There are moments in international affairs when moral theatre overtakes moral substance, when the currency of outrage outpaces the discipline of diplomacy, and when performance, rather than principle, dictates the tempo of political action. We live in a time in which visibility has become the new virtue, and self-exposure the principal tool of advocacy. In such an environment, it was perhaps inevitable that a group of itinerant moralists would cast themselves adrift -quite literally- on the tides of global suffering in search not of resolution, but of relevance.

Such was the spectacle of the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla, a vainglorious maritime procession of self-anointed humanitarians led by that indefatigable paragon of climate sanctimony, Greta Thunberg, and accompanied by a cast of activist dilettantes and virtue entrepreneurs. The vessel ‘Madleen’ embarked on what can only be described as a pilgrimage not to Gaza, but to the self.

To the discerning observer, the affair resembled less an act of international solidarity than a floating Instagram feed. The stated objective -to deliver a parcel of humanitarian aid- was drowned beneath a deluge of photographic posing, social media agitation, and moral theatre. The cargo manifest, laughably meagre in both weight and consequence, included approximately 100 kilograms of flour, some rice, baby formula, and prosthetics. One is tempted to ask whether this was a charity mission or an especially sentimentalised picnic.

The geopolitical theatre surrounding Gaza is grave. Since 2007, Israel has maintained a maritime blockade, a policy rendered legally defensible by international law under the San Remo Manual when applied in the context of ongoing armed conflict. That blockade has been subject to scrutiny, yes, but it has also been acknowledged by serious legal scholars as a permissible, if harsh, security measure given the region’s entanglement with non-state militant actors. To challenge such a blockade is to wade into a contested legal and strategic space. Yet one must be equipped with more than hashtags and hemp sandals to do so credibly.

The flotilla participants, by contrast, arrived not as diplomats, aid professionals, or conflict mediators, but as preening avatars of moral exhibitionism. Their mission was not to change the facts on the ground, but to become facts themselves: visible, clickable, shareable. To watch them, one was reminded of Oscar Wilde’s caution that “charity creates a multitude of sins”, chief among them the self-congratulatory impulse to posture over the suffering of others, all while accomplishing precisely nothing.

The history of humanitarian intervention is replete with examples of quiet, dignified sacrifice, from Raoul Wallenberg’s forged passports in Hungary, to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s discrete wartime negotiations. The Gaza flotilla, by contrast, was constructed not in the spirit of discretion or sacrifice, but as a pageant. It was, as one commentator aptly put it, “an exquisitely curated tableau of moral vanity.”

Indeed, one cannot fail to notice that the flotilla’s cargo held more media personnel than medical kits. The ratio of cameras to crutches was inversely proportional to the utility of the voyage. The humanitarian value of the mission, if measured by weight or need, was effectively nil. It was political theatre, low in substance, high in symbolism, but tragically bereft of strategic foresight.

And what of risk? Much has been made of the alleged peril faced by the flotilla participants as Israeli naval forces intercepted the vessel in international waters. Yet these were not freedom fighters or clandestine resisters; they were activists with European passports, confident in the knowledge that they would be detained politely, processed bureaucratically, and released promptly. Risk, for them, was as curated as their Instagram captions. They ventured into a conflict they neither understand nor endure. Theirs was not solidarity; it was safari.

It would be bad enough if this were merely an act of misguided idealism. But the flotilla represents something more insidious: the transformation of activism into performance art. The spectacle is the point. Gone are the days of moral seriousness, of strategic clarity and consequence. In their place we find the “activist-influencer” hybrid, a creature of the postmodern moment, always ready with a slogan, always ready for their close-up.

There is, too, a deeper harm inflicted by such frivolity. By reducing grave geopolitical dilemmas to emotive photo opportunities, these activists corrode the very notion of humanitarianism. They render aid indistinct from advertisement. They feed off the moral capital of true suffering to elevate their own brands. And in doing so, they exhaust the public’s patience for genuine, painstaking diplomacy and relief work.

To call this escapade a “humanitarian gesture” is to do violence to the English language. Humanitarianism requires humility, endurance, and practical efficacy. It is not a costume one dons for relevance, nor a stage upon which to strut one’s superior morality. The flotilla participants claimed the moral high ground while contributing nothing to the relief of those whose suffering they appropriated. Their moral indignation was matched only by their logistical incompetence.

That anyone still mistakes this grotesque charade for bravery is a testament to how thoroughly our political discourse has been colonised by aesthetics. Appearances now precede consequences. Gestures supplant results. Feeling good is confused with doing good.

