Op-Ed: Sparing Our Children from a Nuclear Iran

A bright missile trail arcs through a starry night sky

(This article was written by Trent Franks and appeared in the Epoch Times. Op-Ed: Sparing Our Children from a Nuclear Iran)

For approaching half a century, the world has borne witness as the Islamic Republic of Iran has, directly and through its terrorist proxies, murdered hundreds of Americans, thousands of Israelis, and tens of thousands of its own civilians, all the while maintaining a brazen and menacing march toward nuclear weapons with which to terrorize the world.

We have also observed the insane left under Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden embrace policies that have allowed that relentless march to proceed.

The current Iranian regime is unalterably determined to delay, demagogue, falsify, and then ignore any honest implementation of any agreement they sign that would prevent them from eventually acquiring nuclear weapons.

They have so glaringly demonstrated for decades (up to this very hour) that their word means absolutely nothing. How can they possibly make this any clearer than they already have?

It is vital that the Trump administration and all Americans remember that the mullahs of Iran are not a traditional government as much as they are a ruthless religious cult whose unalterable mindset and primary reason for existence is the ultimate subjugation of all “nonbelievers” in the world.

In their pursuit of that end, apocalypse becomes an inducement rather than a deterrent.

Do we truly understand the potential reality of Iranian nuclear warheads being detonated in American cities?

Coherent Americans clearly understand that any outcome in Iran that ultimately allows the current cancerous regime to survive by the thinnest thread will be falsely hailed by them as a glorious victory and potentially allow them to come away with a tighter long-term death grip on their nuclear ambitions than ever before.

This entire equation could become even more relevant in light of the potential threat posed by Iran’s development of facilities beneath Pickaxe Mountain, which has heretofore been largely absent from the discussion.

Without American control of the Straits of Hormuz and the displacement capability of committed ground forces comprised of Iran’s own noble and freedom-loving people, the mullah government of Iran will attempt to run out the clock with convoluted, false pursuits of any pretend agreement, only to jettison it on the most capricious grounds when Donald Trump is no longer leader of the free world.

We should all remember that the Clinton administration negotiated a nuclear weapons agreement with North Korea, only to see it later vaporize, with the result being a nuclear-armed North Korea.

We should further remember that this same ideological mindset was responsible for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, in which the Obama administration financially empowered and placed Iran on a certain path to nuclear arms until Donald Trump intervened.

North Korea and Iran drastically differ in that one is a police state dedicated singularly to its own survival, and the other is an insidious theocracy zealously dedicated to the religious conquest of the human race.

Going forward, God help us all to understand that any military, economic, or political costs necessary to depose the current regime and their ravenous quest for nuclear weapons will pale in insignificance compared to the costs of dealing with such a regime or their ideological successors when they do possess nuclear weapons.

President Donald Trump has survived at least three assassination attempts, two preposterous impeachments, over 80 lawfare-driven indictments, and a demagogic hatred by the left that is simply unparalleled in American history.

Yet, he remains one of the very most consequential and successful presidents ever to occupy the White House. He may now be standing on the historic threshold that either defeats the evil ghouls currently leading the world’s most sinister sponsor of terrorism or allows them to stealthily slip past him into the hellish darkness of worldwide nuclear terrorism.

May Senate Republicans find the courage and wisdom to use the collective capability they currently possess to arrest this relentless Democrat obstruction and level the playing field in these fleeting moments before the midterm elections.

Moreover, for the sake of this and coming generations, may President Donald Trump find the courage and wisdom to finish his valiant and imperative quest to conclusively displace the malignant regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Trent Franks was Vice Chairman of the Strategic [Nuclear] Forces Subcommittee in the United States Congress and called for Iran to be referred to the Security Council in 2005.

Congressman Trent Franks is a Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C. based foreign policy and defense think tank.

Why I’m Not Worried About the Senate

U.S. Senate chamber and Capitol

History is the best guide and gives a framework for Senate volatility that should set reasonable expectations

Last month, I wrote an article outlining the uphill challenge Democrats face in seeking to obtain a majority in the United States Senate. That article is open for all readers: End of June 2026 Senate Majority Race Update.

Here are the nine races that will determine which party wins the chamber majority:

Key Races

  • Georgia (Jon Ossoff – D, incumbent)
  • Maine (Susan Collins – R, incumbent)
  • Michigan (Democrat-held, incumbent retiring)
  • New Hampshire (Democrat-held, incumbent retiring)
  • North Carolina (Republican-held, incumbent retiring)

Second-Tier Races

  • Alaska (Dan Sullivan – R, incumbent)
  • Iowa (Republican-held, incumbent retiring)
  • Ohio (Jon Husted – R, incumbent)
  • Texas (Republican-held, incumbent defeated in primary)

Democrats could win all five key races, which I do not consider likely given the strength of Susan Collins in Maine, a developing race against a radical DSA-aligned candidate in Michigan, and the Sununu name in New Hampshire. But let’s say they do win them all. That would have Republicans in the lead 51 to 49, requiring Democrats to win two of Alaska, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas for a clear majority. They have a pathway to victory; but it’s not a realistic one.

Today, I have done the research and I’m going to demonstrate why I consider the Republicans a strong favorite to hold the Senate.

Trump 2024 Margins for Second-Tier Races

Alaska +13.1%
Iowa +13.2%
Ohio +11.2%
Texas +13.7%

2022 Midterm Analysis

2022 Senate midterm drift analysis table

All analysis is from the perspective of the president’s party, given that we are facing a GOP-president midterm in November.

Here’s how to read the table above, using California as the example. In 2020, Joe Biden won California by a certified margin of 29.2% (yes, I know, it is artificially inflated). In 2022, the Democrat Alex Padilla won the Senate seat by 22.2%. That is seven points to the right of the 2020 presidential margin, indicated by a positive number in the “drift” column. Padilla was not an incumbent.

The table includes 15 Senate races, all in states Biden carried in 2020. The only state Biden won (“won” in this case) in which the Republican won in 2022’s Senate contests was Wisconsin, and incumbent Ron Johnson held his seat 1.6% right of the 2020 presidential margin.

Incumbents held 13 of 13 seats in Biden-won states.

9 of 15 seats had rightward drift from the 2020 presidential election.

Hawaii is the extreme outlier with leftward drift of 16.0%, driven by a weak Republican challenger to a strong Democrat incumbent (Schatz). Even keeping this outlier in the numbers, the average drift in these 15 Biden seats comes out to 0.4% rightward. This underscores why 2022 was a “pink trickle” rather than a red wave, and should help you understand why many are pondering if 2026 will be like a “reverse 2022” (Democrats expecting big gains but disappointed in outcome).

