(This article first appeared in the American Spectator: Https://spectator.org/supersonic-boom-overture-goes-presto/)

Recently TAS published my article, Mach Miracles: The Joy of Commercial Supersonic Flight. Therein I speculated as to when such service might return. A new announcement by Boom Supersonic, as reported by CNN, may advance the date for regular supersonic service. The article noted:

Nearly two years after rolling out its prototype supersonic demonstrator . . . Boom has unveiled a major new design (1:24) for its much anticipated “Overture” airliner, which will fly at twice the speed of today’s subsonic commercial jets and is expected to carry its first passengers in 2029.

CNN’s piece followed on the heels of a CBS “60 Minutes” July 10, 2022 segment (13:40), titled Supersonic, on the possible return of non-military supersonic travel. It concluded that 2035 was the earliest plausible date for a new supersonic era. The program’s focus was on two key concepts, one of which was Boom Supersonic. Entrepreneur Blake Scholl’s aim is to raise $7 billion in all-private-funding—a first for supersonic planes. His company aims to test-fly a single-seater craft this year; if successful, he’ll raise funds for a full-size plane, dubbed Overture, which would serve 600 destinations around the globe. Routes would be 4 to 5 hours flight minimum, and use 100 percent sustainable aviation fuel, a currently highly scarce commodity. Scholl’s long-term goal is—NOT a misprint—to enable air travel anywhere in the world in 4 hours at $100 per customer.

I then concluded my earlier piece with this assessment: “The dismal state of flight today augurs ill for a rapid return. Perhaps a supersonic business jet will be a stepping stone to a new Golden Age of Flight.”

The new video touts advances in the latest version: (a) contoured fuselage to reduce drag, thus increasing fuel efficiency; (b) a new delta-wing design, to improve supersonic performance and subsonic stability, thus maximizing safety and efficiency; (c) gull wings, to reduce supersonic noise (i.e., sonic boom), and minimize engine stress; (d) stabilizing tail, for balance and performance; (e) 4-engine design—the earlier XB-1 model (4:37) had 3 engines; on a 71-foot airframe one-third the length of Concorde and Overture —for efficient supersonic performance within standard temperature ranges, plus the ability to fly without afterburners (i.e., use “supercruise” to enable sustained high-speed flight, and thus minimize noise and fuel consumption); (g) Mach 1.7 top speed over water—twice today’s subsonic jets, and 20 percent faster overland subsonic speed, at Mach 0.94, than today’s jets attain; (h) zero carbon-emission “sustainable aviation fuel.”

Overture aims to carry 65-80 passengers up to 4,900 statute miles (7,900 km.), in an airframe roughly the same size as Concorde, with 700-miles longer range, and at 60,000 feet ceiling (same as Concorde, to minimize JetStream effects). This creates at least 600 potentially viable routes, given business first-class comfort. The company estimates that its round-trip fare will be 25 percent more than subsonic business class today, and 75 percent less than Concorde’s $12,000 round-trip fare in the 1990s. Overture provides, we are promised as we view a soft-lit modern interior, that “productivity meets tranquility.” Digital experiences, with customized windows, will offer fliers productivity modes for work, relaxation modes for rest and exploration modes for tracking flight progress.

A New York Post article provides added detail. The article notes that Overture will use lighter, stronger, more thermally stable carbon materials than Concorde’s aluminum alloys for much of its 21st century airframe.

Overture’s NYC – London travel time will be 3-1/2 hours versus 7 hours for today’s planes, LA – Sydney, 8 hours v. 15 hours today; Tokyo – Seattle, 4-1/2 hours v. 9 hours today. The NYC – London time is 15 minutes slower than that for Concorde, reflecting Concorde’s faster top speed (Mach 2.0 v. Mach 1.7); but the difference is minuscule, as much of the flight is not at top speed.

For the longer routes, Overture’s advantage will be greater, as Concorde would have to make one stop for the Tokyo – Seattle flight, and likely two stops for LA to Sydney, because the great circle distance (over the polar regions) shrinkage is far less than for Tokyo – Seattle, due to the southern latitude of Sydney. This Great Circle blog post shows Great Circle distance benefits to major Asian hubs; nearly all distance savings are on the order of a one percent distance reduction. This world latitude map shows latitudes for the above flight-linked cities: New York (400 N to London 520 N); Tokyo (360 N) to Seattle (480 N); LA (340 N) to Sydney (340 S).

More than 100 orders (news reports vary) are on the books—of course, contingent on delivery of the plane. CNN reports that Overture will be built by 2025, begin test flights in 2026 and serve commercial—business passengers, to be sure—in 2029.

Bottom Line. With the global economy teetering on the verge of possible economic collapse, any ambitious business plan is hostage to fortune. Supersonic flight incubates many new technologies, whose interaction cannot be assessed until actual test flights are flown, with full-size airframes. As airline orders are provisional, buyers incur minimal risk, with perhaps significant proffits if everything goes well. Versus my earlier assessment, the new Overture design offers modest cause for a less skeptical outlook.

That said, I am reminded of the classic joke about the optimist and the pessimist. The optimist exclaims, channeling Voltaire’s Candide, “This is the best of all possible worlds!” To which the pessimist, channeling O’Toole’s Commentary on Murphy’s Law, replies: “I agree.”

John Wohlstetter, a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy is author of Sleepwalking with the Bomb (Discovery Institute Press, 2d. ed. 2014).

Dr. Nahro Zagros: ​​Joe Biden went to the Middle East after 18 months in power, do you think his visit was successful?

Amb. John Bolton: I don’t think the trip was successful. I don’t I don’t think he demonstrated the kind of leadership, the kind of grasp of the many issues that face the region. You know, there’s a theory in the United States that says that China is the big threat of the 21st century and we can forget about the Middle East, forget about Europe, and only concentrate on China. It’s a big mistake. America and its allies have interests all over the world and the Middle East remains a central focus for friends of the United States and for the US. And it requires leadership, requires doing things that help bridge differences among our friends. It means taking a tough stance against our adversaries, and you can’t shirk that responsibility.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Well, the meeting was devoid of any drama or excitement, but knowing that, you know what Biden said in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to say that America is not leaving the place and leave a vacuum for the Russians and Chinese to come over. That’s a powerful statement, right?

Amb. John Bolton:: Well, the statement was good now. Now the question is what he does about it, the principal threat in the Middle East today, as it has been for many years, comes from Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support of terrorism in the region and around the world. Its aspirations for hegemony. There are many other sources of tension as well. Erdogan and Turkey has Neo-Ottoman aspirations. And there are terrorist groups, the threat and many of our friends there. So this is something that for long term peace and security in the region and around the world, the United States does not participate actively. It only makes the day much further away when we can expect….peace

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So the previous administration, the Trump administration, and the Biden administration, it seems that they have something in common. They both wanted to get out of the Middle East and yet Biden came back. Like we said, less than two weeks ago. Do you think the visit was mainly to counter Iranian threat there or it’s related to the Russia Ukraine war? Or perhaps America doesn’t want to leave their friends behind in the Middle East?

Amb. John Bolton:: I think the President doesn’t fully understand the impact in the region and more broadly, of the American and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think it was a strategic mistake by the United States to do it. And I think it left all of our friends around the world worried about our staying power, and there was not much from President Biden’s trip to the Middle East that changed that impression.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So you think it was nothing to do about foreign policy about countering Iran about American leaving difference behind in the Middle East it was mainly about the price of oil and gasoline?

Amb. John Bolton: I think I think he wanted more production. Out of the Gulf Arab countries. They had agreed the month before and OPEC to a modest increase, but they didn’t agree to anything more. But of course, being in the region. President had to visit Israel and he had to say something about the American role, but I just think it reflects a lack of attention. And surprisingly, for Biden, who’s spent so much of his career in the Senate on foreign policy, he’s made really little difference in international affairs. The events have gotten beyond his control, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: What about the JCPOA? This administration promised that they will get the JCPOA back on the table. So do you think this is going to happen on the Biden administration?

Amb. John Bolton: I hope not because I thought it was a bad deal and 2015 and I think the concessions that Biden has made over the past year to the Ayatollah have made it worse. Iran has shown no strategic decision not to pursue nuclear weapons. Do they want relief from economic sanctions? Yes, they do. Are they willing to give up the pursuit of no nuclear weapons? I don’t think so. So I think they represent really a huge threat not just because of the nuclear program, but because of their support for terrorism, and it requires much more of a stronger position by the United States.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You advised Donald Trump about the JCPOA and you advised him to leave the pact. So he did. Do you think it was successful because it doesn’t feel that he has achieved anything?

Amb. John Bolton: I don’t think we went far enough. I think it was the right thing to do to withdraw to impose US sanctions on Iran to try for what we call maximum pressure. But, the problem will not be solved until there’s a new government in Iran, a government that represents the people of Iran, not the Ayatollahs … that didn’t happen. We didn’t pursue regime change, but we should have.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Well, he did advocate for preemptive strike on North Korea and Iran and regime change in the latter. But do you think it was lack of understanding from the perspective, from Trump perspective., that he didn’t go far enough with a plan?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I didn’t think he really understood what the implications were he was against the JCPOA because Obama had negotiated but not really appreciating that the regime in Tehran wanted nuclear weapons, and would have been prepared to negotiate at great length. If they could get free from the economic sanctions. It was the leverage the pressure that we put on the regime that caused them to want to negotiate but while they were willing to say they’d give up nuclear weapons, they never did anything to accomplish it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: In your book, you mentioned that Trump wanted to delete Iraq, and yet at the same time, he was criticizing Barack Obama for leaving Iraq in 2011, who created a vacuum for ISIS to come for. So, what was the narrative that we don’t understand? On the one hand, Trump is against staying in Iraq, on the other hand criticizing Obama for leaving Iraq in 2011?

Amb. John Bolton:: Well, I didn’t understand the narrative either. It’s not that Americans really want to have our troops deployed all over the world. That’s the really the farthest thing from their mind, but it’s better to take care of threats and dangers to the US and its allies, where the threats originate not in the streets or the skies of America. So, the presence in Iraq, which Obama should not have abandoned was a way to see if Iraq could succeed as a nation, and to keep troublesome outsiders like Iran, like Syria, like Turkey, at a distance while we tried to solve that problem.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You are one of the architects of the Iraq war, or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Do you think it was a success story?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think there are different parts of the saga. It was certainly a success in that it removes Saddam Hussein from power and he was a threat to international peace and security. He was a threat to his own people in particular, the Kurds. I remember after the first Persian Gulf War, in 1991, going with Jim Baker from the north of Turkey, just into Iraq and seeing 10s of 1000s (tens of thousands) of Kurds who had fled fearing Saddam Hussein’s wrath after the first war, they were without shelter. They were without food. It was a potential for a great humanitarian tragedy. Saddam didn’t care about that at all. So removing Saddam was an important thing to do. Did we accomplish the next step of building a new Iraq? No, I don’t, I don’t think we succeeded. I’m not sure we should have tried the way we did. I think ultimately it was going to be the peoples of Iraq who would decide whether there would be a new Iraq and how it would succeed. It wasn’t anything that we were going to impose. We could draw a ring around them, to give them the chance. And I think that’s all that we should have done.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So in other words, it’s America won the war, but what’s the peace in Iraq?

