This paper originally appeared in the New Direction, The European Journal at https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/the_ukraine_crisis_and_the_west)

The Ukraine crisis could be the greatest boost to restoration of Western unity and the reinvigoration of NATO or it could deepen the transatlantic divide and further weaken the West’s standing in the world.

The crisis deepens

Since the seizure of the Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 the build-up of Russian troops encircling the Ukraine has been in progress for over a year.

In the past four days, the danger of attack has been declared “imminent”. The military procedures, the drills, for changing to combat readiness are well known at both the strategic and tactical levels and well monitored by countries with sophisticated intelligence capabilities such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

The alarm cries from Western governments, predicting the imminent attack by Russia on Ukraine, would have been triggered by clear intelligence indicators. These would include evidence that Russian troops were setting up field hospitals; carrying out final fuel replenishment; loading live ammunition into tanks and other armoured vehicles; pre-positioning artillery ammunition; adjusting artillery fire plans; putting air defence and ground-attack aircraft on a higher alert stage; route marking by military traffic control units; combat units moving from their rear assembly points into tactical pre-battle formations closer to the Ukrainian border; electronic warfare and reconnaissance assets intensifying their activities; changes in the pattern of radio traffic; and overall readiness states reduced from days to hours. These are among the many attack indicators that analysts will note to warn of attack, passing their assessments immediately to war rooms and Governments. They will also know as soon as these measures are put on hold or genuinely go into reverse. But regardless of military capabilities, the missing piece of evidence is locked in President Putin’s head. We do not know his intentions.

Moscow’s claims that it is acting in response to a threat from NATO expansion fall into the category of ‘the big lie’, knowing that there will be sufficient people in Russia and among its allies and client states who will believe this.

The serious enlargement of NATO took place years ago and there has been no change in respect of Ukraine’s status, which lies dormant.

The last major eastwards expansion of NATO took place in 2004. Poland, Hungary and what is now the Czech Republic had already joined 5 years beforehand – that’s 23 years ago. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 there was indeed recognition of the Ukraine’s aspiration to become a NATO member. Over the years since, there have been repeated assurances concerning membership but acceptance of the Ukraine’s application would have to be a unanimous political decision of NATO’s 30 member states, and there is little likelihood of this, given the political sensitivities. Last year’s NATO Summit in Brussels maintained this deliberately ambiguous position.

So what does Russia want – and why now?

Putin wants to re-unite the Soviet imperial sphere – only in this way, he thinks, can Moscow be taken seriously as a great power again. This would be his historic legacy. It could take many forms but a key element would have to be the Ukraine whose loss Putin regards as the greatest strategic disaster to befall Russia.

He wants a compliant Ukraine, ideally under full suzerainty of Russia, but if not, then under Russian influence and certainly not part of any Western military or economic bloc. He will not be satisfied with Ukraine merely withdrawing its application to join NATO. He has a wide range of options that might satisfy his appetite at this stage including: rigorous and rapid implementation of the Minsk Agreements, according to Putin’s interpretation (which would effectively give Moscow a say in the government of Ukraine); neutralisation of Ukraine; recognised secession of all Donetsk, Luhansk and the Crimea from Kyiv rule; or at the more extreme end, occupying all the majority Russian-speaking coastal areas including Odessa. Putin believes that now is the moment to achieve his wider ambition to restore Russian greatness after what he sees as the humiliations of thirty years ago.

As in a very serious game of chess, Putin sees the position as a Zugzwang – it is your turn to move and whatever you do will be bad for you.

He sees the West as weak, riven with domestic crises and the economic consequences of the Covid pandemic and ‘Wokeism’ eating away from the inside and casting doubt, particularly among many young Westerners, over the very foundations of the West.

The United States is reeling from the Afghanistan debacle and President Biden is seen to be indecisive and distracted by domestic issues. Boris Johnson’s position is in question. The new left-leaning German leadership hasn’t had time to settle in and would be prone to a soft option, strongly influenced by its energy dependency on Russia.

President Macron has his eyes on the French presidential elections just 4 months away and in any case has another, EU, agenda in play.

The impact of EU misplaced ambitions on Western unity

The EU is adept at turning a crisis into an opportunity and undoubtedly we shall now hear fresh calls for an EU Army. Far from strengthening the unity of the West and its ability to defend itself, the EU-effect, under French leadership, has been to weaken Western capabilities and the NATO alliance. Historically, both France and Germany have, at different stages of history, had special relationships with Russia. French policy since 1940, has been suspicious of the US and, under de Gaulle, often actively hostile. The Gaullist ambition has been to create a united Europe under French leadership without interference from ‘les Anglo-Saxons’, i.e. America and Britain. The latest evolution of this policy has been the idea of EU “strategic autonomy” – by definition separate from America , and by extension NATO, and therefore able to develop its own relations with Russia. This is precisely the Russian intention – to separate Europe from the US.

It is the power of the United States that gives credibility to Western deterrence through NATO, the only alliance capable of defending our democracies and resisting hostile powers such as Russia. So any policies which create divisions in NATO and the transatlantic alliance play into the hands of aggressors and make conflict more likely.

The UK’s Roles

British policy makers do not forget the reference to the 1938 Czech crisis as a “quarrel in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing”. Today they know nowhere is far away and that Britain is still expected by many countries to lead by example. Russia is a threat to NATO allies such as Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, where Britain has played a key role in providing military reinforcement in recent weeks.

We should not forget Britain’s particular responsibilities to the Ukraine resulting from its role as one of 3 co-signatories to the December 1994 Budapest memorandum. This followed Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish nuclear weapons inherited from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ironically, along with the United States, the other co-signatory was Russia, undertaking “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”. The co-signatories also committed to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine if Ukraine should become a victim of aggression.

Nevertheless, Britain was not involved in the 2014 “Normandy Format” (France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine) and did not therefore take part in the negotiations in 2015 of the so-called Minsk 2 Agreement that was supposed to bring conflict in the Ukraine to an end. This agreement has have never been fully implemented largely because of fundamentally different interpretations of what exactly it means.