Hawaii excluded, none of the Senate seats won by the president had enough drift in either direction to flip any of the second-tier Senate races up in 2026.

2018 Midterm Analysis

2018 Senate midterm drift analysis table

The 2018 Senate cycle appears ominous at first glance, given that 14 of 16 races ran left of the 2016 presidential margin and the presence of some really big drift numbers in Trump-won states. However, the GOP made a net gain in the Senate, driven by Rick Scott’s win over Bill Nelson in Florida, Mike Braun’s over Joe Donnelly in Indiana, Josh Hawley’s in Missouri over Claire McCaskill, and Kevin Cramer’s in North Dakota of Heidi Heitkamp. The latter three races, requiring the ouster of Democrat incumbents from Trump landslide states, had left drifts of -13.3%, -12.8%, and -24.8%, respectively.

Then there were the Democrats in similar races who managed to hold on, like Jon Tester in Montana running 24 points left of Trump’s 2016 margin, and Joe Manchin in West Virginia, at 45.4% left of Trump. Tester and Manchin are now gone, and with them, the blue dog coalition finds John Fetterman as its last surviving member (for now).

Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin had big swings from Trump’s unexpected success in 2016, but Casey was a strong incumbent (out in 2024), Sherrod Brown held on for one last term, and so did Tammy Baldwin, who also almost lost in 2024. The fates of those three Senators (two former) suggest the overall electorate has adjusted since the 2016-18 timeframe and settled well to the political right, meaning the 2018 cycle was one of significant sorting.

Ken Paxton survives a 6.4% leftward drift in 2026 given Trump’s 2024 blowout in the Lone Star State, and Sherrod Brown would only win Ohio by 3.9% with the same differential he had in 2018 as an incumbent. My bet is he doesn’t have it in him.

Deducting extreme outliers Montana, North Dakota, and West Virginia, the 2018 Senate races in Trump-won states ran 7.2% left of presidential performance. All four second-tier states remain Republican with that differential this year, which is unlikely given the volatility of the Midwest in 2018 compared to today.

2014 Midterm Analysis

2014 Senate midterm drift analysis table

15 Obama-won states had Senate races up for grabs in 2014, a year marked by low turnout and a continuation of the 2010 Tea Party wave, but with a lot less volatility. Much of what the Rust Belt and greater Midwest would become was beginning to manifest in 2014, and we also got the last gasp of Republican Colorado here with Cory Gardner’s ouster of Democrat Mark Udall.

12 of 13 incumbents in Obama states won, including Susan Collins, who ran 52.3% right of Obama’s 2012 margin. She only needs to run 7.0% right of Harris’s 2024 margin to hold her seat in 2026.

Matching the 2022 midterms, 9 of 15 states had rightward drift in 2014 from the 2012 presidential election. Throwing out the extreme Collins outlier, the 2014 Obama-state Senate races had rightward drift of 1.1%.

Conclusion

Leftward drift can be expected in all four second-tier Senate races this year in Trump-won states Alaska, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas, on account of the president’s over-performances in all four in 2024.

Paxton is safe with Cruz’s 2018 differential, even if doubled.

Volatility in the Midwest has died off substantially since the first Trump midterm, and is likely to save Jon Husted (Ohio) and Ashley Hinson (Iowa), even though the latter is a non-incumbent.

Alaska doesn’t fit the pattern of volatile Midwestern state, and 2016 Trump states without a blue dog incumbent Democrat showed less volatility (Florida, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Texas as prime examples).

Democrats remain severe underdogs and need to sweep all five key races to have a puncher’s chance at the narrowest of Senate majorities.

Seth Keshel, MBA is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.

When Washington Stays Quiet: The Cases of Olfa Hamdi and Maria Maalouf

Rows of national flags lining the lobby of the Harry S. Truman Building, headquarters of the U.S. Department of State

The cases of Olfa Hamdi and Maria Maalouf expose a widening gap between America’s declared commitment to protect its citizens and refugees and its willingness to act when foreign governments weaponize legal systems against dissent. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen and Tunisian opposition figure, was detained in Tunisia after returning to the country and later became the subject of mounting concern from U.S. lawmakers and commentators who argued that she was being punished for political activity rather than ordinary criminal conduct. Maalouf, a Lebanese journalist living in exile in the United States, was sentenced in absentia by a Lebanese military court to 15 years in prison over speech critical of Hezbollah and Lebanon’s political order. The central point is not merely that two women faced abusive legal proceedings abroad. It is that the United States, despite a more developed policy language on wrongful detention and a longstanding legal commitment to shelter the politically persecuted, did not appear to respond with the urgency, visibility, or seriousness that either case should have demanded.

These cases differ in legal posture, nationality, and institutional setting, but they converge on one question: whether Washington will use the tools it says it possesses when allies, partners, or politically complicated governments target dissidents tied to America. The public record suggests that the United States has articulated a stronger policy on wrongful detention and the protection of vulnerable persons than it has been prepared to enforce in practice. That mismatch is not simply a messaging problem. It is a credibility problem that affects deterrence, diplomacy, and the broader perception of American resolve. The strongest way to understand these cases is therefore structural rather than episodic: they reveal an inconsistency between declared doctrine and operational behavior.

Tunisian authorities detained Olfa Hamdi at the airport on February 15, 2026, shortly after her arrival in Tunis. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen and leader of the Third Republic party, had repeatedly criticized President Kais Saied’s rule and called for a transitional government and early presidential elections. Her arrest is part of the broader repression of dissent that has accompanied Saied’s consolidation of power. The importance of the case lies not only in the detention of an American citizen, but in the political character of the detention itself. If a U.S. citizen can be jailed under such circumstances without a forceful and sustained response from Washington, the United States risks signaling that even its own nationals may receive only selective protection when the diplomatic environment is inconvenient.

That context matters because the United States has repeatedly framed wrongful detention not as an unfortunate byproduct of foreign legal systems but as a strategic abuse that can be used for coercion, leverage, or political punishment. The State Department explains that wrongful detention can involve cases in which a U.S. national is detained under circumstances indicating serious due process deficiencies, political motivation, or use of detention to influence the United States government. The Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act (S.712 – 116th Congress) established the modern framework for determining whether a U.S. national is wrongfully detained abroad, and the State Department says that framework looks to factors including credible evidence of innocence, arbitrariness, denial of due process, and indications that detention is politically motivated or intended to influence U.S. policy. If the Hamdi case fits even part of that pattern, then it should have triggered a visibly robust response from the full range of U.S. institutions, not only routine consular engagement.