Amb. John Bolton: Yeah, that’s why I say there are different phases to this. The war was a success. What came after was not a success, not because of bad faith by the United States. But because in large measure, we became another political party in Iraq. And that was not the path to success, also because of the intervention of Iran, and its effort to impose their kind of theocratic rule in Iraq as well.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So what led to the downfall of the plan and for the flat plan not to succeed because in five years, America lost 5450 service members as well. As 3793 military contractors only between 2003-2018.. So, what went wrong? Exactly?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, there were a lot of other things that were happening, not the least of which was the renewal of al Qaeda terrorism and a different kind of form a lot of developments that really were extraneous to the effort in post Saddam Iraq. I’m not going to tell a Kurdish audience how complicated the politics of Iraq are, but to have succeeded as a state to these three disparate provinces of the Ottoman Empire was going to require political compromises among ethnic groups and confessional groups. It’s possible it could have been done. But there was not good faith on the part of all of the players. There were external powers that were interfering in it. And there were not the circumstances where trust could be built up, especially after the United States withdrew in 2011. Our presence could not guarantee success. But our withdrawal, I think, hastened the failure [11:05]. And I think there had to come a point where reasonable people could say, this creation of post-World War One, European dealmaking wasn’t going to succeed, and we had to look at what the successor structures would be one of those would have been an independent Kurdistan and acknowledges the reality on the ground to say we tried to form a viable Iraq and for reasons not having anything to do with the Kurds. It wasn’t going to succeed. So there has to be an effective government for the people. And that’s what leads you to the conclusion that if Iraq can’t succeed as a country, you have to look at alternatives.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: I’ll come back to this. Talk about Kurdish independence. But first. Iraq is an important country in the region. One of the reasons America went there, it’s to get rid of Saddam Hussein and all the threats that his regime was posing, but also at the same time to counter Iran. And yet, Iraq is run by Iranians, thanks to the invasion, it’s in the hands of Iranians. So from that perspective, it’s a complete fiasco, right?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think as it worked out because of Iranian interference, you know, in the balance between the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs, the influence of Iran, even within the Shia community to build an Iraq that looked like Iran was quite small. And yet we were not able in the parties were not able to find a way to compromise so that you could have not a secular population but a secular government that could accommodate different interests. And I don’t think we gave the kind of support we could have, recognizing the threat from Iran. So that I would say the one of the reasons for failure was the American failure to see the threat that Iran poses, not just because of the nuclear program, not just because its support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen, but their interference and their desire not to have a success at creating an effective Iraqi government.

13:30 (KURDS MIDDLE EAST)

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Okay, I’ll move to another subject about the Kurds in the Middle East. In your book, you mentioned that Trump said he doesn’t like Kurds, and reading what you wrote. that made you furious. Right, because you have this people in the Middle East who are the most reliable American friends in the region and yet the President of the United States is saying he doesn’t like them. So, was it lack of understanding or, or something else?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, he disparaged the Kurds. I think he heard from people who said they’re great when they have American airpower. They’re not so great when they don’t. We tried to explain to him that the Kurds had fought valiantly for many years for their own independence and had been critical for decades against Saddam Hussein, who had resisted against all odds, who were helping us critically and against the Assad regime and against the Iranian and Hezbollah interference in Syria. And it was just one of these things that you couldn’t reason with him on what the facts were and it obviously made coming up with a sensible and fair policy for the Kurds. (it was) very, very difficult.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But during the campaign, Donald Trump, just before becoming President, when he was touring around the states, he was advocating for independent Kurdistan. And yet when he was the president, he disagreed with it. The reason I’m saying that it reminds me of something else, then that’s Joe Biden. When the invasion of Iraq happened, he wrote an article and he advocated for a three-state solution for Iraq. So now he’s the president, but he’s doing nothing for that reminds me of Trump, on one hand, saying he supports Kurdish independence. On the other hand, he saying he doesn’t like Kurds. So, do you think this administration can protect the Kurds in the Middle East?

Amb. John Bolton: I guess the lesson is that American politicians campaigning for office say a lot of things they may not fully understand. To be fair to them, or they just say things because they think that’s what their audience wants to hear. And so, everybody is well advised as Americans have learned painfully that the politicians’ promises don’t always come true. I’m very worried at the moment about the Biden administration because it remains convinced that if it can either revive the JCPOA or find some kind of accommodation with Iran, that that it can it can somehow bring the regime in Tehran out of the self-imposed exile that it’s in isolation from more civilized regimes around the region. And I think the Biden administration is reluctant to do anything that would distract Iran from that objective. So, the notion of an independent Kurdistan, which has been so hard to bring about for so many years, because the neighboring states don’t want an independent Kurdistan. It could interfere with their objective with Iran, as it could with Turkey. And so, it’s, as often happens to the Kurds, other priorities interfere with handling the issue of what kind of government the people of Kurdistan should have.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So, I’ll come back again to the referendum and that notion of independence, but before then, in your book, you also mentioned that Trump wanted to offer personal favors to dictators and the United States Justice Department, made Halk bank in Turkey, illegal for different reasons for money laundering, but also in it was participating in a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade US sanctions on Iran. So, do you think that was one of the reasons Trump was hesitating to support Kurds outright? Or? …because he wanted to get along with Erdogan. He was against all your advice, I think.

Amb. John Bolton: No, it’s an interesting theory, but I don’t think it crossed Trump’s mind, I think he saw it in very simple direct terms. Erdogan was concerned about Halk bank. Trump wanted to do him a favor. We tried to explain that Erdogan’s family used Halk bank as a kind of personal financial vehicle and there were many other problems that Halk bank was violating our Iran sanctions. It was committing financial fraud. It was proven already in one criminal prosecution. Now, there was another ongoing. I think it was much more superficial on Trump’s part. 18:47

Dr. Nahro Zagros: So, the referendum for independence took place in Iraqi Kurdistan, or in the Kurdistan Region on September 25 2017. We didn’t get support from the United States. And yet when the United States wants Kurds to fight ISIS, we were the first one to go to the battle and defeat ISIS on behalf of the world. So this bond was created between the United States and Kurds, yet when 99% of the population of Kurdistan voted for independence, the United States didn’t want to support this. What was the reason? [referendum]

Amb. John Bolton:Well, it was a mistake on the part of the United States. I don’t think people fully appreciate what the implications would be, they didn’t see what the government of Iraq might do in response or how others in the region would respond. You know, you can attribute some of the problem I think to divisions among the Kurdish people.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But the threat was realistic from neighboring countries?

19;42

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think I think the problem was not so much the evaluation of the threat as understanding that when Kurds voted on independence, there wasn’t much question what the answer would be and yet in the US and elsewhere in the West, people didn’t think through what those implications meant. Now, in hindsight, a lot of people who said the referendum was therefore a bad idea. I don’t agree with that. I think there’s a lot of responsibility to allocate here. But we collectively did see that others would not simply accept the referendum and we weren’t prepared and among the Kurds, there wasn’t adequate preparation for the response. But the notion of asking people how they want to be governed is fundamental. And whether this referendum resulted in a concrete achievement or not. There will be another referendum in due course.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: To be fair, the Kurdish leadership never wanted to break up from Iraq, but it became unlivable. And it became a difficult reality of the whole environment in Iraq the way the government’s been hijacked, the way the militias rule in different parts of Iraq. So because the Kurds had no choice but to break away or to decide to break away. But do you think a better administration would have supported independence during the Trump administration when Tillerson was in charge of the State Department? 20:50

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think that should have been the US policy and it was a great lost opportunity and very difficult and painful for the Kurds when we didn’t follow through on it. Look I’ve watched this issue for over 30 years now, but going back to Operation Provide comfort after the first Gulf War. And I have to say, no set of leaders. No political unit ever operates perfectly but in terms of cooperation of trying to find concrete solutions to problems of putting up with a lot of unnecessary diplomatic grief. I think the Kurds and their leaders have behaved in an exemplary fashion for a long time, and it’s to be disappointed as they were at the time of the referendum. It was really tragic. Unfortunately, the Kurds have a long history and in finding themselves on the wrong end of the of an arrangement like that and their subsequent behavior, as you just said, in in playing a critical role in the anti-ISIS coalition is proof of the merit of giving the Kurds a government that allows the people to control their own destiny.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Knowing who we are right now, knowing how chaos and how chaotic Iraq and the Middle East is. Do you think we should count on America?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I’m worried about the Biden administration. I mean, I have to be straight about this. I’m not sure their focus is there. I’m not sure their level of attention is there or their energy to make sure that they have solid support from the American people for another effort in the Middle East. There’s a narrative in this country unfortunately about endless wars. The leadership of the United States has not argued effectively that a forward presence by the United States in very difficult situations can be to our advantage not just to the advantage of the people involved, although that’s an important factor, but ultimately can lead to stability in a place like the Middle East that benefits the United States [23:06]. So you need American leaders who can explain a complicated situation in a faraway place to the American people. I think that’s something that can be done. I’m worried at this point, that it’s not the Biden administration that can do it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: What happened in Afghanistan? You know, you left Afghanistan and the Taliban came back. And do you think you might also leave Iraq and Syria and leave the Kurds behind?

Amb. John Bolton: You know, anything is possible, but I can tell you that there’s a very widespread feeling in (US) Congress and I think increasingly around the country that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a mistake.

They understand that America’s less safe now the terrorist attacks from the territory of Afghanistan are again possible. Hopefully they don’t occur. But we gave up an enormously strong position and are now in a more vulnerable position. This is not the time for further withdrawal from the Middle East. We’ve seen dramatic changes in the region with the Abraham accords with the extension of full diplomatic relations between Israel and some of the Arab states. The threat of Iran has brought former adversaries together. There’s a lot of potential in the Middle East, still dangerous and difficult, but this is exactly the wrong time for the United States to reduce its involvement.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: You think in a few years we might see an Iran who is part of the international community or there will be a war between Israel and the US? 24:47

Amb. John Bolton:I think people should understand, Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons and in fact won’t allow Iran to get very close to nuclear weapons if they need to do that. I do believe that the regime in Tehran is weaker today than any point since the Islamic Revolution of 1970. I think people don’t see it because Western reporters don’t go out of Tehran or the other big cities, but out in the countryside. Among the farmers, the small business people, the shopkeepers, they’re not shouting death to the United States or death to Israel anymore. They’re saying death to the Ayatollahs. Now, the Revolutionary Guard and the military still have a monopoly on force. But I believe there’s splits even within the regime. And this is a time, I think, to put real pressure and support behind the people of Iran and give them a chance for self-government. And if we could resolve that we won’t solve all the problems of the region, but solving other problems I think will be significantly easier.

Nahro: In other words, you’re saying if this JCPOA is not resolved, if the Iranian regime is not changed, then Israel will attack?

Amb. John Bolton: Well, Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons. There’s no doubt about that.

They’ve shut the IAEA.

