The Failures of the Intelligence Agencies and the Secret Service Preparing for 2025 Post-election Protests and Beyond

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of the ever-increasing Presidential campaign rhetoric from both the Democrats and the Republicans since the 2020 election, disturbing narratives have focused, fairly or unfairly, on the outcome and results of the 2024 Presidential election. The Republicans continue to be riled for numerous reasons—citing unfair MAGA characterizations, the vilification of anyone who attended the January 6, 2021 protests, the unfettered immigration of millions of unvetted multi-national migrants, inflation, lawlessness, escalating war(s) in the Middle East and numerous, disturbing examples of a two-tiered justice system targeting former President Trump and many of his former staff. The Democrats have been ignoring these claims or minimizing their effects stating these issues are being exaggerated for political purposes. Instead, the White House and their minions defaulted to women’s abortion rights, healthcare benefits, DEI ideology, defunding the police, supporting Palestinian sympathizers’ rights and “saving democracy.” The Democrats have continually defaulted to blaming Trump for “inciting” the violent protests at the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and an exponential array of problems plaguing America. These divergent positions have sparked outrage since then on both sides. As a result, the lead up to the 2024 election was contentious and the Trump win has law enforcement circles concerned that post-election events have the potential to be contentious and disruptive.[1] [2]

This article, written before the election, is being updated as of January 6, 2025 in light of the convincing Trump Presidential win and his Cabinet and officials’ selections. Ranking Democrats, donors, governors and mayors in many blue states have begun to launch concerted offensives to thwart the Trump agenda as much as possible as outlined in The New York Times:

The panels range from sweeping subjects — “Making Meaning and Meeting the Moment: Resistance and Reorienting” and “It’s Time to Resist: The Fight Against Project 2025” — to more focused discussions about abortion rights, immigration, racial justice, taxes, countering disinformation and other issues, according to a draft agenda.[3]

Several of Trump’s cabinet nominees and other White House team picks have already been targeted with bomb threats and “swatting.”[4] These efforts to disrupt the transition to the Trump administration has the potential to inflame supporters from both sides.

Prior to the election politically charged bi-partisan rhetoric fostered a remarkable awakening in the populus of the country. Given this and the convincing Trump win, the stage was/is seemingly set for potential unrest prior to the Inauguration of President-elect Trump on January 20, 2025. There were and are numerous overlapping concerns that contribute to this. Key among them are the intelligence agencies’ warnings that foreign enemy states, i.e. Russia, China and Iran are planning to wreak post-election havoc. The Trump campaign and Harris campaign had reported hacks and disruptions into its servers. Iran openly revealed assassination plots targeting Trump. As of November 8, 2024, the FBI had confirmed Iran was planning a Trump assassination with two suspects arrested in the U.S. and one other identified in Iran.[5] Adding to this disturbing threat information, intelligence and public media reporting indicates current enemy states: China, Russia and North Korea are partnering with the professed unifying goal of undermining the U.S. election process. Further, intelligence agencies have shared concerns these enemy states pose collective threats to the U.S. and in “multiple parts in the world simultaneously.”[6] Alarmingly, FBI Director Wray has acknowledged a dangerous influx of more than 100 known terrorists and thousands of dangerous criminals across the southern and northern borders, but admits their whereabouts are unknown.

Notably numerous congressional hearings, Inspectors General reports and media reports confirm the Department of Justice (DOJ), the intelligence agencies—especially the FBI, have failed to fulfill their respective missions. This includes misrepresenting the COVID origins, implementing a two-tired justice system targeting Trump and associated conservatives, targeting Right to Life advocates, proposing classifying parents as “domestic terrorists”…all while turning a blind eye to the criminal schemes of President Biden and the Clintons.[7]

In the context of what has transpired before the election and now post-election 2024; three key elements are being addressed accordingly:

1. The benefits of robust integrated security preparation as a deterrent to post election protests prior to the Inauguration;

2. Improving the Secret Service; its performance and future as the nation’s elite protective federal agency;

3. Reforming the deep state leading up to prevent sabotaging the current and future presidents and implementing reforms identified by the several congressional committee investigative and Inspectors General reports.

Factors Contributing to Inauguration Day Protest Concerns and Future Post Election Events

In an effort to provide context to factors that may fuel potential protests and unrest following the election and during the Inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States and beyond, the following, verified background is being set forth. It is important to understand the factors contributing to the ongoing vitriol, particularly from the Democrats pre and post the 2024 election. This includes disparaging political comments made by many former and current Democrat Cabinet level officials, many of their respective staff members, military officials, state and local officials, numerous media outlets and corporate leaders. This unprecedented level of divisive rhetoric, demonization, vilification (based on fabricated claims), has deteriorated to personal assaults and has infected large swaths of the populus. With the abandonment, in some cases, of any serious effort to clarify and fact check claims promulgated from both sides, the partisan division grew to dangerous levels in the country. Even more alarming, these circumstances have signaled opportunities for enemy state regimes to exploit the United States to gain economic advantage and power, especially during the presidential transition. There are innumerable examples of this. Salient among them are the withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Afghanistan, funding Iran with billions of dollars and the disinformation infecting the country’s social media outlets to include information concerning China, Russia and Iran. The resulting divisive political rancor has intensified since 2016 and there is no indication of any let up. All of this points to potentially dangerous unrest in the months to come.

Following the 2016 Donald Trump presidential victory, his 2020 presidential bid and now his second election as the 47th President of the United States, empirical and documented evidence show former President Trump, members of his family, his newly named staff members and other surrogates have been subjected to innumerable political assaults and threats. Historically these included frivolous claims of Russian collusion, accusations of improper collaboration with Ukraine, targeted entrapment investigations against his staff, mainstream media outlets promulgating false and damaging narratives and recruiting 51 intelligence officials to engage in election interference. This includes the fabrication of prosecutions and convictions based on tenuous legal grounds violating due process by the Justice Department—all in an effort to delegitimize the Trump presidency and his 2024 presidential bid.[8] Few media outlets have reported these politically damaging efforts. Many can be traced directly to the leaders and staffs of the Democrat party. They blatantly misrepresented Trump’s 2024 Campaign promises and voiced plans to derail Trump’s transition with a variety of tactics. Enemy states are expected to exploit this misinformation in manipulative ways. Many media outlets have reported ranking democrat efforts to “Trump proof” his administration with last-minute executive orders.[9]

The New Yorker reported Russia and Iran were using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to promulgate “deep fakes” ahead of the election to spread “conspiratorial narratives” and amplifying “divisive U.S. issues to denigrate the election process.[10] Now we can expect this to reimplemented, post-election, to disrupt the transition.

Prior to the decisive Trump re-election ranking Democrats, namely Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability and several senior Democrats in Congress would not commit to certifying the results of the 2024 Presidential election if former President Donald Trump won.[11] [12] [13]

These articles highlight the importance of preparing de-escalation measures to avoid a repeat of the disruption and protests of the January 6, 2021 experience

As of this writing it appears there are plans in the works by leading Democrats to “Trump proof” earlier liberal initiatives and dilute the 2nd Trump administration’s agenda.[14] [15]

The Need for Effective, Integrated Security Planning for the Inauguration and Future Events

Capitalizing on the January 6, 2021 protests/riots, Russia and Iran were considering a repeat in the event of a Trump lost.[16] The National Intelligence Council (NIC) in a memorandum dated October 8, 2024, reports several disruptive scenarios were and are being planned by Russia and Iran with the goal to denigrate the U.S. political process and transfer of power.[17]

There is a documented history of intelligence failures highlighting this concern. If the tepid intelligence provided by the FBI and the DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis (I&A) to Capitol Police Chief Sund and the U.S. Park Police (USPP) prior to January 6, 2021 of planned riots is any indication of what to expect during the Inauguration and beyond, there are legitimate concerns. (The vote certification on January 6, 2025 was conducted without incident). The Capitol Police (USCP), DC Metropolitan Police (DCMP), the USPP, the U.S. Secret Service and the public deserve accurate and complete information from these agencies with respect to anticipated crowd size, crowd composition and planned protests for major events. Scalable security planning requires this. This was not the case prior to January 6, 2021. In fact the January 6, 2021 vote certification was not declared a National Special Security Event (NSSE) by DHS despite the fact the existing intelligence fit the DHS vulnerability rating criteria to declare it. This designation is required when a planned major event is a potential target of terrorism or other criminal activity.[18] Had the Secret Service Protective Intelligence Division (PID) been included in the full disclosure of the existing intelligence regarding anticipated crowd sizes, planned protests and violence for January 6, 2021 they would have made the case to declare the vote certification an NSSE.

Several post January 6, 2021 after-action reviews have documented a myriad of intelligence and planning failures by the FBI, DHS-I&A and the Secret Service leading up to and after the 2021 protests.[19] [20] Worse, indications of disruptive protests by several groups known to the FBI and

I&A with active investigations were not shared with the USCP and other planners. Evidence of alarming social media posts and protest meetings documented in investigations by many FBI field offices were diluted and and/or simply not shared. Reports, studies and testimony of these failures have been drowned out by those that chose to use January 6th as a political tool to dominate the political discussion with a version that appeared to be used to suit a partisan agenda. Two post January 6th reports dated June 27, 2023 and July 10, 2023 document the investigations by U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee cite significant intelligence failures by the FBI and I&A leading up to the January 6, 2021 protest.[21]

Former USCP Chief Sund stated that January 6 was a ‘Cover-Up’ by intelligence officials in power at the time and “they were aware of the attack in advance and covered it up by failing to disseminate the information to those who needed it.”[22] In an interview with Tucker Carlson that never aired, Sund repeated this claim and subsequent congressional investigations corroborated this. In this interview and in his book: Courage Under Fire, Sund explains, with definitive chronological clarity, supported by documents, that he was denied access to the DC National Guard troops for 71 minutes after asking for them at 1 PM on January 6. Sund further stated it took more than three hours after that during an excruciating “approval process” for the District of Columbia National Guard (DCNG) troops to be mobilized. Major General William Walker, commander of the DCNG stated during a Joint hearing he was not given the authorization to deploy them. General Walker stated: “the delay was caused at least in part over concerns of the optics of sending uniformed troops to the scene.” General Walker further testified he received an “unusual” restrictive order to delay a quick troop deployment without the “explicit” approval of of then-Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy.[23] On January 11, 2021, Sund told the Washington Post he disagreed with Nancy Pelosi’s claim that “Additional security could have been provided but no one from the Capitol requested it.” Sund maintains his six separate requests were denied. He also warned federal officials “if they don’t’ get their act together, it will happen again.”[24]

Reports of several requests for intelligence information, prior to January 6, 2021, by Chief Sund are well documented and are confirmed in the following congressional investigative reports. Numerous committee reports outline failures of the FBI and I&A to share intelligence with law enforcement preparing for the January 6, 2021 vote certification. These have been sparsely reported/referenced in media reporting of the January 6th Hearings and Investigations; among them:

· Anna Skinner, Ex-Capitol Police Chief Sounds Alarm That Jan. 6 Was ‘Cover-Up’, NEWSWEEK, (August 6, 2023);

· Alana Wise, DOD Took Hours To Approve National Guard Request During Capitol Riot, Commander Says, NPR, (March 3, 2021);

· Todd Spangler, Peters’ report details failures ahead of Jan. 6 attack, calls for changes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (June 8, 2021);

· HSGAC Majority Staff Report, Chairman Gary Peters, Planned in Plain Sight: A Review of the Intelligence Failures in Advance of January 6th, 2021, (June 2023);

· Committee on House Administration, Chairman Brian Steil, DoD Inspector General Concealed January 6 Evidence,(November 21, 2024); [25]

· DOJ OIG, REP-250-011, “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Handling of Its Confidential Human Sources and Intelligence Collection Efforts in the Lead Up to the January 6, 2021 Electoral Certification” (December 2024).

The key findings are as follows: [26] [27]

  • FBI and I&A received numerous early warnings, tips, and other intelligence about plans for violence on January 6th;
  • FBI produced only two limited raw intelligence documents related to January 6th, both issued the night before the attack, and I&A did not issue any intelligence products specific to January 6th;
  • Despite claims by some agency officials and analysts, FBI and I&A have authority to monitor open-source intelligence, including social media – and agency guidelines require them to report certain online threats; and
  • FBI and I&A failed to follow agency guidelines on the use of open-source intelligence.

A detailed review of all the findings were documented in the Planned In Plain Sight – A Review of the Intelligence Failures in Advance of January 6, 2021.[28] Specifically, this review by the United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs stated:

“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) – obtained multiple tips from numerous sources in the days and weeks leading up to the attack that should have raised alarms. Rather, those agencies failed to fully and accurately assess the severity of the threat identified by that intelligence and formally disseminate guidance to their law enforcement partners with sufficient urgency and alarm to enable those partners to prepare for the violence that ultimately occurred on January 6th. At a fundamental level, the agencies failed to fulfill their mission and connect the public and nonpublic information they received. Internal emails and

documents obtained by the Committee demonstrate the breadth and gravity of the threats these agencies received related to January 6th. For example, FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) received tips and information from multiple sources, including:”

· In December 2020, FBI received a tip that the Proud Boys planned to be in DC and “[t]heir plan is to literally kill people. Please, please take this tip seriously and investigate further.”

· On Jan. 3, 2021, FBI also became aware of multiple posts calling for armed violence, such as a Parler user who stated, “[b]ring food and guns. If they don’t listen to our words, they can feel our lead. Come armed”; plans to “set up ‘armed encampment’ on the[National] Mall”; and a tip about “a TikTok video with someone holding a gun saying, ‘storm the Capitol on January 6th.’”

· On January 4th, DOJ leadership noted multiple concerning posts, including “[c]alls to occupy federal buildings,”discussions of “invading the capitol building,” and individuals “arm[ing] themselves and to engage in political violence at the event.”

In addition, on March 22, 2022, the DHS Office of Inspector General (DHSIG) also noted in its report the I&A had identified viable threats prior to January 6, 2021 but did not issue any intelligence products before the U.S. Capitol breach.

On December 29, 2020, the I&A’s Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) sent a Request for Information (RFI) to the Open-Source Collection Operation for threat information concerning the January 6 events to include:

· Online calls by event organizers to bring weapons to lawful protesters to counter protests;

· An increase in lawful protesters / counter protesters in DC, carrying, brandishing or using lethal weapons, such as firearms or edged weapons;

· Specific, directed threats of violence towards…prominent ideological adversaries or figures associated with an ideological movement; and

· Violent extremists posing a threat to individuals to include law enforcement and government officials holding opposing views prior to scheduled events.

Further, collectors of the sources messaged each other with related concerns but did not issue intelligence reports. In sum, no warnings were issued claiming these threats and other direct threats “did not fit the guidelines.” They were not widely disseminated, until after January 6, 2021.[29]

These and other specific threats were not shared with the USCP despite Chief Sund’s intelligence requests and two (2) intelligence assessment meetings with the FBI and the I&A prior to the January 6, 2021 vote certification and subsequent riots.

These facts were further corroborated by Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector General in his report dated March 4, 2022: I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach. The direct responsibility and culpability of the intelligence agencies, namely the FBI and the I&A, has been conflated and in many cases conspicuously absent from media reporting and investigations to include the January 6th Committee.

The DHSIG in their report evaluating the Secret Service’s preparation and response to the events of January 6, 2021 determined the Secret Service PID prepared two (2) reports indicating the likelihood of violence based on various reports, sources and tips but did not take commensurate protective actions.

The facts cited above added to the concerns about the security planning prior to the 2025 vote certification and the upcoming Inauguration. Many leaders and rank and file members of the USCP, the DCMP, the DCNG, the Republican House and Senate and media outlets expressed this. There are valid reasons for this. It is noted the original DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) Report No. 2022-039, dated November 16, 2021 entitled: “Review of the DoD’s Role, Responsibilities, and Actions to Prepare for and Respond to the Protest and its Aftermath at the U.S. Capitol Campus on January 6, 2021,” was submitted as the final review of the DoD’s actions on January 6, 2021. Due to the numerous investigations, reports and testimony of officials with direct knowledge and roles prior to and during January 6 vote certification, conflicting facts were uncovered.

For these reasons, Barry Loudermilk, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight sent a letter to Inspector General Robert P. Storch, dated November 21, 2024 requesting “a full correction” to the DoD IG’s inaccurate findings and statements regarding the intelligence and security failures on January 6.[30] Numerous, key witnesses, eight (8), were intentionally not interviewed. Subsequent investigations determined their accounts of the DoD’s command responses to urgent requests directly contradicted the DoD IG’s report. Chairman’s Loudermilk’s conclusion: “The inability of the DoD IG to adequately review these and other DoD actions on January 6 has informed the Subcommittee’s finding that DoD IG is complicit in intentionally concealing DoD actions to delay the DCNG’s response to the Capitol on January 6.”

Additionally, recent some media outlets are reporting, due to these and other exacerbating circumstances, law enforcement may not be adequately prepared for the Inauguration on January 20, 2025. Tenuous relationships and the history of selective information sharing between the FBI and the USCP along with the Secret Service has fostered a level of skepticism regarding intelligence gaps. This distrust has further eroded the trust in the intelligence agencies, particularly with the FBI with the release of Senator Grassley’s letter dated December 9, 2024 to FBI Director Wray detailing the extent of FBI’s abuses.[31] In addition, the Secret Service is facing scrutiny due a “loss” relevant emails from January 6, 2021 and continuing into 2024 to include sparse information releases following the two Trump assassination attempts and related missteps. In the wake of the Chairman Kelly’s Final Report by the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump, the ability of the Secret Service to protect Trump and other protectees is being called into question.[32] This is in part being attributed to a lack of reliable intelligence, a lack of competence, lack of requisite funding, lack of training and as whistleblowers contend—partisan pressure from the current administration and DHS to dilute security resources for the Trump detail. Due to these and other facts, the ability of the USCP and the Secret Service to maintain order and security in its preparation for the Inauguration on January 20, 2025 and beyond is a concern and is being questioned.