Britain’s obligations to Ukraine are primarily as the leading European NATO member, aware of how threats to peace in Europe, beyond the immediate coverage of the NATO shield, will have major economic, security and humanitarian repercussions that would rapidly spill over into the NATO area.

The key position of Turkey

Certainly more attention in this crisis should have been given to the role of countries such as Turkey, strongly committed to the Ukraine but with a unique pragmatic relationship with Russia. In spite of her very active NATO membership since 1952, Turkey has been badly treated by her allies for some decades, with hostile EU attitudes led by France and Greece. The United Kingdom has been more positive but has not tried hard enough given the opportunities it seeks for new partnerships, and the importance of Turkey to Western interests. The US showed little sensitivity to Turkish concerns over Iraq; over the Kurdish groups operating in northern Syria; in its handling of Turkish involvement in the F35 combat aircraft programme; and in its response to the 2016 coup attempt against President Erdogan. All the Western players have accepted a bogus and hostile narrative concerning the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. This has corrupted their approach to the issue ever since and has become a serious obstacle to improved relations with Turkey.

If we didn’t think we needed wholehearted Turkish engagement as a Western ally before, we certainly do now. For a start, after Russia, Turkey has the largest armed forces in the region, and is the foremost NATO ally on the Black Sea with a very capable and growing naval inventory. She also holds the key to warship movements in and out of the Black Sea through her control of the Straits, albeit regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Turkey has become a strong political and economic supporter of the Ukraine and a leading trade partner. In recent months Turkey has moved to strengthen the strategic aspects of this relationship, condemning the Russian annexation of the Crimea, bolstering Ukraine’s defence industry and, crucially, providing the very effective Bayraktar TB2 drone, which has already seen action in the breakaway Donbas region.

However, spurned by the West, there should be no surprise that Turkey has triangulated its policies to build other relationships, not least with Russia, while remaining true to its NATO commitments. Turkey needs Russian tolerance of the new situation Turkey has created with its ally Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Idlib province of Northern Syria. There is also strong Turkish reliance on its energy relationship with Russia. It is both a major importer and pipeline facilitator of Russian gas supplies.

But this could change. With major new gas fields discovered off its northern coast Turkey has a vested interest in a peaceful Black Sea. And its claim, along with Northern Cyprus, to be included in exploitation of gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean could be met if there was a sensible shift in Western attitudes. It may not be too late for Turkey to play a pivotal role in the Ukraine crisis. If we expect little from the EU, the UK should certainly be working more closely with Turkey

On the brink of conflict?

We still stand on the brink of conflict in Europe, in spite of the mixed messages from Moscow – deception or maskirovka being a classic technique of Russia at the tactical and strategic levels. It is perhaps premature to review the mistakes that have already been made and what needs to change.

What is clear is the importance of a unified response by the West and its international partners and the need to improve the understanding and support of our own people in time of threat. And we have to invest more in defence. This is certainly about our ability to field sustainable and credible military forces but also about greater national resilience at a time when conventional warfare may take place in the context of entirely new weapons and techniques on many fronts.

If the crisis passes, all this will again be forgotten, until next time it is too late.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy, former British Conservative leader and Defence Spokesman in the European Parliament. As a former senior military officer he served in the front-line of the Cold War including 5 years in Berlin, and at NATO headquarters.

(This article first appeared in the American Spectator at https://spectator.org/evidence-for-policymakers-a-guide-to-making-tough-calls-on-complex-matters/)

Start with a simple empirical proposition: It is rare that one has all the evidence at hand one would like to have when facing important decisions. This holds true for countless big personal choices—marriage, divorce, buying/selling a home, moving to a new location, choosing the best school, embarking on a career, etc. Such decisions involve the uncertainty endemic to life on our planet.

The same uncertainty equally pervades the weighing of policy options, whether to support or oppose, let alone, decide to act. We are constantly calculating odds, assessing trade-offs, estimating plausible outcomes. We also assess their probable impact on allies, neutrals and adversaries—and, in politics as ever, on potential election outcomes. Technology tells us what is or may become possible; markets factor in what consumers and producers see as currently plausible; multi-tiered regulation ultimately dictates what is legally permissible. Many policy arguments feature advocates purporting to apply scientific standards of proof; other arguments center around legal proof standards. And, naturally, many arguments have advocates combining the two.

Standards of Legal Proof: Legal Standards Judicially Applied. One thing that separates executive and legislative branches from judicial branches is that judicial bodies are obligated by law to follow certain rules considering whether evidence suffices to cross the legal threshold of proof and thus decide the case. (For simplicity, I am skipping administrative agencies, which often combine quasi-legislative with quasi-judicial functions.) Unfortunately, decision-makers often clash over what constitutes proof; complicating this is that is it easier to place the onus of proof on one’s opponents, than it is to prove one’s own case.

Imposing high standards of proof can lead to protracted paralysis, making one prisoner of events as they unfold, leaving the initiative to other actors. Conversely, lax standards of proof often carry a greater risk of making catastrophic blunders.

Standards of legal proof aim to match the severity of liability facing defendants. The lowest standard is a mere preponderance of the credible evidence; the highest, famously applied in criminal cases, where defendants face deprivation of liberty—or, in capital cases, life—is beyond a reasonable doubt. (Certain classes of civil cases, were wrongdoing is easily alleged and inherently difficult to rebut, carry an intermediate standard of proof, “clear and convincing”—highly probable or reasonably certain—between the two main standards of proof.) These standards work in legal proceedings, but have little usefulness in guiding empirical policy. The inability to compel production of evidence from many bad actors on the world stage renders all these standards hard to apply in deciding policy matters.

Standards of Scientific Proof: A Key Metric. In a Jan. 24, 2022 article in Tablet Magazine, The Dissidents, author Clayton Fox interviewed many leading scientists, from which he writes: “one quote stood out”:

There is no scientific truth, only replicable science. Then it becomes theory, but not law. And not truth. There are fundamental laws of physics that have been overturned. Law is not truth, law is law, and in science, law can be overturned.

Fox continues:

Somehow in the madness, confusion, and paranoia of our two-year sojourn through Covid-19, that basic definition of scientific truth—that it is ever evolving, and inimical to dogmatism—has been largely mocked, denigrated and ignored, if not met with slogans like “believe science.”