What is left, then, is the bitter spectacle of Western privilege masquerading as empathy. The voyage to Gaza was not about Gaza. It was about the pilgrims’ own need to be seen doing something about Gaza, preferably in high-definition, with captions pre-written. It was less Florence Nightingale, more Narcissus afloat.

Strategy must be informed by outcomes, not optics. This flotilla served no strategic function. It alleviated no suffering, opened no political channels, secured no negotiation, and delivered no material good. It did, however, secure headlines, trigger diplomatic protests, and provide an all-too-perfect case study in 21st-century narcissism masquerading as internationalism.

In an age starved of seriousness, perhaps the greatest tragedy is not that this flotilla failed, but that it succeeded; succeeded, that is, in distracting attention, distorting reality, and degrading the dignity of true humanitarian work.

Let us, then, learn the correct lesson. The suffering of Gaza’s civilians is real. The complexity of Middle Eastern geopolitics is immense. And the pursuit of international justice demands more than selfies on a sailboat.

It demands knowledge. It demands seriousness. It demands, above all, that we stop mistaking moral theatre for moral action.

Yvonne Marie Antonoglou is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your support of the work that all of us at the Gold Institute for International Strategy continue to do. Through the support of people like yourself, the Gold Institute has continued success year after year. As the year comes to a close, I would beg for your generosity one more time.

The Gold Institute for International Strategy is unlike most think tanks based in Washington. While most think tanks are based on the academic knowledge of their scholars, our Institute is based on the practical understanding of our practitioners. We understand that there is often a gap between academic and practical, implementable solutions. Over the past year, the Gold Institute has seen significant growth, and our fellows continue to see an ever-increasing request for insight.

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About Maria Maalouf:

Maria Maalouf is a respected author and expert in Middle Eastern affairs. With a background in international relations and a deep understanding of the region’s politics, she has contributed extensively to the discourse on Iran’s role in global geopolitics. “Iran’s Terrorism Machine” is her latest work, offering valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities presented by the Tehran regime.

This paper originally appeared in the New Direction, The European Journal at https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling)

By: Geoffrey Van Orden CBE, Distinguished Fellow

The re-election of president Macron will give a further boost to the idea of an “EU Army”. Over the centuries there have been many attempts to put together a multi-national European army, always under the leadership of one nation and for military purposes. Wellington’s army at Waterloo had more German-speaking soldiers than English. It also included Dutch, Belgians, and many other nationalities. But the current idea of an EU Army is an entirely different project. It has little military value. Its purpose is essentially political – to further European political integration. Far from being a multi-national coalition it is intended to absorb national capabilities into a single Defence Union under the auspices of Brussels. The idea of a European Army without American involvement has been a French obsession since the 1950s. To provide some additional justification,  President Macron developed the terms “European sovereignty” and  “EU strategic autonomy”- two essentially meaningless but inevitably divisive concepts that can only please Moscow.

You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure? 

Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”

At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.

And imagine if the fate of the Ukraine had been left to the EU leadership in Brussels or the French or German governments with their ambivalent relationships with Moscow. Less than a month ago Berlin was refusing to send heavy armour to support the Ukrainians, while both France and Germany were found to have been supplying some €300 million of military equipment to Russia. It has taken the example of the UK, along with front-line nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic, to set an example by providing desperately needed military aid to Ukraine.

There may well be occasions when the US might not wish to get involved in some particular crisis but the best military and civil response should be discussed around the table with all NATO allies. In recognition of this and in order to encourage greater effort by the continental Europeans, the idea of a “separable but not separate” European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was floated at the NATO Ministerial in Berlin in 1996. At this time France was not part of NATO’s integrated military structure (which it left in 1966) but it remained a member of the NATO alliance and of the crucial North Atlantic Council where it continued to demand flattery of its vanities. It even retained a seat on NATO’s top-level Military Committee, albeit as an ‘observer’. It insisted that ESDI was inadequate and somehow managed to get its way. Nothing short of a separate military capability under EU political control would suffice. The WEU was soon absorbed into the EU.

Arguments are made that limited European resources would be more effective if integrated. This has become one of the EU’s main selling points for EU defence. It sounds plausible – but if you add up the defence budgets of 26 EU countries (Denmark has opted out of EU defence) you arrive at a figure of approximately $200 billion (2020) or 1.5% of the accumulated GDPs of these countries. The US spent about $800 billion, which is some 3.7% of GDP. And you certainly do not need EU involvement to create joint forces with allies. The history of purposeful coalitions goes back centuries. In recent times, under NATO, we have had the 14-nation ACE Mobile Force, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the German/Dutch Corps as examples of closely aligned national formations. All this has worked perfectly well. There is no need for EU involvement – unless of course your motives are political rather than military.