Moving forward in 2025 the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies are collectively facing a disturbing quandary of mistrust across the board…discriminating fact from disinformation is becoming increasingly challenging as of this writing. The need for integrated, robust and complete operational planning with the USCP, the Secret Service, USPP, DCMP along with the DCNG is a serious concern. Further, the critical and immediate need for the FBI and I&A to be transparent, diligent and forthcoming with ALL relevant intelligence (real time) impacting the Inauguration and future events is mandatory.

These concerns in 2025 are legitimate based on documented facts of poor integration among law enforcement agencies, diluted threat information sharing and attempts to coverup the intentional, delayed responses of DoD resources to the Capitol riots on January 6, 2021. Specifically, the in-depth chronology of the preparations, miscommunications and intentional delays to release DCNG troops, DCMP police officers and crowd suppression resources are well documented in Chief Sund’s book, Courage Under Fire, Under Siege and Outnumbered 58-1 On January 6th. Notably, among other revelations, Sund’s book details “An exposé of critical intelligence and military failures surrounding January 6 and the subsequent attempts to cover them up.”[33]

These critical intelligence sharing omissions and others did not allow the responsible law enforcement authorities, i.e. the USCP and the DCNG to adequately prepare for and rehearse responses to large, unruly crowds that flooded the Capitol grounds and some entering the Capitol building. In view of all the above facts, the appointment of the January 6th Committee by Nancy Pelosi and the integrity of its subsequent investigation has been questioned by many. Steps need to be taken immediately to ensure transparency of all agencies’ official preparations and actions.

What Can be Done Immediately?

In addition to the USCP, Secret Service and FBI, the Senate and the House of Representatives leadership; Leader McConnell, Leader Schumer, Speaker Johnson and Minority Leader Jeffries, the Senate and House Sergeants at Arms and the collective membership need to come forth with the following unified and unequivocal actions and message:

· There will be ZERO TOLERANCE for any disruption during the transfer of power and for any official post-election events ow and in the future.

· This official position needs to be unanimous and declared applicable nationwide;

· Enlist the media outlets to convey this message to the nation;

· Prepare pre-recorded messages for dissemination to the public;

· For the Metropolitan DC area—The DCNG, DC Mayor Muriel Bowser, the DCPD, the Arlington Police Department, and USPP will partner with the USCP and the Secret Service and craft Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and devise an integrated plan(s) based on prior events held on the Mall;

· Establish a clear, chain-of-command communications approval process among the Chief of the USCP, the DCNG and the respective Pentagon leadership to minimize any troop and other responder deployment delays to the Capitol/contiguous areas for crowd control needs;

· Provide dedicated and tested communication links to the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) to facilitate immediate intelligence and incident reporting from all law enforcement sectors, local, state and federal;

· Provide dedicated communication links with the FBI/Behavioral Threat Assessment Center to monitor terrorist threats and Russian, Venezuelan and migrant gang activity; and

· Establish consensus among law enforcement agencies via MOUs for timely information sharing of protest and/or riot planning and critically— response criteria and notifications.

Collectively these recommendations and the following examples underscore the critical need to implement effective integration and transparency during security planning for government sponsored events, especially MOU’s. The January 6 Select Committee proceedings did not include fair, bi-partisan representation. Subcommittee investigations into the committee’s findings and the DoD’s handling of their response to the Capitol riots uncovered evidence that show the following:[34]

· Thousands of hours of video footage taken at the Capitol on January 6th were hidden and some destroyed;

· Several key witnesses were not included or their testimony was not included in the January 6 Committee inquiry.

· “Liz Cheney colluded with “star witness” Cassidy Hutchinson without Hutchison’s lawyer’s knowledge.”

· The DoD intentionally delayed the deployment of DCNG troops when urgently requested;

· The DoD IG intentionally failed to disclose evidence contradicting their false conclusions;

· The actions of the highest senior DoD officials, i.e. Secretary of the Army’s failure to honor the DCNG repeated deployment requests;

· The DCNG were prepared, ready and able to respond with a timely deployment;

· The Secretary of the Army falsely stated to Congressional leadership that he told the sheltering Members of Congress: “We have the greenlight. We are moving” at 3:18PM; and

· The DCNG in fact did not leave the Armory until 1700 (5PM).[35]

The recommendations cited below by Senator Gary Peters need to be institutionalized and implemented now and for future events. [36]

  • Conduct internal after-action reviews on the intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes in the lead-up to January 6th;
  • Improve FBI and I&A policies, guidelines, and procedures for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to partner agencies;
  • Improve inter-agency coordination for significant events and consider designating a lead federal agency; and
  • Responsibly reassert Congressional oversight authorities over the Executive Branch.

The State of the Secret Service – Can it be Saved?

A serious concern that January 6, 2021 brought into focus, and more recently with the two assassination attempts of Trump in July and September of 2024, is the competence of the Secret Service. Directly connected is its relationship with the intelligence agencies and the Biden Administration. Equally troubling is the lack of protective resources, i.e. experienced protective agents, counter-sniper teams, technical security teams, counter-surveillance and intelligence teams and worse—weak leadership—have profoundly hampered the Secret Service mission. In addition, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) policy initiatives, excessive demands to staff 35 protective details (for a variety of government officials), lack of mandated training, diluted hiring practices and very low morale have exacerbated the agency’s problems.

Today’s Secret Service finds itself in the midst of a cauldron of divisive issues that has been boiling in recent years. Given this, it is critical to identify strategies and plans to improve its protective competence and get ahead of any post-election potential unrest with growing domestic and foreign threat levels. This may prove to be a herculean task since successful mitigation is predicated on open and coordinated bipartisan support. This may be a naïve goal given the division in the nation’s populous, even now, post-election. It appears the basis of the contention up to the election and now, despite the clear Trump election victory, was to beat Trump. Now many Democrat leaders are vowing to sabotage the Trump administration’s proposed initiatives. Many Democrat representatives, current and former government officials (and former intelligence officials) have stated this through media outlets. With the upcoming Inauguration of President-elect Trump, these facts need to be addressed now and beyond the Inauguration into the next four years of the Trump administration.

These factors and others continue to affect the effective protective operations of the Secret Service.

Considering these circumstances and alarmingly, two assassination attempts, the identification of Iranian assassination plots coupled with the recent operational failures of the Secret Service to implement basic protective security measures—their mission capability will require profound changes.

Reports continue among the Trump detail security agents, whistleblowers and former President Trump and now President Trump, the FBI has selectively and slowly released assassination plot and other threat information to the Secret Service. This has created distrust between the FBI and the Secret Service. On October 26, 2024, Business & Politics (BPR) reported “the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) admitted to Senator Grassley the DHS has a troubling history of obstruction, which Grassley cited as a “major red flag” for oversight.” Violations of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) are also being reported.[37] Other disturbing whistleblower reports allege “Acting Secret Service Director Rowe ‘blocked’ OIG auditors from reviewing former President Donald Trump’s security protocols.” [38]

Most disturbing, there is evidence of mistrust within the Secret Service ranks. For its mission to survive, the leadership must be overhauled, top to bottom. It will require a thorough assessment to redefine its mission and test its capability in the face of the emerging threats from enemy states. This cannot be accomplished in-house.

Following the Capitol protests in 2020, USCP Chief Sund implemented a pro-active intelligence gathering approach but received no threat intelligence by the FBI, Secret Service, DHS and DCMP. Sund stated “there was no indication that a well-coordinated, armed assault on the Capitol might occur on January 6.” This assessment was based on intelligence or the lack thereof provided to Sund. On January 4th and January 5th, Sund hosted two intelligence meetings with the USCP Intelligence and Inter-Agency Coordination Division and with a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from Washington, D.C., including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and the National Guard.[39]

Sund stated: “During both meetings, no entity, including the FBI, provided any intelligence indicating that there would be a coordinated violent attack on the United States Capitol by thousands of well-equipped armed insurrectionists.”

In the DHSIG’s Final Report: The Secret Service’s Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 dated July 13, 2024, by Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D., the Inspector General reported intelligence failures and policy related operational failures.[40] Six recommendations were made to improve preparedness between the Secret Service and the USCP. A few have been met.

The burning question—with this backdrop, how can the Congress and law enforcement officials adequately rely on intelligence agency reporting, the current administration’s support (or the lack thereof) and media reporting to prepare for potential disruptions in 2025? To effectively prepare for Inauguration Day, the Secret Service should establish specific and stringent MOUs with the FBI and the I&A to ensure they share timely and thorough intelligence impacting their protectees and NSSE’s in the future. This was not done prior to January 6, 2021. Further, security planning with the USCP and the DCMP, should include ongoing collaboration with military counterparts. This includes the DCNG and the DCMP to expedite crowd control responses. Critically, an agreed upon communications (tested) protocol among these agencies is required.

It has been observed by many law enforcement authorities the Secret Service is operating under a flawed threat model, i.e. a 1960’s era lone assassination threat. Today’s Secret Service has not fully embraced emerging technologies. The agency has not studied terrorist threat methodologies to see its benefit in varying environments.

The Secret Service published the <a href=”https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usss-ntac-maps-2016-2020.pdf”> Secret Service Threat Assessment Centers Mass Attacks in Public Places Guidance in January 2023 through its National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). This guidance focuses primarily on behavioral threat assessment metrics based on meta-data gleaned from 173 shooting attacks. It appears this guidance is not consistently followed in the current protective training model. The current training model is based more on reactive threat responses rather than proactive threat identification. Very little, if any study and/or training focuses on terrorist pre-attack behaviors i.e. recognizing and mitigating Islamic radicalization, attack planning (target selection, probing, testing), the purchase of precursor bomb making materials and countering multi-coordinated attacks.

Matthew Crooks clearly defeated the Secret Service at its own game. How is this possible? Are the Secret Service advance procedures too canned, too predictable? Strategic planning organizations in the public and private sector, especially in high threat environments, employ Red Team planning. At a basic level this means considering the adversary’s perspective and attack plan. Protectors should simulate attacks as an adversary would and fortify against them with security planning. In other words, wear two hats—your “good guy hat and the bad guy hat.” This is fairly obvious to seasoned military planners and strategists, However, since this strategy appears to be absent from the security planning where two assassination attempts occurred in Pennsylvania and Florida in 2024, it requires review. In simple terms…advance planners need to ask themselves: If I were a shooter or bomber, how would I identify the security plan’s vulnerabilities? What weakness would I exploit? Security planners need to ask what are we doing to fix them? This needs to be an evolving, on-going process. The Army does this on a continuing basis.

There is no evidence the Secret Service conducts any substantive Red Team exercises. The irony is Crooks, the would-be assassin who shot at Trump in Butler, PA and Ryan Routh, who attempted an assassination from a sniper position along a fence line at the Trump International Golf Course at West Palm Beach, FL, conducted better pre-attack planning than the Secret Service’s protective (counterattack) advance security team. Routh’s ability to get within easy shooting range, and remain virtually undetected for12-hours, exposed many other security operational weaknesses. To be clear both assassination attempts, one an actual AK shooting and one pre-empted, were catastrophic failures. This is a jolting and tragic wake-up call. Crooks’ and Routh’s budgets were probably less than $500 respectively. The Secret Service Presidential Campaigns and NSSE budget is reported to be ~$73.3 million from the Office and Management and Data. Clearly the security failures are not due to a lack of money.

What if the attacks at Butler or West Palm Beach had been planned by well-trained terrorists using multiple, simultaneous attack methods as witnessed in the series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France? The Secret Service and the IC at large should be acutely focused on the possibility of diversionary, multitargeted attack scenario planning prior to the Inauguration (or any future major event). There are many analyses of asymmetrical attack methods that should be studied. Other salient examples include Mumbai (2009), Brussels (2016) and Barcelona (2017). DHS has published planning guidance to identify and prevent Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (2018). Would the Secret Service be able to detect an attack plan like these let alone respond to them?

Since the 9/11 attacks billions of tax dollars have been invested in defense strategy revisions, police, military and emergency responder training, communications upgrades and field exercises to better equip all concerned to address evolving threats. The National Response Framework (2019) defines five core capacities to guide the training of the response community: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover. The purpose is to “better integrate government and local response efforts.” Simply stated, all security partners need to focus more on prevention and work as a cohesive team. It appears these capacities were not incorporated in the security plan at Butler, PA or West Palm Beach, FL.

This guidance needs to be incorporated and operationally reinforced into all joint security efforts in the field; not only in training.

Agents from other DHS agencies sed to support Secret Service protective details should be required to meet the same protective training metrics required of Secret Service agents. The required training hours should be increased as outlined in the Secret Service Fiscal Years 2021-2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

The Secret Service needs to redefine its protective mission. The current policies and procedures are based on dated threat models. The old threat models guiding the Secret Service culture are myopic and limit creative thinking. More effective proactive strategies, policies and training that match evolving attack methods are needed:

· Move the Secret Service back to the U.S. Treasury Department;

· Re-examine basic security procedures;

· Recognize and respond to lone shooter profile behaviors;

· Incorporate Red Team planning and training;

· Review lone shooter and coordinated terrorist attack methodologies;

· Develop security advance training to include preventive and deterrent attack strategies;

· Require the IC to proactively and thoroughly brief the Secret Service PID and protective details with ongoing and timely protectee threat intelligence;

· Develop specific integration protocols with public safety counterparts;

· Require a Secret Service supervisor, partnered with the local jurisdiction law enforcement supervisor, to review the security advance Incident Action Plans (IAPs) and visit each site to be visited prior to the protectee’s arrival.

· Conduct post event hot washes and train to correct missteps;

· Partner with elite military forces, i.e. Delta and Seal teams to revise a range of protective measures and training;

· Reinstate annual physical medical screening with a coronary emphasis;

· Reinstate mandatory quarterly physical fitness testing for all gun carrying personnel;

· Develop scalable protective training based on emerging attack methodologies with a terrorist focus; and

· Specifically study and create protective training scenarios that identify terrorist simultaneous attack planning targeting routes, site access/egress locations, command posts, agent and law enforcement personnel staging areas and respective equipment.

Equally troubling, the recommendations set forth by the 435-page U.S. Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis from December 2014 (after serious security failures prompted this inquiry) as of this writing, have yet to be fully implemented. Conspicuously absent among them remains—the failure of protective detail agents to complete consistent training—“at least 12% of work hours by fiscal year 2025.” According to Jason Chaffetz, the agency has woefully failed to achieve this training target. He says the Secret Service has been on notice since 2015 to implement effective changes, namely training and accountability to prevent the failures. Many key recommendations have not been met.[41]

The collective observations and recommendations outlined above are further delineated, along with others, in the FINAL REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS completed by the Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump, dated December 5, 2024. This report was issued by Chairman Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Jason Crow (D-CO).[42] These recommendations should be prioritized with elite military forces. Establish scalable protective survey plans that can effectively adapt to changing locales and environments.

The world of team sports provides a compelling metaphor for how games are won. Team members are assigned positions based on ability and experience. They rehearse their plays incessantly until they get it right. Success in the protective security arena requires the same focus.

If the Secret Service team expects to win their zero-fail mission, they will need to rebuild a foundation of trust—first. Leadership deficits, disparate experience levels, inconsistent training, dated technology and other security advance omissions are fixable. Restoring trust among their fellow agents and with their brothers and sisters in blue and critically with their prized asset—the protectee—poses their biggest challenge. Winning is impossible without trust.

Is the Country Being Effectively Protected by its Intelligence Agencies?

To fully answer this, a hard look at the intelligence agencies and their successes and failures need to be critically examined in 2025. There have been more than 70 successful terrorist interdictions since 9/11. Unfortunately there has been an increase of serious failures in the last eight years, many preventable, in the homeland that dilute these successes. Many observers and media outlets are reporting partisan politics has rendered the agencies responsible for investigating and preventing many attacks in the past four years less proactive and less effective. Congressional committees and Inspectors General reports conducted in response to whistleblower testimony and media reporting have shown the FBI reallocated its resources from its primary mission to protect the nation from domestic and international terrorism. Their focus has shifted from cyber-threats, organized crime, violent crimes, human trafficking etc. to lesser crimes with a political bent. This shift in focus by the FBI along with collaboration with DHS has added to the rise of Domestic Terrorism.[43] According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) there has been a 357% increase in domestic terrorism from 2013 – 2023.[44]

After the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001, a candid review of the nation’s intelligence failures—contributing causes, i.e. agency information sharing dysfunction and the “siloed” structure of the IC; namely the CIA, FBI, NIA, DIA and the NSA was reviewed. The 9/11 Commission Report, released on July 22, 2004 examined these failures in detail.[45] Notably, the consensus finding was and unfortunately remains today—the intelligence agencies lack imagination and do not effectively share domestic and foreign threat information, particularly with a terrorist nexus. Bureaucratic and administrative restrictions delay the release of “sanitized” threat information that is in large part, not immediately useful by its consumers. Among the 9/11 Commission’s many recommendations—create a DHS in an effort to centralize 22 different federal agencies into one department. The intent was to unify security operations to be more responsive and less siloed in its handling of, sharing and responding to threat information to the homeland.

Unfortunately, this has not happened. DHS has been widely criticized for being stymied by bureaucratic dysfunction. Many have observed the amalgamation of the 22 agencies, in many cases, has had the opposite effect…these agencies, many of which with a more than a 100-year history, were not fully on board to “play in one sandbox” and share their tools risking the loss of their respective agency eminence.[46] As a result some argue many agencies hold onto information to be able to control investigations, justify funding, etc. Several studies show the goal of more effective information sharing has not been achieved despite the creation of several Presidential Directives enacted post 9/11 and the creation of more than 80 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).[47]

The numerous recent intelligence failures we are seeing and continue to experience is alarming. The conclusions of many Inspectors General reports and House Committee Hearings have further revealed the key intelligence agencies, CIA, FBI and others are not fully effective protecting Americans. It has been proven these agencies have been weaponized against conservatives and directly at Donald Trump and his family. This leads us to only one conclusion —our IC is broken. This is supported by the footnoted documents referenced in this writing. Among the many glaring facts: 51 former intelligence officials declared the Hunter Biden laptop, disinformation—later proven to be false. Further, the CIA admitted many of the 51 signatories were paid CIA contractors.[48] [49]

Several FBI, IRS and Secret Service whistleblowers including former FBI agents Richard Stout and Nicole Parker (and many others) have publicly called out the credibility of the FBI; specifically the leadership who have not prioritized the core mission of the FBI.[50] On December 9, 2024, Senator Grassley sent a letter to FBI Director citing as many as 60 examples of the FBI’s blatant failures to uphold the rule of law and obstruct the work of the Congress. The letter stated, “the FBI has shown an outright distain for congressional oversight during your tenure.”[51] Instead, recent FBI Directors, Comey and Wray chose to violate their oaths denying fair and due process rights to several hundreds of citizens and Brady rule violations for political purposes. Whistleblower testimony corroborates the FBI leadership, at many levels, were aware of this but continued this blatant dereliction of duty anyway.

