Trump should double down on “peace through strength” with immediate, targeted military, economic and diplomatic pressure rather than chasing another round of endless talks that are only buying the Iranian regime time.
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Day 35 situation report on the Iran conflict covering regional spillover, homeland threats, cyber operations, and diplomatic developments.
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We are now on the 24th day of active U.S. and Israeli strike operations against Iran. What began on February 28 as a coordinated campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile program, and military command structure has expanded significantly in scope and is now touching nine countries across the region.
CENTCOM has confirmed strikes on more than 7,000 targets inside Iran since February 28. The U.S. military has confirmed 13 American fatalities from Iranian counter-strikes across the region, with an additional six service members killed when a refueling aircraft went down in western Iraq.
Iran has responded by launching strikes across nine countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. Iranian missiles have repeatedly targeted the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
Iran’s military has declared it is prepared to close the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely and attack regional infrastructure if President Trump follows through on his threat to strike Iranian power plants.
Nearly 50 percent of global urea and sulfur exports and 20 percent of global LNG transit the Strait of Hormuz.
President Trump announced a five-day pause on strikes against Iran’s power grid, citing what he described as productive conversations and a positive tone from Iranian interlocutors. Iran’s Foreign Ministry immediately denied that any dialogue had taken place, calling President Trump’s characterization an attempt to lower energy prices and buy time.
The five-day pause buys time but does nothing to resolve the structural issue.
Bahrain has intercepted and destroyed 143 missiles and 242 drones since February 28. Saudi forces shot down 47 drones in a single day, including 38 within a three-hour window. Kuwait’s Mina al-Ahmadi refinery, one of the largest in the Middle East, was struck by Iranian drones, sparking a fire.
The Pentagon has requested an additional $200 billion for war operations. The cost to the U.S. as of March 19 was estimated at $18 billion. The conflict has been described as the world’s largest supply disruption since the 1970s energy crisis.
The five-day pause is not a ceasefire. It is a pressure valve. The Strait of Hormuz remains the decisive terrain, economically, strategically, and diplomatically. Iran understands this and is leveraging it. The administration is managing competing pressures: oil prices, allied cohesion, questions of congressional authorization, and an Iranian regime that has replaced Khamenei but has not collapsed.
The hard questions remain unanswered. What is the defined end state? What does a post-conflict Iran look like under whatever governing structure emerges? Who holds the ground, secures the nuclear material, and prevents the power vacuum from being filled by forces hostile to U.S. interests? What, if any information can be provided to the U.S. public about activation of Iranian sleeper cells inside the United States?
We can second guess all we want the decision for the United States to enter another war in the Middle East, this time in Iran. However, cutting to the heart of how geopolitical debates often get mired in rearview mirrors rather than what’s next, I want to break down the dynamics at play.
Why the Fixation on the Past?
People (policymakers, analysts, media, and the public) dwell on historical decisions for a few interconnected reasons, even as the current situation demands forward-thinking:
1. Accountability and Blame-Shifting: The Persian Gulf’s volatility, marked by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria, ballistic missile tests, and disruptions to shipping lanes like the Strait of Hormuz, stems directly from past U.S. and allied policies. Think the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War (with Western backing for Iraq), the 2003 Iraq invasion that empowered Iranian influence, or the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal and its 2018 withdrawal. These aren’t abstract history; they’re scapegoats. Critics on the left blame Bush-era neocons for destabilizing the region, while those on the right point to Obama-Biden appeasement or Clinton’s missed opportunities. It’s easier to litigate old choices than own new risks, especially in a polarized environment where admitting “we need to adapt” feels like weakness.
2. Lessons from History as a Crutch: The Gulf’s strategic importance (oil flows, U.S. naval presence via the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and alliances with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel) makes every misstep feel existential. Past events like the 1980s Tanker War or the 2019 drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities are invoked to justify caution or aggression. But this often turns into paralysis: “We can’t trust diplomacy because of the failed Algiers Accords” or “Military action backfired in Iraq, so let’s not repeat it.” It’s a valid way to avoid repeating errors, but it crowds out innovation, like exploring new deterrence models or economic levers.