But wouldn’t it make sense to seize the advantages of economies of scale and procure military equipment together? Again, that happens anyway for a variety of reasons.  You don’t need the EU to get involved. There are examples of both successful and failed collaborations. “Successes” might include the Anglo-French Jaguar and the Tornado and Typhoon fighter projects. Most spending on defence equipment in Europe has been by just five countries, most notably the UK, but the UK, of course, is not now an EU country. Collaboration is usually inefficient but it opens the way to a bigger defence market. That’s the key. But many in the EU would like to close off their defence market from outsiders. That would rapidly run foul of those countries who want to buy US or British or other equipment. Even Germany has just announced its intention to buy US F-35A  fighters.

The most profound case against a single EU Army comes back to the degree to which the nations of Europe wish to retain their national independence. You cannot get closer to the bone of national sovereignty than over the status of national armed forces. I doubt that the citizens of many EU countries would be willing to see decisions about conscription, about the deployment and use of their troops, about fighting on or surrendering, indeed about life and death –  handed over to Brussels. Remember, a highly significant distinction between NATO and the EU is that NATO decisions are inter-governmental, they are taken consensually by representatives of the governments of the NATO members. The EU is a hybrid organisation where governments have handed over certain powers to the EU Commission. At this moment EU defence and military matters are still largely in the hands of member country governments who can exercise a veto. But there is now strong pressure for such military decisions to be taken by a majority vote. If this were to be conceded then Brussels would rapidly be in the driving seat and national capitals would be increasingly side-lined. Certainly the European powers need to increase their spending on defence. But this does not mean handing over strategic decision-making and their military to the EU. What is needed is a revitalised and reinforced NATO, an enhanced coalition of the capable, resilient and willing, not a political bloc of the unwilling.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, former British Conservative Leader and Defence Spokesman in the European Parliament and Founding President of New Direction. As a former senior military officer he was a counter-terrorism specialist, served in the front-line of the Cold War including 5 years in Berlin, and at NATO headquarters.

(This article first appeared in the EuroNews at https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/28/the-west-must-stand-firm-to-combat-russia-s-threats-to-ukraine-view)

Updated: 28/12/2021

Distracted by Omicron and Christmas, only a few can now recall US President Joe Biden’s video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 7 December, when Biden voiced deep concerns of both the United States and its European allies about the threat of Russian troop movements to Ukraine.

Putin’s dismissive response has been to intensify cyberattacks on Ukrainian government agencies, including the national police and electricity infrastructure.

One expert has described this as ‘preparation of the battlefield’.

For months now the Russian people have been subjected to a massive, perverse government propaganda campaign to strengthen their resolve in the face of the ‘threat’ from the West.

We can expect mobilisation of ‘peace movements’ in Western countries as Putin escalates his military posture.

Months of ground-laying by Moscow

After Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its proxy war in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, NATO sent symbolic reinforcements to member countries that are regarded as most vulnerable to Russia.

Twenty-two years after the first of the former Warsaw pact countries joined NATO, Putin has now demanded a reset and wants all NATO forces withdrawn. In effect, he wants recognition that these nations are within Moscow’s sphere of influence.

At the same time, Putin is adept at gradually creating and promoting divisions between Western states: the EU’s constant vilification of the Polish and Hungarian governments, the threat by Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia’s wooing of Turkey, are all examples.

What is Putin really up to? He is testing Western resolve. He wants recognition of his gains in the Donbas region and Crimea, full control of the Sea of Azov coastline, domination of the Black Sea, and ultimately the return of Ukraine and other former Soviet bloc countries to Moscow’s sway.

Ukraine has warned that an attack could be as imminent as early January.

Putin will not listen to the West’s concerns unless he sees a united front against his designs and US moves to reinforce a strategic posture in Europe, and also faces serious financial pressure, including from a crash in crucial gas exports.

The need for targeted sanctions against Russia, alongside the provision of equipment and expert cyber assistance to Ukraine, cannot be understated.

Could Ukraine join NATO?

While American officials have had extensive discussions with European partners on coordinating the response to Russian military activities, NATO is revealing little of how it would react to Russian territorial aggression.

The EU, of course, has no credible military capability separate from those of its own members that are already in NATO, although it does have powerful economic tools at its disposal.