It has been empirically shown the FBI and the DOJ, under the Biden Administration, have implemented an ongoing two-tier system of justice strategy targeting Republicans at large, prominent conservatives and Donald Trump while ignoring instances of clear federal statute violations (with undeniable probable cause) by the Democrats and leftists. “These include pay-to-play schemes by the Bidens and the Clintons.”[52] Not the least of which are the 18 instances of arson and vandalism targeting pregnancy resource and other faith-based centers by the group Jane’s Revenge which the FBI has not addressed.[53]

Basically, the FBI has shifted its focus and resources from counterintelligence, established terrorist threats, China hacking our nation’s IT infrastructure, sex trafficking of minors and organized crime to targeting Catholics, declaring parents attending school board meetings ”domestic terrorists,” investigating thousands of January 6th attendees and protesters and arresting pro-life demonstrators. Among the most egregious investigations and warrant executions was the unprecedented search of former President Trump’s residence, staging evidence and doctoring photos in August 2022 to justify prosecutions.[54]

Equally egregious, FBI failures identified by Senator Grassley included serious threats posed by foreign actors treated with tepid urgency if at all. For example, the FBI did not thoroughly vet Afghan evacuees under the Operations Allies Welcome (OAW), at least 50 of which were later flagged with “potentially security concerns.” This and the “open border” policy of the Biden administration, the dilution of ICE resources, restricting ICE’s arrest and deportation enforcement purview, defunding the police and weak enforcement of crimes committed by a high number of migrants entering the U.S. illegally has increased the nation’s vulnerability.[55] On June 25, 2024, DHS identified more than 400 crossed the U.S. border with an ISIS-affiliated network.[56]

Another disturbing example of the egregious failures and unlawful government oversight is documented in Senator Ron Wyden’s (D-ORE.) recent release of documents confirming the NSA and the FBI are unlawfully purchasing Americans’ internet browsing records and personal data.[57]

Restoring faith in America’s intelligence agencies to prevent what we have witnessed for at least the last eight (8) years will require significant reforms.[58] Essentially, there is a call for more transparency and bi-partisan oversight across the board.[59] Various national polls reflect more than 60% of Americans do not trust the government—especially the FBI.[60]

The GAO found the greatest number of domestic terrorism attacks are committed by either racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, (this includes homegrown violent extremism) many of whom have been radicalized since 2010.[61] A few notable examples include:

· May 3, 2024 – Two Jordanian foreign nationals attempted to force their way onto Marine Base Quantico. Both were in the country unlawfully;

· May 9, 2024 – Trevor Bickford of Maine received a 27-year prison sentence for attempting to kill police officers in Times Square in 2022. He claimed he wanted “to wage Jihad and kill as many targets as possible;” and

· June 9, 2024 – 8 Tajikistan nationals were arrested in New York, Philadelphia and Los Angeles with ties to ISIS plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S.

Recent intelligence failures are compounded by disjointed inter-agency information sharing, fewer proactive responses to threat intelligence, poor monitoring of social media posts and not responding to credible law enforcement reporting. A key policy failure is the open U.S. border and restricting the Border Patrol’s ability to identify illegal crossings and account for “gotaways.” Collectively, these intelligence failures have led to increases in a wide range of crimes as follows:

· A resurgence of terrorist attacks;

· Human trafficking;

· Drug trafficking;

· Attacks targeting law enforcement officers and their equipment;

· Homegrown violent extremism;

· Lone wolf attacks at mass gatherings;

· Hate crimes;

· Attacks on churches;

· Active school shooter attacks;

· Attacks on family planning centers; and

· Cyber-attacks/Ransomware attacks.

Fixing this will require honest, bipartisan commitment. The IC, above all, will need to be accountable to their staffs and the American people. The proposed remedies (some of which cited below) are required to ensure the respective intelligence agencies are transparent with the appropriate federal and local law enforcement agencies. This is needed to prevent a repeat of the abuses identified earlier that targeted a variety of individuals and groups by the Biden administration.

· Establish a special bipartisan committee with full access to all intelligence and threats to ensure proportional decisions and actions to protect the homeland are made above politics and reviewed before being implemented;

· Ensure the investigations conducted by the intelligence agencies are strictly within their jurisdictional purviews;

· Assess the effectiveness of the collaborative sharing information practices and formal agreements between the FBI and DHS. A 2023 GAO study shows threat information is not shared effectively by them and is not immediately useful. This GAO report identified a key reason for this serious information sharing dysfunction:[62]

“FBI officials told us they did not use the data DHS collects on domestic terrorism incidents because they weren’t aware DHS was collecting it. DHS officials in turn told us they didn’t share their incident data with their FBI counterparts because they weren’t asked for it.”

· Verify that any unmasking follow CIA & FBI rules. The names of many U.S. citizens were improperly released instead of or with foreign targets;[63]

· Enact strict verification processes to prevent using circular reporting by “creating” false and damaging information, leaking it to the press and then opening investigations based on that. It has been established the FBI under Director Comey and other FBI officials engaged in this practice; and

· Enact strict adherence to verification processes to ensure the basis of any Section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) application requests are factual. Rampant abuse of the FISA process by Director Comey and other FBI officials (from 2016 – 2017 and beyond) has been confirmed by the DOJ IG.[64]

On December 9, 2019, Attorney General William Barr stated the DOJ IG determined the evidence put forth to the FISA Court to secure warrants to surveil the Trump campaign and his administration “were not factual, omitted consistently exculpatory information.” AG Barr further stated: “ The malfeasance and misfeasance detailed in the Inspector General’s report reflects a clear abuse of the FISA process;”[65] [66]

Looking Forward

As we begin 2025 and we assess the state of our government, the state of our safety, the state of our security, our sovereignty and most important, America’s pre-eminence on the planet; now is a great opportunity to work to rejuvenate the bedrock principles that make us the sterling example of freedom and strength. It is possible to reignite the nation’s status as the “Shining City on a Hill” as President Reagan described it.

It will take an honest commitment for the new Trump administration to set things right. In the last several years many of our agency heads and politicians put egos and politics ahead of the nation’s guiding principles. How many of them were boy scouts and forgot the first point of the scout law?: “A scout is trustworthy.” How many attended military academies and committed to the credo?: “A cadet shall not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate anyone the does.” How many swore allegiance to the United States and their Oath of Office (5 US Code Sec. 3331)?: “I do solemnly swear I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic…I take this obligation freely without purpose of evasion…”

If there was ever a time in the history of our nation when accountability, honest introspection and reform is critically needed…it is NOW!

[1] https://www.gpb.org/news/2024/10/21/law-enforcement-officials-prepare-for-possible-post-election-violence-in-dc

[2] https://www.govexec.com/federal-news/2024/10/law-enforcement-officials-prepare-possible-post-election-violence-dc/400374/

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/us/politics/democrats-anti-trump-battle-plan.html

[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj6kj383k4ko

[5] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/08/donald-trump-iran-assassination-plot-00188498

[6] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/24/asia/russia-china-north-korea-iran-new-axis-intl-hnk/index.html

[7] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[8] https://nypost.com/2022/03/18/intelligence-experts-refuse-to-apologize-for-smearing-hunter-biden-story/

[9] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/12/14/biden-trump-laws-judges-regulations-legacy/76865964007/

[10] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/10/28/the-us-spies-who-sound-the-alarm-about-election-interference

[11] https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/02/democrats-congress-trump-january-6/677545/

[12] https://americanmilitarynews.com/2024/08/video-democrat-congressman-calls-for-civil-war-conditions-to-disqualify-trump-if-he-wins/#google_vignette

[13] https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/10/20/trump-overturn-2024-election-plan-00184103

[14] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/20/democrats-trump-foes-governors-attorneys-general-interest-groups-00190177

[15] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/presidential/3238783/shell-shocked-democrats-struggle-mount-resistance-trump/

[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/22/us/politics/election-warning-russia-iran.html

[17] https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024.pdf

[18] https://www.dhs.gov/publication/special-event-assessment-rating-sear-events-fact-sheet

[19] https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/25-011.pdf

[20] OIG-24-42-Aug24-Redacted copy.pdf

[21] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[22] https://www.newsweek.com/ex-capitol-police-chief-sounds-alarm-jan-6-cover-1817365

[23] https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973292523/dod-took-hours-to-approve-national-guard-request-during-capitol-riot-commander-s

[24] https://www.npr.org/2021/01/11/955548910/ex-capitol-police-chief-rebuffs-claims-national-guard-was-never-called-during-ri

[25] https://cha.house.gov/press-releases?ID=1E353E41-4087-428A-A477-B70E5FD46FA1

[26] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[27] https://www.peters.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/peters-report-finds-significant-intelligence-failures-by-fbi-and-dhs-in-lead-up-to-january-6th-capitol-attack

[28] https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/230627_HSGAC-Majority-Report_Executive-Summary_Jan-6-Intel.pdf

[29] https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-04/OIG-22-29-Mar22-Redacted.pdf

[30] https://cha.house.gov/_cache/files/2/2/22c7bff3-c7be-4ba9-b539-767ec0fda0ac/DA74D6968E28C88C7160A0ED12148C84.11.21.2024-loudermilk-dod-ig-letter.pdf

[31] Letter from Chairman Charles Grassley, Se. Comm. on Fin., to Director Wray (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_fbi_-_failures.pdf

[32] https://taskforce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/july13taskforce.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/12-5-2024-Final-Report-Redacted.pdf

[33] https://www.blackstonepublishing.com/blogs/news/former-capital-police-chief-steven-a-sund-set-to-publish-a-new-book-about-the-attack-on-january-6-with-explosive-never-before-revealed-information

[34] https://cha.house.gov/press-releases?ID=1E353E41-4087-428A-A477-B70E5FD46FA1

[35] https://cha.house.gov/2024/12/chairman-loudermilk-releases-second-january-6-2021-report

[36] https://www.peters.senate.v/newsroom/in-the-news/peters-report-details-failures-ahead-of-jan-6-attack-calls-for-changes

[37] https://www.bizpacreview.com/2024/10/26/whistleblowers-claim-secret-service-employees-working-with-trump-were-made-to-sign-ndas-1497932/

[38] https://nypost.com/2024/10/09/us-news/secret-service-blocked-watchdog-to-hide-inconsistent-security-protocols-at-trump-events-whistleblower/

[39] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/capitol-police-chief-steven-sund-entire-intelligence-community/story?id=75729882

[40] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/dept.-of-homeland-security-oig-releases-report-on-secret-service-s-response-to-jan.-6-attack-on-the-u.s.-capitol

[41] https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf

[42] https://taskforce.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/july13taskforce.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/12-5-2024-Final-Report-Redacted.pdf

[43] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[44] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-104720

[45] https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf

[46] https://www.thoughtco.com/department-of-homeland-security-4156795

[47] https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/114425/witnesses/HHRG-117-JU08-Wstate-JonesS-20220217.pdf

[48] https://www.newsweek.com/hunter-biden-laptop-jim-jordan-facebook-disinformation-twitter-1767369

[49] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/cia-admits-some-signatories-of-hunter-biden-laptop-letter-were-paid-contractors/ar-BB1oVNjs

[50] https://ijr.com/richard-stout-how-to-reform-our-politically-weaponized-fbi-and-restore-public-trust/

[51] Letter from Chairman Charles Grassley, Se. Comm. on Fin., to Director Wray (Dec. 9, 2024), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_to_fbi_-_failures.pdf

[52] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[53] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/zero-arrests-16-janes-revenge-attacks-pro-life-organizations

[54] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/house-judiciary-committee-investigates-alteration-evidence-seized-fbi-trump-classified-records-probe

[55] https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/10/02/dhs-2025-homeland-threat-assessment-indicates-threat-domestic-and-foreign-terrorism

[56] https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CHS-10.3.24-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf

[57] Senator Ron Wyden (D-ORE.) recent report by Ars Technica states the NSA has admiied to buying records

[58] https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-intelligence-community-is-broken-heres-how-we-fix-it

[59] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/3224584/how-trump-can-intelligently-reform-the-intelligence-community/

[60] https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/3671392-nearly-half-of-the-country-now-has-serious-doubts-about-the-fbi-heres-why/

[61] https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-threat-domestic-terrorism-u.s.-and-federal-efforts-combat-it

[62] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720-highlights.pdf

[63] Lt. General Flynn and other Trump administration officials were improperly unmasked during 2016 – 2017.

[64] Section 702 authorizes targeted foreign intelligence information collection related to terrorism. U.S. persons may not be targeted and their names indiscriminately used without a specific nexus to terrorism.

[65] https://clayhiggins.house.gov/2019/12/09/higgins-ig-report-confirms-obama-era-fbi-abused-fisa-process/

[66] https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/4012650-fbi-misused-surveillance-tool-fisa-section-702/

Securing NATO’s Southern Edge: Tunisia’s Strategic Value in a Changing Mediterranean

Ladies and gentlemen, Distinguished colleagues and guests, both present in person and online,

Good morning,

I speak to you today at a critical moment for Tunisia and the Mediterranean region. Our nation, historically a cornerstone of stability at NATO’s southern edge, stands at a crossroads that will reshape the security architecture of the entire region.

Let me share with you a telling moment that crystallizes our current crisis:

In December 2023, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stood in Tunisia’s presidential Carthage palace making threats against the United States – broadcast on our state television – Tunisian civil society leaders and political leaders were being imprisoned for defending democratic institutions and the rule of law.

This moment is not merely about global power politics. While others may frame such events within the narrative of a polarized world order, I am here to present a more urgent reality: that of a nation fighting to preserve its democratic transition, secure its borders, save its economy and protect its people.

Tunisia’s crisis today is not about choosing sides in global politics – it’s about survival and renewal. It’s about security and stability in Tunisia and North Africa. As some geopolitical actors exploit our vulnerabilities, they compound an already critical situation, creating what I believe is the most significant threat at NATO’s southern border today.

I speak to you as an engineer who has taught in Tunisia’s military institutions and served as the youngest woman to lead our national airline’s reform. My perspective on NATO partnership with Tunisia comes from direct experience with both Tunisian security governance and ground political reality.

Let me be clear from the outset: what I present today is not mere political opposition, but rather a rational, evidence-based analysis of the diplomatic, economic, and security policy implications of Tunisia’s current trajectory on NATO’s southern border security and stability.

This analysis draws from concrete data and documented patterns of institutional change.

My ultimate goal through this analysis and policy recommendations presented today is to help the Tunisian people make their way out of the current multifaceted crisis.

The strategic question before us isn’t whether Tunisia matters to NATO – we know it does. The question is why this vital partnership is failing to achieve its potential at a time when Mediterranean security challenges are exponentially growing.

Tunisia’s position at the center of the Mediterranean’s southern shore makes it vital for three key security domains: counter-terrorism coordination across North Africa, migration flow management between Africa and Europe, and maritime security in the central Mediterranean.

Our deep-water ports, particularly Bizerte and Zarzis, located at critical hub of fiber optic submarine networks, provide crucial access points for Mediterranean naval operations.

But today, this strategic asset is being systematically compromised, hurting and threatening the People of Tunisia and our allies and partners.

Let me outline the crisis we face:

First, our institutions are being deliberately dismantled. The regime’s explicit “breaking down of western state machinery” – echoing Lenin’s own words – isn’t mere rhetoric. It’s a systematic ideological experiment and program that has devastated our economy and security capabilities.

The World Bank confirms Tunisia as the only country in the MENA region failing to recover to pre-pandemic GDP levels. Our middle class, once 70% of the population and cornerstone of regional stability, has contracted to 46% in the past 3 years.

The parallels with Venezuela’s collapse are stark and deliberate. Just as Venezuela’s leadership rejected “Western financial diktats” before its economic implosion, we’re seeing the same playbook in Tunisia, but at the heart of the Mediterranean Sea.

The regime’s systematic assault on economic international and domestic institutions includes undermining Central Bank independence and forced local bank financing of state budgets, starving the Tunisian private sector of access to financing, communist-type asset seizures and expropriation of private businesses, disruption of commercial courts, and punitive taxation policies driving Small and Medium businesses into unprecedented bankruptcy rates or informal sector sliding.

The consequences are severe: When a state cannot maintain basic economic functions, cannot control inflation, nor prevent its workforce from sliding into the informal economy, its capacity for effective security partnership fundamentally erodes.

Youth unemployment has reached 40%, with over half a million Tunisians leaving the country in just four years. Over 60% of Tunisians express their active desire to leave, legally or illegally – data thoroughly documented by polling organizations and US Non-Governmental institutions operating in Tunisia.

Second, our security institutions are being politically weaponized. The regime’s hijacking of the National Security Council and militarization of the presidential election management compromises the professional integrity and apolitical legacy of our security forces – forces I’ve worked with directly at our War College, Naval Academy and Staff College and that I can attest to their highest integrity and commitment to professionalism. In fact, Tunisia’s defense apparatus ranks first among all Arab countries in the Government Defense Integrity Index as measured by Transparency International.

Third, we’re witnessing a dramatic strategic foreign policy realignment of Tunisia. Chinese control of the Bizerte port – historically crucial for NATO’s Mediterranean operations – isn’t just about infrastructure management or EPC construction. It’s about compromising a key strategic asset that directly affects NATO’s operational capacity.

Meanwhile, Saied’s unprecedented visit to Tehran and meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei in May 2024 signals a dramatic shift in alliances.