Rep. Joe Wilson, a Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, publicly denounced Hamdi’s arrest as “outrageous,” while Rep. Jason Crow, a Democrat, moved to co-sponsor legislation (Tunisia Democracy Restoration Act – H.R. 5101) calling for sanctions on Tunisia until democracy is restored. Rep. Chris Smith, also a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, raised Hamdi’s case alongside the detention of other Tunisian dissidents and warned that the arrests deepened concerns about civil liberties and judicial independence under Kais Saied. These interventions showed that Hamdi’s imprisonment was not being ignored on Capitol Hill. Yet congressional pressure, however important, is not the same as a coordinated executive response. The central problem is not that no one in Washington noticed; it is that the United States did not appear to convert congressional concern into a sustained public strategy proportionate to the detention of one of its own citizens. The absence of a clear and repeated executive message matters in diplomacy because public silence often becomes part of the political environment in which foreign governments calculate risk.

Maria Maalouf’s case is different in form but equally troubling in substance. The Jerusalem Post reported that a Lebanese military court sentenced Maalouf in absentia to 15 years in prison after remarks she made in a 2021 Israeli media interview criticizing Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s domination of the Lebanese state. Other reporting likewise described Maalouf as a journalist living in exile in the United States and one of several anti-Hezbollah media figures punished in absentia over their political speech. The use of a military court to impose a severe sentence for political expression is itself alarming. Equally troubling is Maalouf’s claim that she was not meaningfully notified and was denied a real opportunity to defend herself before sentencing, a circumstance that raises due process concerns even under the court’s own asserted legal framework.

Maalouf’s case should also be part of any serious American conversation with President Aoun about negotiations, normalization, and the future of Lebanon. While Beirut seeks U.S. support for diplomacy with Israel and a post-conflict political realignment, a Lebanese military court has sentenced a U.S.-based exile to 15 years in prison for speech that advocated the same broad direction: peace with Israel, resistance to Hezbollah, and a more sovereign Lebanese state. That is not a side issue. It is a measure of whether Lebanon’s governing order is genuinely prepared to move beyond Hezbollah’s coercive influence or is merely asking Washington to support diplomacy while preserving the domestic instruments of political intimidation.

Her case therefore implicates both freedom of expression and the right to fair proceedings. Although Maalouf is not a U.S. citizen, her presence in the United States as an exile or refugee gives the case direct relevance to U.S. law and policy. A foreign government’s decision to criminalize the speech of a U.S.-based political exile should not be treated as a distant matter, particularly when the speech concerns a U.S.-designated terrorist organization’s influence in the Middle East. The practical issue is whether refuge in the United States carries meaningful diplomatic protection when an authoritarian or captured judicial system attempts to project coercive power across borders. If the answer is uncertain, the deterrent value of American refuge is weakened for precisely the people U.S. law is meant to protect.

The current U.S. policy architecture is stronger on paper than many earlier frameworks. In September 2025, the White House announced an executive order to strengthen efforts to protect U.S. nationals from wrongful detention abroad. The White House said the order authorizes the Secretary of State to designate foreign states as State Sponsors of Wrongful Detention and to employ penalties that may include sanctions, visa restrictions, export controls, foreign assistance consequences, and related restrictions under existing law. Public reporting on the order likewise emphasized that it was designed to create punishments for countries that unjustly detain U.S. citizens and to raise the costs of this practice. The administration has also framed wrongful detention as a national-level policy concern rather than a narrow consular issue, with the State Department describing hostage-taking and wrongful detention as acts that undermine the rule of law and target Americans for political, financial, or strategic gain.

This policy detail is essential because it sharpens, rather than softens, the criticism in the Hamdi case. Washington cannot plausibly argue that it lacked a conceptual or legal basis for a stronger response when it has publicly described wrongful detention in precisely these terms and has advertised an expanded coercive toolkit. On paper, the United States possesses both the vocabulary and the instruments necessary to confront foreign abuses against Americans abroad. The unresolved question is whether those instruments will be used with consistency or only in cases that are already impossible to ignore.

The Maalouf case must be analyzed through a different but related legal lens: the protections the United States extends to refugees, asylees, and others who seek safety from persecution. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services states that refugee or asylum status may be granted to a person who has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The asylum statute, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158, provides the legal basis for granting asylum to eligible applicants who are physically present in the United States or arriving at its borders. These protections are not merely formal. Asylum can permit a person to remain in the United States, obtain work authorization, pursue derivative protection for qualifying family members, and seek lawful permanent residence after one year. Even where asylum is unavailable, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture may bar removal to a country where persecution or torture is more likely than not, though those forms of relief are narrower and do not offer the same benefits as asylum.

That legal structure does not automatically prevent all forms of transnational repression, but it does express a basic principle: the United States offers shelter because persecution on political grounds is unacceptable. When a foreign military court sentences a U.S.-based exile in absentia for political speech, that act collides directly with the underlying rationale of America’s refugee and asylum system. It tests whether the United States will treat refuge as a meaningful commitment rather than a purely domestic immigration status. This is why the Maalouf matter should be understood not as an eccentric foreign court ruling but as a challenge to the practical value of American protection for politically vulnerable people.

The inconsistency revealed by the Hamdi and Maalouf cases is therefore straightforward. In one instance, the United States has publicly committed to deter and punish the wrongful detention of its nationals abroad. In the other, U.S. law and policy recognize the need to protect individuals present in the United States from persecution tied to political opinion. Yet the public record in both matters suggests a restrained, low-visibility response rather than a forceful defense of either principle. This is the core thesis of the essay and the strongest basis for criticism: America’s declared protective doctrines are outpacing its willingness to operationalize them.

That gap matters because deterrence depends less on rhetoric than on observable consequences. If foreign governments conclude that Washington will reserve its strongest measures only for especially famous cases or for detentions by adversaries of the highest strategic salience, then the formal policy will not alter their behavior. Selective enforcement reduces the preventive value of the policy itself. Smaller states, fragile democracies, and hybrid regimes are often precisely the governments most likely to test the limits of U.S. resolve when they believe geopolitical considerations will mute the American response. The result is not only weaker deterrence but a broader invitation to use courts, detention, and in absentia proceedings as instruments of political intimidation.