Thus, he writes, does Anthony Fauci aver that “attacks on me are attacks on science”; Pfizer’s single clinical trial of its own antiviral pill induces health policymakers to discount and defame hundreds of clinical trials produced by other firms. Fox blames a coterie of “authoritarian bureaucrats and tech platforms that increasingly function as private arms of the state.”

In October 2020, three leading medical scientists, from, respectively, Stanford, Harvard and Oxford (the GBD3), issued the Great Barrington Declaration. They recommended “Focused Protection” of the most vulnerable, instead of blanket protection that includes many people at near-zero risk to catch Covid. The latter are unlikely to be hospitalized, let alone, die, if they catch it; for them, early therapeutic treatment can be very effective. The GBD has been signed by over 60,000 medical professionals, and has gathered over 920,000 signatures in total. In the entire history of epidemiology, the GBD3 stated, no disease in history has ever been eradicated by lockdowns. While much scientific evidence was slighted or ignored outright, eventually facts came to light that, along with public attitudes, may make them decisive in altering current policies. One key reason that these facts were not widely known sooner is that many mass and social media platforms actively suppressed contrary views as allegedly “misinformation.” I recently came across a Big Word, ultracrepidarian, an adjective that denotes “the habit of giving opinions or advice on matters that lie outside of one’s knowledge and competence.” Its leading practitioners in America today are today’s politically correct mass and social media outlets; with the pandemic they outdid themselves.

Standards of Policy Proof: No Authoritative Arbiter. Disputes over public policy are not governed formally by any standard of proof. Intuitively, one would ask for higher standards of proof for the most serious matters—such as going to war. Yet adversaries with whom we might go to war often have largely opaque societies, with limited information available without necessary cooperation that will rarely be forthcoming.

There is also the human tendency to favor one’s own side, by placing burden of proof on others. In more than half a century of policy disputation, I can’t recall a single instance where someone said to me: “The burden of proof rests on my side, and I hereby accept it.” Thus, no one can divorce oneself from self-interest, in making the other side’s case harder to establish.

From this flow two propositions which in tandem come as close to genuine neutrality as I can propose:

(1) As there may be many problems where neither side can meet even the lowest standard of courtroom proof: Each of us has the burden of making the best case we can for our side.

(2) As none of us can impartially justify deciding standards of proof for others: Each of us may determine what standard we wish to apply.

These are fine in the abstract, but a real-life problem is that people in positions of power routinely impose their preferences on those with less power. Bosses tell subordinates what to do, including, when deemed necessary, what burden of proof applies. Ditto parents, presidents, etc.

Yet pressing issues call for arriving at some realistic mid-point. Two major controversies serve as case studies in the pros and cons of how empirical evidence has been used in support of or opposition to major public policy choices: (a) Covid-19’s origin and consequent policy responses; (b) the potential effectiveness of economic sanctions to deter or punish aggressive behavior by foreign adversaries—Russia, China and Iran—as well as conduct by our allies that may undermine such policies.

Covid-19. What evidence should we require before finding China guilty of hiding Covid-19 to protect itself from being held responsible for unleashing a global pandemic? How should we weigh hazardous research carelessly conducted and thus not contained? How much evidence—qualitative and/or qualitative—should suffice for lifting lockdown and mask restrictions, and targeting discrete population segments for vaccination and treatment?

One avenue of inquiry is determining culpability. State of mind is at the root of these questions. What may have been done intentionally? What activities may show reckless disregard for the safety of others? What acts were grossly negligent, or merely negligent? And what honest misjudgments were made in good faith, and hence not culpable?

A second avenue of inquiry is whether policies were reasonable in light of the perceived threat. What adjustments, if any, were made as more was learned about the virus? What options, if any, were foreclosed? Were any efforts made to suppress qualified medical authorities who disagreed with decisions made?

For two years now, the public health establishment has ignored or denigrated critics, demonstrating that bureaucratic attitudes and perceived imperatives can triumph over even a vast storehouse of contrary empirical evidence. The Covid-19 scorecard was in many respects a dismal one. Virtually worldwide, the authorities chose total lockdowns; mandated vaccines and wearing of masks; dismissed opposing views; demonized dissenters; and revoked emergency authorization for monoclonal antibody treatment despite awareness of successes with it, enraging Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who said at a Jan. 25 presser:

Without a shred of clinical data to support this action [President Joe] Biden has forced trained medical professionals to choose between treating their patients or breaking the law. . . . There are real world implications to Biden’s medical authoritarianism—American’s access to treatments is now subject to the whims of a failing president. . . . this is not how you help people. The government is going above and beyond to deny access to people. . . . Now [patients] are being told that it would be illegal for a provider to give it to them—all based off one observational non-peer reviewed study.

Johns Hopkins Dr. Marty Markary slammed CDC for ignoring the superior results documented for natural immunity, and misled the public when it finally issued a report; the result was serious harm to millions of Americans:

Public-health officials ruined many lives by insisting that workers with natural immunity to Covid-19 be fired if they weren’t fully vaccinated. But after two years of accruing data, the superiority of natural immunity over vaccinated immunity is clear. By firing staff with natural immunity, employers got rid of those least likely to infect others. It’s time to reinstate those employees with an apology.

For most of last year, many of us called for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to release its data on reinfection rates, but the agency refused. Finally last week, the CDC released data from New York and California, which demonstrated natural immunity was 2.8 times as effective in preventing hospitalization and 3.3 to 4.7 times as effective in preventing Covid infection compared with vaccination.

Yet the CDC spun the report to fit its narrative, bannering the conclusion “vaccination remains the safest strategy.” It based this conclusion on the finding that hybrid immunity—the combination of prior infection and vaccination—was associated with a slightly lower risk of testing positive for Covid. But those with hybrid immunity had a similar low rate of hospitalization (3 per 10,000) to those with natural immunity alone. In other words, vaccinating people who had already had Covid didn’t significantly reduce the risk of hospitalization.