Nahro: So if they continue to pursue, Israel might attack?

Amb. John Bolton:Israel is attacking now and other states in the region. And I think that the people of Iran that is something that they’re increasingly understanding. They’re not safer, because Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. They’re more in danger. And I think that is undercutting the regime as well.

Nahro: In your opinion, how optimistic are you that in a few years we will see a peaceful Middle East, knowing what’s going on around the world with the Russia Ukraine war, and knowing who the actors are in the Middle East? (26:53)

Amb. John Bolton: Well, I think we’ve moved beyond the ideological warfare of the Cold War. We’ve been through war on terrorism. We’re back in a period where there’s enormous great power competition. Again, this is not something America looks forward to. But it’s a world we live in and the Middle East for thousands of years has been the center of great power competition. I think if we can keep external forces outside, we can deal with the principal internal problem, which is Iran. There’s a lot of potential in the region…

And again. The reconciliation between Israel and some of the Gulf Arab states and other Arab countries, shows that part of the world can change very dramatically. And we’ve just got to keep applying our effort to it. Because progress is possible. I’m not saying it’s easy, it won’t be it.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: But what we need in the Middle East is strong leadership, American leadership boots on the ground, and that’s what it’s lacking at the moment. So without that nothing can be achieved?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think that’s why I think the Biden administration it’s not going to provide the leadership, there’s no indication that it’s of interest to them. They’re more interested in climate change than a lot of American strategic interests. But we’re now in a period in our country where we’re in an election campaign. For Congress, by November there will be an election campaign , for 2024 for the presidential nomination. It seems like we’re always in an election campaign, but it’s important for aspiring leaders in the United States to explain to the people that our best interest here comes from having a strong presence internationally, especially in regions that are important to us and where the risk of conflict is high. So if we’re not present, we’re not going to have influence, if we are then we’ve got a chance to make progress.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Ambassador Bolton, do you think the future administration’s of the United States will realize that Kurds are the only supporters of the United States and only friends of the United States? Therefore they have to support Kurdish independence?

Amb. John Bolton:Well, I think there’s a large number of people in the United States who have dealt with the Kurds over the years and the American military, the diplomatic corps, American business community, who are the strongest friends of an independent Kurdistan and if you want stability and a difficult and unstable region, there are ways to do it and one of them is to continue to find ways to achieve the long side goal of an independent Kurdistan.

Dr. Nahro Zagros: Ambassador Bolton, many thanks for your frank talk, as always.

Amb. John Bolton: Glad to be with you.

Geoffrey Van Orden CBE, former leader of the Conservatives in the European parliament, writes: Over dinner in Brussels in January 2002, I put it to David Trimble (obituary, July 25) that one of the greatest strategic errors of the Northern Ireland Unionists and British government was to make little effort to rally those of Scots-Irish background in America to speak out against the Irish Republican caucus (those who support the Irish Republican cause – Sinn Fein/IRA for short) in Congress.

This left the field open to the IRA activists and their sentimental apologists and ignored the large number of Scots-Irish migrants to America — the largely Ulster-origin families, many of which had risen to leading positions in American political and industrial life — indeed, 17 Ulster Scots had become president. David agreed the point while observing that, generally speaking, the Protestant Irish migrants had assimilated more rapidly into the wider population and were more dispersed than their Irish Catholic counterparts and so were less easy to mobilise.

(This article first appeared in the American Spectator: https://spectator.org/uvalde-ii-will-we-ever-apply-empirical-lessons-learned/)

The Main Roadblock: Politics. Put simply, the Left’s ultimate goal on guns is not merely making schools safe. Rather, it is evisceration of the Second Amendment, by subjecting gun rights to the proverbial “death of a thousand cuts.” As straightforward amending the federal Constitution to eliminate the Second Amendment is a political non-starter, there being too many Red states to allow this to pass, death by oppressive regulation is a logical fallback play for the diehards.

It has become clear that hardliners will use any mass shooting to undermine the Second Amendment personal right to “keep and bear” arms, a goal it made clear the president would pursue from the start.

One top Democrat who openly advocates this strategy is Hillary Clinton. Another top Democrat, Chuck Schumer, offers nostrums—banning so-called assault weapons, limiting magazine clip size (to as little as 10), making it harder for “mentally unstable” people from buying guns—that have proven ineffective in the past. Speaker Nancy Pelosi called again for more extensive background checks.

For his part, President Biden initially responded to Uvalde by stating the obvious, i.e., that the Second Amendment is not an absolute—“you can’t own a cannon”; at the same presser, vice-president Harris called for taking on the “gun lobby.” Jonah Goldberg shreds the “gun lobby” argument:

In 2020, the NRA gave less than $1 million directly to candidates — putting it 996th on the list of top donors. It spent $5.4 million on lobbying, making it the 169th most lavish lobbyist. As Stephen Gutowski, founder of The Reload, a site focused on gun issues and politics, wrote in The Atlantic, since 2012, “the NRA’s highest contribution ranking has been 294th, and its highest lobbying ranking has been 85th.”

Over Memorial Day Weekend, the president indicated a desire to ban 9mm (38 caliber) handguns, owned by 57 percent of gun owners (as of 2019). The president is apparently ignorant of the physics of bullets: high-powered rifles have a much higher muzzle velocity than that for handguns, and thus rounds fired from high-powered rifles do far greater damage than those fired by handguns. (One violator of gun laws Joe ignores: Hunter Biden.) Incredibly, the White House press secretary publicly stated on May 31 that the president does NOT favor hardening schools, nor does he favor legislation dealing with mental illness issues. She said that Biden believes that guns are the problem, and gun control the remedy. But Sen. Biden, in 1985, believed the polar opposite:

During my 12 and a half years as a member of this body, I have never believed that additional gun control or federal registration of guns would reduce crime. I am convinced that a criminal who wants a firearm can get one through illegal, nontraceable, unregistered sources, with or without gun control.

June 4 cometh, enter Biden Gun Control 3.0: He decided that he now supports hardening the schools. Biden 3.0 announced that he will sign the June 12 compromise package reached by 10 R and 10 D senators, paving the way for probable passage. The bill would encourage adoption of “Red Flag” laws, provide a first-ever federal ban in gun trafficking and straw purchasing, and establish enhanced background checks for purchasers under 21. It would be, if passed, the first major federal legislation since the 10-year “assault weapons” ban enacted in 1994.

Background checks are very popular with the public despite their dubious effectiveness; a poll taken after Uvalde showed 88 percent public support. A new ban on “assault weapons” won’t work; raising the age for purchase from 18 to 21 would have marginal impact at best. Banning bump stocks, mandating background checks for ghost guns at point-of-sale, adding restrictions on gun trafficking, are laws we can live with. (One GOP policy endorsed by most voters is arming teachers.)

Trying to limit access to mentally unstable people is much harder to accomplish than at first blush it may seem. Federal law already makes it a felony for anyone to knowingly sell or transfer guns to adjudicated mental defectives or those who have been confined to a mental institution, as procedural due process safeguards would initially be bypassed. President Trump called for (2:36) pre-empting due process during a Feb. 2018 meeting after the Parkland massacre. He issued an executive order two days after that meeting instructing the attorney general to draft rules banning bump stocks. Constitutional scholar John Yoo warns that some proposals would violate the Second Amendment (6:51). Fox News legal analyst Greg Jarrett explains why some of Biden’s original gun-control measures violate the Supreme Court’s 2008 Heller decision which held that private citizens have a constitutional right to own guns for personal-self defense, upon which undue burdens may not be placed.

Kevin Williamson notes that Democrats juxtapose crackdowns on lawful owners/merchants, while being increasingly more lenient on career criminals, who are either not prosecuted at all, or rapidly released if convicted of gun crimes carrying long sentences under federal/state law.

But determining who, among those not already identified, is mentally ill and dangerous to others, is often notoriously hard to establish. And if, as in New York, Red Flag laws on the books are not enforced, no legislation will work. The predicate for passing new laws is that either there are no existing laws, or that existing laws do not fully cover a new situation. Assessing how well laws are being administered is a task for legislative oversight; but unlike oversight hearings, talkfests that rarely attract voter interest, introducing a new bill shows voters that those they elected are “doing something.”

One view is that we are missing the “REAL Red Flag“: the corrosive socio-cultural climate that generates a growing number of violent, under-socialized males. Shining exceptions recently came from two Florida sheriffs, who upon learning of a minor making an adult threat to commit murder, immediately arrested them—a policy they follow whether the threat is real or fake. A not-so shining counter-example is California, where the State Senate has passed a bill relegating student threats made against schools solely to the school administrators, with no state involvement.

Draconian magazine-clip limits are worth resisting, as under the extreme stress of a home invasion or a burglary, many shots miss, even at close range. Criminals will get high-capacity magazines on the street; new magazines can be reloaded in seconds. By one tally, only once, in a 2011 mass shooting, were intended victims able to rush the shooter during reloading, and that was because the shooter dropped the replacement magazine. Finally, imposing stringent storage rules on homeowners could deny them access to their weapon in event of criminal entry.

Consider the realities of home self-defense, using the most recent area data available for each category (nationwide unless specified otherwise): The average residential home size is 2,300 sq. ft.; the average urban apartment size is 882 sq. ft. They range from Seattle’s 711 sq. ft. to Florida’s 1,038 sq. ft. The single family suburban home depicted here is a duplex, which would make for 1,150 sq. ft. per level. The typical assailant, according to a noted police calculation, covers 21 feet in 1.5 seconds, the amount of time a typical police officer can draw a gun from a holster and be ready to fire. In round figures with a square configuration urban units would range from Seattle’s 27 ft. per side to Florida’s 32 ft.; for houses, assuming a square shape, each floor would have 34 ft, diagonals. (Per Pythagoras, using rectangles would change the numbers, but not by much.) In no case would the homeowner have more than three seconds to aim and fire.

Now add in time factors (all rounded figures). In a typical suburban burglary, the burglar spends one minute casing the property, then once inside, 8 to 12 minutes, assuming the home is vacant. Most burglaries occur between 10 AM and 3 PM, when people are usually outside the home.

If someone is home, the burglar will of course deal instantly with the encounter—attack, demand compliance or flee. The Dept. of Justice estimates that out of 3.7 million annual burglaries, in 27 percent of the one million committed with people home, the occupant is victim of a violent crime.

Police response times vary widely. For household burglaries, 14 percent within 5 mins., 22 percent between 5 and 10 min. For 14 selected cities, none were less than 5 mins., 10 were between 5 and 10 mins., and four were over 10 mins.—for LA, America’s largest urban area, 20 min.

Finally, factor in gun-use metrics: There are from 500,000 to 3 million uses of guns by residents facing home invasion or burglary. Intended victims fire the gun only 8 percent of the time, otherwise using the gun to scare the intruder. Of 40,000 gun deaths per years, suicides were twice as often the cause of death, versus homicides; only about 2 percent were accidental deaths. Add gun-fight metrics from an article in the International Journal for Police Science Management:

According to the article abstract:

All subjects were tested for accuracy at target locations from 3 to 75 ft. For all locations, no difference was found in accuracy between expert and intermediate groups (p > 0.30). Experts and intermediates had better results than novices on all locations (p < 0.05) except from 3 to 15 ft. Alarmingly, experts were only 10% more accurate than novices between 3 and I5 ft. Finally, novices and intermediate shooters were more likely to hit head locations from 3 ft (57%), whereas experts mainly hit the body location (78%). The results of this study indicate that officers had no advantage over intermediate shooters and a small advantage over novices. (My italics.)