There is also a normative cost. The United States regularly asks other governments to respect due process, free expression, and judicial independence. Those appeals carry greater force when Washington is willing to defend them in messy, politically inconvenient cases involving partners or countries that still maintain diplomatic relationships with the United States. When the response is quiet, delayed, or purely procedural, foreign elites may reasonably infer that U.S. principles are negotiable. Over time, that inference damages American credibility not only in human rights advocacy but in broader diplomacy, because commitments that appear selectively enforced are harder to take seriously.

A more serious U.S. response in Hamdi’s case would have begun with an unmistakable public determination that the detention raised wrongful-detention concerns under the Levinson Act framework. That should have been followed by sustained high-level diplomatic pressure, repeated public messaging, close coordination with Congress, and a transparent explanation of what costs Tunisia might face if the detention was not remedied. If the evidence supported it, the United States could also have considered the newer coercive tools publicized by the White House in 2025, including sanctions-related measures and restrictions linked to a formal wrongful-detention designation. Even if the administration stopped short of a formal designation, a visible escalation ladder would have demonstrated seriousness and helped restore deterrent value.

In Maalouf’s case, a substantive response would not depend on the wrongful-detention framework because she was not reported as a U.S. national. It would instead rest on a combination of diplomatic protest, public defense of freedom of expression, and a clear rejection of efforts by foreign military courts to criminalize the speech of U.S.-based exiles and refugees. Washington could also have used the case to articulate a broader policy against transnational repression, making clear that foreign governments may not exploit legal proceedings to intimidate dissidents who reside under U.S. protection. Such a response would have served not only Maalouf’s personal interests but the integrity of the American asylum and refuge system itself.

Such steps would not guarantee release in one case or reversal in the other. But foreign policy credibility is shaped as much by visible effort as by final outcomes. A government that says it will protect Americans and the persecuted must be seen trying with urgency and consistency, especially when the abuse is tied to political dissent. This is why the issue should matter even to observers who disagree on the personalities involved or on the wider politics of Tunisia and Lebanon. The principle at stake is whether legal coercion directed at an American citizen or a U.S.-based political exile will carry meaningful diplomatic consequences.

These cases should be understood not as isolated humanitarian episodes but as part of a larger contest over whether legal systems can be weaponized to suppress dissidents across borders. Wrongful detention, politicized prosecutions, in absentia convictions, and military-court proceedings are different legal instruments, but they often serve the same political end: punishing critics while preserving a thin appearance of legality. That is precisely why U.S. policy must connect citizen protection, anti-hostage diplomacy, and anti-transnational-repression measures into a coherent doctrine. Without that coherence, individual cases will continue to be handled in ad hoc fashion, and foreign governments will continue to infer that the United States distinguishes between principles it proclaims and principles it is prepared to defend.

For Tunisia, the lesson is that democratic backsliding should not be insulated from consequences merely because the country occupies a complicated place in regional diplomacy. For Lebanon, the lesson is that the use of military courts and politicized legal proceedings against critics of Hezbollah should carry diplomatic repercussions, especially when those critics reside in the United States. For Washington, the larger lesson is that credibility erodes when policy instruments are advertised broadly but deployed sparingly. These are not marginal concerns. They go to the heart of whether the United States still intends to match legal principle with strategic action.

The cases of Olfa Hamdi and Maria Maalouf are linked by more than timing or geography. They reveal a structural contradiction in American statecraft: the United States increasingly speaks the language of protection, accountability, and opposition to politically motivated repression, yet too often responds cautiously when called upon to defend those principles in practice. Hamdi’s detention tests whether Washington will vigorously protect its own citizens abroad, while Maalouf’s sentence tests whether refuge in the United States comes with meaningful resistance to foreign political persecution. If the United States wants its warnings about wrongful detention and political persecution to be taken seriously, it must act as though credibility is itself a strategic asset. That requires more than quiet diplomacy and general concern. It requires a visible willingness to impose costs, defend dissidents, and demonstrate that America’s legal and moral commitments are not merely aspirational slogans but operational principles.

Eli M. Gold is the President of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC based think-and-do tank

Paving the Pathways to 218

U.S. House seat map — decisive seats on the path to a 218-seat majority

A top-down look at the 23 decisive seats and where I have them ordered for a majority

Four weeks ago, I recapped my 203 to 187 Republican advantage over 390 “safe” seats, and put my assessment on the 22 seats I call leaners.

I am weighing a couple shifts between safe/leaner categories, but my combined assessment would still come out to 209 to 203 favoring the Republican Party before sorting decisive seats. Again, for the ratings system:

Safe: Seat unlikely to be competitive, normally with margins greater than 10 points in 2024.

Leaner: Competitive seat in which various fundamentals (such as a GOP-president midterm instead of a Democrat-president midterm) suggest the likely winner, although an upset could change things.

Decisive: In most cases, tight margins expected. Seats expected to align with the majority winner arranged near the tipping point. In other cases, seats like AK-AL (Alaska At-Large) are part of a decisive GOP hand, but not necessarily a decisive Democrat hand.

Seat Rankings

I have divided the remaining 23 seats, all decisive, into three camps. They are evaluated from a Republican lens, and are ranked as bullish, neutral, or bearish:

Bullish – Seats I evaluate to have a strong chance of going Republican in November based on incumbency, previous margin, candidate quality, voter registration/trend, and quality of election laws.

Neutral – Somewhere in between bullish and bearish, with outcomes largely uncertain.

Bearish – Seats I think are likely to be lost, particularly given 2026’s positioning as a GOP-president midterm. These seats, in most cases, have terrible election laws or have found their Republicans barely holding on in much better electoral climates.

Author’s Note: The following sections do not contain final predictions. Seat colors reflect the current incumbent party, and should not be interpreted as a predicted winner.

Bearish Seats

The good news: 5 of 7 Republican-held seats in the bearish category have an incumbent.

The bad news: With the exception of Nebraska, these states have some of the worst elections anywhere in America. Ballots will be counted in California and Washington for weeks – even into December.

CA-22: David Valadao is an incumbent Republican looking to hold on in a newly redrawn district in central California. Democrats took 59.3% of the primary vote. This is a very unlikely GOP hold and could arguably be listed as a Democrat leaner.

CA-48: Jim Desmond is the newly selected GOP nominee for this redrawn seat in Southern California. This will likely be the most competitive seat in California, and Democrats took 54.9% of the primary vote combined.

CO-8: Gabe Evans is seeking a second term as GOP incumbent. He upset his Democrat opponent in 2024 on the back of a massive Trump surge with Latinos in this district that spans three counties north of Denver. Colorado is a Universal Mail-In Voting state and a very slight shift back to the left, in line with voter registration, will flip this seat.