Similarly, the National Institutes of Health repeatedly has dismissed natural immunity by arguing that its duration is unknown—then failing to conduct studies to answer the question.

It was left to the Johns Hopkins team to conduct the study, which confirmed the superiority of natural over vaccinated immunity.

As if all the above were not enough, the health authorities covered up much wrongdoing by the Chinese Communist Party and the Wuhan researchers—in which the CDC and NIH appear complicit. Last fall President Biden claimed that in a meeting with Xi Xinping he pressed the Chinese president for more Covid transparency; as the two were alone when this exchange allegedly took place, we have only Joe’s word for it. His long record of fabrications does not inspire confidence.

The fact that the CCP refused to allow timely access to the lab, for health authorities to come in and help contain the outbreak, speaks volumes. Given such refusal, we should conclude that the CCP has done bad things that they are hiding to avoid being held accountable. It is unrealistic to demand a high standard of proof when the guilty party denies access to the evidence that could definitively determine the causes of the outbreak.

And perhaps moist infuriating of all, many leaders, and other entitled elites, ignored the restrictions they dictatorially and capriciously imposed upon the general population. Nor was much effort made to evaluate the harm caused by the virus, versus the harm caused by lockdowns, masks—especially, to kids. NYP columnist Karol Markowicz offered a graphic portrait of how school lockdown and mask mandates harmed her children.

Arguably, excepting the two world wars that earned the 20th century the sobriquet, the Bloody Century, the collective failures associated with Covid-19 amounted to one of the most globally ruinous, in terms of human suffering and immense economic expense, in modern history.

Sanction Strategies. Historical evidence can guide policymakers in choosing sanction strategies that have a realistic chance to bear fruit. Collectively it suggests five principles of targeting and timing that can govern when adversaries might be brought to heel by a sanctions regime:

1. Markets: Control by a sole supplier or group of suppliers of goods or services for which there is no available substitute, and who equally agree on the sanctions to be imposed;

2. Precision: The ability to direct pain at the regime and its leaders, by withholding goods and services deemed essential to the regime’s ability to stay in power and carry out its policies;

3. Vulnerability: A regime weak enough to be unable to circumvent sanction or endure under them;

4. Implementation: Honest, effective administration of the sanctions;

5. Timing: Enough time for sanctions to achieve their intended purpose.

President Reagan lifted the grain embargo imposed upon the former Soviet Union by the Carter administration after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan did so because the only adverse impact had been on American farmers. Substitute suppliers—Canada, Australia and Argentina—had stepped in to export the grain. In 1982 Reagan imposed a high-technology embargo—including products that only the U.S. made—that denied the Soviet military essential technology. This precisely targeted items essential to the regime’s survival, and for which there was no circumvention or endurance option available to the Soviets. The vehicle for administering the sanctions was CoCom, a coordinating committee established by NATO; though not completely airtight, it proved sufficiently so, and honestly and competently administered, to accomplish its intended objectives. The time frame needed for the Reagan sanctions to work was remarkably brief; the Berlin Wall was taken down in 1989, and the former Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991.

Conversely, the post-Gulf War oil-for-food embargo imposed upon Iraq failed all five tests. Not only did it abjectly fail, but Saddam Hussein co-opted the UN into undercutting the sanctions by diverting billions to pay for illicit goods he sought, including parts to build missiles.

Bottom Line. Generally accepted standards of proof often have little utility versus adversaries in public policy disputes—and little chance of prevailing over strong contrary political headwinds. This holds especially true if mass and social media align themselves with one political party. Yet in minor or even middling cases our ensuing policy paralysis is merely a nuisance.

With Covid-19, and when weighing imposing sanctions upon geostrategic adversaries, such indulgence is dangerous. Making matters worse is a mainstream media mob heavily invested in favor of whatever helps Democrats and hurts Republicans. Unless we shake off our lassitude, vigorously contest suppression of contrary views by media minders, and adopt reasonable, realistic standards of proof—whether mine or some other formulation—our security, freedom and prosperity bids fair to be smothered by dictatorial elites.

https://thefederalist.com/2021/03/10/bidens-national-security-strategy-aims-to-take-the-leftist-culture-war-global

By: Matthew R.J. Brodsky, Senior Fellow

The Biden administration released its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” last week in a 24-page blueprint for reordering American society according to leftist dogmas that will also be applied as policy abroad.

A central theme of the text is “democracy,” a word mentioned 24 times. According to the “Guidance,” democracy is the solution at home and abroad, it is under assault, and it must be “revitalized.” One must dig a little deeper and connect the loose threads to understand how the Biden administration imbues the word “democracy” with meaning that goes far beyond what most people would assume.

While lamenting the global rise of authoritarianism, the document argues that our democracy and national strategy were “reinforced by the 12 initial executive actions issued by President Biden in his first two days in office,” which the administration argues “centers on restoring trust with the American people.” In the administration’s version of “democracy,” then, presidential authority that bypasses Congress is considered more democratic.

The national strategy says “a vibrant democracy rejects politically motivated violence in all of its forms,” which most Americans could agree on. It also states, however, that “millions of Americans have braved COVID-19 to demand racial justice.” So not only has history been re-written to remove the most obvious features of reality — such as the violence, burning, and looting that raged across the country during 2020 — but all those who participated are considered brave for having done so while violating local lockdown orders and curfews.

The “Guidance” sees democracies across the world — including our own — as under siege but not from the aforementioned “brave” protestors, which is why U.S. cities from Washington, D.C., to Minneapolis to Seattle remain boarded up. Instead, it identifies the chief causes of this siege as “nationalist and nativist trends,” which is to say that America’s new version of democracy rejects the very concept of a nation-state that pursues national interests while prioritizing the welfare of its citizens.

Another theme repeated throughout is that the United States “will lead with diplomacy” while “renewing our commitment to global development and international cooperation.” In practice, global development means that nation-building projects are back on the list of priorities. For example, it pledges “to provide Central America with $4 billion in assistance over four years,” which is designed, among other expectations, “to address the root causes of … irregular migration.”

Even as we make Central America Great Again, the strategy seeks to keep the red carpet unfurled to its citizens: “We must renew our promise as a place of refuge, and our obligation to protect those who seek shelter on our shores.”

