as an indication of joint Biden-Harris responsibility, emphasizing that the withdrawal left billions of dollars of equipment behind and that Harris played a direct role in the debacle, which embarrassed America on the world stage. Therefore, according to Trump, Harris is unfit to lead as commander-in-chief.

In conclusion, the Trump campaign succeeded in forcing a discussion about Afghanistan during a debate that was watched by 57 million people in the US. Most likely, there will be more debates about Afghanistan in the remaining weeks of the campaign. However, the ultimate arbitration on Afghanistan will come from Afghan Americans living in the US. They can make the best judgment on what transpired in their home country. When they voice their opinions on such a critical policy, it may encourage more Arab and Muslim Americans to speak up courageously about their concerns, frustrations, ambitions and hopes regarding America’s relationship with the Arab and Islamic worlds. This could represent a political victory for Arab and Muslim Americans.

Maria Maalouf is a Senior Media Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy and defense think tank.