NE-2: Brinker Harding is replacing long-time GOP incumbent Don Bacon in a district Bacon barely held, even in good years. I am getting KS-3 vibes here in an increasingly slippery urban area that was redrawn recently, but not enough.

PA-7: First-term GOP incumbent Ryan Mackenzie defends against Bob Brooks. Mackenzie knocked out an incumbent by 1.0% in 2024 alongside a Trump statewide win. A Josh Shapiro imminent reelection blowout on the back of a serious mail collection campaign is a serious threat to this seat.

PA-10: Scott Perry ranks as one of the most endangered GOP reps in the country. Somehow he managed to nearly squander a comfortable 2022 victory and win his seat by just 1.2% in 2024, alongside Trump’s statewide win (how?). This is an area that has been shifting left by registration, so it seems like a long shot to me and the most likely Democrat flip in the Keystone State.

VA-2: GOP incumbent Jen Kiggans takes on Elaine Luria in a rematch. A flip of the coin from where I stand, perhaps with a little tailwind thanks to the redistricting referendum pissing everyone off. I don’t like the trend of Virginia Beach or the election laws.

WA-3: Polling looks bad for Democrat incumbent Marie Gluesenkamp Perez because she’s not far enough to the left, but if you know Washington State, you’re taking any good GOP polls with a grain of salt. She has a tough GOP opponent in Senate Minority Leader John Braun, but has the mail-in ballot collection apparatus that kept Joe Kent at bay working for her in a Democrat-favorable year.

Neutral Seats

The good news: 7 of 8 seats have a Republican incumbent running for re-election.

The bad news: 5 of the 8 are in some of the hottest political battlegrounds over recent presidential cycles, 2 are in blue states with loose election laws, and one more (IA-1) barely stayed red despite a Trump landslide in 2024.

AZ-1: Jay Feely won the nomination for the GOP last night to replace David Schweikert, who ditched the seat so he could get driven into the pavement by Andy Biggs in the gubernatorial race. I’m not a big Feely fan despite Trump’s endorsement, but he may have the popular appeal to keep a tough seat red against Amish Shah, who is making his second consecutive attempt at the seat.

AZ-6: One of the truest coin flips in America with Juan Ciscomani looking for a third term. Ciscomani has a tough electorate in Pima County that lists itself as (R) but votes in an increasingly leftward fashion. He’s up against the latest Democrat girl boss, JoAnna Mendoza, who is talking tough as a retired Marine.

IA-1: Scott Perry redux, as incumbent Republican Mariannette Miller-Meeks takes on Christina Bohannan for the third straight time. Miller-Meeks won easily in 2022 before winning by 0.2% in 2024 despite Trump destroying Ann Selzer’s career in the Hawkeye State. This one could arguably be in the bearish category, and would be if not for Iowa’s great election laws preventing an eternal count.

MI-7: Just a rough patch of precincts here for Tom Barrett, the Republican who took over Elissa Slotkin’s seat in 2024 alongside Donald Trump’s statewide win. It’s red as far as the eye can see until you get to Lansing, straddling three counties. That is enough to put the Democrats in business, and they’re probably going to have another spook (Bridget Brink) as nominee to hoodwink voters. I’m looking at a 2-point race either way.

NJ-7: Tom Kean (R) won this seat by 5.4% in 2024 with Trump having a massive overperformance in the Garden State. He’s up against Democrat Rebecca Bennett as the state was just exposed yesterday for having 6,600 non-citizens on the rolls. I think this is going to be a close one, with perhaps a slight Democrat edge.

NY-17: Another blue state brawl here with Michael Lawler (R) up against Cait Conley. Lawler won by 6.3% in 2024 alongside a relatively strong Trump performance in the Empire State. He’s seen as one of the more liberal Republicans, but in New York, that may save his campaign. This is a 50/50 coin toss.

PA-8: Widely considered the best opportunity for Republicans to hold one of my decisive seats. Rob Bresnahan had a better margin than Mackenzie in 2024 and has most of the key endorsements in his district, nestled in northeastern Pennsylvania. To make things better, a legitimate Green Party spoiler just jumped in:

“PA CD-8. Bad news for the Dems. Shop owner & ’24 US Sen nom Leila Hazou (Green) jumps into race vs US Rep Rob Bresnahan (R) & Scranton Mayor Paige Cognetti (D). This race is a top Dem target.” — Politics1.com (@Politics1com), Jul 19, 2026

WI-3: Derrick Van Orden is defending a very large map with a tough mid-sized city electorate. He’s up against Rebecca Cooke, who he defeated in 2024 while running several points behind Trump’s margin (+6.9%) in the district. Incumbency is Van Orden’s biggest strength, but Democrats have shown a lot of skill in their mail collection game recently, especially if turnout is low. Probably a 60/40 Democrat edge.

Bullish Seats

AK-AL: A very likely Republican win, with Nick Begich running for reelection. It appears in decisive because of a tight margin in 2024, and the urgent need for the GOP to hold it. Mary Peltola, the Democrats’ only real candidate statewide, is running for the Senate and is no threat to retake this seat, which she held thanks to Ranked Choice Voting.

FL-25: Florida’s trend is too much to ignore here, and this district is newly redrawn on the outskirts of Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach (very tall and skinny). Democrat Congressman Jared Moskowitz moved over to this race and does not yet have a GOP opponent (awaiting primary). Comfortable Trump margin in 2024, but likely much tighter in a midterm. Slight edge to the GOP and held under great election laws.

IA-3: Zach Nunn has a much better trajectory than Miller-Meeks. He expanded his margin from 2022 to 2024 in a Trump +4.3% district, running slightly behind the president at +3.9%. With a left-drift expected in 2026, he doesn’t have a high ceiling and will need to do well in suburban Des Moines (and Dallas County) against Sarah Trone Garriott, who has a strong reputation as an aggressive campaigner.

ME-2: Similar level of confidence as Alaska-At Large. Former governor Paul LePage should flip this seat for the GOP, especially now that incumbent blue dog Jared Golden is out of the way. Maine runs terrible elections, but I don’t think LePage can be stopped. Still, it’s a must have for the GOP to maintain its majority. For reference, this is the district in Maine that Trump won for a separate electoral vote in all three of his runs.

MI-10: After two terms, John James vacated this seat (Macomb and Oakland Counties) to run for governor. It is a district with a serious Trump trend, which the president carried by +6.5% in 2024. What makes me bullish on this seat is the fact that the Democrats have a terrible field to pick from, and the Oakland County Sheriff’s son, Michael Bouchard, is the likely GOP nominee. It is undoubtedly a stronger seat than MI-7, which is in my neutral grouping.