While the document repeatedly references threats that don’t respect national borders, the White House can’t admit that illegal immigration is one of them, much less suggest that it is best addressed by strengthening our border, as that would be a nationalist solution. The answer they offer is to keep America’s borders open while investing in failing countries to make them a better place to live, which would presumably cause fewer people to want to immigrate to the United States.

At least the Guidance admits, “We will not be able to solve all of the challenges we face at the southern border overnight,” because this approach will exacerbate the problem. Likewise, the thematic focus on international cooperation in the context of “principled diplomacy” also reflects a new Democratic Party norm where we don’t have a genuine foreign policy as much as a domestic wish list on how to remake our own country, which we then preach abroad.

If one is unconvinced, the report spells it out clearly:

Because traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic policy — and among national security, economic security, health security, and environmental security — are less meaningful than ever before, we will reform and rethink our agencies, departments, interagency processes, and White House organization to reflect this new reality.

To be clear, nothing has changed the distinction between foreign and domestic policy. What changed is how this administration chooses to see them. One must utterly redefine “national security” to justify the Biden administration’s priorities. For example, one of the few enemies we will aggressively combat is “systemic racism”:

Combatting systemic racism requires aggressive action to address structures, policies, and practices that contribute to the wealth gap, to health disparities, and to inequalities in educational access, outcomes, and beyond.

The Biden administration believes another clear threat facing the United States is climate change. In the 24-page document, the word “climate” appears 27 times (the word “military,” by comparison, only appears 19 times).

You’d also be forgiven for thinking the document was issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the Labor Department, since the word “diversity” appears seven times — the same count as the word “nuclear.” Stunningly, the Biden administration pledges that it “will prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and clean energy.”

While some national security experts may believe too many cooks in the kitchen can spoil the broth, Biden’s approach is to not only include all the cooks but the bartenders as well. The strategy pledges to “develop new processes and partnerships to ensure that state, municipal, tribal, civil society, non-profit, diaspora, faith-based, and private sector actors are better integrated into policy deliberations.”

President Biden’s Strategic Guidance promotes and redefines a leftist wish list as not only a vital American interest but as a vital global interest. In doing so, it completely erases the line between domestic and foreign policy, replacing it with new dividing lines that pit Americans against one another.

America’s genuine adversaries will likely view this document with a mixture of relief, laughter, and incredulity. Americans who read it carefully will realize it’s a national security document that will not make them one bit safer.

I recently had the opportunity to participate in a seminar in South Korea for future leaders regarding the role and importance of soft power, and the influence that it provides a country globally. No longer are soldiers, tanks and guns needed to fight a war, but other forms of influence known as soft power can have a greater impact with less physical destruction.

<

>The recent – or more appropriately worded, current – U.S. elections have many scratching their heads. While here in the United States, you have Trump supporters wondering how brazen the left has become, across the globe there are many more that are watching in utter disbelief. The United States has been a country of tough rhetoric, but a beacon of honesty – until now. What we have seen in the months leading up to the November 3rd elections is the role of soft power in our own country and its use by enemies of the constitution from within. The loss [at present] that President Trump and more than half the country is experiencing is nothing short of a soft coup.<

> <

>This use of soft power by the rising American socialist left to influence or steal an election has many in Europe concerned. Senator Joe Biden announced his win when it was already November 7 in Europe and to these concerned leaders the coup they see here is reminiscent of the Russian Revolution and specifically the Bolshevik Coup which also took place on November 7 in 1917. Europe was not the same since that event and now they are concerned about United States. For our European friends 1917 was not that long ago, and to many more the impact of that event is not something that they may read in a history book.<

> <

>For years U.S. leaders have urged for democracy in countries that may not have wanted it, and for “free and fair” elections in countries where it may not be possible. In such cases the United States, along with others, have played the role of observer. The country that has been the visible leader in personal freedom and the rights of the individual has always been there to urge the same for all.<

> <

>President Barack Hussein Obama and Democrats in congress have called the removal of the Egypt’s terror supporting Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi from office by as many as 55 million Egyptian a coup, even though the subsequent election of President Sisi was done to the letter of the law. Now that Senator Joe Biden is claiming victory in what can be at best be considered a questionable election, and more appropriately a soft coup, how do we explain to countries like Egypt, that the United States is still the beacon of honesty and integrity? It is clearly time for Joe Biden to stop calling President Sisi “[President Donald] Trump’s favorite dictator.”<

> <

>President Reagan told the story of two people were talking about how lucky they are to live in the freest country in the world. A Cuban refugee said to them, “How lucky you are, at least I had someplace to escape to”. That story tells us everything we need to know today, with the rise of the Socialist left
in this country were to win, they hope everyone has their passports with which to “escape” to another country. What country we can escape as there is no other on God’s green earth that does not rely on a strong United States. Never has there been any other country in the history that has a greater global impact.<

> <

>We must understand that what makes this country great is not our cities or countryside, but who we are. In a message I received from an Pakistani immigrant to our shores, he said “All I will say is that people migrate to this great country, not for the political leaders, not for its lavish landscapes, not for its food, but for its CONSTITUTION. Which in its essence is a road map for the land of opportunities.”<

> <

>Whether you call it voter fraud, or irregularities, there is enough evidence for President Trump to take legal action and Joe Biden to explain. What is at stake here is not just the question of what car you drive, or which doctor you use, but rather the future of our constitution, our nation, our people.<

> <

>Eli M. Gold is the President of the Gold Institute for International Strategy. Prior to creating the Gold Institute Eli was the co-founder a leading foreign policy and national security think tank. Eli Gold has created go-to organization for U.S. policy makers, as well as foreign governments seeking guidance on the most complex foreign policy and defense issues.<

>

Defence Review

Changes in our strategic environment are taking place faster than anticipated and require urgent response and a shift in approach. As a consequence, defence strategy and spending is being reviewed across many of the democracies after years of complacency.