3. Institutional Inertia and Media Cycles: Bureaucracies in Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh are staffed by veterans of those eras, so institutional memory biases toward hindsight. Media amplifies these headlines’ love “what if” retrospectives (i.e., “How the Iran Deal’s Collapse Led to Today’s Crisis”) because they’re clickable and don’t require predicting uncertain futures. In 2026, with ongoing Houthi disruptions backed by Iran and potential escalations post-any recent incidents, this backward gaze distracts from evolving threats like cyber warfare or Iran’s alliances with Russia and China.
Shifting to Future Decisions:
The real imperative RIGHT NOW is ensuring a proactive strategy. The situation today (escalating Iranian enrichment to near-weapons-grade uranium, proxy militia attacks on U.S. bases, and Gulf states diversifying away from oil amid climate shifts) demands decisions that aren’t just reactions. Here’s what could (and should) be prioritized:
Strengthen Deterrence Without Endless Wars: Build on Abraham Accords momentum by integrating Israel-Gulf defense networks, perhaps with AI-driven early-warning systems for missile threats. Future-focused: Invest in non-kinetic options like economic sanctions tied to verifiable de-escalation, or cyber defenses to counter Iran’s hacking prowess.
Energy Independence and Diversification: The Gulf’s oil chokehold is waning with global renewables push. Decisions now could accelerate U.S. and allied transitions to alternatives, reducing Iran’s leverage from asymmetric warfare on tankers. Think incentives for nuclear power or green hydrogen hubs in the region.
Diplomatic Off-Ramps with Teeth: Instead of rehashing JCPOA debates, craft a new framework that includes ballistic missiles and regional proxies, enforced by a coalition including Europe, India, and even cautious outreach to moderates in Tehran. But this requires bold leadership willing to risk short-term backlash for long-term stability.
Countering Broader Influences: Iran’s ties to the Axis of Resistance (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) and partnerships with Moscow/Beijing are accelerating. Future moves: Bolster Gulf cyber resilience, support proxy countermeasures, and use trade deals to peel away Iranian allies economically.
In essence, the past obsession is human nature, comfort in the known versus the gamble of the unknown. But America is a leader who’s navigated these waters before, we know victory comes from decisive action ahead, not endless autopsies. If we keep debating yesterday’s calls, tomorrow’s threats will outpace us. There are clearly emerging and unknown threats that we must consider and be prepared to address when they raise their ugly heads. Let’s not fall into the traps of staring at our strategic navels, instead, think geo-strategically, long-term, and use common sense and then move rapidly to end this war.
This past week we’ve begun to see indicators that suggest an increasing number of elements within the regime are fearful that defeat is inevitable. We’re not yet talking huge numbers, but the trend is building in the right direction. This follows previous analysis that the regime had already psychologically isolated itself from the Iranian citizens. Both of these developments, when they arise at compelling levels and combine, are two conditions favorable to successful revolution. A third belongs to the citizens (as irregular operators), who must reach the point where they’re convinced there’s no going back to the way things were before the uprising…that life can only improve after the regime is toppled. This reflects the reality that the psychological component in irregular warfare contributes at least 50% toward ultimate victory.
So, consider the following:
In the last few days alone we’ve seen several reports of Iranian diplomats requesting asylum in the west. In Denmark, Australia, Switzerland and Austria…probably others, too. (BTW we’ve put a $10M bounty on the heads of several other listed senior leaders in the Regime).
Also, we continue to see increasing reports of IRGC members and basij, and police failing to report for duty.
Other reports suggest desertions are rising amongst Iran’s various security forces.
And we’ve disrupted the logistics for the regime’s security forces, and that has produced acute shortages for them…And the shortages, in turn, have led to tension between the IRGC and the Artesh (the conventional Army), because now they’re competing against each other for resupply.
And this supply problem’s only going to get much worse….because a few days ago we destroyed the main data center for Iran’s largest bank, Bank Sepah, which, until now, paid the salaries for all government workers, police, IRGC and basij. I can tell you from first-hand experience that when indigenous forces can’t get money home to their families, bad things happen.