As further evidence of how Democrats historically have approached gun issues, consider what transpired in 2013. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a pair of bills (5:26); In his own words, when recently interviewed by Jesse Watters:

In 2013, I introduced legislation that would spend $300 million on federal grants to harden schools to make them safer, to make them more protected. The Democrats filibustered that legislation. I’ve introduced legislation to say schools like this elementary school behind me can get federal grants to harden their security, to put in bulletproof doors, bulletproof glass, to put in armed police officers to protect kids (at a cost of $1.3B].

Cruz later added:

In 2013, I introduced legislation called Grassley-Cruz, which targeted felons and fugitives and those with serious mental illness. It directed the Department of Justice to do an audit of federal convictions to make sure felons are in the database. It directed the Department of Justice to prosecute and put in jail felons and fugitives who try to illegally buy firearms.

Cruz went on to say that a majority supported the bill, but the Democrats, led by Speaker Harry Reid, blocked a cloture vote to end his party’s filibuster, thus killing the bill. Cruz concluded that passage of the bill was viewed by Democrats as a threat to their agenda of stripping law-abiding gun owners of the personal right to posses firearms for self-defense. It is hard to gainsay his assessment, as undeniably his legislation would have helped matters.

Immediately after Uvalde Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer quickly blocked a bill introduced by Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI), named after two victims of the 2018 Parkland massacre, which would have set up a website presenting school safety “best practices”; schools could individually elect which practices, if any, to adopt. Johnson had been so sure this bill would be accepted that he sought unanimous consent for its adoption. A presidential commission appointed by President Trump issued a massive report in Dec. 2021. It includes a section detailing best practices for schools security. Its recommendations are in line with the ones cited in this article—access control, armed presence, networked information sharing about active shooters who gain access to the school, mental health intervention.

On June 13, Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine (R) signed legislation allowing schools to arm school staff and teachers, after appropriate training.

But no security system can work if best practices are not implemented; one security expert details the challenges since Columbine in getting smaller communities to adopt such practices (4:03). Trump DHS secretary Chad Wolf said that local commanders can override orders from superiors given certain emergencies, of which Uvalde was an example (4:04). Former homicide detective Ted Williams said that the local commanders waited far too long for a SWAT team to arrive, and that they should have gone in quickly (4:26). Indeed, the local commander said at 11:33 am—three minutes after the shooter entered the school—it was no longer an active shooter situation; this was flatly false. There were seven officers on the scene at 11:35 and 19 by 12:03, when they held off, calling it a barricade standoff. Students in the room with the shooter risked their lives to inform police outside that there were more shots fired inside the room. When the last 911 call came at 12:47, 27 officers were on the scene. In the end, it took an elite Border Patrol unit to storm the school, after being delayed 30 minutes by the local police. Hardly reassuring is that the city of Uvalde is resisting disclosure of information about Uvalde police performance.

Andrew Pollack, who tragically lost his daughter in the Parkland massacre, writes that parents are the key in stopping mass shootings. Door access should be single-entry, multiple-exit; armed presence inside the schools can help; parents should confront schools and if the schools are not responsive, they should run for the school board to effect changes.

Can We Afford Securing the Schools? We cannot afford to let things be. The National Center for Education Statistics tallies 131,000 K-12 schools in the U.S. Using $400,000 per school (see above) yields $52 billion; adding 6,000 four-year colleges, at the same price, yields $2.4 billion. Combining costs would be equal to less than one percent of FY 2022 federal spending. The funds needed nationwide would surely be spread over several years.

President Biden’s FY 2022 budget called for $6TR in federal outlays, of which 65 percent—$4TR—was for so-called “uncontrollables”; these cover entitlements like Social Security & Medicare. By comparison, the $715B for military spending—is 12 percent of the budget, and is “discretionary,” and hence an easier target for budget cuts. These dwarf any costs that would be incurred to protect our schools nationwide.

To add historical perspective, take a gander at the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio over the past century, from 1929 forward. In 1929, U.S. public debt was $17B, equal to 16 percent of GDP. In 1946, after the end of World War II, the debt was $269B, or 119% of GDP. In 1974, fueled by the postwar economic boom, the debt, at $475B, stood at a record postwar low of 31 percent of GDP.

That year marked passage by Congress of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, overriding an-impeachment-weakened President Nixon’s veto. The new law shifted power from the executive to the legislative branch—where, to be fair, the Constitution vests the taxing and spending powers. The law also set up the Congressional Budget Office, and moved the federal fiscal year from July 1 to October 1, to give Congress more time to respond to executive branch budget proposals.

Congress did this not to spend less money, but to spend more. And did Congress ever succeed. In early 2022, the total federal debt outstanding surpassed $30 TR, putting the debt/GDP ratio at 124 percent of GDP.

No one knows when the financial merry-go-round will stop; as new trillion-dollar milestones were reached—$1TR, $5TR, $10TR, $15TR, $20TR, $25TR, $30TR—voices called for fiscal restraint, lest the country’s financial position collapse. Ultimately, most voters sense that there will be a financial reckoning, and that it will not be pretty. Whether it is tomorrow, next year, next decade, or later, no one can say with certitude. We would be wise to cut spending, but recipient constituencies will fiercely resist, So in the meantime, we should, for clearly dire emergencies like school safety, ante up what is needed to fix the problem—which only can work if we choose wise policies and elect leaders who will competently administer them.

Bottom Line. There is a wealth of available knowledge about virtually every aspect of mass shooter situations. The chief obstacle to their implementation has been an unholy alliance of politicians, media players and and interest groups obsessed with enacting into law a web of statutes and regulations that would eviscerate the right to possess firearms for lawful use. By accepting the Senate compromise, Republicans clear the way to press for further hardening the schools. The GOP will have a better chance to make its case to persuadable independents—if it can bypass hostile mass media coverage and social media censorship.

Hardline Democrat proposals bring to mind Albert Einstein’s famed definition of insanity: “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Their efforts fly in the face of a pair of infamous massive American regulatory failures: attempts to ban alcohol and drugs. Like alcohol and drugs, guns are easily transportable and in wide demand; applying supply-side prohibitory remedies cannot cure a demand-side problem. The Senate compromise represents a welcome step away from gun-control absolutism.

Guns abound worldwide, are getting far easier to manufacture, and increasingly in demand; the firearm black market surely will rise to the occasion, as the mob did with alcohol and the drug cartels did with drugs. The most likely outcome is that if strict gun control laws pass, they will prove once again ineffective. An outright ban would drive suppliers—and buyers—underground..

With the Senate deal, Republicans managed for the first time to get real concessions from the Democrats—at least, at the federal level. Blue statues will likely continue pushing more radical proposals, unless voters toss them out.

John Wohlstetter, a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy is author of Sleepwalking with the Bomb (Discovery Institute Press, 2d. ed. 2014).

This paper originally appeared in the Reaction.Life, https://reaction.life/indo-pacific-tilt-why-the-uk-needs-to-up-its-game/)

Over a year ago, in its “most radical assessment of the UK’s place in the world since the end of the Cold War”, the British government set out its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. It advocated for an “Indo-Pacific tilt” as a critical element in what was a fresh “Global Britain” strategy.

This was in the middle of the Covid pandemic and before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine urged a reappraisal of strategic threats and priorities. Russia was certainly identified as the most acute direct threat to the UK but the review’s emphasis on the need for an Indo-Pacific tilt also remains highly relevant.

Apart from the growing economic importance of the region, China’s increasing military power and assertiveness needs to be counterbalanced. This means securing and enhancing relationships with old friends, particularly within the Commonwealth, and seeking new partners.

When some other parts of the world held back from condemning Russian aggression, eight out of 10 of the vital ASEAN bloc voted with the Western democracies, including its most populous member, Indonesia. As one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and predicted to become the world’s fourth-largest in 2050, Indonesia has been a priority post-Brexit partner for the UK. A year ago, the UK and Indonesia concluded the first round of exploratory trade talks and committed to further strengthening their trade and investment links, which rose to a record £3bn of bilateral trade in 2019 through a new joint trade dialogue.

Yet while the Integrated Review set out the ambitious goal of Britain being “the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific,” the UK has struggled to make much of a visible impact in the region.

Aside from penning the AUKUS agreement, and its application to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), it has achieved few results so far. The principle behind the strategy remains sound. In what is a fast-moving environment, more of a priority must be placed on pushing through initiatives of substance, unless the UK is to be left behind by other competitors with poorer credentials.

Bottom of Form

The region is an ideal candidate for leveraging “post-Brexit freedoms”. But expansive new trade deals and deepened strategic ties have not been pursued sufficiently. Others, including the US with its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the EU, which has trade talks underway with the ASEAN bloc and many of its members, seem to be on the front foot in the region. But even these initiatives have not been as substantive as many Asian countries may have hoped. Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, Airlangga Hartarto, says these countries are merely asking for “equitable and comprehensive agreements which recognise the true potential of all parties.”

The potential for the UK is obvious. With over 270m people, already in the world’s top 10 largest economies, and current chair of the G20, Indonesia cannot be considered small fry by any government. It is an example of a country that should be a key piece of post-Brexit, Global Britain strategy.

Other major players in the region like the Philippines – where a new President looks set to actively pursue international engagement – Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam could also be vitally important for the UK. Equally, relations with ASEAN itself need to be expanded beyond Britain merely being a “Dialogue Partner”.

More concrete economic commitments and security partnerships, along with a more active information policy, must be at the heart of revitalised engagement if countries in Asia, and indeed elsewhere, are to take the UK seriously as a worthwhile international partner.

The importance of the Indo-Pacific, as outlined by the Integrated Review, in terms of the wider Global Britain vision is clear. Outside of its economic value (as a key market for British exports and a key supplier of British imports) there are other issues that loom large – climate change, defence, cyber security, democratic values, counter-extremism.

The leading role that Britain has taken in supporting Ukraine is an example that needs emphasis in other theatres.

Continuing along the generally slow path that it currently treads with regards to its Indo-Pacific engagement does nothing for its Global Britain credentials. The enormous post-2009 opportunity to assist and exert real influence in a country such as Sri Lanka lapsed into an unwelcome and often misconceived human rights critique. The disappointing results from failure to wean India from her over-reliance on Russia are clear from recent UN votes. The countries of South-East Asia and several Commonwealth countries are increasingly under the shadow of China, the primary trading partner for many of them.

Domestic political crises, the unhelpful attitude of some EU members, and the Ukraine conflict seem to leave little bandwidth for pursuit of vital British economic and foreign policy aims that would also greatly help the countries concerned. This is in spite of the British Foreign Secretary’s efforts. The “Indo-Pacific tilt” remains very much in the balance.