NATO has completed a ‘reflection process’ to consider the shape and role of the Alliance ten years hence. The US Congress ‘Future of Defense Task Force’ has called for a ‘major course correction’ in the US approach to national security. In February 2021, US President Biden referenced a new Department of Defense China task force to look at US strategy and operational concepts, technology, and force posture. In March 2021, the British government published its “Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”, and announced a huge uptick in UK defence expenditure. An additional £16.5 billion that will include 13 new frigates, an AI Centre and a new RAF Space Command. There are calls in India for a fresh military posture based on a new Grand Strategy. Australia has recently published its Defence Strategic Update.

These reviews share common threads:

– The certainties of the past, the model of successful Western free-market economies, the ambition for democracy, and commitments to the established rules-based, post-World War 2 system are under challenge. This has been driven primarily by the rise of China;

– The binary distinction between war and peace has been eroded by ‘grey zone’ conflict where subversion through social media, cyberattack, economic coercion, unattributable aggressive action and state-sponsored terrorism, undermine and distract our capabilities and the public confidence on which they are based;

– The realms of space and cyberspace have added new and awesome dimensions to the traditional domains of conflict;

– The threat of limited conventional warfare remains, as evidenced by Russian actions and threats against the Ukraine, and many more countries now have access to advanced weaponry, including sophisticated armed drones;

– Weapons of mass destruction, and of mass infection and disruption, in the hands of both rogue states and terrorist groups represent a potential threat to our homelands and people;

– The effects of climate change have major potential security implications;

The Locust Years

Without a strong economy, ambitious defence plans cannot be sustained. That is a truism. But neglect of defence spending is always a mistake. In periods of apparent peace and in difficult economic times, defence budgets are seen as a “regrettable necessity” if not a luxury spend absorbing precious resources and manpower.

For example, after the First World War, the massive British public spending cuts of 1922-23 (the so-called Geddes Axe) fell disproportionately on the armed forces. Defence spending restraint continued into the mid-1930s while the potential enemy was already spending three times as much. Britain was in a state of unpreparedness. The wakeup-call almost came too late.

After the massive and exhausting exertions of the Second World War leading to victory and peace, there were rapid cutbacks. A spike in defence expenditure during the Korean War was followed by massive defence cuts after the Suez crisis in 1956. Defence spending continued its spiral of decline with ‘salami cuts’ that reduced both military effectiveness and international capabilities at cost to Britain’s international standing and effectiveness. A dramatic fall in defence spending was justified following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the removal of the Warsaw Pact threat. But this proved to be far from the predicted ‘end of history’. New threats soon arose and Britain, like others, was slow to respond, hovering on the barely acceptable 2% of GDP on defence –a modest and reasonably achievable spending target for all NATO allies, which most fail to meet. Britain is the only European nation with growing full-spectrum military capabilities, global reach, continual operational experience, and robust political will, confirming its position as the most indispensable ally of the democracies after America

Defence Investment as a Multiplier of Advantages

The relationship between defence spending and economic well-being has been a subject of academic dispute for decades. Defence spending has often been a scapegoat for poor economic performance and ‘balance of payments’ difficulties while insufficient attention has been paid to the wider economic, political, technological and social benefits of defence spending, on top of the primary task of maintaining national security.

The commitment of NATO allies to the defence of the European democracies, the US defence guarantees to the Republic of Korea in 1953, to Taiwan in 1954, and to Japan in 1960, the UK protection of Kuwait from Iraq in 1964, the Commonwealth defence of the newly formed state of Malaysia in 1965, and the fearsome determination of Israel to defend its territory and its very existence, are all examples of credible deterrence, readiness and response.

The attempted communist takeover of the Korean peninsula in 1950, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982, and the seizure of Eastern Ukraine in 2014, would probably not have happened if the aggressor had thought these territories would be robustly defended.

What needs to be done

If we cherish continued freedom, security and prosperity, more needs to be spent on defence, sometimes differently than before. To strengthen the capabilities and resilience of our armed forces and intelligence services the lessons are clear:

– make a step-change in research, development and efficient procurement, protected from hostile espionage and acquisition, so that we become masters of the new domains of potential conflict;

– strengthen national resilience including critical infrastructure. The Covid-19 plague, for example, has exposed the weaknesses in even the most advanced societies to produce and distribute basic protective equipment, and maintain the confidence of the population;

– revitalise existing alliances, in particular NATO (where there is also a need to resist the divisive military ambitions of the EU, which includes 21 of the 30 NATO members) and generate new, flexible and willing coalitions.

and, most importantly, the much-neglected need to

– regenerate national solidarity and the understanding of our people, particularly the young, of the need for commitment to the defence of our freedom, prosperity and individual liberty.

We can rightly applaud the steps now being taken by the UAE and Israel to normalise their relations. Such initiatives can only be to the long-term advantage of the people of the Middle Eastern nations, helping to build trust, opening fresh possibilities for harnessing Israeli know-how and Arab resources, and finding pragmatic solutions to the most bitter and deep-rooted problems. Following moves by Egypt some four decades ago and then Jordan, to reset relations with Israel, there are now  many permutations in the relations between Israel and the 22 states of the Arab league with a majority open to low-level diplomatic relations and trade. This is in spite of the efforts to isolate Israel through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement and its western apologists. Extremists will of course seek to exacerbate problems. They will try to intensify their efforts through the more radical mosques and madrassahs, through social media, and through acts of terrorism, to continue to cajole and mislead the most populous and deprived areas of the Arab street. All this is well understood.

My immediate concern is elsewhere – the alienation of Turkey. We are used to Iran’s exploitation of Shia proxies in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq in order to threaten Western interests and the security of Israel. But there is now a new and deepening schism in the region. This could open dangerous and fresh fault lines across the Sunni Arab world where temporal rivalry is being played out through various strands of political Islam, in particular the Moslem Brotherhood. Central to this concern is Turkey, a great country that for the past century has looked to Europe for its modernising inspiration, for nearly 70 years has been a key member of NATO but which has been taken for granted by the West and its interests neglected. Now Turkey, feeling rejected, has turned to the South,  seeking to rekindle its Ottoman heritage and to show affinity with radical,  pious or opportunist elements in Gaza and Libya and Qatar and take issue with rival traditional rulers in Saudi Arabia and UAE and the military secular regime in Egypt.  The pre-Erdogan alliance of convenience between Israel and Turkey has long collapsed. The west is in disarray. Not only has Russia now managed to reinsert itself into the Middle East but we also have France and the EU exacerbating the difficulties with Turkey by bone-headed support for Greek interests over the long-running Cyprus issue and now exploitation of natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean.