OH-9: This could (and should) finally be the political end of Marcy Kaptur (D), who first sat in Congress in 1983 – before I was born. The Ohio GOP made a back room deal on their new maps, making OH-9 a likely GOP flip, slightly reddening OH-1, and giving the Democrats more blue turf in OH-13 (which will save them there). Derek Merrin is the GOP nominee for this seat, which covers the northwest/Toledo in a state with strong election laws.

TX-34: Vicente Gonzalez (D) knows the heat is on, which is why he’s become a social conservative with his voting record. The new Texas maps are good for a pickup of three seats and make, Henry Cuellar’s TX-28 playable in the future (likely not this year), while TX-34 is a tossup. Eric Flores is the GOP nominee in this newly drawn district, running from Cameron County (Brownsville) up to Nueces County (cutting out core Corpus Christi).

Summary

I have the GOP at 209 seats after safe and leaner categories are considered. AK-AL and ME-2 are two layups out of the decisive seats, making the GOP floor a likely 211 seats.

Sweeping the 7 bullish seats would have Republicans at 216 seats, needing just two seats out of the tough neutral and bearish categories, which feature 13 GOP incumbents. I do not agree with assessments showing a blue wave thanks to the newly drawn districts, and maintain that the majority winner will have between 218 and 223 seats.

The GOP maximum is 232 seats, if they sweep every decisive seat and don’t squander any leaners. The Democrat maximum is 226 seats, based on the same criteria.

Seth Keshel, MBA is a Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.

Let the MSM Hedging Begin on the 2026 Midterms

Let the MSM Hedging Begin on the 2026 Midterms

Media slowly adjust expectations and point viewers right where I’ve pointed them for over a year

I’d like to open the week with a little bit of a “humblebrag.” On Friday afternoon, I received a package from the White House. Inside I found a copy of my book, The American War on Election Corruption, signed by President Trump along with a wonderful letter.

I had dropped the copy off with one of the President’s aides after I saw him (President Trump) in Florida in May, and I’m very pleased to have received it back with such a nice note that will be passed down someday to my children.

Since the President’s address on election interference Thursday, that book has surged again.

I didn’t step up for accolades or recognition, however. I jumped into the fray in 2020 because I knew our elections were in a state of despair significant enough to jeopardize our entire national future. I have continued to wield a heavy hammer on elections in the years since, and still get flak from the corruption enablers in the media. Democracy Docket has a particular axe to grind with me:

“All hell is going to break loose with the president’s address Thursday on election interference,” Seth Keshel, a leading anti-voting activist, wrote on social media. “It will compel action and make the pressure to pass the SAVE America Act overwhelming and will mandate change at the highest levels,” Keshel added.

If Marc Elias still thinks I’m worth crapping on, I suppose there’s still gas left in my tank for decrying electile dysfunction, and I remain a worthy adversary of those who wish to subjugate us through the corruption of the voting process. I have remained on point, rarely straying from what I know best. Because we suffered under the rule of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., for four years and are currently swimming upstream against the Murkowskis of the world and never-ending Democrat lawfare, the repairs to our electoral system are taking a long time; long enough, in fact, that the most critical ones are at risk of not happening under the Trump 47 administration.

This means that all of my electoral assessments are made with the corruption of elections accounted for. Remember, the laws of the various states dictate what types of ballot counts and, by extension, candidate performances are possible. I can feel good about Iowa with its strong voting laws in the same election cycle I feel bad about Washington, with its ballot collection free-for-all that is certain to impact the WA-3 decisive seat the GOP candidate is polling well in.

I’ve been directing traffic on the 2026 midterms since the infant days of the Trump 47 administration, which terrifyingly is already three-eighths of the way to completion. Believe it or not, I am already taking on questions regarding the next two election cycles. I have come to realize that election season is an enduring thing that never really ends, kind of like how the NFL season proliferates itself through the calendar in unique ways.

I’ve had to make some changes to the electoral math because of the various redistricting changes impacting 10 states:

AL, CA, FL, LA, MO, NC, OH, TN, TX, UT

My assessment for those, cumulatively, goes as follows:

+12 GOP
+5 DEM
3 toss-ups

That makes +7 net for the GOP, pending the outcomes of CA-48, FL-25, and TX-34. It’s safe to say, thanks to the scrapping of the Virginia quasi referendum, that the GOP won the redistricting war – but we all know legislatures in Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina didn’t go far enough or we’d probably already have this year’s race in the bag.

On that note, the winds are blowing early. Normally we don’t get hedging until after Labor Day. I’m referring to the period in which media blowhards come up with something like, “It looks like voters are coming home and sticking with the GOP after all, and perhaps Wyoming isn’t due for a blue tidal wave after all.”

“Because of Redistricting, analysts estimate that Democrats need to win by 3 to 4 points to gain a majority in the House. Per WSJ. 2026 Generic congressional ballot — Democrats: 48%, Republicans: 45% (Washington Post/Ipsos poll, 7/9-7/13).” — OSZ (@OpenSourceZone), July 18, 2026

MSM reporters are starting to follow suit as the so-called “generic ballot” tightens:

“Right now, the most likely outcome for Democrats would be winning anywhere between 214 and 228 seats. In roughly three-quarters of those scenarios, they would have a majority in the House.” — @ercovey (linking Cook Political Report: ‘Democrats Remain Narrowly Favored for the House; CPR Moves Six Races in Their Favor’) — Chris Cillizza (@ChrisCillizza), July 16, 2026

Right now, the generic ballot sits at D+4.7% (meaning Democrats turn out at a rate 4.7% greater than Republicans). However, factoring in just the last six polls, all within four points, we see D+3.0%. Like our presidential races, Democrats being packed into blowout districts requires them to find the widespread appeal they lack in order to win the decisive seats. We have never held a midterm under the current boundaries in what is the most tightly gerrymandered national map ever produced, so no one really has any idea how big the Democrats would need to win the House popular vote to pull a bare majority (218 seats). Most people, like Cillizza above, are thinking 3-4 points at minimum. Makes a lot of sense when you look at the reality of it all.

My safe forecast (seats highly unlikely to be competitive) calls for 203 Republican seats and 187 Democrat seats, which accounts for 390 of 435 seats. I can then “lean” 22 more seats I have a feel for (but in which an upset could potentially happen), and I wind up with 209 Republican to 203 Democrat.