If Global Britain is to be anything more than a slogan, then there needs to be a more pragmatic, hard-headed and proactive approach to enhancing relationships in a crucial region of the world.

Geoffrey Van Orden is a Distinguished Fellow of the Gold Institute for International Strategy. He was formerly a long-standing member of the European Parliament, where he was Conservative Leader and Defence and Security Spokesman, Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with India and member of the Parliament’s Friends of Indonesia group.

By Derk Jan Eppink, Distinguished Fellow (Member of the Parliament of the Netherlands (JA21-ECR), formerly an MEP and a journalist)

Seth Cropsey, a former U.S. top military officer, published his vision on the war in Ukraine in The Wall Street Journal on 27 April, writing: “The U.S. should show it can win a nuclear war.” However, what does “winning” mean in case of a conflict with a nuclear power s prepared to deploy nuclear weapons? The war in Ukraine is increasingly turning into a war between Russia and the United States, albeit on Ukrainian soil. A war by proxy.

On 9 May, Russia celebrated its victory over Nazi Germany with a large parade on the Red Square in Moscow, showcasing Russian nuclear weapons, as a big warning to foreign countries. This includes the Sarmat, Russia’s most modern intercontinental missile.

For a long time after the Cold War had ended, the West saw such parades as empty displays of power. For decades, the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe have been discussing controlling their nuclear weapons: from the SALT I and II Treaties, to START and New START. Over the years, that discussion died down, but the nuclear weapons remained, as they were also modernised in the meantime. Today, a generation of politicians that did not consciously experience the Cold War, with political leaders for whom a nuclear conflict is akin to a Hollywood film, is in charge.

Nuclear power as life insurance

Already in 1957, in his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger described the essence of a conflict with a nuclear power. He stated that a country with nuclear weapons will not capitulate without first having used them. This makes a conflict with a nuclear power by definition different from a conflict with a country without nuclear weapons. For the regime in North Korea, for example, and soon perhaps Iran as well, nuclear power is a kind of life insurance. That certainly applies to the Kremlin.

The war in Ukraine requires that politicians who talk about ‘winning’ – like the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, – gain more insight into Russian nuclear doctrine, which is a legacy from Soviet times. Russian military thinking is based on power and huge explosions with the most powerful guns or bombs, like the hydrogen bomb (nicknamed the Tsar Bomb). Here, destruction comes before precision. This nineteenth-century pattern of warfare was visible during the Tsarist Empire as well as the Soviet era and it can be witnessed today under President Vladimir Putin.

Russia’s status is based on its nuclear power

Russia’s status as a great power is not based on its economy – Russia’s gross national product is about the size of the countries forming the Benelux. Russia’s status is founded on its nuclear power, which rivals the nuclear potential of the United States. In 1982, the Soviet Union made a «no first use declaration»: Moscow would not be the first to deploy nuclear weapons. This promise was made during the discussion about placing American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. This helped the peace movement. It should however be recalled that at that point, the Soviet Union had already stationed SS-20 missiles itself.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Russia abandoned its no-first-use policy, in 1993, and it introduced the strategy of preventive nuclear attack. This involves Russia reserving itself the right to strike first as soon as it faces a nuclear threat. This definition has been increasingly broadened. When the nuclear doctrine was redefined in 2010, it also included a conventional attack threathening the survival of the Russian state and its institutions. In 2020, the doctrine was strengthened further. It now also applies to a conventional attack on military bases in Russia, after which Moscow will use tactical nuclear weapons to deter the attacker. This policy is called «escalate to de-escalate» and it applies in the current war with Ukraine.

A thin dividing line of what constitutes «war»

Today, we find ourselves on a thin dividing line of what constitutes «war». The West, in particular the United States, is supplying more and more valuable military equipment to Ukraine. Initially, the arms deliveries were intended to repel the Russian attack, which partly worked.

The question is whether the supply of modern weapons is helping Ukraine or whether it is fuelling the conflict.

Another question is whether Russia, with its tactical nuclear weapons, is in the process of moving to “escalation” in a bid to de-escalate. We are, as it were, slipping imperceptibly into the nuclear phase.

That is a major change in the nature of the conflict.

Politicians without a memory of the Cold War will not hear the alarm bells. Then the battle is no longer about

Ukraine’s sovereignty, which should be the objective, but about the competitive struggle between two nuclear powers.

The command to deploy nuclear weapons is riskier in Russia today than it was during Soviet times.

During the Cuban crisis in 1962, the explosive character of Soviet Party leader Nikita Khrushchev did not seem the best guarantee for a controlled nuclear policy. Fortunately, a hotline was installed: a direct line of communication between the White House and the Kremlin. Under Leonid Brezhnev, who took office in 1964, collective leadership was installed, with more power for the Politburo. Secretary-General Brezhnev was a ruler, but not an autocrat. Putin is a de facto autocrat. Power does emerge from the party, but from the person. The ultimate decision power belongs to him.

A stalemate is needed for a way out of the conflict

The way out of the conflict in Ukraine must be found through negotiations. For that, a stalemate is needed, so that none of the parties has anything to gain. Continuing a war of attrition does not yield anything. Only then will there by a step from the battlefield to the negotiation table.

There, a route to the exit can be found, with questions like: «What should be on the agenda», «what are the goals of each party», and «what room is there for agreements?» With a final compromise, there would be some ‘wins and lose’ for each party. Nobody would be the big ‘winner’.

However, those recklessly pushing for nuclear war will make everyone a loser.

Originally published in Dutch by Elsevier Weekblad

(This article first appeared in the Charleston Mercury: A talk with John Wohlstetter: Nuclear threat, Beethoven and N.Y. pizza (charlestonmercury.com)

By: Emily Havener

The first thing John Wohlstetter and I talk about is pizza. He’s originally from New York City, and he’s picked up a slice or two at New York City Pizza before our interview. He tells me about his childhood pizza spot growing up in the Carnegie Hill district, Hav-a-Pizza on 86th Street, which sold slices for 20 cents. It closed when pizza was up to 75 cents a slice because the son of the owner figured out he could make more money driving a cab.

John lived in Manhattan for the first 31 years of his life, then moved to Washington, D.C., for 37 more and now finds himself in Charleston as of 2015. He is a true renaissance man, and his career is storied: trading on Wall Street, corporate law, authoring books on war and nuclear proliferation, radio appearances and columns in The Wall Street Journal, American Spectator, The Daily Caller and the National Review online, to name just a few. He is a senior fellow at two think tanks — the Discovery Institute and the Gold Institute for International Strategy. Of immediate importance to our Charleston readers, he is an amateur concert pianist who will be giving a Beethoven concert on May 21 at Redeemer Presbyterian Church.

“I was born in Sodom, moved to Gomorrah and now I’m in paradise,” he tells me with an air of being very pleased. “Now, the sidewalks are another matter. They’re a little bit picaresque for my taste.” I explain it’s because we don’t have any mountains, so people who enjoy hiking can come down here and feel at home.

I’ve asked him here to talk about serious topics, though, and soon enough, we move on to D.C. statehood, which he, as an American history lover, legal mind and former resident, has a clear opinion on: “D.C. statehood is, in my view, contradictory to the Constitution. If you look at the 23rd Amendment, it says the district shall never have more than one vote in the House.” States, he says, can gain and lose votes; constitutionally the district can do neither.

However, he agrees that the people living in the D.C. area are disenfranchised voters. His solution is to bring D.C. into Maryland as a county. Residents would be able to vote for Maryland’s senators and gain a seat in the House of Representatives, as well as vote for the state’s governor.

Then he tells me another thing he likes about Charleston: “You can go a week and not have a discussion about politics.” When I respond that some would say it’s a privilege, even perhaps a dereliction of duty, to go that long without discussing politics at this point in time, he disagrees.

“What do you think totalitarianism is? Everything is a political question. It’s not good to be headed in that direction.”

The Ukraine question

Of course, we talk about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to his work with the Discovery and Gold institutes, John tries to produce at least one article a month — and we discuss his recent one for the Spectator entitled “Ukraine Outcomes: Promise and Peril” in which he outlines demands that must be met for Putin not to view his invasion as a victory.

John’s first trip to Russia was in 1985, where he witnessed first-hand the information control of the USSR. But he says that even though we’re seeing something new in terms of Putin’s direct threat of using tactical nuclear weapons in an ongoing conflict, the Russian president doesn’t hold enough sway over his commanders to carry out that threat.

John says the Russian military has a similar chain of command to ours in terms of deploying its nuclear arsenal. “The leader may give the order but it goes through five operational layers. Putin already would have used nuclear weapons if he could have gotten his commanders to actually fire them. I think the risk of nuclear war is as close to zero as it gets in these things.”

The other difference he sees in this conflict is that it’s being broadcast on social media — “and in this case, social media is showing how savagely the Russians fight. It’s the way they fought for a thousand years.” He says the shock of this clouds our judgment of the situation. “We can’t mirror image and project onto them how we look at these things.” He illustrates this with the story of Stalin telling Walter Bedell Smith, first chief of the CIA in 1947 and ambassador to Russia, “We are no more interested in war than you are, but we are less interested in peace and that is our advantage.”

Then John offers a powerful metaphor: “If I put it in in a slightly different context, let’s go from nations to people. We’re sitting here, and sitting over there is a psychopathic serial killer and a sociopathic professional assassin. They kill for different reasons, one by profession and one under a compulsion. Suppose we say, ‘We have our common humanity. We have common interests in peace.’ How far do you think that’s going to get with those two people? The answer is, not very.”

His assessment is that we must keep pushing Putin back so that he asks for a ceasefire, but John fears that the U.S. and other European countries will pull their support and pressure Ukraine to make a less-than-beneficial settlement so as to end the conflict sooner, and Putin will get concessions, such as additional territory in Ukraine.

“That would be a victory for Putin, which is the wrong message to send people like that,” John says. “That’s what happened in the 30s when the British and France gave up Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and he didn’t stop there.

“What NATO and the U.S. can do is increase the supply of weaponry and ammo and basically shore things up. The more they give the Ukrainians, the better chance they have. They’re fighting for their homeland and the Russians are conscripts. I didn’t know in advance how good the Ukrainian army was, let alone that they would built their own anti-ship missiles. I knew that the Russian technology had a relatively thin layer of top technology, but it turns out the systems have significant vulnerabilities.”

Although he agrees with the assessment that a no-fly zone isn’t the answer –— “No fly zone takes too much to impose. Nobody’s ever imposed one on a superpower” — he argues that President Biden, and other world leaders, have not done enough in terms of providing materiel that could have prevented the widespread destruction in Ukraine and ended the conflict in its earliest days. In addition to a misguided assessment of the nuclear threat level, this is due to fear of being seen as provocative.

“That’s a word that should be taken out of the lexicon,” John says with as much heat as I’ve heard yet in our measured conversation. “Everything the free world does that strengthens its position against the unfree world is provocative. So what?” He addresses Putin: “You just put 170,000 troops on the border and you’re telling us it’s provocative if we move some up?”