Iranian leadership celebrates the rollback of Tunisian reforms, particularly praising the active dismantling of Tunisian women’s rights – achievements that made Tunisia a beacon of progress in the Arab world. While Venezuelan and Russian officials are invited to observe our presidential elections, civil society and independent observers and political party observers including our party are systematically excluded.

The impact on NATO’s interests is direct and severe, amplified by a documented pattern of US policy failure, unfortunately:

Over the past years, the US administration adopted “strategic patience” and democratic support withdrawal as formal policy – evidenced by the State Department Country Integrated Strategy and a documented pattern of diplomatic actions.

When opposition leaders were imprisoned, US silence followed. When the regime militarized election management through the National Security Council, US silence followed. When electoral laws have been violated, US silence followed. When it harassed Western diplomatic missions, US silence followed.

In Tunisia, the current minority regime’s escalating hostile anti-American rhetoric in state media deliberately rekindles the hostile environment that led to the 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. That attack, happening in the middle of the Tunisian people’s fight against radicalism, left a lasting mark on U.S. institutional memory and security protocols, creating the deepest rift in U.S.-Tunisia relations. Today’s systematic pattern of hostility isn’t just concerning – it deliberately threatens decades of carefully built trust between our nations and people.

This policy of “silence that sometimes flirts with enablement” has had devastating consequences not just for the Tunisian people, but for NATO’s strategic interests.

Avoiding direct confrontation with hostile regimes may be understandable from a diplomatic perspective, but not at the expense of completely sidestepping core American foreign policy tenets and mutual defense security interests, not when minority regimes take local populations and state institutions hostage with the classic bait and switch Leninist strategy.

This diplomatic deterioration leaves Pentagon-Tunisian Defense cooperation increasingly exposed, isolated, and vulnerable.

The damage extends beyond Tunisia’s borders. Over the past three years, the regime’s racist rhetoric about black legal and illegal migrants has severely damaged Tunisia’s deep-rooted relationships with African partners – relationships crucial for successful collaborative migration management.

From my direct interactions with leaders from Ghana to South Africa, from Ethiopia to nineteen sub-Saharan African countries, I can attest: African nations are united in wanting their people to prosper at home, in Africa. The West doesn’t need to convince us to keep our people home – a prosperous Africa for our people to stay and thrive is at the heart of our modern political dilemma.

Instead, Tunisia’s current collapse threatens to accelerate migration pressures across the Mediterranean and between African nations. When our counter-terrorism capacity, demonstrated in successes like the 2016 Ben Guerdane operation, erodes as security forces are diverted to protect regime interests rather than national security, the entire regional security architecture weakens.

The path forward requires immediate strategic policy recalibration, with a fundamental shift in how we approach the relationship between diplomacy and defense.

As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once remarked, “Diplomacy is the art of restraining power.” This principle is especially crucial when confronting the erosion of democratic institutions and the rise of authoritarianism in a strategically vital partner like Tunisia. Yet current policy has inverted this relationship – leaving defense cooperation to bear the burden of failed diplomatic engagement.

Let me be clear: Diplomatic engagement must be the first line of defense, rather than leaving Pentagon-Tunisian defense cooperation as the only remaining bridge. Foreign policy focused on shared values provides the political cover for safe and solid security cooperation – not the other way around. When we allow diplomatic relationships to erode while relying solely on military-to-military ties, we compromise both.

To address these challenges, and building on Tunisia’s US NON-NATO ally status, I propose the establishment of a new strategic framework – the Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework. Named after the ancient city-state of Carthage – modern-day Tunisia – whose legacy of maritime power and cross-Mediterranean influence still resonates today.

Drawing direct inspiration from NATO’s successful Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean Dialogue frameworks, combined with the successes of the Georgia-NATO commission, this platform would significantly expand upon their proven models while anchoring security cooperation in shared values and institutional excellence.

Let me elaborate on why this new framework is essential and how it would operate:

The Carthage Cooperation Dialogue would transcend the limitations of existing regional forums and training centers that focus primarily on consultation and training. As a NATO-backed, regionally-owned, Tunisia-hosted and facilitated, security and development framework, it would have real operational power.

Where the Istanbul Initiative created important channels for dialogue with the Middle East, the Carthage Dialogue would coordinate joint security operations across North Africa and the Sahel with other African nations, drive concrete institutional reforms, and establish rapid response protocols for emerging threats. It would integrate critical priorities from climate security to food security into our regional defense planning, while fostering professional standards that reflect our shared commitment to the rule of law.

Tunisia’s position as the hub of this initiative leverages our unique advantages. We stand at the intersection of Mediterranean and Sahel security zones, maintaining deep historical ties with both European and African partners.

Our experience in counter-terrorism coordination and migration management, coupled with our professional military institutions’ legacy of regional cooperation and tradition of independent judiciary, makes us ideally suited to host this framework.

The Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework would pioneer a new model of regional ownership. Rather than following previous NATO initiatives that were sometimes perceived as externally imposed, this framework would give African nations direct agency in shaping regional security architecture.

Through dedicated working groups led by regional experts and a permanent secretariat in Tunis, we would integrate development and economic priorities with security objectives while building capacity for regional forces to lead joint operations.

This framework would develop common protocols for maritime security and disaster and emergency response. Through technological cooperation and protection of critical infrastructure, we would build regional resilience against economic and political destabilization.

For Tunisia specifically, hosting the NATO-backed Carthage Dialogue would reinforce our historic role as a bridge between Europe and Africa while creating concrete incentives for maintaining professional security institutions. It would generate economic opportunities through strategic infrastructure development and strengthen our democratic republic institutions through value-based security partnerships.

Most importantly, it would restore our position as a reliable regional partner while upholding our tradition of independent judiciary and professional security forces.

This isn’t just another diplomatic forum – it’s a practical mechanism for integrating diplomatic, political, economic and security functions, empowering NATO’s regional partners while securing shared interests.

By imbuing the Carthage Dialogue with real political weight and material resources, we signal NATO’s long-term commitment to North Africa and the Sahel’s stability and prosperity through partnerships anchored in shared democratic values.

Most importantly, this framework addresses the strategic depth of North Africa and the Sahel in ways existing frameworks have failed to achieve. By linking security cooperation with economic and financial development and stabilization, institutional integrity, and democratic values, it creates a comprehensive approach to regional stability – one that recognizes that lasting security can only be built on the foundation of strong democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Let me finally address a critical security concern that underscores the stakes of Tunisia’s current trajectory. In the years following the 2011 uprising, Tunisia faced an unprecedented challenge: thousands of our youth were recruited into regional conflicts, making us one of the largest per capita sources of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, engaged in many sides and fronts.

This wasn’t merely a security crisis – it was a profound failure of state and social and economic institutions to provide hope and opportunity for our young people. Through dedicated reforms and democratic governance, we successfully closed this dark chapter.

However, today’s systematic dismantling of these same institutional and democratic safeguards, pushing Tunisia’s vibrant political forces to clandestine activity, coupled with the regime’s removal of entry visa requirements for Iran and Iraq, creates dangerous new vulnerabilities. Tunisia has historically maintained robust defenses against organized crime networks, ranking among the region’s leaders in combating transnational criminal activities.

But the current regime’s policies risk transforming our country into an open corridor between NATO’s southern border and states of concern like Iran, Iraq, and Yemen.

In addition to the threats to on our tourism and service-centered economy, mostly built on the security guarantee of our professional security forces, the implications extend far beyond our borders – when democratic institutions erode, the vacuum is often filled by clandestine networks that threaten regional security.

We are fighting to prevent the kind of economic and political collapse that historically makes youth vulnerable to exploitation by foreign actors and criminal networks. This isn’t abstract policy – it’s about preventing the concrete security threats that emerge when democratic safeguards fail.

The choice facing NATO today isn’t between stability and democracy – that’s a false choice. It’s between supporting Tunisia’s managed democratic transition or accepting uncontrolled collapse at your southern flank. Supporting Tunisia’s democratic forces while containing institutional breakdown isn’t just about Tunisia – it’s about preserving NATO’s entire Mediterranean security strategy.

The Tunisian people’s resilience remains our greatest asset.

Our vision for a Third Republic anchored in freedom, democracy, and rule of law prioritizes institutional continuity and carefully crafted economic and financial transition reforms. We seek stability through growth and enhanced professional management, not through suppression.

Tunisia’s position as a critical node connecting Mediterranean security architecture cannot be maintained through geographic location alone. It requires strong institutions, professional capabilities, and democratic legitimacy – all of which are at risk under the current regime’s ideological experiment. An experiment the Tunisian People did not vote for or chose.

Knowing the Tunisian People, and given the expanded security guarantee that the NATO-backed Carthage Cooperation Dialogue Framework would provide, anchored in regional peace and stability, African-NATO nexus cooperation, and with a professionally and politically managed transition, I believe Tunisia will be able to welcome investment opportunities from eastern and western and African powers.

With such frameworks and guarantees, Tunisia would not fall into the tragic fate of Venezuela, but will mirror’s Spain post Franco’s democratic transition and cultural renaissance. Tunisia would mirror Portugal’s 1974 transition period leading to Portugal democratic and economic renewal.

I Tunisia’s future development years focused on professional competence dominating governance without compromising political necessity, cultural authenticity combined with modernization and the strengthening of the integration between the economic and security spheres.

Finally, I extend my gratitude to the US-Africa Forum, to Mr Adam Powell III for the keen interest he showed my and Tunisia, and the broader policy research community – from Johannesburg to Washington – for your continued analysis of Tunisia’s strategic importance.

I am deeply moved to see attendees from nearly all five continents joining us today – your presence is a powerful testament to Tunisia’s enduring place in the hearts of the international community.

Your innovative policy recommendations, political journeys, and research initiatives are vital as we navigate these challenges.

We welcome your continued engagement in examining Tunisia’s unique case and its implications for regional security.

Thank you.

Olfa Hamdi is an senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank.

Why the European Union Must Designate the IRGC a Terrorist Organization.

When we talk about the IRGC, we should separate its activities inside and outside the borders of Iran, or in other words, domestic and international terrorism, as it was intended when it was established by Ruhollah Khomeini’s direct order after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Domestic terrorism

As the name of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps indicates, its creation was seen as the protection of the Islamic Revolution, and the name of Iran is not even mentioned in the title of this organization. This terrorist organization views the Iranian people as a threat to the survival of the Islamic Revolution, which it believes will continue until it conquers the entire world and seeks to keep the regime alive through organized domestic terrorism inside Iran. Domestically, the IRGC plays a central role in the violent repression of Iranian citizens, systematically suppressing protests and dissent through brutal measures. It has been involved in the killing, kidnapping, and disappearance of thousands of protesters and opposition members over the past 45 years. Its subdivisions, such as the Basij and the IRGC Intelligence Organization, are instrumental in maintaining a regime of terror within Iran.

· IRGC and its Proxies in Domestic Terrorism

Iran has witnessed numerous bloody uprisings since the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC and the Basij, the IRGC’s domestic paramilitary volunteer militias, have always suppressed protests in Iran as long as they were confined to a few cities. The IRGC’s regional proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hashd Al-Shaabi, and Fatemiyoun, have contributed to the suppression of nationwide protests such as the Green Revolution, the 2018 Uprising, the 2019 Bloody November Uprising, and the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom Uprising. These proxies have been involved in regional conflicts and terrorist activities, spreading the Islamic Republic’s influence through violent means.

International Terrorism

The international terrorism of the IRGC itself is divided into two main branches, which are closely related to each other.

1. Regional Proxies

The IRGC has invested large amounts of money and energy in training its proxies in the Middle East, which began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War with a direct order from then-President Ali Khamenei to send IRGC forces to Lebanon to train the Lebanese Hezbollah. The main objective of creating the proxies under the Quds Force was to carry out the terrorist operations outside the borders without being mentioned in order to keep the name of the Islamic Republic clean and leave room for diplomacy. In the first decade of the Islamic Republic, the very existence of the Quds Force was denied. The proxy presence in the Israeli-Lebanese 1982-2000 war and the Lebanese civil wars 1975-1990, as well as the equipping and training of the Lebanese Hezbollah, should be considered among the first missions of the IRGC’s overseas branch. Although the Islamic Republic tries to deny its role in recent conflicts in the region, such as the October 7 massacre, Ezzatullah Zarghami, a former IRGC officer, discussed on Iranian state television how the IRGC provides military support to resistance forces and admitted to providing military training to Hamas, including the use of rockets, and that he himself spent some time in the underground tunnels in Gaza teaching Hamas how to build rockets.

The IRGC’s terrorist actions over the past four decades, especially the elimination of its opponents, have always been among the Islamic Republic’s priorities around the world. The Quds Force has established several bases in Iran and even in some neighboring countries, where it provides training in terrorist and espionage operations to facilitate intelligence cooperation with the Islamic Republic’s security institutions. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has its independent training bases in Iran and around the world to train its forces and proxies.

Meanwhile, some of its bases are specifically responsible for training non-Iranian forces for terrorist operations on the soil of other countries, forces selected from Iran’s proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain and Afghanistan. IRGC Intelligence is responsible for the final selection.

2. Worldwide Proxies

Since the IRGC is the most powerful entity inside Iran in various fields, whether it is financial or military, the Quds Force should be considered as the intelligence executive arm of the IRGC to establish companies to evade sanctions and finance terror operatives especially in Europe and America which also leads to terror attacks. It also establishes companies that operate in various fields from shipping to import and export. In essence, the Islamic Republic has found a new way of doing business to evade sanctions through the IRGC.

Terrorist attacks, especially on European soil, by the IRGC is a very clear issue. If we want to examine it more closely, we come to Unit 400 of the Revolutionary Guards. Unit 400 of the Quds Force is responsible for carrying out terrorist operations outside Iran by hiring local criminal gangs, drug cartels and other third parties who can be considered as members of its proxies living abroad to carry out its assassination plots. The establishment of Islamic centers to gather its agents abroad under the cover of religion has been one of the achievements of the IRGC, especially in European countries such as Germany, to carry out the operations organized by the military branches of the Islamic Republic in its embassies. Most of the kidnapping and physical extortion operations in Europe, America and other parts of the world are carried out through this method of the Quds Force’s Unit 400.

The Islamic Republic poses political, security, and economic threats to Europe. The Islamic Republic’s extensive network of proxy forces is believed to have sleeper cells in Europe capable of carrying out terrorist attacks. In recent years, the Islamic Republic has sponsored terrorist activities and assassination plots on European soil. In 2018, European intelligence agencies foiled an Iranian plot to bomb opposition groups gathering in Paris. In 2023, German police arrested an Iranian man suspected of planning a chemical attack motivated by Islamic extremism.

Iran’s nuclear program must be considered the most important threat specifically to Europe. Iran has long sought access to advanced European technology for its nuclear program. According to European intelligence agencies, much of the technology Iran has sought is classified as dual-use, it can be used for civilian purposes but also for military or nuclear weapons development.

The IRGC is the root cause of regional conflicts and exacerbates instability that directly impacts Europe, leading to the refugee crisis that has both economic and security implications for Europe. Millions of Syrian refugees have fled to Europe because of the IRGC’s involvement in Syria and its support for the Assad regime. Another economic threat to Europe is the IRGC’s ability to destabilize the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of Europe’s oil imports pass. Disruptions to global oil supplies could affect energy prices and economic stability in Europe.

The U.S. State Department officially announced in a May 2020 report that the Islamic Republic has carried out more than 360 assassinations and terrorist operations in 40 countries over 40 years. According to the State Department, “senior Iranian officials have stated that Iran tracks and constantly monitors Iranian dissidents in other countries in order to ‘crack down’ and ‘strike decisive blows’ against them.”

The 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the 1992 Mykonos terrorist operation in Berlin, the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina, and the 2012 bombings in Bangkok and New Delhi that killed Israeli citizens all have Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps footprints, according to documents released by security agencies in those countries. It is worth noting that the IRGC’s global terror campaign is not limited to eliminating the Islamic Republic’s opponents, assassinations, and bombings; these are not the only areas of IRGC terrorist activity in Europe. In recent years, this organization has planned several projects to kidnap opponents of the regime, which, although many of them failed, revealed that the terrorist operations arm of the IRGC has spread from neighboring countries to Europe. Recently, information leaked from the IRGC revealed another unit specializing in crimes abroad, Unit 700. According to the leaked information Unit 700 has extensive connections with senior officials in Iran, Syria and Lebanon. This unit was established secretly by the Quds Terrorist Corps overseas. Unit 700 provides supplies and military equipment to Quds Corps-affiliated forces in the region.

In early 2021, the U.S. government revealed that the Islamic Republic’s proxies and its operatives were actively plotting against U.S. military personnel and diplomats in the Middle East. This was not limited to the Middle East, however, and most recently, former U.S. President Donald Trump was briefed by the ODNI on suspected Iranian assassination plots. To date, the Islamic Republic has planned several plots to assassinate or harm current and former U.S. officials. These plots reflect the IRGC’s strategy of using proxies and covert operations to target individuals it considers enemies.

The Islamic Republic no longer tries to hide its terrorist nature. The IRGC commanders and Islamic Republic security officials have repeatedly and proudly mentioned this widespread influence in European countries, America, and the countries of the region. Therefore, the European Parliament can push for the official designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, like the U.S. designation, in response to its involvement in terrorist attacks and regional instability.

Strengthening sanctions against the Islamic Republic by targeting its key sectors to limit its access to international markets and financing, including companies or countries that facilitate the Islamic Republic’s arms smuggling or missile development and expanding sanctions against individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses, terrorism, and regional destabilization, such as the IRGC and its subdivisions are some of the most important steps the EP could take. The EP should crack down harder on Islamic Republic agents involved in terrorism, arms smuggling, and espionage in Europe. The European Parliament can increase its support for civil society organizations and NGOs working on human rights and democracy in Iran. Engagement with Iranian civil society, particularly the Iranian diaspora in Europe, would strengthen grassroots movements challenging the authority of the regime. The EP should recognize Iranian opposition groups in exile to gain a deeper insight into the regime’s internal weaknesses and ensure that these voices are reflected in international diplomacy.