NATO has said it is monitoring the situation closely and will continue to offer “political and practical support” for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and its right to decide its own future, free from outside interference.

At the last summit in June, NATO also reiterated a pledge that Ukraine would become a member of the alliance in due course.

Like any democratic country, Ukraine is free to apply. For its part, NATO will balance political and strategic considerations before it extends its massively powerful umbrella over another country. Russia is determined to ensure that this threshold is not crossed.

Given Putin’s ambition to reincorporate Ukraine into the Moscow bloc, he will go to enormous lengths to prevent Ukraine from exercising free will and joining the Western clubs.

The West must demonstrate resolve – and fast

Parallel to the aggressive military threats and cyber abrasions, Russia is applying pressure in other areas. Ukraine is currently battling a $3-billion (€2.65bn) Eurobond case in the UK Supreme Court: a loan Russia forced on it shortly before the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, and which Ukraine fairly argues it shouldn’t be required to pay back under the circumstances.

This is an example of a prolonged campaign of legal and economic Russian belligerence that threatens to undermine Ukraine at a critical moment. Ukraine needs tangible support.

Russia thinks, after the Afghanistan debacle, that the West is on the back foot and unwilling to get embroiled in another messy military situation. Deterrence will not work unless the West demonstrates its resolve. It must minimize its internal differences and act with unity and solidarity over Ukraine.

For the EU, that means downplaying any idea of separateness from the US or UK in pursuit of its ideas of ‘strategic autonomy’, and strengthening its economic and political support for Ukraine, including for enhanced military capabilities.

In parallel, the West should consider further economic and political sanctions against Russia as credible deterrents. Escalatory options could include full blocking of major Russian state banks and investment agencies.

Sectoral sanctions could be broadened to areas such as mining, metals, shipping, and insurance. And maybe a cyber-shot across Russia’s bows would serve as a warning.

Both NATO and the EU now need to demonstrate a concerted effort in addressing Russia’s dangerous military build-up on Ukraine’s border and its steadily escalating cyber-attacks.

The significance of Russia’s actions and the need for resolute action should be clearly explained to the Western public as well as Moscow. It would be a tragedy if conflict were to break out on Eastern frontiers because of any failure of deterrence. Garbled messages and misunderstandings are how wars start.

Geoffrey Van Orden is currently a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy. He was formerly a senior British military officer and long-standing member of the European Parliament, where he was Conservative Leader and Defense and Security Spokesman

(This article first appeared in the American Spectator at https://spectator.org/bye-bye-007-where-is-008-when-we-really-need-him/?fbclid=IwAR3xkUhlHK2S-cRYuck-7ckp3vEBOKNVja_lJiydtDzit8o8r3Pwyw3kGFM)

By: John C. Wohlstetter, Senior Fellow

Time to take a break during the holidays—impossible during last year’s kerfuffle after the 2020 election—and hence the delay in publishing this piece on a legend who left us on Halloween 2020; and quite a bio he had–before and after his cinematic alter ego.

Those of us who remember seeing the early films realize how risqué they were for the time, and how comparatively tame they seem now. The series should have been cancelled no later than after Roger Moore’s GQ-style 007. Connery made his last Bond film in 1983, Moore in 1985. Bond hanging up his Super-Spy spikes at 23 would have been plenty.

Nothing much has come along since. Bond has become an empty vessel into which anyone can be placed. How would Sir Ian react to the just-released LGBTQ 007? How many stunt-driven car chase scenes, how many ridiculously protracted digitally-created fight scenes, do we need to see?

Yet much was added to Fleming’s characters early on, by the original actors playing supporting roles. “Q” (Desmond Llewelyn), MI6’s fictional acerbic armorer (2:39); Miss Moneypenny (Lois Maxwell), the trusty secretary with a crush (3:06) on 007; Bernard Lee, the formidable MI6 chief, “M.” The spy agency’s intrepid crew faces arch-villains galore: Rosa Klebb (Lotte Lenya)–who’d have thought that the sinister director of SMERSH (acronym for smiert shpionam,—“death to spies”) was the lovely lass married in youth to composer Kurt Weill, who gave us the immortal tune, Mack the Knife? Lenya’s instrument for dispatching 007 to the hereafter was psychopathic killer Donovan “Red” Grant (Robert Shaw). Then came Auric Goldfinger (Gert Frobe), who cheated at cards and golf, losing to 007’s slicker cheating both times; and his thuggish bodyguard, karate-killer Oddjob (pro wrestler Harold Sakata), carved seemingly from granite, only to be electrocuted by 007 just in time to save Fort Knox; and for perennial menace, who could have topped Jaws (Richard Kiel), a worthy successor to earlier film Frankensteins.