He also blames the administration for hedging its bets in hopes that Putin will assist in U.S. relations with Iran, but Biden’s recent gaffe put even that distant hope in jeopardy. “If you want this guy to help you, why are you calling him a war criminal and saying he should be put on trial? This is not the brightest idea. I was annoyed when Biden said he’s going to be tried in The Hague and all that. Win the war first; if you don’t win the war, there are not going to be any trials at all.

He has an astute assessment of the American mindset about war: “It’s because we hate war so much that we’re reluctant to get into it, and we’re up against people who don’t feel the same way, and they use our reluctance, at times, to considerable strategic advantage.”

“So let’s say we do get Putin in retreat and he calls for a ceasefire,” I respond. “Where do we go?”

“If Putin gets pushed back across the border, and even if he keeps Crimea, but especially if he loses that, he will not be in office.”

Love of humanity

At this point, John deliberately changes the subject: “We’ve solved all the problems. Now we need to end on an upbeat thing.” Throughout our conversation it’s become clear to me how important music is to him; he’s been playing the piano since childhood, but it was in middle adulthood that something clicked and it took on the priority it holds for him now. He tells me how much he’s looking forward to the concert he’s giving in coincidence with his 75th year: “We’re going to celebrate, two years delayed, the 250th anniversary of one of the greatest human beings who ever lived, one of the greatest creators who ever lived.”

He will be playing his three favorite sonatas by Beethoven, whom he says “brought music out of the aristocracy and sent it out to all of us.” He calls the “Ode to Joy” an expression of Beethoven’s love of humanity.

Beethoven’s eventual deafness makes him something of a kindred spirit as well; John is deaf in his right ear, although he also has perfect pitch. “Beethoven had tinnitus. It was a huge handicap, and when he practiced he had the ability to concentrate, to shut out noise.” Not only that, John says: “He had far hearing; he could hear into the future. The instruments of this day were not capable of producing this sonorities we hear in the ‘Appassionato’ today. It wasn’t till the late 80s that the modern piano was perfected. He may have been the only one of his day who could hear what his compositions really sounded like.”

Music got John through the long, isolated days of the pandemic. “I didn’t want to spend my time staring at flickering images, so I decided to double my practice time and see if I could raise my piano chops. I’m playing 100 percent better than I played two years ago.

“At the piano those first two months, it was the quietness of Walden Pond. There was no traffic, no construction cranes — and I concentrated. And the wonderful thing is, when the sounds came back, my concentration still stayed. I’m going to have a great time finishing the prep for this concert. I am so looking forward to it.”

This story originated in VOA’s Kurdish Service (https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-launches-new-offensive-against-pkk-rebels-in-northern-iraq/6536148.html)

WASHINGTON — Turkey announced the start of a new ground and air campaign in northern Iraq Monday, targeting the armed rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Dubbed Operation Claw-Lock, the Ankara government says the offensive is a pre-emptive measure to prevent the PKK from using Iraq as a base to carry out attacks in Turkey.

Founded in 1984 to fight for Kurdish self-rule, the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

The new operation comes days after Iraqi Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara. The two leaders discussed ways to improve security, business and trade ties, according to a statement by Barzani’s office.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar was quoted by the state-owned Anadolu news agency as saying, “Our operation is continuing successfully as planned. The targets identified in the first phase have been captured.”

Meanwhile, in a statement, the PKK fighters claimed to have downed two Turkish helicopters and killed more than two dozen Turkish soldiers.

VOA cannot independently verify the conflicting reports.

The Turkish military has carried out several operations against the PKK in recent years, both inside Turkey and in northern Iraq. The latest operation targets areas near Amedi city’s Shiladze district.

Amedi’s mayor, Warsheen Mayi, told VOA by phone that the operation has not targeted civilian areas. But Iqbal Omer, a freelance journalist, said civilian properties had been damaged in the most recent airstrike.

Turkish interests in northern Iraq go beyond combating the PKK. Turkey has a significant economic stake in the region, particularly the energy sector. Turkey is also seeking to expand its influence in the region as a counterbalance to the growing power of Iran.

Some experts have suggested that Kurdistan, which is estimated to have 700 billion cubic meters [25 trillion cubic feet] of natural gas, could become a major energy supplier to Turkey and Europe as the world tries to wane itself off its dependence on Russian gas.

“Europeans are searching for new potentials to supply gas to Europe,” said Nahro Zagros, a non-resident senior fellow at the Washington-based Gold Institute for International Strategy.

“The KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) can be one of these potentials. Having said that the KRG cannot fill the whole vacuum that Russians will leave in Europe, but it can help in some ways, and this cannot be achieved without Turkish support,” he added.

Safeen Dizayee, head of the KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, said that after meeting domestic supply, his government was open to the notion of exporting natural gas to Europe.

“The Kurdistan region is not trying to become an alternative to other countries,” he told VOA. “That is why it will in the first stage use most of its extracted gas to supply domestic needs. Later on, some portion of the gas can be exported to other parts of Iraq if they have a need for it. In the coming years, when the Kurdistan region opens up more to the world, no doubt it might export some of the gas.”

Dizayee added that Turkey, which serves as a bridge for the landlocked Kurdistan region to the outside world, will be a major partner in the exportation of gas.

Others, such as Sulaymaniyah-based Izzat Sabir, an economist who led the Finance and Economic Committee in the Kurdistan parliament, say the region first needs to resolve its internal political issues and meet domestic demand before it can focus on becoming an exporter.

Not every Kurdish politician is on board with the idea of exporting the region’s gas through Turkey.

“I think it’s my party’s official decision that we will not allow natural gas to be sold through Turkey the way oil is being sold,” said Rekawt Zaki, a senior leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls some of the region’s largest gas fields in Chamchamal.

“The future of the Kurdistan Region is natural gas, not crude oil. Crude is depleting in many fields,” economist Sabir said.

“Iraq imports billions of dollars’ worth of natural gas from Iran and other neighboring countries. While the domestic demand for gas has not been met, we in the Kurdistan region should not think about signing agreements to export natural gas,” Sabir added.

Mutlu Civiroglu, Zhiyar Mohammed, and Rikar Hussein contributed to this story from Washington.

This story originated in VOA’s Kurdish Service.

(This article first appeared in the American Spectator: https://spectator.org/ukraine-outcomes-promise-and-peril/)

Recently, scholar Mark Galeotti published Peace, Partition or Stalemate, assessing prospective scenarios for how the war started by Vladimir Putin might end. The peace outcome will almost certainly entail that Russia keep some of its gains in the east, and possibly the southeast as well. Partition would give Russia formal sovereignty over those areas under its sway. A stalemate would translate into a protracted low-intensity counterinsurgency locked in a long, twilight struggle, either alongside the current Ukraine government, or its successor. Conversely, if Russia extends its gains to Kyiv, the insurgents would fight allied with a Ukrainian government-in-exile (based in western Ukraine or Poland) against a pro-Russian government puppet installed in Kyiv by its Moscow masters.

The War: Geographic and Cultural Factors. At this writing much hangs in the balance: Russia has been unable to consolidate gains in the central and western regions of what is the largest country whose borders lie completely within Europe. It is mostly flatland, average elevation a mere 574 feet, which notable mountains only in the southwest corner, the Carpathians, the highest peak inside Ukraine reaching 6,762 feet; it is bisected from north to south by the Dnieper River, at 1,420 miles the fourth longest in Europe. Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, sits on the west bank of the Dnieper at its northern end; its primary open-sea port, Odessa, sits by the western terminus of the river, which empties into the Black Sea. Its principal products are agricultural—the “breadbasket of Europe” and mineral.

Russia is the largest country in the world, with 23 percent of its land area and 77 percent of its population (some 100 million) considered part of the European landmass. Its European area is 6-1/2 times and its European population 2-1/2 times greater than Ukraine’s. Eyeballing a map, Russia now appears to control some one-quarter of Ukraine, concentrated in the east and southeast sections. Ukraine’s official language is part of a complex historical and cultural tapestry. Ukrainian, which evolved from Old East Slavonic, the original language of Kievan Rus, is the official language today. But in 2012 Ukraine’s unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, passed a law allowing regions that have more than 10 percent non-Ukrainian populations to adopt a local official language; per this, the Russian-occupied regions in eastern and southeastern regions made Russian their official language. Overall (rounded figures), Ukrainian is spoken by 67 percent and Russian by 30 percent. Western Ukraine speaks mostly Ukrainian; central Ukraine equally speaks both languages; but notably, in Kyiv, the majority, like eastern Ukraine, speaks Russian.

The War: Current Status. While there are conflicting reports of how Russia is doing, and events could suddenly break decisively one way or another, it seems clear that Russia has gotten bogged down, and is trying to use reinforcements to change the war’s course. Hopes on the part of Putin and his military leadership for a quick Russian win and complete subjugation of the country under a puppet government have been shattered. Much credit goes to the NATO countries, but even more goes to the bravura performance of Ukrainians. Their leader has emerged as the closest thing the 21st century has seen to British World War II prime minister, Winston Churchill. Their military is fighting to a standstill a heavily-armed force with thousands of tanks and other armored vehicles, and a larger air force and navy. Their civilian population arose with courage for the ages; it fights with far less weaponry, but far greater tenacity, in defending their homeland against an invader who sent in mostly conscripts.

Yet victory for Ukraine, while possible, seems elusive, and likely will require greater influx of sophisticated weapons and logistical supplies—to say nothing for food and medical care, if Ukraine is to emerge a victor on the battlefield. Already, Moscow has achieved one of its prime objectives: inducing Ukraine’s leaders to proclaim that they are willing to forego the possibility of becoming a member of NATO, as it is a sovereign country, newly recognized as such upon the end-1991 break-up of the former Soviet Union, and thus is legally entitled to apply for membership.

The West: Strategic or Moral Stake? Myriad articles and commentary—from both the political right and left— convey the view that America has no geostrategic interests in getting involved in the Russo-Ukraine War. Why, then, risk World War III to save Ukraine from Russian conquest or, short of actual takeover, dominance? Russia, were are told, has legitimate historical fears that go back to its very beginning, when in the late 9th century Kievan Rus was formed, marking the emergence of Slavic peoples from antiquity; historians date the formation of a Russian state to 988 AD, when Prince Vladimir of Novgorod converted to Orthodox Christianity—albeit what we now know as the modern nation-state awaited the 16th century. Kievan Rus extended only to the Ural Mountains, some 800 miles from Moscow. That range runs north to south, and divides European Russia from Asian Russia—mainly Siberia in the north, and mostly south of Siberia, the five Islamic states that were part of the former Soviet Union.

So, the narrative points to serial great invasions of Russia—the Tatar Yoke (after 1237 invasion), 1240-1480; that same year, the Swedes; the Swedes again in the 18th century; Napoleon’s France in 1812; and Hitler’s Germany, on June 22, 1941. In all, these great invasions spanned nearly a millennium. But what is rarely noted, is that all these great invasions came from distant powers, who were not neighbors of Russia. The Russia historian Richard Pipes once counted all wars Russia was involved in, over a period from the 16th though late 20th centuries. Of 230 wars, he counted 200 started by Mother Russia (no link available, but this is a number one does not forget). Many of these were, to be fair, smaller conflicts. But the point to be made is that Mother Russia’s neighbors have far more to fear from Russia than vice-versa. Further, given that the great invasions came from afar, logic would dictate that Russia would benefit from having strong buffer states surrounding it.