Sheina Vojoudi is an associate fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank.

ASEAN Centrality Amidst the Current Regional Security Challenges

The ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, and larger US–China contestation are pressing issues the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) needs to address. With such diverse member states, the bloc’s ability to be an effective body on these major security issues in the region has been severely tested.

In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi

who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions, citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The US–based Carter Center, which had a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in ten states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on the election day. Per an Amnesty International report, over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed since the coup d’etat, including at least 1,345 people in 2023.

Reactions from fellow ASEAN Countries

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The Association aims to promote regional peace and security, as well as economic growth. Due to the complex security dynamics in the region, the former design seems to be the group’s priority. ASEAN subsequently expanded and the numbers slowly grew, as Brunei became a member in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, Timor-Leste in 2022 was granted an official observer status and in principle approval by ASEAN countries to become a full member of the association at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.

ASEAN Centrality, a concept that relies on assumption that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,” was designed to be an important feature of the regional bloc. The concept was first used at the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which explained that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and, in order to effectively function, the member states needed to be united.

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from the fellow ASEAN member states. The regional bloc has been chaired by four countries since the military coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been particularly successful in resolving the crisis as, three years after the coup, forging a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive.

Most founding members were alarmed over the developments in Myanmar. Indonesia expressed a serious concern over the military take-over in Myanmar, calling for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore took the same stance, expressing grave concern and expressed hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and Singapore echoed these sentiments, viewing the developments with considerable unease. The Philippines followed the situation with deep concern, particularly over the personal safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, flatly described the coup as an internal matter and advocated no comment be made. Newer members generally shared Bangkok’s sentiment.

That member states were divided between expressions of serious concern and a hands-off approach illustrated that the regional bloc has lacked a united stance. Even as early as five months after the coup unfolded, the division were seen when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy, with only six ASEAN members voting in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Myanmar itself, who was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand abstained.

ASEAN consists of countries with significant differences, including their political systems – which may have played a role in the divided responses toward the overthrow of the democratically elected government, as well as their approach to the ongoing post–coup troubles. Only three members — Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines — are considered to have democratic systems.

Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar for decades was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The United States and European Union states accused SLORC of human rights violations and suppression of democracy activists. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy was the way to secure regional security as well as the country’s socio-economic development. Despite objections from the United States, Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. Today, the bloc finds itself in a challenging situation where it needs to find a way to manage Myanmar’s membership amidst continued civil unrest.

In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (“FPC”), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special envoy of ASEAN; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day.

In contrast to the West imposing sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders were united and opted to keep the communication channels open with the junta, balancing between engagement but carefully not to give legitimacy to the military regime.

In October 2021, the ten member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet the jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised an option, as the group has no mechanism of expulsion, let alone any specific mention about expelling its members in a situation when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter.

Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, during his tenure as ASEAN Chair the following year, was criticized by ASEAN fellow members, Indonesia and Malaysia. His visit to Myanmar undermined what the group has agreed, which is to withhold the junta’s recognition until they start to cooperate.

As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This move constituted a different approach by the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed an individual as a special envoy to Myanmar. Jakarta favored a non-megaphone diplomacy, a quieter approach where not every diplomatic activity was disclosed and maintaining a position that, until there was progress on the implementation of the FPC, no representation from Myanmar at ASEAN meetings would be accepted, except at the non-political level. Still, the junta did not heed Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and with no punitive actions applicable under ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, nothing more was done.

During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. However, Indonesian President Joko Widodo pushed back against the accusation of the division within the regional’s bloc by stating that differences of opinion didn’t mean there was no unity, a view that strains credulity.

This year’s chair, Laos, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, a similar move from Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022, which only highlighted once more the bloc’s inability to speak with one voice.

ASEAN and the South China Sea

As with the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN members have also been divided with regard to Chinese encroachment in its naval backyard.

Looking at the dynamics between member states on South China Sea (“SCS”) concerns, the expectation of an ultimately fruitful South China Sea Code of Conduct (“CoC”) negotiation, which constitute guidelines created to ease the tension in disputed waters by defining rules of related parties, needs to be managed. A CoC is hoped to have a more meaningful impact than the previous non-legally binding document signed by ASEAN members and China in 2002, yet it remains a discussion whether a CoC will even be legally binding. ASEAN and China have been working on a CoC for over two decades but within the former, unity once more proves elusive. The claimant countries who often involved in incidents with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, support the agreement to be legally binding, while countries that are closer to China, such as Cambodia and Laos, prefer to avoid any conflict.

With China claiming almost the entirety of the SCS, there is also a question on what geographical areas that the code should cover and agreed by all parties.

Recently, China and the Philippines were involved in another incident located in Sabina Shoal, which lies

630 nautical miles from China. Manila and Beijing accused each other of ramming into each other’s vessels, marking the fifth incident in one month. The incident occurred just a month after a de-escalation effort from both sides, where both disputants agreed to a provision arrangement that allows Manila to resupply the outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. China makes no secret of its more assertive moves in pursuing its claims in the disputed waters, ignoring a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal concluded China’s claims had no legal basis. The tension in the disputed waters has been on the rise since last year and sparked a concern of a possible larger confrontation.

In his speech at the Shangri–La Dialogue this year, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, without mentioning a specific country, condemned China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea. He mentioned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a willful act was close to what gets defined as an act of war. He hinted that, in this case, Manila may ultimately invoke the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States, stating that he believed that his treaty partner holds the same standard. The treaty consists of eight articles that requires both countries to defend each other if another party attacks.

Similar to the Myanmar crisis, the members are not united in addressing the SCS disputes. In 2012, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique amidst tension in the disputed waters, a first since its establishment, with Cambodia blocked the consensus. Its leader at the time, Hun Sen, argued that the issues should be addressed bilaterally, similar to what China preferred. Cracks in the group’s facade were again reflected in July’s post–ministerial,meeting in Vientiane, when host Laos and Cambodia opposed the wording to be put in the joint communique, condemning the coast guard vessel belonging to China in a June collision with the Philippines’ resupply boat.

In next month’s ASEAN Summit, member states expect to remain divided on the issue of the Myanmar crisis, between those supporting vocal criticism toward the military government’s lack of commitment on the FPC, as well as rising violence and the junta deciding to again postpone its scheduled general election scheduled for 2025, and those advocating a markedly softer approach.

Member states also remain divided on how to address China’s more aggressive behavior in the disputed waters, particularly against the Philippines. Meanwhile, the CoC negotiation between ASEAN and China will still be a tough one, despite being scheduled to be concluded in the next two years. It’s important to note that not all ASEAN members are having territorial disputes with China; therefore, consensus isn’t easy to reach. The disunity may weaken its negotiation’s position and possibly allowing China to drive a wedge within the group.

There is doubt that China will agree to a legally binding CoC, given its more assertive behavior in the disputed waters, the use of water cannon, ramming incidents with other disputants, and the artificial islands equipped with military facilities, despite the existing but unenforceable Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, where the disputed parties agreed to resolve the territorial disputes by peaceful means and practice self-restraint from activities that would escalate the disputes. More importantly, China openly rejected the 2016 ruling by an international tribunal and sees it as null and void.

ASEAN was built based on a declaration, not a treaty. It provides a platform for discussions through forums over security issues aimed to maintain peace and stability in the region. It has a distinctive way in managing interstate relations, widely known as the “ASEAN Way,” relying on consultation and consensus. The style of diplomacy consists of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, consensus decision making, preference of non-binding and non-legalistic approaches. Therefore, the CoC is less likely to be a legally binding agreement.

Further, ASEAN has no army in its disposal so cannot project any military power and consequently the group’s diplomatic influence is weakened without such enforcement capabilities.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, on the sidelines of Nikkei’s Future of Asia Summit in Tokyo, mentioned that the economy, including trade and investment will be the priority of Malaysia as ASEAN’s chair next year. Additionally, Kuala Lumpur has decided to join the Chinese – led regional bloc, BRICS, which suggests its approach towards the SCS dispute next year is unlikely to be assertive towards China.

ASEAN’s rotating chair changes annually. Learning from Indonesia’s term as a chair, which has experienced of fully transitioning from an authoritarian system to the world’s third largest democracy, a year wasn’t nearly enough to make a significant progress on the Myanmar crisis. Accordingly, the chances of success for any ASEAN chair to play a key role in finding a solution to the crisis is low.

The decision-making mechanism of ASEAN that consists of consultations and consensus have also raised question on its efficacy in managing current security issues. ASEAN as a regional group should prioritise the interests of the member states, not those of external powers. For that to happen, there is a need for the group to speak in one voice and to restore ASEAN Centrality.

HOW TO FIX PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

The Trump-Harris debate—with 67 million viewers, the most watched in 16 years—was a 3-on-1 travesty. Megyn Kelly’s take (4:34) on the moderators shows extreme moderator anti-Republican bias, so ingrained that drastic measures must be taken. There are preliminary indications that Trump may have picked up undecided voter support, but even if so, reform is urgently needed. There are fixes at hand, but getting the Democrats to agree requires that Trump wins the election, as they benefit from today’s bias.

Truly Neutral Rules: (1) candidates and their campaign staffs prepare questions for the opposing candidate(s); (2) each side decides which topics to raise; (3) questions are limited to 30 seconds, to prevent candidates from making speeches disguised as questions; (4) candidates fact-check each other; (5) moderators are time-keepers only, cutting off mics when each time segment expires; (6) keep the new practice of no in-studio audiences.

My views come primarily from my years of watching debates—until, after the first presidential debate in 2016, I soured on watching live contests.

At age 13, I watched the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates. One lesson learned was that appearances do matter: JFK was move-star handsome, well-dressed—he was told that light blue shirt and makeup would work well with he black-and-white TVs of the time—and exuded charisma and charm. Alas for Nixon, he was on the wrong side of all three; his post-shaving five-o’clock shadow showed up by lunchtime. Viewers gave JFK the edge, while radio listeners thought Nixon won.

There were no debates in 1964, 1968 and 1972. In 1968, a very close election, the outcome might have been different had the charismatic RFK, tragically assassinated and not saddled with Vietnam, been the Democratic candidate; RFK could well have swayed enough voters. Debates might have have had to include George Wallace, whose 10 million voters delivered five states and 46 electoral votes in the still solidly Democratic South. Epic landslides made debates irrelevant in 1964 and 1972.

Came 1976, and debates were revived. The GOP tickets introduced a new feature that factored in some debates: the catastrophic gaffe. In the vice-presidential debate, Senator Dole, a genuine war hero, crippled while trying to help a comrade, called the two world wars, plus the Korean and Vietnam conflicts “Democrat wars” (0:46)—adding that the total killed and wounded came to 1.6 million, equal to the population of Detroit. President Ford, in one of his debates with Jimmy Carter, said in response to stellar NY Times foreign correspondent Max Frankel, asking about Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, that their populations did not see themselves dominated by the Soviets; given a change to retract, Ford repeated his view. He was belatedly vindicated on November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell.

In 1980 the race was roughly dead even going into the final week. President Carter and Reagan met alone that might (Independent John Anderson had participated in the first debate, a month earlier). That night, Reagan closed by asking voters: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” He cited Carter’s stagflation economy, and serial retreat abroad, The race margin held through the workweek, but over Saturday, Sunday and Monday, the numbers tipped decisively to Reagan, who won on the issues foremost in voters’ minds.

In 1984, Reagan won in a monster landslide. His debate with Carter’s former vice-president, Walter Mondale, decided little. Reagan had faded at the end of the first debate. This led a journalist to ask Reagan, who was to turn 73 shortly after Inauguration Day 1985, if his age should be an issue.

Reagan answered (0:45), looking at Mondale, then 56, that he promised not to use his opponent’s “youth and inexperience” against him. The audience roared, and Mondale, always a good sport, laughed.

In 1988, Bush handily defeated a weak Democrat, former Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. The year’s noteworthy debate moment came when vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen, who had served in the Congress Senate with JFK, pounced (0:49) on Dan Quayle’s citing having had as much experience in Congress as did JFK when he ran for president. To which Bentsen delivered a zinger: “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. And senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy!” The audience, packed with Democrats, erupted.

In the next five quadrennial debates, only one produced a truly noteworthy moment. The 1992 debates produced no fireworks, and were a veritable three-ring circus. In 1996, 2004, and 2008, ditto. But 2000 produced one extraordinary episode, that may well have cost then-vice president Al Gore the White House, given the razor-thin final margin. (Officially, Bush 43 won Florida, and the Electoral College majority, by only 537 votes in a protracted recount.) In one of the debates, Gore wandered over to Bush, physically invading his personal space (0:17) on stage, a major breach of debate etiquette.

In 2012 there was a new element introduced: moderator fact-checking. CNN moderator Candy Crowley fact-checked Mitt Romney on what Obama said about the murder by Arab terrorists of three special ops defenders guarding our consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where then-U.S. ambassador, J. Christopher Stephens, also perished. Crowley fact-check was, alas, not fully factual. In the event,Obama was handily re-elected.

In 2016, I watched the first debate only, and was disgusted as the moderator, NBC’s Lester Holt, interceded on Hillary’s behalf after her dismal showing in the first thirty minutes. That did it for me and suffering through debates, praying that my preferred candidate wouldn’t make a fatal gaffe. In 2020, it is generally conceded that Trump’s constant interrupting of Joe Biden cost him the win. Lest Trump do better a second time, the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) used Trump’s recent recovery from Covid as an excuse to deny him a second debate. As if the candidates could not have been in separate booths, socially distant. The GOP co-chair of the CPD called (4:01) the performance of the ABC moderators the worst he’d ever seen in the 33 debates he’d run as CPD co-chair, from 1988 through 2020. (In 2024, Biden rejected CPD debate sponsorship.)

True, no amount of reform can nullify advantages of looks, charm, charisma. And sheer luck can play a role. But lots can—and should—be done to minimize bias and caprice. The voters—for whose benefit political debates are presumably aired—deserve maximum transparency.

Bottom Line. An earlier generation of moderators tried to be fair: Their biases—impossible for anyone to completely eliminate—never decided a debate. Today’s generation of pseudo-journalists that moderate political debates are overwhelmingly—about 90 percent—ardently pro-Democrat. Reforming debate rules would enable voters to better appraise candidates.

John C. Wohlstetter is the author of Presidential Succession: Constitution, Congress and National Security (Gold Institute Press, 2024)

The Failed Assassination of Former President Trump in Butler, PAHow did the Secret Service Miss the Warnings?

The Failed Assassination of Former President Trump in Butler, PAHow did the Secret Service Miss the Warnings?

The country and the rest of the world are still incredulous—how could a 20-year-old lone gunman manage to defeat the nation’s elite protectors and fire 8 rounds from an AK that nearly inflicted a fatal skull injury on a Presidential nominee? By divine intervention and the momentary distraction of the shooter by a Butler, PA police officer, Former President Trump escaped an assassination at a rally in Butler, PA on Saturday, July 13th. Now, more than three weeks later, despite two Congressional Oversight hearings with now former Director Cheatle and Acting Director Rowe there are still many unanswered questions and very troubling facts continue to emerge. Former Director Cheatle’s vacuous responses to the Oversight Committee’s questions and Acting Director Rowe’s equally indirect answers and misinformed statements on July 30th (including the FBI’s limited statements) have allowed serious questions to linger. Numerous theories, some supported with facts and other less credible, have been developing. Numerous articles have been published. Senator Grassley, as reported by Real Clear Politics, RCP on July 22nd, has received agency whistleblowers’ information, audio and texts from Butler law enforcement officers. These have exposed many disturbing, negligent lapses and security omissions contradicting many claims made by Cheadle and Rowe.

As of this writing, the Secret Service has been guarded with their responses to the Oversight Committee’s inquiry and to the public. Rowe’s limited statements seem to contradict evidence from Butler law enforcement authorities and video evidence obtained from the public.

In an effort to set the record straight and in the spirit of urging critical reforms, the following factual information supported by video evidence and statements from Butler Police officers and SWAT officers assigned to the rally on July 13th with direct operational knowledge, is set forth. It is critically important to bring clarity to the information being reported.

This review will highlight key omissions of protective advance procedures during the security planning of the July 13, 2024 rally. . Many recommendations set forth by the 435-page U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel’s report from December 2014 (after serious security failures prompted this inquiry) were not fully implemented. Conspicuously absent among them was and remains—the failure of protective detail agents to complete consistent training—“at least 12% of work hours by fiscal year 2025.” According to Jason Chaffetz, the agency has woefully failed to achieve this training target. He says the Secret Service has been on notice since 2015 to implement effective changes, namely training and accountability to prevent the failures like those seen in Butler, PA.

The intent is to fact check the numerous statements and theories put forth by self-proclaimed experts and balance those with some credible authorities. In the spirit of separating facts from theory—context, background and explanations of the facts as we know them are sorely needed. Effective, tested protective strategies and advance procedures will be presented as a basis of comparison.

Normally I would not comment with this amount of detail on related matters. However, this assassination attempt has exposed systemic operational failures of the Secret Service’s protective arm and the advance team’s preparations. For example Real Clear Politics, RCP on July 30 referenced CNN reports and admissions by Rowe that expose the fact that security resources were denied for the Trump detail despite repeated requests by the detail agents. This has been an on-going complaint by detail agents and whistleblowers for at least two years. Denied resources for Trump rallies include counter sniper teams, drones, canine teams, metal detection equipment and other matériel. Further, documents show where Rowe decided unilaterally to restrict counter sniper teams to any Trump event beyond driving distance outside of D.C. While Cheatle, Rowe and the Secret Service spokesman initially denied this, whistleblower reports has forced them to confront their denials. RCP further reports the Butler rally was not allocated any counter sniper teams but Secret Service management reversed the decision and sent two teams to Butler with one day to conduct a survey that normally takes two to three days to complete.

This is appalling given the thousands of on-going death threats directed at Trump and the Iranian assassination plot discovered before the Butler rally.