On the other hand are the citizens. So, a few days ago we hit a cyber-company in Tehran, named Sahab Pardaz. That’s the company that the regime used to shut down the internet. So, clearly the intent of our strike was to enable turning the internet back on for Iranian citizens. That’s important, because until the regime blacked out the internet over Iran, the protestors had been relying on social media and other online capabilities to communicate and coordinate. If the internet comes back on, the citizens will regain their ability to organize…and when conditions in the streets ripen…we’ll likely see an increase in organized opposition activity. BTW renewed/re-energized opposition activity is kinda typical in irregular warfare. It’s common that resistance activity goes…let’s say…dormant for a period, and then pops up again, re-energized and with renewed intensity. My guess is we’ll see this when conditions become optimal. Keep watching for it.
Another thing to watch is the shifting priority to our targeting. Why? Because folks on the ground in Iran report that they’re starting to see our targeting shift to local security forces. Until recently we’ve largely been targeting fixed assets of the national-level security forces, air defenses, radars, missile stockpiles, launchers, HQs, bases, armories, airfields, aircraft, storage facilities, training facilities, motorpools, ammo storage bunkers, etc. However, as those have been largely addressed, folks on the ground are now reporting that our targeting is transitioning to other, more local elements of the regime….They’re seeing us hit neighborhood police patrols, snap traffic control points, snap personnel checkpoints…even private automobiles where security forces are sleeping, because they have no patrol base to return to..…these are local levers of repression the regime has relied upon to control the population. Destruction of enough of these local security forces is a necessary condition to enable to citizens to return to the streets. Oh, and much of this targeting is the result of Iranian citizens themselves identifying for us the hide sites and geographic locations of police, baij and IRGC operating in their villages and towns.
We discussed all of this AND the “closing” of the Straits of Hormuz on our show this week. My guest is Arash Saleh, member of the KDP-I (Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran), the oldest Kurdish resistance group inside Iran. It traces its history back to 1945 in the days leading up to Qazi Mohamed bravely stepping onto the park at Chwar Chira in Mahabad and declaring history’s first, so far only, and sadly short-lived independent, sovereign, Kurdish state…the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Threatened by Tehran, the Republic ended one year later. Click on the link to hear our discussion: https://frontlinesoffreedom.com/frontlines-03-07-2026
Given current conditions, does Iran have a fallback doctrine (ie., a Strategy)?
Now that Iran has experienced some level of leadership decapitation and defeat of some components of their military, does Iran possess or follow a military doctrine that allied and partner forces should be aware of?
The short answer is YES.
Iran’s military doctrine in the face of leadership decapitation emphasizes resilience through decentralized command structures, rapid succession planning, and asymmetric warfare to ensure regime continuity and deterrence. This approach, often referred to in analyses as a “fourth successor” strategy, involves pre-designating multiple backups for key positions to prevent total disruption, making the system harder to fully dismantle.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a central role, stepping in to consolidate power, stabilize institutions, and drive retaliation, potentially through collective leadership or hardline figures while a new supreme leader is selected via constitutional mechanisms like the Assembly of Experts or an interim council.
Key elements include:
Asymmetric Response and Escalation: Rather than conventional engagement, the focus shifts to missile strikes, proxy networks, and disruptions like targeting regional energy infrastructure or waterways to impose costs on adversaries without direct confrontation.
Recent examples highlight operations framed as “ferocious offensives,” prioritizing vengeance and regional destabilization over submission.
Institutional Intertwining for Survival: The regime’s architecture links the security sector (including the IRGC and Basij militia) with political, economic, and religious institutions, allowing quick adaptation but risking fragmentation if the security core weakens significantly.
This setup aims to maintain control amid chaos, with the IRGC often emerging as the dominant force in wartime transitions.
Deterrence and No Capitulation: Attacks are viewed as confirming external hostility, reinforcing the need for sustained asymmetrical tools and proxy operations to signal resolve, even if it leads to prolonged conflict rather than collapse (forms of asymmetry and attrition).