Let’s take the argument one step further. Does the United States today fear invasion from the United Kingdom? In the War of 1812 we fought the British Commonwealth, during which in 1814 the British burned down the original White House. Our national anthem’s lyrics celebrate the American heroes who survived cannon bombardment by the Royal Navy. Now it is the case that Ukraine, and the former satellites of the former Soviet Union, hate the Russians. But no one anywhere—let alone in Moscow—believes that any of these countries would start a war with a nuclear-armed Russia; nor in any plausibly imaginable future would such an event come to pass.

And what picture should we have of Russia? During the thousand years since its 988 AD inception, the Motherland has had a total of eight years—1992-1999, under Boris Yeltsin—when there was an effort at privatizing the economy and establishing some semblance of democratic governance. Consider the portrait of Tsarist Russia drawn by the 19th century nobleman, the Marquis de Custine, in his classic account of his visit to Russia, Empire of the Czar, published in 1839:

The Kremlin, on a hill, gives me the idea of a city of princes, built in the midst of a city of people. This tyrannical castle, this proud heap of stones, looks down scornfully upon the bodes of common men; and, contrary to what is the case of structures of ordinary dimensions, the nearer we approach the indestructible mass, the more our wonder increases. Like the bones of certain gigantic animals, the Kremlin proves to us the history of a world of which we might doubt until after seeing the remains. In this prodigious creation strength takes the place of beauty, caprice of elegance; it is like the dream of a tyrant, fearful but full of power; it has something about it that disowns the age; means of defence which are adapted to a system of war that exists no longer; an architecture that has no connection with the wants of modern civilization; a heritage of the fabulous ages, a gaol, a palace, a sanctuary, a bulwark against the nation’s foes, a bastille against the nation, a prop of tyrants, a prison of people,—such is the Kremlin. Kind of northern Acropolis, a Pantheon of barbarism, this national fabric may be called the Alcazar of the Slavonians.

Such, then, was the chosen abode of the old Muscovite princes; and yet these formidable walls were not sufficient shelter for the terror of Ivan IV.

The fear of a man possessing absolute power is the most dreadful thing upon earth; and with all the imagery of this fear visible within the Kremlin; it is still impossible to approach the fabric without a shudder.

Towers of every form, round, square, and with pointed roofs, belfries, donjons, turrets, spires, sentry boxes upon minarets, steeples of every height, style and colour, palaces, domes, towers, walls, embattlemented and pierced with loopholes, ramparts, fortifications of every species, whimsical inventions, incomprehensible devices, chiosks by the side of cathedrals—every thing announces violation and disorder, every thing betrays the continual surveillance necessary to the security of the singular beings who were condemned to live in this supernatural world. Yet these innumerable monuments of pride, caprice, voluptuousness, glory, and piety, notwithstanding their apparent variety, express one single idea which reigns here everywhere—wear maintained by fear. The Kremlin is the work of a superhuman being, but that being is malevolent. Glory in slavery—such is the allegory figured by this satanic monument, as extraordinary in architecture as the visions of St. John are in poetry. It is a habitation which would suit some of the personages of the Apocalypse.

Custine’s work has often been compared to that of another French nobleman, Alexis de Tocqueville, whose Democracy in America presented a celebrated 1835 portrait of the U.S.

Tsar Vlad the Bad fits neatly into Custine’s chilling portrait of the dark tyranny that was Tsarist Russia. From this historical list, in the 16th century, there was Ivan IV “the Terrible” (1547-1584), who created the first Russian secret police, the Oprichnina. The 17th century brought Peter the Great (1689-1725) to the throne. Known in the West for his opening Russia to European influence, he was brutally repressive at home. The 18th century saw Catherine the Great (1762-1796) seek a warm water port in parts of the Ottoman Empire. And the 19th century featured two repressive tsars. Nicholas I, 1825-1855, nicknamed “the Cudgel” by his unfortunate subjects, began his reign by crushing the democratic Decembrist revolt; halfway through his rule, he established the Pale of Settlement to confine the Jews; and ended his three decades by starting the Crimean War, in pursuit of Catherine’s dream of a warm water port. Alexander III (1881-1894) established the Okhrana, a restructured secret police, and actively persecuted the Jews. In all fitting pedigree for Vlad.

The moral calculus, beyond traditional humanitarian concerns that often motivate Western powers to act, stems from events that, per a recent WSJ article, sealed Ukraine’s Fate. The intense pressure actually began in 1992. James Baker, Bush 41’s secretary of state, feared that all 14 Warsaw Pact nations would then wish to join NATO (which ultimately proved true). In what a contemporary observer called a “blistering” phone call, Baker blasted Ukraine’s president, Leonid Kravchuk, for signing but not ratifying the 1992 Lisbon Protocol, which sought to disarm three newly-minted, former Soviet republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine—of their nuclear arsenals, by having them ship their weapons to the Russian Federation. President Kravchuk resisted such a transfer, fearing that Russia would conquer Ukraine; he sought but could not get agreement to join NATO, where if bereft of his own nukes he could take shelter under NATO’s extended deterrence nuclear umbrella. Per the accord, Ukraine surrendered its 1,900 strategic and 2,275 tactical nuclear warheads—then the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. One central limitation, however, on Ukraine’s freedom of action, was that although their nuclear arsenal (which included ICBMs), was located physically on Ukrainian sovereign soil, Moscow retained control over authorization, arming and and release codes. Without control over these the arsenal could not be used—albeit reportedly it may have been possible for Ukraine to bypass them.

Enter one William Jefferson Clinton, on Jan. 20, 1993, the new Oval Office occupant. Within six days of taking the reins, Clinton demanded that Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons—not even waiting for the results of a couple reviews of the situation that were underway. Clinton’s minions, with rare exceptions, were adamant about disarming Ukraine—and not so insistent with Russia. They ignored a prescient warning from Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, an expert on Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. “Zbig” said: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire. But with Ukraine, suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”

The ultimate result was the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, ostensibly guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, signed by the U.S., UK and Russia; but the latter made no new commitments, beyond those continued in earlier East-West accords. In effect, the U.S. has no legal obligation, as it does with its fellow NATO members, per Art. 5 of the 1949 NATO Treaty. As for the Budapest Memorandum it may be said, per Samuel Goldwyn’s famed malapropism, “An oral contract is not worth the paper it is written on.” In fact, Clinton’s overarching Eurosecurity goal was embodied in his 1993 “Partnership for Peace” program—an all-encompassing East-West mutual security initiative, envisioning even Russia as a member—conjoined to NATO. In the event, for Ukraine to join NATO, per the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine, would require an amendment to said Constitution.

What Should Ukraine Seek? Ukraine has already conceded that it is willing to forego NATO membership—albeit, President Biden has extended NATO-level Cold War-era nuclear deterrence to include Ukraine. Ukraine is also willing to pledge neutrality. Thus, the keys for Ukraine/NATO are that:

(a) Ukraine be formally recognized by Russia as an independent country;

(b) any territory occupied by Russia be formally recognized as autonomous regions–NOT legally part of Russia;

(c) Ukraine be guaranteed unfettered access to the sea via Odessa and other ports;

(d) Sevastopol (the naval base on the island of Crimea) remain jointly accessible to Ukraine and Russia;

(e) Ukraine receive from NATO concrete security guarantees, in light of the Budapest Memorandum fail–buttressed by massive rearmament by NATO and domestic forces near the border–albeit, likely with a demilitarized zone.

(f) Sanctions relief must include commitments by Russia re energy supply and agricultural trade.

Anything less gives Russia a win, unacceptable after the massive destruction inflicted on Ukraine—which can never accept a formal partition.

Hence if peace talks fail, a long low-intensity war will most likely result. A special nightmare scenario for NATO is if the Russians occupy the Suwalki Gap, a 104 km. (65-mile) strip of land that runs southward from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad from the Baltic Sea, along Poland’s border with Lithuania; thus, it cuts off the three Baltic states from the rest of NATO.

The “X” Factor: Mismatched Leaders. President Biden’s stupefyingly incoherent bluster and retreats—best summed up as an inversion of Teddy Roosevelt’s “speak softly and carry a big stick—during his stay in Europe, and frantic serial efforts by the White House to clean up his improvised sallies, left everyone confused on both sides of the Atlantic. No one outside the administration senior staff knows who is running the show, and how far the president’s mental state has declined.

Making matters worse is that Biden’s threat to use chemical or biological weapons runs afoul of the U.S. having in 1997 signed the International Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, committing to eliminate all such agents by 2007, a date later extended to 2012. And the U.S. is a party to the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention, which went into effect in 1975.

The mess was starkly illustrated by the sharp reactions of French president Macron and voices in Moscow. Macron tartly said: “I would not use those words.” He added that “everything must be done to stop the situation from escalating.” Moscow reactions included one source describing Biden as “weak, indecisive and sick”; and the head of the State Duma (Russian parliament) calling for Biden to “undergo a medical examination.”

Paradoxically, whereas normally a feeble, feckless leader spells disaster, in this instance Moscow’s choosing to dismiss Biden’s rhetorical wanderings suggests that Moscow is cutting him slack, by not taking Old Joe seriously. Else they could have used his unhinged open call for regime change as a pretext for escalation. This further suggests that Russia still holds out hope of gaining additional ground without a WMD escalation.

Bottom Line. While many developments look promising for Ukraine, there is increasing peril due to: (a) the unreliability of the shifting, often contradictory U.S. responses; and (b) the volatility of Vladimir Putin, who shows no sign of looking for an off-ramp. Add to this the ultimate extraneous wild card: Team Biden has engaged Putin, whom they (accurately but imprudently, in the midst of a crisis) call a war criminal, to represent U.S. interests in negotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran. Put another way, Team Biden is trusting a war criminal to faithfully represent America’s interests in talks with our mortal terror-state enemy; the administration seems to assume that Putin’s interests are congruent with ours. They are not. Putin does not fear a nuclear strike by Iran on the Russian homeland, as Putin’s certain nuclear response would extinguish Iran. Iran’s threat is to Israel and the U.S. Especially in light of our aid to Ukraine, Putin is happy to give us more vexing security issues to deal with.

It would, it seems, take Putin declaring that his off-ramp is the annexation of Brooklyn’s Brighton Beach “Little Odessa”, to bring the administration to its senses.

John Wohlstetter, a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy is author of Sleepwalking with the Bomb (Discovery Institute Press, 2d. ed. 2014).

(This article first appeared in the American Spectator: https://spectator.org/25th-amendment-disability-can-we-quickly-boot-joe-kamala/)

Recently, Yale Law School professor E. Donald Elliott, a first-rate lawyer and regulatory expert, wrote in TAS that a little-known provision in the 25th Amendment can be used to swiftly toss the sitting president and vice-president, and replace them with competent, trusted leadership for the remainder of the Biden-Harris term. The provision, in the Amendment’s involuntary disability paragraph, sec. 4, contains the following sentence, the last 11 words of which one might call section 4’s Emergency Clause:

Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide. . . . (Emphasis mine.)