All of us need to avoid feeding into conspiracies. Fair-minded folks want the forensics experts to complete their investigation and analysis based on facts. Hopefully this will minimize theories that are gaining attention. Additionally, when unsupported theories are not checked, there is a risk of feeding into them and they seemingly become more credible. The other risk is people tend to lose their objectivity and unintentionally get drawn into these conspiracies. With the cascade of information bombarding us, we have difficulty discriminating credible facts from fiction and “exciting” and “dramatic” theories. Everyone needs to be reminded to take a deep breath, pause and consider verified facts. To do this effectively, it is important to understand context and known factors.

The following is set forth based on what has been reported by credible, law enforcement agencies and other official sources on the ground at the Butler rally site, information from a closed-door Oversight Hearing, others familiar with the facts (as best that can be determined) and video evidence leading up to, during and after the assassination attempt. The FBI is continuing their investigation.

Tragedies as serious as a nearly successful assassination resulting in injuring a Presidential nominee, the death of one spectator and serious injuries of two other supporters is not an isolated event. There were and are a host of diverse factors at play at the Butler rally before and during that impacted the attack. Contributing factors are multi-factored and complex. Agency mission, leadership, federal statutes, intelligence information, agency policies, training, security resources, physics, human factors, political tension and others play a role.

Isolating these elements and assigning a predictive value of each poses a near impossible challenge.

Suffice it to say the collective circumstances (as we now know) at play leading up to, during and immediately following the attack are very disturbing and are indicative of the Secret Service’s negligent execution of their protective plan. Before we can move forward, key omissions and departures from established protective procedures need to be identified. This will give insights on factors that contributed to the security vulnerabilities and failings at the rally. Hopefully, this will help guide our understanding and conclusions based on fact and verified evidence. Most important, the ultimate goal is to learn how we can collectively, from our respective vantage points, do everything possible to prevent attacks like this from happening in the future.

While rare (the last assassination attempt of a president occurred 43 years ago), none of us are naïve enough to think a breakdown in security would never occur again. However, ensuring that effective, scalable security procedures are consistently implemented will minimize the possibility of a repeat (as much as humanly possible), is the goal moving forward. Hopefully this review will ensure a more diligent focus on preventive security measures. If a response is needed, it will be immediate and effective.

What we do know now is the earlier blame shifting of security responsibility, communications breakdowns and serious omissions of basic security advance operating procedures are worse than originally reported. The security missteps point to profound negligence in the execution of the security plan. Key to understanding the egregious breakdown in security is answering how the shooter slipped through the cracks after being observed by local counter snipers at a picnic table on July 13th at 4:26 PM. A Beaver County counter sniper’s text message released by Beaver County officials reported initial sightings of a suspicious individual about 100 minutes before the shooting. He was observed by a Pennsylvania State Police Officer with a range finder exhibiting suspicious behavior. His photo was reportedly sent to the Police Command Post. Apparently this information was not passed to the Secret Service Security Room at this first sighting. A video taken more than an hour before the shooting, at about 5:06 PM, shows Crooks in front of the AGR building. This sighting of a suspicious person was reported to police by spectators. Police on the ground were looking for him up to the time of the shooting.

On July 23, 2024, the New York Times reported the FBI determined a local SWAT team spotted Crooks on the roof of a warehouse about 18 minutes before Trump took the stage (about 5:44 PM) and 27 minutes before the assassination attempt (6:11:33 PM). Why was this report of a man on a roof lost and/or not reported to the Secret Service and the other officers at the rally?

On July 19, 2024, CBS News reported information from three sources that closed door meetings between Secret Service/FBI officials and law makers the Secret Service was aware of a suspicious person 20 minutes before the shooting began. At 5:51 PM State Police alerted the U.S. Secret Service about a suspicious person within a minute of this sighting.

Why were the Trump protective detail agents not immediately notified? Why was Trump not informed? Trump took the stage at 6:02 PM, a full 17 minutes after multiple reports of a suspicious person with a range finder were received and passed to law enforcement radio channels? The Secret Service treated this as a generic suspicious-person-notice until minutes before the shooting.

The delayed, ineffective response to these warnings violates the Secret Service’s core protective responsibility to notify the protective detail and the post agents of potential threats when the behaviors fit the lone shooter profile. Crooks’ behavior was not “merely suspicious.” The first sightings of Crooks alarmed police officers. To deem Crooks’ behavior as merely suspicious is irresponsible. Further, in the context of the thousands of documented threats received by the Trump detail, the Secret Service Intelligence Division and the Iranian assassination plot received before the rally, an urgent and heightened alert and response to the reported behaviors were clearly in order. The Secret Service’s own threat assessment center provides guidance to employees and law enforcement agencies to assist in the detection of would be attackers (See Planning-page 12-18). Why were these lone shooter profile behaviors, that fit those being exhibited by Crooks, not considered when these reports were received?

Crooks exhibited many of the predictive behaviors identified by the Secret Service and other numerous post shooting attack studies associated with lone shooters. The investigation to date shows Crooks visited the rally site at least twice before the rally and once (leaving and returning) the same day before the attack. Crooks evaluated the rally site two hours before the rally with his own drone, probed security at various locations, brought a range finder and paced nervously before leaving, apparently eluding officers trying to locate him. All of these behaviors, sightings and notifications by local police officers and spectators, were not prioritized as a threat by the Secret Service until Crooks was seen with a rifle on the AGR building. Why didn’t the Secret Service agents and the Secret Service counter sniper teams link these behaviors to the behavioral profile known to be typical of lone shooters? Cheatle lamely claimed to the Oversight Committee the suspicious behavior was only “suspicious” and not deemed a threat until Crooks was seen with a gun on the roof of the AGR building. Not prioritizing this as a threat and alerting the Trump detail immediately about Crook’s’ early behaviors, known to be linked to the behavioral profile of known shooters, is nothing short of negligent. On July 30, 2024, at the Oversight Committee hearing, Rowe gave an equally evasive answer to Senator’s Lee’s question as to why Trump was allowed on the stage with the behaviors cited above. Rowe stated (0-:27) a threat needs a weapon “it comes to weapon, a potential threat, is he carrying an IED…? To be characterized as a threat, Rowe’s statement that Crooks needed to have been seen with a gun or IED before decisive intervention should be taken is naïve. This exposes his lack of understanding and failure to link Crooks’ behavior as more than suspicious despite sightings of Crooks with a gun well before the shooting.. Assessments like this chill decisive decision making. Similar indecision allowed Omar Gonzalez to scale the White House fence on September 19, 2014, overpower a Uniformed Division Officer and enter the Diplomatic Entrance of the White House.

The behavioral profiles cited in the Secret Service Threat Assessment Centers Mass Attacks in Public Places Guidance recommendations, published in January 2023, define behaviors displayed by Crooks’ as threatening. Similar pre-attack behaviors are clearly linked to shootings and have been validated in published metadata summarizing the conclusions of studies of mass shootings in the past 40+ years. Crooks’ behavior should have been linked to the lone shooter behavioral profiles. Crooks exhibited many of these behaviors before Trump took the stage. To attempt to ”dilute” these disturbing behaviors that exceed the baseline of normal spectator behaviors, is negligent. If the Detail Leader and shift agents protecting Trump were notified after the first sightings (they were not), Trump would have been held in the limo or holding room or taken off the stage until the suspicious person was located.

Not informing the Detail Leader, Trump and the rally security agents about the suspicious person from the early sightings, especially his nervous movements, possessing a range finder and evading police is among the most egregious failures at the Butler rally. The Police Command Post and the Secret Service Security Room should have informed the Secret Service detail protecting Trump—immediately.

The FBI investigation has now confirmed Crooks exhibited many other pre-attack behaviors, i.e. using aliases to purchase precursor bombmaking materials and researching the DNC schedule in Chicago and historical assassination details.

The most important protective tool required to effectively protect people and assets are competent security team members, a thorough security advance and a diligent review of the security measures before the visit of the protectee. The security advance elements, resources and physical response protocols need to be rigorously applied and continually refined to match evolving threats and be scalable to adapt to changing circumstances.

Any effective dignitary security advance requires teamwork by developing a cohesive team with ALL partners in the city and jurisdiction being visited, especially the public safety responders.

Presidential advances and Presidential campaign advances with heightened political tension with thousands of protectee death threats require diligent attention to every facet of the security preparations. Commensurate manpower, resources, a scalable security plan and oversight that match threat levels is required! This is a tall order but needs to be done.

Information gleaned from the Butler County law enforcement agencies assigned to the rally site, whistleblowers and members of the public to include videos taken, before, during and after the shooting are detailed below. All point to the fact many immutable tenets of protection were not followed, not implemented and/or ignored.

U. S. Secret Service Legal Authority

Before the deviations from and omissions of well-established Secret Service advance procedures are identified and explained, the legal protective authority needs to be referenced. Very few media outlets are reporting this.

The jurisdictional investigative and protective authority of the Secret Service is defined in the United States Code, Title 18 Section 3056. As it relates to Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, the following section of the Code specifically applies.

Title 18 U.S.C.’ 3056(a)(7) authorizes the U.S. Secret Service to provide protection for major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.

This authority cannot be abdicated to local law enforcement. Former Director Cheatle and Acting Director Rowe erroneously stated it could be. Cheatle claimed local law enforcement were responsible for the security of the AGR Building in Butler, PA. Crooks fired eight (8) AR rounds from the roof in the direction of the stage hitting Trump and three others. Cheatle specifically stated the AGR building was outside the security perimeter and the building was not swept. Cheatle essentially blamed local law enforcement for the security failure.

On July 30, 2024, Acting Director Rowe testified: “We made an assumption that there was going to be uniformed presence out there, that there would be sufficient eyes to cover that, that there was going to be the local counter sniper teams.”

These claims fly in the face of the statements of the local police officers assigned to support the sectors and posts at the Butler rally. Cheatle and Rowe attempted to shift blame and responsibility to local law enforcement. This is not supported by law nor precedent. It is simply not tenable.

The USSS is always responsible for identifying and preventing any threat regardless of its origin; inside or outside established “secure” perimeters during an official event. This has never been proffered as a defense for absolution of protective responsibility in the history of the Secret Service. The Secret Service is the overall lead agency responsible for all Presidential candidate security arrangements. This is not delegable.

On July 20, 2024,The New York Times reported that several local officers, including Butler County Sheriff Michael Slupe, stated:

None of the law enforcement agencies that assisted the Secret Service that day — the Pennsylvania State Police, the Butler Township Police Department, the Butler County Sheriff, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police or the multicounty tactical teams—say they were given responsibility for watching the zone outside the Secret Service’s fenced security perimeter…More specifically, the local law enforcement officials stated that none of them were assigned to safeguard the complex of warehouses just north of the farm show grounds including the AGR building.

Alarmingly, statements made by the local agencies indicate the majority of their assignments were to provide security inside or along the perimeter fencing leaving the outside perimeter beyond the fencing exposed. The only outer perimeter police presence were officers assigned to direct traffic. There were however, three local counter snipers assigned to use the 2nd floor window from inside of a building adjacent to the AGR building. They were instructed to monitor the inner perimeter crowd only.

Butler Township Commissioner Edward Natali stated unequivocally:

“There were seven officers all assigned to traffic detail. Period!! The BTPD was NOT responsible for securing AGR or any other location…“Anyone who says so, reports on it, implies it, etc… is uninformed, lying, or covering their own backsides.”

The seven Butler Township police officers were assigned traffic posts but once there was a suspicious person notification, four of the seven officers left their posts to look for him.

Anyone familiar with basic security understands that limiting exposure requires creating strong, integrated and functional perimeters. Limiting your focus on the inner perimeter is just plain myopic, especially in an environment with upswept and unposted buildings in the outer perimeters less than 150 yards away from the protectee. It appears the Secret Service advance team forgot one of the most basic security perimeter concepts—all rings of security need to be fortified and integrated into the overall security plan. It needs to be one team, one fight. An absence of security or weakness in the outer security perimeters reduces the time needed to respond to a threat and shortens the distance between the attacker and the protectee—all factors favorable to the attacker.

Security Advance Omissions Leading to Critical Failures

Normally a Presidential and/or Presidential candidate security advance, especially one conducted for a candidate nominee of Trump’s stature and threat level, should include tested advance protection procedures that have been implemented consistently by the Secret Service for decades. These are well documented in Candidate Nominee Operations directives and manuals. Terminology of these may vary but their security function is clear. Omissions of these could lead to catastrophic consequences. In Butler there were key omissions and an assassination nearly occurred as a result.

Credible sources, whistleblower reports, local police agency statements and Oversight Committee hearing testimony identified negligent deviations and omissions of standard Secret Service protective operation procedures.

It is noted many of the security omissions have been acknowledged by Cheatle and Rowe. Other missteps have been denied despite local police officer statements/texts, whistleblower reports, Secret Service emails and media reporting.

Security Advance Omissions/Oversights:

· Assigning an inexperienced agent to lead the advance in Butler, PA.

· Middle perimeter security manpower included 1-2 Secret Service agents, far fewer than comparable size rallies.

· The security plan was inner perimeter focused with less emphasis on the outer perimeters.

· Local police officers were too siloed and not integrated with the overall security plan.

· Unclear radio communications reporting procedures.

· No officers were assigned to monitor the perimeter beyond the rally perimeter fence to include the AGR building and other warehouses.

· Secret Service did not attend a police meeting with local police counterparts. This prevented functional pairing of Secret Service agents and police officers.

· No helicopter surveillance was provided.

· The Secret Service did not deploy a drone and declined one offered by local law enforcement.

· No Counter Surveillance Unit or Intelligence Unit were available.

· The Secret Service counter sniper team was deployed one day before the rally.

· Four local counter sniper units were located inside the rally perimeter fence; three others inside an adjacent building (next to the AGR building) to monitor the rally

· Secret Service agents did not monitor the AGR building.

· The Secret Service counter sniper teams were not operationally integrated with the local sniper teams.

· No supervisor site review or walk-thru was conducted before the rally.

Resulting Operational Failures:

There were numerous failures resulting from not following established security advance procedures. On July 19, 2024, Breitbart reported nine critical, interconnected planning failures. These are all the result of a negligent failure to follow established advance procedures. These are valid but deserve more context. The following failures are identified to date.

Collectively these oversights led to critical operational failures, the most egregious of which was not communicating Crooks’ threatening behavior to the entire security team when it was first noted by the police at least an hour before the shooting. There were several opportunities after the first sighting of Crooks that should have been communicated to all the police officers and the agents assigned to the rally and critically, to the Trump detail agents.

Given the number of police agencies assigned, the potential for disjointed communications, coordinated through two separate communications hubs, should have been anticipated. A dedicated emergency reporting channel should have been set up and tested. These communications and related technology updates to include drones have been acquired but the Secret Service has been slow to adapt and implement them.

The Secret Service advance agent should have requested the local snipers to take positions outside the AGR building.

The Secret Service drone was not utilized in Butler. Inexplicably, the Secret Service turned down a drone offered by the local police.

A counter-surveillance agent or roving intelligence team should have been available to respond to reports of a suspicious person.

The advance agent should have met with the Secret Service counter sniper teams and local sniper teams to establish a joint workable operations plan. The Secret Service counter sniper survey should have been jointly reviewed with the local sniper teams. This would have identified vulnerable areas and clarified the rules of engagement and statutory authorities. This would have provided would have provided for better sector surveillance and a more cohesive operational team. This would have made life and death split-second decision making more accurate. The fact the Secret Service counter sniper teams did not have communications with the local sniper teams. Collectively, these factors and others contributed to delays.

Secret Service emails reported by Real Clear Politics obtained by Senator Grassley determined 1 – 3 Secret Service agents were assigned to support the Butler rally. Whereas 12 Secret Service agents were assigned to First Lady Dr. Jill Biden for a function in Pittsburgh the same day. The majority of security posts were assigned and held by Homeland Security agents. Current and former Secret Service personnel expressed concern over this and similar disparate resource allocations, i.e. giving Biden more resources than Trump. Trump detail agents have reported this disparity for at least two years prior to the Butler assassination attempt. At the July 30th Oversight hearing Senator Cruz asked Rowe about these and other documented discrepancies, Rowe’s stated rationale was “the sitting president holds national command authority to launch a nuclear strike, sir.” Rowe’s answer (4:30-7:34) did not address threat levels against Trump and how that would affect security resource allocations and the actual numbers disparity.

Senator Grassley, Real Clear Politics and whistleblower reports exposed that Cheatle and Rowe were directly involved in denying requests for needed crowd screening equipment, additional agency manpower, counter sniper teams and other resources for Trump rallies.

It is noted that Rowe was evasive and did not answer the question: “Did you directly approve withholding security resource allocations for Former President Trump vis à vis President Biden events?” This disparate resource allocation exposes more vulnerability to Trump. Notably, no Secret Service counter sniper teams were given to support Trump’s rallies prior to the Butler, PA rally. To rely on local sniper team(s) as the sole sniper resource, with admitted radio interoperability problems between the local police and the Secret Service, poses numerous operational risks.

Two Secret Service counter sniper teams were assigned to the Butler rally a day before the event. Normally, counter sniper teams are deployed 2 – 3 days prior to an event for the current sitting president. At the Butler rally two Secret Service counter sniper teams and local sniper resources were used. At the July 30th Oversight Hearing, Senator Lindsey Graham asked Rowe if the Iranian assassination plot factored into the security footprint. Rowe replied: “Secret Service does a threat based protective model.” Whistleblower reports, Real Clear Politics and Representative Mike Waltz dispute this since the Trump detail agents claim additional security resources have been historically denied. denied and prior to the Butler rally by Secret Service managers, (i.e. Cheatle and Rowe). Secret Service spokesman Anthony Guglielmi and Rowe claim otherwise. In fact Rowe testified these assertions are false.

Nowhere in the U.S. Code, Title 3056(a)(7) is there a caveat for less effective or fewer security resources when there is a clear, on-going death threat level which Trump clearly had and continues to have. The mission of the Secret Service requires it to deploy resources commensurate with the protectee’s threat level as much as possible. Every Secret Service protectee deserves this. To do otherwise invites an attack as we saw in Butler. It is well documented, supported by decades of metadata, that many would-be attackers, especially lone attackers study their targets, note and exploit vulnerabilities.