US policy in the region in recent years has lacked strategic consistency and is seen to be weak. The UK, once the most influential power in the region, has been barely visible, but could play a key role with the US in helping bring Turkey into the mainstream before schism becomes an irreparable chasm. The threat from the Iranian regime, from Russia and from international terrorism have not gone away. It is vitally important therefore to generate cohesion among our allies in the Middle East, to heal sensitivities and to repair damaged relations with restored regional alliances and economic opportunities. Turkey is central to this task.

The Israel-UAE agreement to normalise relations is a historical peace accord in the region. It is a bold and courageous move by both sides, which could lead to further Arab countries in the region to follow suit and recognise the state of Israel. Whilst a number of Arab and Islamic countries already have secret relationships with Israel, the current accord is only the third Israel-Arab peace treaty in the Middle East after Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). The international community has welcomed the move, except for Palestine, Iran and Turkey who have  lashed out against it; the fact that other Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia, have not denounced the agreement is generally positive.
It is worth paying attention to the timing of the agreement. Arab countries have been hostile to the Jewish State since its establishment. For many years, the idea of recognising Israel was unthinkable; and most Arab states, including the UAE, have financially and militarily supported various Palestinian groups against Israel. Now the political landscape and geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East are changing. A united front to fight economic problems and military threats from Iran is needed. Whilst we do not know the exact details of the agreement just yet, here are 12 positive points that we think are important for the understanding of the impact of  this peace agreement and for the overview of its geopolitical, social and economic effects for the whole region:

1. Iran is growing militarily in the region. A united anti-Iranian front is essential to combat the Iranian danger; the  deal will signal the official formation of an anti-Iranian bloc. 
2. Israel is the region’s superior military force which the UAE and other Gulf states can rely on.
3. This move will encourage other Arab and Gulf states to engage with Israel. (It is understood that Sudan, Oman and Bahrain are interested in finding ways to normalize their relationships with Israel).
4. In the past, most people believed that the road to peace with the Arab world must go through Ramallah, but now the road to peace is going through Cairo, Amman and Abu Dhabi and might soon go through new locations in the Gulf and North Africa.
5. The deal firmly highlights American leadership in the region and demonstrates how the role of the US can be paramount in controlling current political troubles. 
6. The agreement is no longer about the ’land for peace’ mechanism but, as Netanyahu said, ’peace for peace’ formula. 
7. Whilst the deal has the potential to change Arab-Israeli relations and begin a new path for the future; it moves the Arab and Gulf states away from the Palestinian question. 
8. Israel makes peace with the Arabs without returning to the 1967 borders.
9. It appears that recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital is not an issue for the UAE leadership.
10. Israel is now less secluded and isolated, not just in terms of political connections but also in the commercial, social and geostrategic importance with its neighbors. 
11. Apart from the geopolitical repercussions from the deal, which antagonizes Iran, it is a warning sign to Hezbollah, Syria’s Al Assad, Turkey’s Erdogan and some of the Iraqi Shia militias.
12. The deal has significance for those who fight terrorism in the region and is damaging for the Shia and Sunni terrorist groups, such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra and the Houthis in Yemen.

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The policy of Iran is bringing Sunni countries together with Israel. KSA has relations though not a diplomatic status, as far as I know. The developments with UAE, followed by Oman and Bahrein broaden the network. Qatar will be more reflectant, given its Shia majority, if I am right.

The policy of Iran is bringing Sunni countries together with Israel. KSA has relations though not a diplomatic status, as far as I know. The developments with UAE, followed by Oman and Bahrein broaden the network. Qatar will be more reflectant, given its Shia majority, if I am right.

European countries and the EU had to admit that the ‘normalization of relations’ between Israel and the UAE is a good step forward, which they probably had not expected to be achieved by the current US administration. The EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, ‘welcomed’ the move but added that plans to annex the West Bank should be completely abandoned immediately.

The EU is not in the driving seat as far as the Middle-East is concerned. It always regarded itself as the caretaker of the Iran nuclear deal, once the US government decided to leave it. During the Obama administration the EU had been given a disproportionate part of the praise allowing the US government to remain less visible for the political forces in US Congress, in particular the Senate. Obama had to maneuver carefully because there was no majority in the Senate for ratification in terms of a treaty. So, it became a ‘deal’.

The EU felt it owned the deal, hammered out by the US, and that it made the EU ‘relevant’ in world politics. The EU negotiating at the table made it a ‘reality’ on the ground. For the first time since the introduction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy ten years ago the EU could point at an achievement. For the EU the deal was all about the EU, not about the content of the deal.

After the US left the Iran deal, the EU was on its own. Strongest supporters of the deal were Germany and France. Most lukewarm were countries in Central and Eastern Europe like Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. They tended to support the US. In particular Germany pretends the Iran nuclear agreement is still in place and the German Greens, an upcoming force in German politics, are the strongest supporters of the ayatollah regime in Iran.

Simultaneously, the EU is a strong critic of Israeli policies in the Gaza and the West Bank. Again, there is a rift within the EU between East and West. Some East European countries supported the relocation of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. France and Germany predicted ‘violent demonstrations’, but little happened. Also, BDS is strongly rooted as a movement in several West- and North European countries, though not state policy. The EU tries to target products from the West Bank with customs formalities.

But generally, the EU is running after the facts and taken by surprise. Borrell speaks about ‘normalization’ between Israel and UAE, avoiding the term ‘full diplomatic relations’. Bahrain and Oman are likely to follow. Egypt and Jordan already have normal diplomatic relations with Israel for many years. Saudi-Arabia maintains relations with Israel through the backdoor. Arab countries come closer to Israel, while the EU shifts further away, with the wrong focus.