All hail, Connery Bond belles: Ursula Andress, whose legendary Playboy pictorial and penchant for displaying her ample charms earned her the sobriquet, Arsula Undress; Daniella Bianchi, first runner-up to 1960’s Miss Universe; Honor Blackman, who had the honor of being the first Bond belle to flip 007 on his keister; Shirley Eaton, best known for her being painted a suffocating gold; and Lana Wood, whose “plentiful” charms (2:37) livened up a dice game. But their feminine charms extraordinaire.often did not include their actual voices. Incredibly, from 1962 to 1979—Dr. No through Moonraker—many Bond-belle voices were voice-overs by German-born Nikki van der Zyl, including that of Brit Shirley Eaton. Van der Zyl’s voice was thought sexier than those for whom she dubbed.

Moore-era Bond femmes like Jane Seymour (Live and Let Die, 1973); Swedish-Polish Ford model Maud Adams—Octopussy, 1983 & The Man With the Golden Gun, 1974; Britt Ekland (also in TMWTGG), another sexy Swede, whose wedding night gift to husband Peter Sellers was a near-fatal coronary, offered audiences “Moore” of the sexy same. How many players –if any–from later Bond flicks match the cavalcade on these lists? Those of the later Bond flicks I passed idle time on nights in hotel rooms with limited video fare and inadequate light for reading.

Central to the success of Bond films was nonpareil set designer Ken Adam. He worked on all Connery Bond films save 1963’s From Russia With Love and 1983’s Never Say Never Again. He created the spectacular supertanker set (4:17) for 1977’s The Spy Who Loved Me, on the then-largest sound stage in the world. In 1965’s Thunderball, Adam’s underwater stagings (9:18) offered a technology showcase in small submersibles and the hydrofoil Disco Volante—“flying fish”). Adam was set designer for film classics Around the World in 80 Days (1956), Ben-Hur (1959) and Dr. Strangelove (1964). Work on Strangelove precluded his working on From Russia With Love. Besides his film work, the German-born Adam was one of three German expatriates to fly RAF combat missions in World War II.

No appraisal of the great era of Bond films would be complete without mention of the music. Two songs stand out above the rest: 1964’s Goldfinger, composed by John Barry, whose Bond music and conducting work spanned 26 years. With lyrics by Anthony Newley and Leslie Bricusse, it was sung memorably in the film’s opening title sequence (2:49) by Shirley Bassey, spiced up by the nude (though shadowed) image of Bond girl Margaret Nolan. The 1977 Marvin Hamlisch/Carol Bayer Sager jazz-rock Nobody Does It Better, in the title sequence (2:43) for The Spy Who Loved Me, showcased superstar Carly Simon’s nonpareil rendition.

Add four cool instrumentals. The world-famed James Bond 007 Theme was originally a song from a failed musical, composed by thespian Monty Norman; the tale of the tune (5:47) is a lulu. John Barry arranged and orchestrated the movie version (1:44). A second 007 theme offers a minor-key melody (2:19) for the gypsy camp battle in From Russia With Love, and adds a major-key melody (4:47) for an aerial panorama in 1967’s You Only Live Twice. Throw in 1964’s Welcome to Miami (1:33), that introduces Bond’s first encounter with Eaton while being massaged by bikini-clad Nolan. In 2011 the Palms aired a rousing tribute (9 min.) to the early films.

Gambling games figure prominently in several Connery/Bond films. Bond makes his gambling debut at the baccarat—chemin de fer—table in Dr. No: “Bond, James Bond.” Best game scene: the spectacular bridge game in Moonraker (1979) at the fictional Blades, with the 18th century “Duke of Cumberland Hand“–that fooled King George III, no less–leading villain Hugo Drax (played by Michel Lonsdale, who bore no resemblance to the physical description in Fleming’s novel) to ruin. Drax, a talented card cheat, thinks he has a grand slam in clubs, but against a diamond lead and a mistake by the dummy player, instead the defenders run 13 non-suit tricks in diamonds. Octopussy has Bond in India, facing off against Louis Jourdan in backgammon, winning big by getting hold of what he knows is the villain’s loaded dice—always comes up two sixes—by claiming “player’s privilege,” a rule that does not exist in the real-world game.