The problem with the broad brush analysts, or pure propagandists, is that they don’t get granular with the analysis. They take a generic ballot and try to apply it to maps that have seats cut so much to favor one party and try to make it work – like sticking a CD into a VCR. Folks, it doesn’t matter if the generic ballot turned out to be D+10.0% or if gas wound up at $9 per gallon in November – Georgia is going to produce 9 GOP seats and 5 Democrat seats.

My forecast informs me that Democrats, presumably at 203 seats (to the GOP’s 209 seats) before addressing the 23 decisive seats, have an absolute cap of 226 seats (203 + all 23 decisive). Looking at which seats I have listed as decisive seats, I can assure you they won’t win all of them (AK-AL and ME-2 are daunting tasks), meaning their likely ceiling is in the low 220s already. The GOP, at a likely 209 after leaners, has a higher potential ceiling, maxing out at 232 seats if they won every decisive seat – which they almost certainly wont.

So, the stars are aligning like this:

Democrat ceiling of 226 seats, floor of 203.
Republican ceiling of 232 seats, floor of 209.
Neither party has a high ceiling or low floor.

I feel confident that the winner of the House majority will hold between 218 and 223 seats, barring a major change in forecast or world conditions between now and Election Day (election season is here in less than two months thanks to mail-in ballot nonsense). Because the GOP has a higher ceiling, the pressure is on the Democrats. Every day, more bad news:

“PA CD-8. Bad news for the Dems. Shop owner & ’24 US Sen nom Leila Hazou (Green) jumps into race vs US Rep Rob Bresnahan (R) & Scranton Mayor Paige Cognetti (D). This race is a top Dem target.” — Politics1 (@Politics1com), July 19, 2026

Most folks were already thinking Rob Bresnahan in PA-8 has the best chance to hold one of the three decisive seats in the Keystone State (with PA-7 and PA-10 being the other two). A Green candidate is only going to harm the Democrats, who will have the benefit of a Josh Shapiro reelection blowout as a tailwind. Then we have articles like this:

“Gov. Katie Hobbs is considered the most vulnerable Democratic incumbent in a swing state that’s been on the 2020 election denier frontlines for years.” (USA TODAY: ‘Trump ally seeks makeover ahead of critical Arizona governor’s race’) — USA TODAY (@USATODAY), July 19, 2026

After months of phony polling, now we have Andy Biggs about to win a huge primary victory tomorrow and start on the warpath to dethrone the “veto queen” of Arizona, Katie Hobbs. Hobbs has wasted substantial money already, and now her race isn’t the slam dunk it’s been made out to be. All of this leads me to one conclusion:

This is a rare midterm opportunity for the President’s party to make gains, and that can only be done if we get serious about micro-targeting the races that can be won. I have been mapping precincts and districts for these decisive seats, and also for separate counties. If you want to sponsor that work for your campaigns locally, contact me at skeshel@protonmail.com.

The new media – the ones that get it right – are the ones with a consistent track record of being right. Hopefully the media hedging happening right now gives you confidence that you are subscribing to someone who “gets it.” Thank you for all of your support; now let’s go take some scalps.

Seth Keshel, MBA is a Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.

Tough Love on the Declass

Tough Love on the Declass

It only matters what happens moving forward.

I live in two universes most of the time. This is the curse of “knowing too much.” Now that President Trump’s address has wrapped, I am in the clear to tell you I knew what was coming down the pike beforehand. I was part of a small group given access to this information in order to help shape the information space.

All five points of the speech unfolded exactly as we were told they would. Here they are:

  • Proof of foreign tampering within election infrastructure (primarily China, but other nations included) dating back to 2018 and impacting the 2020 presidential election
  • Intelligence community concealed the breach(es) from President Trump’s first administration
  • Proof that electronic voting systems can be manipulated, Venezuela named
  • Identification of registration fraud, focused on Michigan, occurring in the 2020 election (also concealed for years)
  • Proof of non-citizens on voter rolls (over 278,000 in a small sliver)

I wrote in Wednesday’s article that I expected the address to fall within four categories (including within multiple categories):

  • A total “nothingburger”
  • Announcement of emergency measures
  • Pressure for the SAVE America Act
  • Decimation of all 2020 (and associated) media narratives

Now, with the address behind us, here is my evaluation and diagnosis:

So far, I’d grade it a C.

Dead average. The good news here is that the test may take place in multiple parts, thereby affording opportunity for higher marks. When I say I straddle two universes, I would explain that in these two ways:

  • Election integrity minds are underwhelmed and asking “Great, but now what?”
  • “Normies” are thrilled and in awe of the new revelations

Take a look around the online space. To me, there is no consolation in having people say, “You were right!” I’ve known for almost six years that the 2020 presidential election was rigged in a way that would make Boss Tweed blush, and gave enough proof in The American War on Election Corruption that the media won’t touch it. It’s been obvious to me as long as I’ve been a watchman on the wall.

Yet there are people ranting and raving about the declassification (in a good way). Brian Cates is one who never takes his eye off the ball, and he’s been positive. Just now, as I write today’s article, here is Cleta Mitchell with some positive news:

“@SecMullinDHS will host a press conference today at 11 am EST to outline mitigation measures DHS is legally obligated to commence following the speech last night by @realDonaldTrump detailing the threats and vulnerabilities to America’s election system. That is required by…” — Cleta Mitchell (@CletaMitchell), July 17, 2026

That would satisfy “emergency measures,” the second bullet listed above for courses of action.

Summary of Facts

The announcement is not a “nothingburger.” Far from it. While it confirmed what a lot of people familiar with the elections crisis in America already knew or suspected, it’s important that it is recognized at the highest levels of government.

We did not get “emergency measures” announced from the President like we wanted. How this pans out rests on the subordinate agencies in the coming days and weeks. Grade to be determined.

The SAVE America Act was harped on with tremendous effort. I think we are well past the point of “calling our Senators” to get this across. They know it must be passed yet keep finding every excuse. This seems like a “box check” from President Trump.

Indeed, the official government narrative now records massive vulnerabilities and opportunities to rig our elections. We have reached terminal velocity now with how many minds can change on the issue, meaning only one thing.

The time to act is RIGHT NOW.

There must be accountability for those who have jeopardized our elections and those who concealed knowledge of the vulnerabilities from the President. We cannot simply continue to “expose” every issue. We know, and the hour is late. Let it be known I am not jumping the gun and throwing in the towel; how the address of July 16, 2026, will be remembered falls directly on the steps directly taken by those with the emergency authority to act to craft an entirely new system that eliminates opportunities to defraud the electorate, and what efforts are taken by the Senate and state legislatures to create a voting system that cuts down on mail and registration fraud.