Historical precedents suggest this rarely leads to regime submission, instead fostering adaptation or internal power contests.
Overall, the doctrine prioritizes endurance and counterpressure over reform, with outcomes potentially ranging from stabilized hardline rule to protracted instability, depending on internal cohesion and external pressures.
Bottom line: Settle in for a sustained conflict. History, cultural and societal norms, political dynamics, ability to suffer, and the idea they are the “chosen” people are all elements that must be considered, along with many other factors.
Iran has crossed a significant threshold. Following confirmed strikes on banking infrastructure inside Iran, Iranian military sources are now threatening retaliatory action against US and Israeli financial centers across the region, with specific signals pointing toward tech sector targets. This represents a deliberate strategic shift from military-to-military engagement toward targeting civilian economic infrastructure, a move that places ordinary American workers, employees of major technology companies, directly in the crosshairs of a regime at war.
This escalation is not a sign of Iranian strength. It is the signature of a losing force making a desperate play.
Regimes that are winning wars fight on the battlefield. They do not threaten banks, financial centers, and technology campuses populated by civilian workers. The decision to escalate toward economic and civilian targets is a calculated gamble by Tehran, an attempt to generate enough global economic disruption and political pressure to force Washington and Jerusalem to stand down before the military situation deteriorates further.
It will not work, but it must be recognized for what it is.
Iran’s air defense architecture has been severely degraded since strikes began on February 28. Their missile and drone stockpiles are being systematically reduced. Proxy networks across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen are fractured or operating under significant constraint. The transition in the supreme leadership with Mojtaba Khamenei installed only days ago creates internal uncertainty at the command level. These are the conditions that produce exactly this kind of escalatory threat: loud, broad, and designed to intimidate rather than defeat.
Threatening US tech sector targets is significant for one specific reason.
It signals Iran is willing to accept international condemnation for targeting civilian economic infrastructure in exchange for the psychological and political impact of threatening American workers on American soil or in American-affiliated facilities abroad. That is a terrorism calculus, not a military one.
Iran is making a massive, desperate move because they are losing and they know it. The targeting of financial centers and technology infrastructure is designed to change the psychological terrain of this conflict when they can no longer change the physical terrain.
Desperation dressed as escalation is still desperation. Do not be deceived by it.
5th Generation Warfare at its most defined level
The IEA (International Energy Agency) is a Paris-based intergovernmental org founded in 1974 by 31 OECD countries (plus associates) to ensure energy security after the 1973 oil crisis.
The 1973 oil crisis was a total oil embargo against countries that had supported Israel at any point during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (another Middle East war—they never seem to end), which began after Egypt and Syria launched a large-scale surprise attack in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to recover the territories that they had lost to Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War (a previous Middle East War).
The IEA monitors, among many tasks, global energy markets and coordinates emergency oil reserve releases—like today’s proposed HISTORIC drawdown from the 1.2B barrel stockpile to stabilize prices and supply.
So what?
Fill your gas tanks up now before the prices go up even further.
You may not want war but war wants you and when it takes hold, the costs and consequences are usually severe.
Pray for our troops and our POTUS
The ongoing military conflict in Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, involves a coalition led by the United States and Israel conducting airstrikes and operations aimed at degrading Iran’s military capabilities, including its ballistic missile program, nuclear sites, and leadership structures. The strikes have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other high-ranking officials, escalating into a broader regional war.
Iran has retaliated with drone and missile attacks on U.S. bases, embassies, and allied infrastructure across the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain.
The conflict has drawn in proxies and allies, with no clear end in sight, though U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested it could last around four weeks.
Internal pro-regime forces are clashing with anti-regime protesters, adding a domestic dimension that could evolve into civil unrest.
These include broader proxy networks across the Middle East, such as those in Yemen (Houthis, though less prominently mentioned in recent reports) and Syria, united against U.S. and Israeli presence.
Sunni militant groups, like those historically opposed to Israel, have shown some alignment with Shia proxies in this context.
This side focuses on asymmetric warfare, including missile barrages and proxy attacks, aiming to overwhelm defenses and disrupt energy supplies.