Add some choice selections from Imdb’s voluminous Bond-flick trivia collection. Start with From Russia With Love. Its Orient Express climactic fight scene was based upon a real 1950 episode: a Red agent assassinated his victim and tossed the body off of the celebrated train. The decoding machine that was the object of 007’s desire in that film—when he was not distracted by the honey-trap charms of Bianchi’s delectable Tatiana Romanova—was based upon the real-life World War II delivery of the Nazi “Enigma” cipher machine. Thought unbreakable, its code was broken at Bletchley Park. Ian Fleming, a WW-II intelligence officer, was involved on the intel side of the so-called “Ultra” secret, vital to the Allied victory. The retractable shoe toe-knife that Lenya’s Rosa Klebb tries to kill Bond with at the end was in real life an actual weapon employed by the Soviet KGB. In an 1961 interview, President Kennedy listed the book as one of his all-time favorites. This led the producers to make this the second Bond film. Screened at the White House Nov. 20, 1963, it was the last film JFK saw.

From You Only Live Twice came a case of truth stranger than fiction. Key Bond-film figures did, in a way, live twice. On March 5, 1966, during the filming in Japan, five key players were to board BOAC Flight 911—a number designation that proved tragically apt—for Hong Kong and London: co-producers Albert “Cubby” Broccoli and Harry Saltzman; director Lewis Gilbert, who would later direct two more Bond films; Freddie Young, winner of three Academy cinematography awards; and set designer Ken Adam. But just before departure they were invited to a special ninja demonstration, to help plan the final fight scene inside Bond nemesis Ernst Stavro Blofeld’s subterranean volcano lair. Minutes after take-off, the Boeing 707 airliner they missed disintegrated upon crashing into Mt. Fuji.

And finally there is Fleming’s literary connection with legendary sci-fi novelist Jules Verne. Bond’s most durable antagonist, Blofeld, was inspired by Captain Nemo in 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea. Card-cheat Hugo Drax was drawn from Verne’s sci-fi inventor, the arch-villain Robur, whose flying machines appear in two of Verne’s lesser-known novels.

Enjoy Sir Sean’s TV guest stint (6:07) on What’s My Line?. A perfect setting for a festival party would be the Cote d”Azur mountainside Bond-style mansion Connery built; at this writing it remains on the market.

Sir Sean was a larger-than-life superstar—the rare “man’s man” and “woman’s man.” The producers originally thought of casting Rex Harrison, romantic “sexy Rexy” of British stage and film; David Niven, epitome of highbrow British suave; and Richard Burton, legendary Shakespearean player, as 007. Harrison, a dashing romantic lead in his youth, had become middle-aged Professor Henry Higgins in My Fair Lady; Niven, ever debonair, fared far better as the suave jewel thief in the original Pink Panther film (1963). Both were also much too old for plausible fight scenes. Burton, at 37 only five years older than Connery, was already well into alcohol-fueled decline. His spy persona was to be fixed in 1965’s gritty Cold War black & white The Spy Who Came in from the Cold. Author John LeCarre’s moral ambiguity went far towards both sides being equally immoral; Fleming’s hero harbored no such reservations in confronting supreme evil. Indeed, Sir Ian’s Cold War hero became openly allied with the Soviets in later films, teamed against the fictional S.P.E.C.T.R.E. (Special Executive for Counterintelligence, Terrorism, Revenge, & Extortion).

The “man’s man” side of Sir Sean earns bonus points for literally stomping Johnny Stompanato, a top enforcer for L.A. Mafia kingpin Mickey Cohen, in a fracas. Seems tough-guy Stompanato decided Connery was having an affair with his main squeeze, 1940s sex symbol Lana Turner, then starring in a 1958 film with Connery as her lover. He confronted Connery and pulled a gun, only to be disarmed and decked by the future 007.

But what of 008? First mentioned in 1964’s Goldfinger, M delivers a stern warning to 007:

• M : Gold? All over?
James Bond : She died of skin suffocation. It’s been known to happen to cabaret dancers. It’s all right as long as you leave a small bare patch at the base of the spine to allow the skin to breathe.
M : Someone obviously didn’t.
James Bond : And I know who.
M : This isn’t a personal vendetta, 007. It’s an assignment, like any other. And if you can’t treat it as such, coldly and objectively, 008 can replace you.

No one in Hollywood today comes close to the cinematic original 007. It is long past time to close up shop. Sir Sean, nobody did 007 better.

John C. Wohlstetter is author of Sleepwalking With the Bomb (Discovery Institute Press, 2d. ed., 2014).