So far, the address gets a C. It was a necessary box-check for the normies and to establish the new standard. It did not go far enough, in my opinion, in using the power of the executive with a mandate for change in proposing and implementing necessary changes in light of massive cheating covering many vectors of corruption.

But that may change beginning today, and so might the grade. The election corruption is fully exposed. The next phase of action must now occur in short order.

Seth Keshel, MBA is a Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy and a retired Army Captain. He publishes Captain K’s Corner on Substack.

Budgets, National Priorities and the Radicalism

(This article was written by Peter Huessy and appeared in the RealClearDefense. Budgets, National Priorities and the Radicalism)

In the last year, the country has seen the election and nomination of candidates who are Democratic Socialists of America. These include the Mayor of New York and Seattle, but most importantly a number of Senate candidates in Maine and Michigan. Some of the candidate views are controversial.

But former New York Mayor Bill DeBlasio says don’t worry about the often looney views held by some. They will not have sufficient support from Senate democratic colleagues to even get a vote on the Senate floor let along get a bill to the desk of the current President. Getting rid of prisons, the police and the border patrol, or seizing private property are not serious ideas (although being proposed) but most importantly says DeBlasio it’s not what people voted for.

DeBlasio tells Sean Hannity that people did vote for abolishing deportations, having universal government run health care and free college education, while eliminating carbon and greenhouse gases from energy production.

And such ideas are not new and have been pushed by the democratic party for many years.

For example, Medicare for all was first introduced in the House in 1993. And most Americans embrace Medicare for 65 million Americans, most of them over 65.

Free college education also sounds enticing given the multiple stories of graduating students carrying with them debt of $100,000 or more.

Open borders ideas are not new. We had that from 2021-4, and anywhere from 12-20 million illegal, unvetted migrants came to America. These people were welcomed by an administration seemingly unconcerned with the health, safety, security and economic impact of such a mass influx of unknown people into the country, often justifying such a strategy with a glib “we need more workers” while repeatedly assuring Congress and the country “the border is secure.”

And a carbon free energy world was first proposed in 1977 by Italian scientist Ceasar Marchetti.

What is surprising is the lack of a serious look at the U.S. federal budget impacts of such proposals.

Let’s begin by looking at some numbers.

Medicare costs $1.1 trillion yet Medicare premiums are only $440 billion annually. To support 350 million Americans would be costly. The average non-Medicare recipient uses $9000 in medical care compared to an average of $15,000 for a Medicare recipient. Since FY2014, Medicaid has risen 41% in costs and costs $894 billion in federal and state support, especially since the program was expanded to include all low-income adults. To cover all Americans under Medicare implies an annual additional cost of $2.6 trillion plus those currently under Medicare or $3.7 trillion. However, all annual health insurance premiums for government and private sector programs comes to $1.1 trillion so “Medicare for all” would send a new tax bill to all 166 million working Americans of $22,300 each, compared to the average Medicare tax of $6,600 now paid. The current Federal government is spending at a $7.1 trillion annual pace, so Medicare for all jacks that up to $9.7 trillion.

But there is more. Current U.S. government “college” outstanding loans are $1.9 trillion, which gives one an idea of what “free college education” would cost. This is not an annual cost but the U.S. government currently spends $126 billion each year even after the reforms implemented starting in 2025. To pay the current outstanding loans would require each of the 166 million working Americans to shell out another $11,400 each. So federal spending goes up to $11.6 trillion.

No internal U.S. deportations, the latter the idea of Senator Mark Warner, ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, would at least cost the U.S. $350 billion a year. Warner says once you get by the border patrol or get a visa to come to America, you are home free, working off the books, receiving universal health care and free education. So that costs very working American another $2200 a year. That puts Federal spending at $11.950 trillion.

Finally, estimates for the cost of eliminating carbon from energy production, now at 41 billion tons a year out of 61 billion tons of greenhouse gases, vary but on average would be $6 trillion a year. Given the U.S. produces 16% of energy worldwide, the U.S. would implicitly be required to spend some $960 billion a year to meet the goals of the Paris “climate accords.” However, as former Secretary of State Kerry has acknowledged, China and India produce together 5.8 billion tons of coal, or 70% of all coal worldwide. And India and China together are constructing 95% of all new coal based energy production worldwide. Given these policies, the greenhouse gas (GHG) and carbon reduction goals cannot be met. So Federal spending is now estimated to be $12.910 trillion.

So, the Mamdani wing of the Democratic party would have the Federal government annually spend an extra $2.6 trillion for health care; $126 billion for free college; another $350 billion as a consequence of no deportations; and another $960 billion for no carbon energy, or a grand total of $4.036 trillion annually to meet just the top four socialist party objectives. And push overall annual U.S. government spending to $11 trillion.

The revenue required would be eighty percent of the current $5.3 trillion now collected by the Federal government.

All 166 million working Americans would each see their tax burden jump $24,300.

If you stole the entire $9 trillion wealth of every billionaire in America, they could pay the added bill for 2 years.

Apart from doubling the Federal tax burden of every working American, the only offsetting budget cuts proposed have been defense cuts especially nuclear deterrent cuts. Senators Sanders, Warren and Markey, and Representatives Khanna and Garamendi support unilaterally cutting our nuclear deterrent from 400 to 150 ICBMs, from 60 to zero strategic bombers, and from 12 to 4 submarines, reducing U.S. nuclear capability from 640 to 214 ICBMs and SLBMs and from 1550 warheads to 400. The savings would be minor as the cost of making our strategic bombers nuclear capability is 3%. Currently we only produce one SSBN annually so budget cuts would be in the outyears as they would be for the new Sentinel missile. Reducing Minuteman from 400 to 150 could implicitly eliminate two operating ICBM bases and overtime save annually some hundreds of millions and overall, no more than $1.3 billion annually, (as previous assessments often show base closings do not provide immediate cost savings but only in the very long run.)

True, Sentinel, Columbia and an upgraded D-5 will cost some $325 billion. But the proposed cuts will save funds only in the outyears when production will end. The savings of roughly $200 billion over some 20 years or $10 billion a year have to compared to $4 trillion in additional annual costs which are some 40-fold greater.

Spend $4 trillion more and save $10 billion makes no sense. It doesn’t matter what you call these ideas–socialist, communist, democratic socialist, or progressive. To repeat, the spending doesn’t make sense. And the budget cuts harm our national security and begin a process of disarmament.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington D.C. based foreign policy and defense think tank.