For the EU the Palestinian issue is the heart of the problem in the Middle-East. For Arab countries Iran is the problem. Iran is the troublemaker and Palestinians have a knack to end up at the wrong side of history. The US has understood that; the EU hasn’t. The US focuses on solving the Palestinian issue within common ground on policies towards Iran. The EU befriends Iran hoping it will help the Palestinians in some way. But it won’t. Therefore, EU policy is misguided; and the current US government has shown to understand the heart of the problem much better, using the right focus.

The Indians, fast emerging as a bulwark against Chinese aggression, offer enormous opportunities in a deeper partnership.

If China has been trying to push its advantage during the Covid-19 pandemic, maybe it should be more modest as it now faces a backlash from Western countries seeking to unravel Chinese involvement in their economies, infrastructure and communications. And more attention should be paid to India, a friendly democracy and leading Commonwealth nation whose population is at least as big as China’s and which is projected to become the world’s third largest economy by 2030. 

The calls for serious reappraisal of relations with China have been sparked by increased tensions over Taiwan, the imposition of new security laws on Hong Kong, more incidents in the South China Sea, and most recently, serious incursions in the contested Himalayan borderlands with India.

The fight that took place last month between Chinese and Indian troops in the Galwan River area of Ladakh cost 20 Indian lives and an unknown number of Chinese. In spite of periodic incidents over the years, it was the first fatal clash between China and India since 1975.

Three weeks later, on 5 July, after a “frank” exchange,  Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi,  agreed to calm the situation, not to “turn disagreement into dispute”, to ensure respect for the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, and for disengagement of troops.

India is highly sensitive to encirclement. On assuming power in 2014, Prime Minister Modi made a point of prioritising strong relations with neighbouring South Asian states such as Bhutan, Nepal, Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar to try and head off growing Chinese influence.

China’s seizure of Tibet in 1950, previously an exclusive sphere of influence of the British Raj,  expanded enormously the frontier between India and China opposite Ladakh in the Northwest, Himachal Pradesh in the central sector, and Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast. It changed the strategic calculus. India long regarded Tibet as its northern rampart while Beijing saw it as its backdoor. Now it is its forward base. 

The Xinjiang –Tibet highway and its offshoots, cutting through the disputed Himalayan Aksai Chin region, was begun in 1951. This was followed by major development of military road systems on the Chinese side along the Himalayan rim, accelerating in recent years. The 1962 conflict, that ended with over 700 Chinese and 1,300 Indian dead, on terrain that included this same Galwan area, was a strategic shock to India that forced major improvements to her military capabilities and drew attention to the poor road links on the Indian side.

The Nehru-era fear that road improvements would merely assist an invader has been set aside and some dozens of upgraded road links have been created now that the response capabilities of the Indian Defence Forces have been massively enhanced. Perhaps the most sensitive of these has been the 140 mile, all-weather road connecting Leh, the Ladakh capital and greatly expanded military base, via Darbuk, with Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), a key forward  military post and airstrip near the China border. It runs just four miles from the scene of the latest incident.

On 3 July, Prime Minister Modi travelled to the Ladakh border region, to Nimo 22 miles from Leh, to show solidarity with the forward troops, reiterate his commitment to the territorial integrity of India and warn of the serious consequences of Chinese aggression which will require a diplomatic and military response.

The negotiations to bring about de-escalation seem to have ended up with a ‘buffer zone’ in territory previously regarded as Indian. This action has disturbed the status quo and given India cause for concern just when she has been seriously struck by Covid-19. While Modi has put a bold face on his relations with Xi Jinping, it’s certainly not the “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) of a previous era. 

As we have seen in the South China Sea and now in the Himalayas, China still takes note of the teachings of its 4th century BC military strategist, Sun Tzu, who advocated using “small steps forward” that are certain to improve your position while not overly alarming the enemy. 

India must itself judge the significance of China’s latest small step in the Himalayas, given all the complexities of its international relationships. Some take the view that India has no real strategic interest in the area under dispute and risks being drawn into conflict for no good reason beyond saving face. Others see this as a short-sighted analysis.

In the immediate area, there is the need to maintain tactical advantage, occupying dominant high ground and controlling key passes otherwise more territory will gradually be lost.  Strategically, the disputed interface between India and China extends some 2,500 miles across the Himalayan rim, almost from Afghanistan in the west to Myanmar in the east. There are many potential access points and Chinese violations of the LAC have become more frequent, more violent and more coordinated.

Any concession of territory potentially begets another, rendering India more vulnerable.  And the appearance of weakness on India’s part will influence the friendly alignment of vulnerable countries such as Bhutan and Nepal, undoing years of diplomatic investment and seriously undermining India’s regional security. 

India today is not the India of 1962, when she was politically naïve and militarily helpless. There are now some 200,000 acclimatised and well-equipped troops in the forward areas opposite China with artillery and armour support and backed by the very capable Indian Air Force. Narendra Modi is a strong Prime Minister, intensely protective of Indian sovereignty and deeply conscious of India’s place in the world. It makes no sense for China to try and push India too hard or to imagine that it has a free hand to do what it wants in the Himalayas.

At a time when the West is questioning its reliance on the economic relationship with China and when there is so much evidence of Chinese malpractice – industrial espionage, human rights abuse, cyber attack – far more attention now needs to be given to strengthening the relationship with India. The opportunities are enormous. The French have certainly seen this.

Britain, with all its ties of history, of people, and shared experience, should be even further in the forefront of substantive strategic partners – investing, cooperating ambitiously in research and manufacturing, helping to build effective alliances, developing Commonwealth capabilities, militarily present in the Indian Ocean, and working closely together in international forums such as the UN, where India will shortly take its seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. There are undoubted complications, but these can be worked through. 

As the West tries to rebalance its relationship with China, India should step forward. In this case she needs to make a step change in her economic development – in 1990, the GDPs of India and China were about the same. Now China’s economy is five times that of India, attributable in large part to the economic inputs that China got from the US, Europe and Japan. Some Western companies will re-shore their businesses but others, following the example of firms such as JCB, should perhaps turn to India. The vicious spat on the Galwan River should be noticed and could be the incentive to a deeper relationship.

This article was published in The Telegraph