Approximately a week after the assassination attempt, several local law enforcement officers from Butler, PA appeared on ABC News and asserted the Secret Service advance team did not coordinate or meet with them before the rally. Jason Woods, the lead sniper stated: “We were supposed to get a face-to-face briefing with the Secret Service members whenever they arrived, and that never happened.” Further, Woods stated: “So I think that was probably a pivotal point, where I started thinking things were wrong because it never happened,” Woods said. “We had no communication.”

Investigations have determined the Secret Service detail agents protecting Trump were not notified of this suspicious person at any time from the first sighting up to the time he was sighted on the roof. It is noted other Secret Service agents were informed at least 20 minutes before the first bullets were fired. The detail agents should have been notified immediately as soon as a suspicious person was spotted on the roof of the AGR building, at the very least at 5:53 PM. At this point, the suspicious person was no longer “suspicious” by any definition.

There is no way this can be excused. This was now an imminent threat! This notice should have given the detail at least during the 17 minutes and 30 seconds (when Crooks was seen on the roof of the AGR building) to inform the Detail Leader to make the decision to remain in the limo or in the holding room until the threat had been resolved.

There are many hundreds of examples in Secret Service history when a protectee has been moved to or held in a holding room or removed from a site when threats and vulnerabilities are identified.

During the hearings, Rowe acknowledged some radio transmissions were and lost and not relayed. He attributed the miscommunications and delays to the Secret Service’s encryption algorithms. He stated integrating the encrypted system would take many weeks. Certainly that is not a reasonable solution during an emergency and cumbersome since each jurisdiction has their own radio technology. Radio interoperability has long been a problem for responders. It was cited in the 9/11 Commission Report following the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Since then, significant government resources have been provided to law enforcement agencies to achieve better radio interoperability technology among agencies. Notably, following the Oversight Committee Report – U.S Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, infrastructure investments were made starting in 2017 to facilitate the integration of radio communications between Secret Service and local police. This technology was available but not implemented at the Butler rally.

To blame secure radio encryptions for the delay in getting immediate messages from police officers to the Police Command Post and the Secret Service Security Room is not an excuse.

Creative and imaginative thinking including using common sense solutions like cell phones, jointly staffing Command Posts and or Security Rooms with local police radios would have minimized urgent threat notification delays. Simply having someone physically dispatch to the Command Post to personally deliver urgent messages during the approximately 20-minutes Crooks was sighted on the roof might have saved the day.

The Secret Service Presidential candidate advance teams are normally staffed by agents assigned to the field offices within the jurisdictional, geographic boundaries of the closest field office. Agents are also detailed from other offices as manpower needs and availability dictate. The security advance procedures for a Presidential and a Presidential nominee should have equivalently experienced personnel, resources and technology vis-à -vis for a sitting president’s advance. There should be no qualitative difference—the same protective standards should remain consistent. Whistleblower reports indicate the site advance agent assigned to the Butler rally was not experienced with large-scale advances.

For example, the middle perimeter was staffed with Homeland Security Investigative Agents reportedly with little to no experience with Secret Service protection assignments.

Strategic Failures

Among numerous burning questions: How could a lone 20-year-old with relatively cheap equipment, i.e., a drone, range finder and his father’s AR rifle defeat the Secret Service with 22 agents and approximately 80 additional law enforcement officers assigned to secure the Buller, PA rally site?

Obviously money and supposedly years of sophisticated dignitary protection training, state-of-the-art security surveillance technology, access to classified threat intelligence, an expensive array of assault weapons, encrypted communications systems—all failed. What was missing? Was it leadership? Was it a flawed security strategy? Was it incompetence? Was it an inability to assess risk? Was it an inability to communicate? Was it an inability to craft an effective protective security plan? Was it a combination of all of these?

Or…was it a lack of imagination? The experience and millions of dollars’ worth of equipment available to the Secret Service appeared to be no match for understanding and effectively implementing these tools to counter a lone 20-year-old shooter. Was the Butler, PA attack a one-off or does this expose profound weaknesses of the protective arm of the Secret Service?

Matthew Crooks clearly defeated the Secret Service at its own game. How is this possible? Are the Secret Service advance procedures too canned, too predictable? Strategic planning organizations in the public and private sector, especially in high threat environments, employ Red Team teaming. At a basic level this means considering the adversary’s perspective and goals. Simulate an attack as an adversary would and fortify against it with your security planning. In other words, wear two hats—your good guy hat and the bad guy hat. This will be fairly obvious to seasoned military planners and strategists, However, since this strategy appears to be absent from the security planning at Butler, it deserves to be mentioned. In simple terms…advance planners need to ask themselves: if I were a shooter or bomber, where are the vulnerabilities in this plan? What weakness would I exploit? Then as a security planner I need to ask what am I doing to fix them? This needs to be an evolving, on-going process. These are basic strategic security planning questions. The Army does this on a continuing basis.

There is no evidence the Secret Service conducts any substantive Red Team exercises. The irony here is Crooks did it for them by exposing the security plan’s egregious weaknesses. This is a jolting and tragic wake-up call. Crooks’ budget was probably less than $500. The Secret Service Presidential Campaigns and National Special Security Events budget is reported to be ~$73.3 million from the Office and management and Data. Clearly the security failures are not due to a lack of money.

It is as though Crooks had the Candidate Nominee Operations advance manual and observed the security advance planning. Crooks visited the site, researched Trump’s schedule, surveyed the site and stage with a drone and probed and tested security.

Leadership should have given the security advance team the training and tools needed to at least be on par with Crooks. Clearly the planning should have expanded the security footprint well beyond the security perimeter defined by the fence. Assuming the outer perimeters were covered by local law enforcement without the requisite police meetings was negligent.

What if the attack had been planned by well-trained terrorists using multiple, simultaneous attack methods as witnessed in the series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France?

Homeland Security published planning guidance to prevent Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (2018). Other salient examples include Mumbai (2009), Brussels (2016) and Barcelona (2017).

Would the Secret Service be able to detect an attack plan like these let alone respond to them?

Since the 9/11 attacks billions of dollars of government resources have been invested in defense strategy revisions, police, military and emergency responder training, communications upgrades and field exercises to better equip all concerned to address evolving threats. The National Response Framework (2019) defines five core capacities to guide the training of the response community: prevent, protect mitigate, respond, recover. The purpose is to “better integrate government and local response efforts.” Simply stated, all security partners need to focus more on prevention and work as a cohesive team.

This guidance needs to be incorporated and operationally reinforced into all joint security efforts.

Goals Moving Forward

To learn the Secret Service systematically failed to protect one of the nation’s Presidential candidate nominees is extremely troubling. The implications are staggering. Given the assassination attempt of Trump at Butler, PA and the security vulnerabilities this has exposed, restoring the pre-eminence of the Secret Service is critical. The highest priority needs to be given to finding long-term solutions. This has national security implications.

Solutions moving forward are challenging since the security failures are a multi-factored problem. Among the most important—stronger leadership, better recruiting, balanced funding allocation, refining intelligence sharing, consistent training, accountability and continuing oversight. The implementation of key protective training initiatives and procedures require review. These include simulated attack exercises, 4th Shift Training field scenarios and practicing advance agent procedures and protocols. It appears many were omitted and/or not followed during the security planning of the July 13th rally.

Immediate recommendations should include committing to a thorough review and implementation of existing protective security policies and procedures. The budget allocations should be balanced more equally for investigations vis à vis protection. The current Secret Service allocations are approximately 70% for the investigative arm and 30% for the protection arm respectively.

Importantly, manpower supplementation for protective details from Homeland Security, should require protective training on par with the protective training metrics required of Secret Service agents. The required training hours for all protective agents should be increased as outlined in the GAO January 2022 Human Capital Strategic Plan.

The Secret Service needs to bring clarity to the remaining questions surrounding the assassination attempt more than three weeks later. Their protectees, the American public, and government legislators deserve it.

The world of team sports provides a compelling metaphor for how games are won. Team members are assigned positions based on ability and experience. They rehearse their plays incessantly until they get it right.

If the Secret Service team expects to win their zero-fail mission, they will need to rebuild a foundation of trust—first. Leadership deficits, disparate experience levels, inconsistent training, dated technology, and other security advance omissions are fixable. Restoring trust with the brothers and sisters in blue and with your prized asset—your protectee poses your biggest challenge. Winning is impossible without trust.

J. Lawrence Cunningham is a Senior Law Enforcement Fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based, foreign policy and national security think tank. Prior to joining the Gold Institute he served as special agent-in-charge in the U.S. Secret Service.

The South China Sea Disputes: Beyond the regional issue

Brief Historical Background

Southeast Asia is known as a region prone to territorial disputes, which present a serious challenge to regional stability. The experience of colonial rule was one of the contributing factors due to arbitrary demarcation. One security challenge of note in the region derived from complex territorial disputes centers around the South China Sea (SCS).

The body of water is one of the largest semi enclosed seas in the world with an area of 648,000 square nautical miles and encompasses vital routes linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans with $5.35 trillion worth of trade passing its waters annually, almost one-third of all global maritime trade. Equally contributing to the significance of the SCS is what lies underneath: oil, gas and potential hydrocarbon reserves.

The SCS is highly contentious with China and four other Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — involved in disputes featuring the Spratly and Paracel Island chains being contested. Although most of the disputes involve China, Vietnam and the Philippines, recent tensions primarily have been between Beijing and Manila.

From eleven to nine – dash line

China claims almost the entirety of the SCS, popularly visualized as the “nine-dash line”. It was first shown on a Republic of China-issued map in 1947 with an 11-dash line and later the Chinese Communist Party adopted the map in 1949 with two dashes removed to give the Gulf of Tonkin to Communist North Vietnam.

In 2009, China reinforced the map’s international status by submitting a diplomatic note to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with the attachment of a nine-dash line map, the day after Malaysia and Vietnam submitted their joint submission, and claimed that Beijing has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS.

However, it hasn’t been clear what the nine-dash line signifies. Does China claim the bits of reef and land inside the line or does China claims all surrounding waters?

Geopolitical complexity in the disputed waters has become more apparent due to the intensified great power rivalry between China and the United States. The issue was brought up for the first time in 2010 at the multilateral platform that is internationally recognized as one of the world’s strongest forums when it comes to the SCS, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Vietnam brought up the issue at that time to then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She expressed that Washington has national interest in open access to Asia’s maritime commons, freedom of navigation, as well as respect for international law in the SCS, despite maintaining neutrality in the disputes. The attempt from Vietnam to internationalize the issue to get a solution was understandable, given the power asymmetry between China and other disputants. On the other hand, Beijing has always been clear about its preference in solving the disputes with direct bilateral negotiations and perceived the role of the U.S. in the disputes as an interference; this sentiment remains to this day.

Serious clashes from 1974 involving China, Vietnam and the Philippines

However, it is important to note that even before the statement from China that indicated the involvement from the U.S. will only make the matters worse, disputes have already involved serious clashes.

The deadliest of these incidents was the Sino–South Vietnam battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and Johnson South Reef skirmish in 1988. The Paracels, composed of 130 small coral islands and reefs, are presently claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan and China, but have been under the latter’s control when it forcibly ejected South Vietnamese troops from the chain, in the process killing 74 Vietnamese service members. The latter clash, located in the southwestern Spratly Islands, saw Chinese forces drive off the Vietnamese military presence and resulted in the deaths of 64 Vietnamese sailors and marines.

A significant incident without fatalities occurred in early 2012, when China and the Philippines were involved in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal located in the northern Spratlys. Both countries claim the shoal as a part of their national territory and accused each other of intruding on the other. Two years later, tensions rose over China’s placement of a giant state-owned oil rig inside Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This incident marked the first time that Beijing had sent one of its oil rigs into another state’s EEZ without prior permission. The clash featured the ramming of boats between the two and an explosion of large anti-China protests inside Vietnam.

Looking at the dynamic of the tensions, especially over the past decade, the disputants appear under no illusion that such incidents won’t be repeated in the future. As a result, closer defence cooperation between Vietnam and especially the Philippines with Washington has increased.

Tension between China and the U.S., however, was accentuated during the pandemic. The Trump administration insisted that China needed to be held accountable for the spread of the Covid–19 virus. While other governments were distracted with the outbreak throughout 2020, Beijing managed to build up activities in the disputed islands by establishing administrative districts on the Spratly and Paracel islands.

In the same year, the U.S. had toughened the stance by officially rejecting specific claims made by China in the disputed waters for the first time. The Biden administration adopted a similarly strong position. During her 2022 visit to Jakarta for the ASEAN summit, Vice President Harris stated that America was in the region to stay, giving reassurance to allies that Washington had their backs. One may argue whether Washington’s strategy has been effective in deterring Beijing’s increasingly aggressive moves, but the gradual change of tone was clear. The U.S. also has a major role in the region by conducting Freedom of Navigation operations and sent military aircraft and warships into the South China Sea.

In July 2023, Vietnam, in a display highlighting just how important it considers territorial integrity matters, preemptively banned the Hollywood movie Barbie over a scene featuring the disputed nine–dash line on a cartoon map. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report showed that Hanoi has accelerated its land reclamation and dredging activities some seven-fold over the past three years. However, the ramping up to approximately 2,360 acres pales in contrast to China’s activities, which measure some 4,650 acres since 2013.

A month later, prior to the ASEAN Summit, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources unveiled its “standard map” with a tenth dash added to the east, which includes eastern part of Taiwan. Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines subsequently rejected the new map while Indonesia insisted that the drawing of territorial lines must be in accordance with international laws. By the end of last year, China and the Philippines involved in a dispute on Scarborough Shoal where Chinese vessels blasted water cannons to prevent Filipino fishing vessels from reaching the shoal.

More recently, the more noticeable tension has been between China and the Philippines. The larger power was less than pleased when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was elected in 2022, embraced closer ties with the U.S. During this past June’s standoff which featured Chinese vessels engaged in ramming and towing of Filipino boats in the Spratly Islands’ Second Thomas Shoal, Washington warned that it’s obligated to defend Manila in any major conflict with an external actor under a 1951 mutual defense treaty.

In March 2024, China and the Philippines involved in another incident at the shoal. The Philippines had grounded a World War II-era warship in 1999 and has maintained regular rotation and resupply missions to deliver supplies ever since, while China has deployed regular coast guard patrols since 2013. The shoal has been the spot of contention between the two, as China has sought to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the grounded vessel. Both countries stated that they were protecting their sovereignty.

However, it is important to remember the tribunal’s South China Sea in 2016 found that China’s nine-dash line were without legal claims. The International Permanent Arbitration in the Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines. The panel also concluded that Beijing does not have a right over the resources within the nine-dash line that covers almost the entire disputed waters. It also ruled that Spratly Islands are not islands in a legal sense, rather rocks or low tide elevations. (For example, Second Thomas Shoal is identified as a submerged reef.)

Beyond a regional issue

The SCS disputes have also become an issue affecting relations between the U.S., China and to certain extent, Washington’s western allies.

The future trajectory of the tensions very much depends on not only the level of commitment of the claimant countries to regional stability and its impact of global economy, but also America’s willingness to prioritise the issue amid the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

President Biden was noticeably absent from the 26th ASEAN summit in Jakarta last September, which seemed to participants and observers to contradict Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s statement that Washington’s long term focus remains in the Asian Pacific.

The rivalry between the U.S. and China is affecting ASEAN’s role in facilitating dialogue in order to seek for a solution. Additionally, the organization’s centrality may be difficult to keep, since some member countries may be closer to Beijing than others. For example, Cambodia, a close ally to China, blocked a 2012 ASEAN consensus statement on the SCS and did so again four years later. There is no guarantee that this behavior will not be repeated in future deliberations, even as forging a consensus on what steps need to be taken to prevent further incidents becomes increasingly necessary. ASEAN members may also need to balance demands of great powers with their commitments to the organization.

NATO summit and Indo–Pacific

At the most recent NATO Summit in Washington, the alliance couldn’t ignore the Indo-Pacific issue. Despite the focus of discussion about issues within the member states, such as the election in France and United Kingdom, as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine, the alliance’s communique acknowledged that the Indo-Pacific developments have affected Euro-Atlantic security. This view was also reflected by incorporating the Indo-Pacific (IP-4) countries of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the third time they were invited to a summit.

The involvement of NATO members and allies in the region isn’t new. In 2021, Germany sent its first warship to Indo-Pacific region for the first time in 20 years to support other western countries and object to Beijing’s territorial claims. That same year, the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, along with naval vessels from the U.S., Japan, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands, conducted combined exercise in the west Philippine sea.

Since the stability of the SCS waterways is related to prosperity in Europe, other NATO member states are expected in the future to engage more with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region via the conducting of freedom of navigation operations to send a message to China that challenging the rule-based order doesn’t only mean going against Washington, but also its western allies.

The tensions will continue to ebb and flow and likely between China and the Philippines with the Spratly Island chains being the focal point. China will likely continue to ignore the 2016 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruling and stick with the “indisputable sovereignty” since “ancient time” as the basis for its claims. ASEAN members will remain divided on their response to China’s more assertive moves and sooner or later have an impact on ASEAN’s centrality in dealing with regional security issues, including the SCS.

While the Vietnamese land reclamation brings more militarisation to the disputed waters, it is less likely to create serious tensions. Hanoi’s move seems to be more about boosting its presence in the SCS amid the rising tensions.

De-escalation attempts through the expected legally binding document Code of Conduct of the South China Sea is less likely to be signed by both China and ASEAN members anytime soon.

The conflict is unlikely to be resolved, but conflict management is possible. Recently, China and the Philippines held talks, in which they agreed to defuse ongoing tensions. However, de-escalation is unlikely to be permanent.

China and the United States are likely to keep the status quo in the disputed waters in the near future, despite their intensified rivalry.