In support of his idea, he argued: Most voters, across the political spectrum, see Biden and Harris as manifestly unable to govern—the former clearly beset by cognitive deficiency; the latter—like many vice-presidents—chosen for political appeal, despite lacking basic issue knowledge or executive ability. Hence, Congress should call upon Biden and Harris to both resign voluntarily. If either or both refuse, Congress should activate section 4’s Emergency Clause, and schedule a plebiscite. The House and Senate should each vote by simple majority for a recall election, asking a majority of the electorate to vote that neither is capable of discharging the “powers & duties” of their respective offices, and to replace them with a caretaker national unity government. If a majority votes to recall both, Congress would pick two replacement leaders who are trusted by both sides. An illustrative example Professor Elliott offered was to have top Democrat Leon Panetta serve as president, and respected Republican Robert Gates—who served in the Bush 43 and Obama cabinets, to serve as Panetta’s vice-president. Other respected figures could well fill the bill.

The genesis of this Emergency Clause was during the debates on presidential succession in the Eisenhower administration. Whether to craft either a Constitutional or statutory provision to remedy what was by then universally regarded as a gaping hole in the collection of laws—in the text of the Constitution and laws that Congress enacted—governing presidential succession.

In a series of five TAS articles published last fall I examined presidential succession in detail: Part I, historical antecedents; Part II, 25th Amendment genesis; Part III, 25th Amendment implementation today; and Part IV, possible first-ever use of the 25th Amendment’s involuntary presidential disability provision — focusing mostly on Constitutional issues, dipping down into legislative enactment (in legal shorthand parlance, “statutory”) issues only when necessary. Finally, I discussed problems for today’s situation, created by flawed presidential succession statutes. What follows in the next two sections is a summary extracted from my five articles.

Presidential and Vice-Presidential Disability, 1789-1965. By 1965, when Lyndon Johnson was sworn in for his full presidential term, there had been seven presidencies terminated by death—William Henry Harrison (1841), Zachary Taylor (1850), Abraham Lincoln (1865), James Garfield (1881), William McKinley (1901), Warren Harding (1923), Franklin Roosevelt (1945)—by eerie coincidence, six of the seven were originally elected in a year divisible by 20. Ronald Reagan, first elected in 1980, narrowly escaped the “20” jinx in 1981, breaking the spell.

The two most notable presidential disabilities were those that struck James Garfield (1881) and Woodrow Wilson (1919-1921). Garfield’s illness lasted 80 days, from being shot July 2, until his death September 19. Wilson’s was far more consequential, his massive stroke coming in the midst of his two biggest fights: (a) win ratification of the Versailles Treaty that he had negotiated in Paris with the European members of the Big Four; (b) his push for the U.S. to join the nascent League of Nations. He failed on both counts. Many regard first lady Edith Bolling Gault Wilson as the first—albeit de facto—woman president; she headed a triumvirate that from behind the scenes ran the executive branch for 18 months, from Wilson’s September 25, 1919 stroke until Warren Harding was inaugurated March 4, 1921.

And as if all that were not enough, from April 30,1789 to January 20, 1965 the vice-presidency was vacant, either by death or illness, 37-1/4 years—roughly one-fifth of the time. As vice-presidencies were derisively regarded as a useless appendage for much of that time, it did not seem to matter. But when Harry Truman, largely unknown to the public, succeeded to the presidency in 1945, HST was woefully unprepared to assume the Oval Office. FDR had neglected to brief Truman on the Manhattan Project, then nearing its goal of producing the world’s first atomic bombs. The war in Europe was less than one month from V-E Day; V-J Day in the Pacific was 4-1/2 months away. And it was this untried vice-president who, now in the Oval Office, had to decide whether to unleash upon Japan the moist lethal weapons ever created.

Fortunately for America—and the world—Truman rose magnificently to the occasion, ending the most destructive war in world history, and then meeting the Soviet challenge at the start of the Cold War. Winston Churchill later told HST:

I loathed your taking the place of Franklin Roosevelt. . . . I misjudged you badly. Since that time, you more than any other man, have saved Western civilization.

The Push for Succession Reform, 1956-67. Thereafter, it occurred to many that the next time in a crucial turn of history presidential succession was uncertain, or a vice-presidential vacancy left unfilled, America might not be so lucky.

It was President Eisenhower himself who pressed for a solution to the problems of succession, after his 1955 heart attack.Then, on November 25, 1957, Ike suffered a paralyzing stroke. Thinking he would not survive, he asked his chief of staff to alert the vice-president; Nixon was told that he might be president in 24 hours. But Ike rallied, and was back at work in one week. The effort for reform, led by his attorney-general, came to naught, for want of agreement on how to deal with the myriad complexities attending presidential involuntary disability. The 1960 presidential campaign saw a contest between two able men in their forties, and a sense of crisis gone.

Circumstances dramatically and tragically changed on Nov. 22, 1963, with the shocking assassination of JFK, a president in the apparent prime of life (his many serious health problems concealed from the public with the acquiescence of the press corps of the time). Lyndon Johnson took office determined to find solutions to the problems of presidential and vice-presidential succession. From LBJ’s inauguration on Jan. 20, 1964, it was to be just over three years to the 38th state ratifying the 25th Amendment.

Spurred by urgent necessity, in the aftermath not only of the JFK assassination, but also in the wake of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world was poised on the precipice of possible nuclear war, the best legal, political and medical minds were assembled to find a solution. Those advocating a legislative remedy touted the great flexibility that would enable rapid resolution of a succession crisis. But such flexibility gave much room for political mischief, and politicians, like Oscar Wilde, notoriously can resist anything but temptation. Conversely, while encasing the succession process in a Constitutional amendment would ward off opportunistic mischief, that risked leaving no quick solution if the text did not expressly cover a particular set of circumstances.

The compromise reached in 1964 was to add the Emergency Clause language to section 4 of the 25th Amendment. In doing so flexibility was introduced and, inevitably, commensurate opportunities for expedient political exploitation. Supporters of the 25th conceded this, but added that absent some sense of civic virtue during a crisis, no free republic could survive. An overwhelming majority of both Houses of Congress decided that the gravity of the crisis would likely induce gravity of civic purpose.

In his 1968 memoir, One Heartbeat Away, Birch Bayh, who led the Senate effort to adopt the 25th, recalled how President Eisenhower said that those considering presidential succession crises must assume that the necessary civic purpose would bring forth “men of honor, men of integrity, men whose concern is the welfare of their own country and not of their own personal ambitions.”

Can A Recall Election Realistically be Held? The Crisis of 2022-2025. Only 14 months into the Biden-Harris term, we find ourselves transformed into a nation that reels from banana-republic inflation whilst sliding into stagnation—the worst stagflation in 50 years; that sees “woke” district attorneys aid criminals while undercutting the police, and an attorney-general who regards activist school parents opposing teachers’ unions as domestic terrorists; that traded a secure southwestern border for an open-border welcome mat for unvaccinated economic migrants and massive lethal drug smuggling by the cartels; that traded energy independence for the first time in 70 years, for importing oil and gas provided by Russia (just halted) and Iran; that faces an emboldened China determined to replace Pax Americana with Pax Sinica, as our military atrophies from the twin constraints of omnibus budget limits and 30 years of continuous oversees operations. Most sinister of all: Washington labels opposing views “misinformation” over which it asserts, in league with “woke” tech oligarchs and mainstream media allies, the right to censor the views of political opponents. George Orwell, call your office.

Accepting the premise that a recall of the current administration is needed, there is a need for procedural and substantive policy safeguards, if the recall proposal is to have any chance of passing. The first set covers limits upon those who accept a caretaker role.

National Unity (NU) Procedural Prerequisites: Six safeguards must be implemented to minimize the prospect that a caretaker government seeks to exploit an emergency by enacting permanent legislation:

(1) NU members serve to 1/20/2025, when President and VP are sworn in.

(2) NU members recuse themselves from campaigning for anyone.

(3) NU members agree not to join the next administration.

(4) NU members work with Congress on an interim “caretaker” program.

(5) NU members work to rapidly restore proven successful policies.

(6) NU’s top priority: Avoid big wars by shoring up nuclear/cyber defenses.

The second set covers limits upon what those caretakers can do:

NU Substantive Prohibions–“must NOT”—Pre-Empt Matters Properly Reserved for the Voters or those elected by them:

(1) Aim to resolve long-term structural disputes (abolishing Electoral College; packing Supreme Court; admitting D.C./PR by statute; abolishing Senate filibuster for legislation; federalizing elections).

(2) Aim to permanently resolve major substantive policy disputes (energy/environment, market/socialist economy, amnesty/return of illegal migrants, teacher/parent control of education, health policy, etc.).

(3) Aim to permanently resolve bedrock constitutional issues (1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 14th).

(4) Lifetime appointments must be reconfirmed by the new administration.

(5) All interim measures expire 4/30/25 (100 days into the administration).

Bottom Line. In my TAS article on statutes governing presidential succession, I called those laws “a ticking time bomb.” With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its brutal ruler obsessed with recovering all the territory surrendered by the former Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the Presidential Succession Time Bomb has just exploded.

Therein I wrote, of our deepening partisan division:

The state of near open civil war that prevails today precludes bipartisan cooperation — especially given one-party control of the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives. It will take electoral outcomes that alter the balance of power, in order to make possible considering change. . . .

What makes today’s partisanship so dangerous and obstructive is that the divide is not simply over policy. It is over the very structure of government and the balance between governmental power and individual rights — with rising claims of selective group rights for currently favored constituencies.

No recall can happen before the November elections. It will take landslide GOP sweeps in both the House and Senate for it to begin. Yet while that will stymie the Biden administration’s legislative program, and force less partisan judicial appointments, the main administration response will be a broader attempt to govern by executive fiat. Most of these initiatives will ultimately lose in the federal courts, but the administration already has openly stated that it will implement policies struck down in the federal courts, until the appeals process is complete, so as to create faits accompli that cannot easily be undone by a new sheriff in town.

We can live with—however reluctantly—those expedient workarounds. What we should not risk is living with a moribund administration living in its Beltway Bubble, as a raging Vladimir Putin threatens World War III over Ukraine, including possible use of nuclear weapons, not only against Ukraine, but also NATO countries, including the United States, if his aggressive designs are stymied. Ditto Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, who ardently desires to force Taiwan back into China’s orbit, waging war if necessary. And ditto to Iran’s mullahs, who pine for a nuclear weapon to give them immunity from removal, and redouble efforts to destroy Israel.

There is an adage in business: Never bet the company. Allowing Joe Biden and/or Kamala Harris to continue in office for the next 35-1/2 months amounts to betting the American republic, and all the freedoms it stands for.

John Wohlstetter, a senior fellow at the Gold Institute for International Strategy is author of Sleepwalking with the Bomb (Discovery Institute Press, 2d. ed. 2014).