“SUDDENLY” 1954 VERSUS REAL LIFE 2024 IN BUTLER PA

Hollywood Original: 1954

On July 13, Butler, Pennsylvania eerily replayed a long-ago classic 1954 film, Suddenly, via an attempted presidential assassination, but with grim reality rather than Hollywood magic. Frank Sinatra, free off his Oscar-winning performance as Best Supporting Actor in the 1953 film From Here to Eternity, plays a psychopathic assassin hired to assassinate the president, whose train is to stop in a small town named Suddenly. He and his accomplices seize a house on a hill overlooking the train station. Taken hostage are a pacifist widow, her son and her ex-Secret Service grandpa. At the last minute, the plot is foiled, partly through the efforts of a hero local cop played by Sterling Hayden. A TV repairman, fixing the set, sees a chance to help disrupt the plot by hooking up an iron table on which the rifle is mounted to the TV’s 5,000 volts. Then the ex-Secret Service agent clandestinely spills water onto the floor. A henchman sighting through the rifle is electrocuted. Then Sinatra takes over the rifle, but the train passes through without stopping; he is then shot dead by the widow and the cop.

A visit to the film’s Trivia page reveals startling facts: (1) A real-life assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, reportedly viewed the film days before murdering JFK; (2) the film was based on a short story by Richard Sale, who took inscription from the fact that Dwight Eisenhower, during his presidency, travelled by train from the White House to Palm Springs, California, as his wife, Mamie, hated to fly; (3) two real-life presidents, Benjamin Harrison and Franklin Roosevelt, actually rode a train through the small California town where the film was made, with FDR having stopped there to speak.

Further perspective comes from Eddie Muller, Turner Classic Movies film noir expert, who in 2018 offered his Intro and Afterword takes on the film. He concludes that the film was not a major cultural influence, but simply an early entry into a film genre about psychopathic and sociopathic killers.

Real Life Replay: 2024

In stark contrast to the superb performance of the authorities in the 1954 thriller, the July 13 assassination attempt that nearly cost former (and possible future) president Trump his life was made possible by epic, astonishing failures by the Secret Service and local authorities. They were of such magnitude that Director Kimberly Cheatle was forced to resign the day after the July 22 House Oversight Committee hearing at which she gave serial evasive answers—essentially, stiffing the Committee and enraging Members of both parties.

In her July 22 testimony, Cheatle said that her agency’s mission is protecting the nation’s leaders, and called the agency’s performance “the most significant operational failure in decades,” yet still gave the agents an “A” grade for July 13. (Many Members acknowledged that those who put their bodies over Trump after the first shots were fired acted heroically.)

This birds-eye panoramic view (3:56) of the July 13 site, taken by a drone after the event space had been completely cleared, dramatically illustrates all the major factors that led to near-catastrophe for the nation.

Nine huge failures that day are clear. In summary, they center around: (a) failure to follow through on a potential threat during the hour prior to the start of the event—one cop saw the a “suspicious man” (5:19) using a range-finder 30 minutes before the shooting; (b) failure to keep Trump off the stage until a known potential threat was neutralized; (c) failure to hustle Trump away from the site when it was not known if there were additional shooters; (d) failure to secure a landmark local building whose roof gave shooters a direct easy shot for a rifleman; (e) failure of Secret Service counter-snipers to shoot the rifleman in the 11 seconds before he fired; (f) failure to use drone surveillance as part of the security plan—whereas the shooter used a drone to survey the site. Indeed, the shooter sent multiple drone flights; he began researching the event upon its announcement on July 3, and registered for the event on July 7. The shot that took down the would-be assassin was a “million-to-one” shot, as the shooter was sheltered by the roof lip, and only the top of the shooter’s forehead and eye behind the gun scope were visible.

A former Service agent stated (2:40) that there was “definitely” pre-planning by the shooter. There will be a “hard look” at technological capabilities; more resources are needed for the campaign detail. We face the highest threat level we’ve ever had, and lack resources. An ex-US Army sniper weighed in (4:50): This is a shot your boot-camp trainee makes within the first nine weeks of training, and they eventually train to hit targets at 300 to 500 yards. This was “massive negligence to the point of me speculating about what was intentional and what wasn’t.” Noting “massive DEI”—the politically incorrect anesthetic buzzwords Diversity, Equity, Inclusion in the Biden years—he said that in this instance “DEI” means “d-i-e.” At 200 yards an average grouping capability for a rifle that holds one degree of angle is 2 inches: the average human head is 6” by 8”; the shoulder width is 20 inches; and head-to-waist is 40 inches.” Within five minutes a novice could make this shot 9 out of 10 times.

At the July 22 House hearing, Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX) recounted how he made 15 of 16 hits with an AR-15 rifle, having only fired the weapon once before:

I have never had any long-gun training in my life. I own an AR-15, and I last time I shot it, I shot it one time my whole life, was six years ago. That is, until Saturday.

We recreated the events in Savoy, Texas. We recreated what happened in Butler. I was lying prone on a sloped roof at 130 yards at 6:30 at night and fired with two different scopes.

So I shot eight rounds from both. You know what? The result was 15 out of 16 kill shots, and the one I missed would have hit the president’s ear. That’s a 94% success rate, and that sure was a better shot than me,” he declared. “It is a miracle President Trump wasn’t killed.

It was left, however improbably, to AOC to pose a vital question, namely, why the Secret Service security perimeter for the event did not encompass the effective shooting range for AR-style rifles, i.e., about 400 to 600 yards. Director Cheatle gave wandering evasive answers about the Service dealing with many types of weapons in various circumstances.

This video taken (0:15) by Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ) shows the view from a building next to the shooter’s perch, offering agents a clear view of the roof; agents had access to this vantage point but never used it.

As we learn more daily about the shooter, two noteworthy early mistakes are a caution against prematurely trusting early reports from stressful, highly newsworthy events—the former affecting eyewitness accounts and the latter, reporters rushing to get the story out first. In this case, it turns out the the shooter was neither a member of his high school rifle club, nor was he bullied. (The school issued an online statement rebutting false reports, and said that while it will cooperate with investigations, as a result it will limit disclosure of information as to school policies, interactions with investigators and law enforcement protocols.)

On another front, we learned this week that the Service bureaucracy denied repeated Trump campaign requests for beefed-up security. The campaign asked for more agents and magnetometers at large public events, plus more snipers for outdoor events. Worse, at the event the Service claimed to have relied on local police for outer perimeter protection. But the only police officers who got close to the shooter, were, according to the New York Times, the few who went beyond the area they were supposed to protect. The the local authorities said (3:59) that they made no such commitment; they had seven officers to manage traffic, and no other responsibility.

The crown jewel of excuses for the failures was offered by Cheatle:

That building, in particular, has a sloped roof at its highest point. And, so, you know, there’s a safety factor that would be considered there that we wouldn’t want to put somebody up on a sloped roof…And, so, you know, the decision was made to secure the building from inside.

As for the roof slope gradient, Donald Trump Jr. said: I can assure you . . . . they’re not worried about a 5-degree pitch on a sloped roof. . . .” For his part, Trump said that Cheatle had visited with him after the attempt, about which Trump offered: “She was very nice. . . . But . . . somebody should have made sure that there was nobody on that roof.”

A retired police officer who served in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force said (10:37) that protectors always try to be “left of bang”—stopping assailants before they fire; if they fail, the advantage shifts to the would-be assassin. Retired FBI agent Nicole Parker stated (4:52) that Secret Service resources are “stretched thin” due to increasing protection responsibilities; retired Secret Service agent Bill Gage added:

When I first joined the service in 2002, we were only protecting the president, the vice president and a few members of their family. By the time I left, we were protecting the vice president’s grandkids, foreign presidents, former presidents who were taking trips overseas. As the list of protectees expanded, so did the list of threats. The Islamic State terror group rose alongside Al-Qaeda. Fears grew about home-grown terrorism. But the Service saw no significant growth in budget or personnel. . . .

Another former agent, Chuck Marino, noted (11:54) that the director had set a goal of 30 percent female agents by 2030, per DEI. Marino has worked with female agents who were as fully qualified as he was. Had Marino been on duty, Trump would have been swept off his feet and rapidly exfiltrated—a move the undersized female agents could never have accomplished—the assumption is multiple shooters and/or a possible diversionary shooter. Retired military veteran John Spears said that Trump has been assigned the B Team.

Retired Secret Service agent Mike Matranga said:

If a countersniper assesses an immediate threat to life or bodily injury during the event, that agent can shoot to kill. The policy at the Secret Service is we do not have a “green light system” where they need to seek authority. They do not need anybody’s permission to neutralize someone.

Finally, Kimberly Cheatle’s affinity for DEI, and her service on the Second Lady’s security detail, induced Jill to promote her for Secret Service Director. Alone, this would have sufficed to remove her. Upon her resignation, Rep. Nancy Mace (R-SC-1) called for a “reset” of the agency.

Broadly speaking, one may divide events that do not call for resignation of top management, and those that do. In the first category one may put hitherto successful pharmaceutical executives, whose companies issue vaccines that cause fatalities from a small number of customers. Probably no vaccine has ever caused zero fatalities. While monetary compensation to victims, however, small in number, must be paid, executives may be allowed by the courts to stay on and oversee remedial measures.

But: When there is an utter and complete failure of executives to fix a readily fixable problem, or when bad management exacerbates a fixable problem, and the threat of grave injury for death is readily foreseeable, termination of the responsible executives is called for—even, an essential element of addressing the problem.

Such is the case with a Secret Service management team that fails to prevent a near-assassination of high-value protectees and their families, foremost of whom are presidents, presidential candidates and former presidents, and their families. As has been universally recognized, a successful assassination was ultimately thwarted by a millimeter miss due to the former president turning his head at exactly the right instance to avoid death or serious injury. Alas, a few spectators were not so lucky.

In searching for the causes for major strategic failures, this assessment by a seasoned national security professional compares Butler, Pennsylvania to Pearl Harbor:

The keys to understanding are cognitive dissonance , confirmation bias, and normalcy bias. “Cognitive dissonance” simply means “the sudden confrontation with the unbelievable,” a conflict between new information and established expectations.

With “confirmation bias,” an individual tries to come to terms with cognitive dissonance by defaulting to the most comfortable interpretation of what he is seeing. At Pearl Harbor this meant assuming that the low flying planes were part of a drill, at Butler it likely meant initially disbelieving the evidence of one’s own eyes.

‘Normalcy Bias’ Threatens Our Security

“Normalcy bias” represents a special case of “confirmation bias.” This refers to a latency period, the period of incomprehension and inaction following the recognition of acute danger, the moment when someone “freezes.” At best, this involves delayed reaction, at worst it represents a virtually paralytic refusal to believe “this” is happening, whatever the awful “this” might be.

Bottom Line. The Secret Service needs a top-to-bottom overhaul, with the funds and other resources needed to do so. DEI must be completely eliminated, with merit the sole yardstick for all aspects of planning and operations. Many more employees besides the director must be fired.

John C. Wohlstetter, the author of Presidential Succession: Constitution, Congress, and National Security (Gold Institute Press, 2024), is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based national security, and foreign policy think-tank.

TARGET TRUMP:THE DEADLY WAGES OF ORCHESTRATED HATRED

July 13 joins a list of American dates that will be remembered without reference to the year—think December 7, November 22, September 11.

After a chorus of “shooting candidates has no place in our society” incantations that weekend, once the GOP Convention got started it was, per baseball Hall of Fame Yogi Berra’s famous malapropism, “deja vu all over again”: open season on Trump, Republicans, etc.

Worse, Harris, had in 2018 joked about killing Trump during an appearance with talk-show host Ellen DeGeneres. Asked with whom she’d rather share an elevator with, Trump, Mike Pence, or Jefferson Sessions, she asked, “Does one of us have to come out alive?” DeGeneres laughed as did the audience and Kamala cut loose with her trademark cackle.

At age 77, I can recall that after JFK’s assassination jokes about such matters became strictly verboten—anyone did uttered such jokes in public risked arrest for posing a threat to the president. Short of that, being fired, and socially ostracized, was virtually certain. Call it cancel culture before cancel culture became cool—at least, for critics of Republicans.

In all, Democrats today have much to answer for. Days before the near-miss on the former president’s life, Biden said: “It’s time to put Trump in the bullseye.” This April, House Judiciary chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS) introduced legislation, the DISGRACED Former Protectees Act (CAPS in original). The DFPA would

reform the U.S. Secret Service’s protective mission by automatically terminating Secret Service protection for those who have been sentenced to prison following conviction for a Federal or State felony—clarifying that prison authorities would be responsible for the protection of all inmates regardless of previous Secret Service protection.

Thompson added that the bill was intended to see that former protectees convicted of a felony do not get special treatment while in prison.

Former attorney-general William Barr (whose second stint was as one of Trump’s attorneys-general) said: ” The Democrats have to stop their grossly irresponsible talk about Trump being an existential threat to democracy. He is not.”

A former assistant FBI director called (5:44) the July 13 event “a security breakdown from start to finish”; he cited the failure of the Service to properly protect the president, and a delay in getting the former president off the stage and into the car—in stark contrast, he noted, to the instant rapid response of the Service made in hustling former president Ronald Reagan into the presidential limousine and away from the scene of the shooting. Finally, he said: “Anyone who demonizes someone in the matter the he has been demonized has basically put a bullseye on him.”

An IDF special services veteran said (5:39) that a split-second head turn—a shot from an AR-15 rifle travels 3,300 feet per second—high-likely saved the former president’s life. He called a 150-yard shot “a putt.”

Former Secret Service agent Dan Bongino stated, of the Secret Service’s serial inactions on requests from Republicans for added security: I want to repeat, and can absolutely confirm, the USSS Director Kim Cheatle has repeatedly turned down requests for a larger security footprint around President Trump. Despite knowing the threat level is catastrophic.

In 2015 the House of Representatives issued a scathing report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis. It focused on four incidents: (1) a gunman who fired several shots at the White House on Nov. 11, 2011; several agents consorting with females of ill-repute in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012; (3) an armed security guard with a violent arrest record who rode in the elevator with then-president Obama and later breached the security perimeter on Sep. 16, 2014; (4) two drunk Secret Service agents—one who was part of the president’s protective detail—who interfered with an on-site investigation of a March 4, 2015 bomb threat. The Committee findings cited budget shortfalls, high attrition rate, poor morale, lack of confidence in Service leadership, and calls for bringing outside leaders to lead a full-scale effort. A core comprehensive compilation was posted at National Review.

Nothing better encapsulates this current failure of the Secret Service than Director Cheatle’s “sloping roof’ alibi: that a sloping roof—in fact, an upward gradient of, NOT making this up, three percent, raised “safety concerns as to the security forces; never mind that the gradient that counter-snipers faced on their roof top perch was greater than three percent.

Bottom Line. The Secret Service is being run into the ground. Democrats have seen their main theme—hostility to Trump as Evil Incarnate, trashed by a tectonic event—NOT a Black Swan—as it was entirely foreseeable. The image of Trump, nearly martyred, fist raised in the air with an American flag in hand, will be the iconic image of the 2024 campaign and will go down in history, joining the iconic 1945 photo of GIs failing the flag atop Mount Suribachi during the sanguinary battle for control of the island of Iwo Jima.

John C. Wohlstetter, the author of Presidential Succession: Constitution, Congress, and National Security (Gold Institute Press, 2024), is a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington, DC-based national security, and foreign policy think-tank.

From the Kurdish Mountains to Hollywood Hills

Hayman Homer is bridging the cultural gaps in entertainment with his captivating work in the film industry.

In the international realm of filmmaking, a new name stands out: Hayman Homer. This young up and coming American actor of Kurdish origin has taken on the film industry with his standout performance as the first Kurd to portray Jesus Christ in The Messiah (2024) This historical drama is currently showing at the Museum of the Bible in Washington, D.C., the biggest bible museum in the world. Hayman also plays a war medic in the drama thriller Aman (2024).

Hayman is deeply motivated by his background. Born in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, he and his seven siblings were raised by a single mom. Hayman was only 10 years old when his dad was killed. Hayman’s father first became a prisoner of war and was later martyred in the Kurdish-Iraqi war, fighting for Kurdish independence as a Peshmerga intelligence operative… “My father was a revolutionary for the Kurdish people’s rights, he sacrificed his own life for the sake of freedom and the existence of Kurdish identity against the dictatorship of Sadam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. I’m continuing his path through filmmaking and telling powerful stories that resonates with the world to give a voice for the voiceless. His struggle and my mother’s dedication to raise a big family on her own with honor and dignity is what motivates me the most.” Hayman stated.

Hayman, being deeply motivated by the struggle of the community in which he grew up, commits his work to showcase the rich culture of Kurdistan on the global stage and break down stereotypes of minority groups. The Kurdish-born American actor is one of the few actors, of Middle Eastern origin, using his platform to promote diversity and to reduce prejudicial portrayals of minority groups in Hollywood. “I want to use my platform to expand diversity and raise awareness about issues that matter and help make a real difference in the world,” stated Hayman.

His mission is evident in his groundbreaking role as the first Kurd to portray Jesus Christ – which not only brings representation to Kurds in cinema but also promotes peace by showcasing acceptance of all religions in Kurdistan. Furthermore, his mission is evident in his lesser-known community efforts off screen as a board member of the Kurdistani Diaspora Center and Tennessee Kurdish Community Council that work to promote principles of democracy, peace, free opinion, coexistence, and community cooperation. His public service initiative reflects his educational background as he holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and international relations from Salahaddin University.

Hayman is driven by his origins as well as his passion to bring diverse representation into entertainment as he expands his work into the American film industry and beyond. He aims to not only portray stories through acting but also through his work into film producing.

On producing, Hayman reflects: “this allows me to bring powerful and compelling stories to the big screen, explore different aspects of humanity, and tell stories that resonate with people all over the world”.

Up next is Hayman’s ambitious secret project bringing the saga of a Kurdish renowned mythological character to life as a Hollywood blockbuster. He plans to continue utilizing inspiration from both Kurdish and American history and literature to help feature well-rounded portrayals of diverse backgrounds. Hayman works tirelessly to change the disparity in the lives of Kurds and other isolated minorities in the Middle East, creating positive outcomes and inspiring hope.

Rahim “Mr. Kurd” Rashidi is a media fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy, a Washington DC think-and-do tank.