We can second guess all we want the decision for the United States to enter another war in the Middle East, this time in Iran. However, cutting to the heart of how geopolitical debates often get mired in rearview mirrors rather than what’s next, I want to break down the dynamics at play.

Why the Fixation on the Past?

People (policymakers, analysts, media, and the public) dwell on historical decisions for a few interconnected reasons, even as the current situation demands forward-thinking:

1. Accountability and Blame-Shifting: The Persian Gulf’s volatility, marked by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria, ballistic missile tests, and disruptions to shipping lanes like the Strait of Hormuz, stems directly from past U.S. and allied policies. Think the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War (with Western backing for Iraq), the 2003 Iraq invasion that empowered Iranian influence, or the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal and its 2018 withdrawal. These aren’t abstract history; they’re scapegoats. Critics on the left blame Bush-era neocons for destabilizing the region, while those on the right point to Obama-Biden appeasement or Clinton’s missed opportunities. It’s easier to litigate old choices than own new risks, especially in a polarized environment where admitting “we need to adapt” feels like weakness.

2. Lessons from History as a Crutch: The Gulf’s strategic importance (oil flows, U.S. naval presence via the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and alliances with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel) makes every misstep feel existential. Past events like the 1980s Tanker War or the 2019 drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities are invoked to justify caution or aggression. But this often turns into paralysis: “We can’t trust diplomacy because of the failed Algiers Accords” or “Military action backfired in Iraq, so let’s not repeat it.” It’s a valid way to avoid repeating errors, but it crowds out innovation, like exploring new deterrence models or economic levers.

3. Institutional Inertia and Media Cycles: Bureaucracies in Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh are staffed by veterans of those eras, so institutional memory biases toward hindsight. Media amplifies these headlines’ love “what if” retrospectives (i.e., “How the Iran Deal’s Collapse Led to Today’s Crisis”) because they’re clickable and don’t require predicting uncertain futures. In 2026, with ongoing Houthi disruptions backed by Iran and potential escalations post-any recent incidents, this backward gaze distracts from evolving threats like cyber warfare or Iran’s alliances with Russia and China.

Shifting to Future Decisions:

The real imperative RIGHT NOW is ensuring a proactive strategy. The situation today (escalating Iranian enrichment to near-weapons-grade uranium, proxy militia attacks on U.S. bases, and Gulf states diversifying away from oil amid climate shifts) demands decisions that aren’t just reactions. Here’s what could (and should) be prioritized:

Strengthen Deterrence Without Endless Wars: Build on Abraham Accords momentum by integrating Israel-Gulf defense networks, perhaps with AI-driven early-warning systems for missile threats. Future-focused: Invest in non-kinetic options like economic sanctions tied to verifiable de-escalation, or cyber defenses to counter Iran’s hacking prowess.
Energy Independence and Diversification: The Gulf’s oil chokehold is waning with global renewables push. Decisions now could accelerate U.S. and allied transitions to alternatives, reducing Iran’s leverage from asymmetric warfare on tankers. Think incentives for nuclear power or green hydrogen hubs in the region.
Diplomatic Off-Ramps with Teeth: Instead of rehashing JCPOA debates, craft a new framework that includes ballistic missiles and regional proxies, enforced by a coalition including Europe, India, and even cautious outreach to moderates in Tehran. But this requires bold leadership willing to risk short-term backlash for long-term stability.
Countering Broader Influences: Iran’s ties to the Axis of Resistance (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) and partnerships with Moscow/Beijing are accelerating. Future moves: Bolster Gulf cyber resilience, support proxy countermeasures, and use trade deals to peel away Iranian allies economically.
In essence, the past obsession is human nature, comfort in the known versus the gamble of the unknown. But America is a leader who’s navigated these waters before, we know victory comes from decisive action ahead, not endless autopsies. If we keep debating yesterday’s calls, tomorrow’s threats will outpace us. There are clearly emerging and unknown threats that we must consider and be prepared to address when they raise their ugly heads. Let’s not fall into the traps of staring at our strategic navels, instead, think geo-strategically, long-term, and use common sense and then move rapidly to end this war.

Given current conditions, does Iran have a fallback doctrine (ie., a Strategy)?

Now that Iran has experienced some level of leadership decapitation and defeat of some components of their military, does Iran possess or follow a military doctrine that allied and partner forces should be aware of?

The short answer is YES.

Iran’s military doctrine in the face of leadership decapitation emphasizes resilience through decentralized command structures, rapid succession planning, and asymmetric warfare to ensure regime continuity and deterrence. This approach, often referred to in analyses as a “fourth successor” strategy, involves pre-designating multiple backups for key positions to prevent total disruption, making the system harder to fully dismantle.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a central role, stepping in to consolidate power, stabilize institutions, and drive retaliation, potentially through collective leadership or hardline figures while a new supreme leader is selected via constitutional mechanisms like the Assembly of Experts or an interim council.

Key elements include:

Asymmetric Response and Escalation: Rather than conventional engagement, the focus shifts to missile strikes, proxy networks, and disruptions like targeting regional energy infrastructure or waterways to impose costs on adversaries without direct confrontation.

Recent examples highlight operations framed as “ferocious offensives,” prioritizing vengeance and regional destabilization over submission.

Institutional Intertwining for Survival: The regime’s architecture links the security sector (including the IRGC and Basij militia) with political, economic, and religious institutions, allowing quick adaptation but risking fragmentation if the security core weakens significantly.

This setup aims to maintain control amid chaos, with the IRGC often emerging as the dominant force in wartime transitions.

Deterrence and No Capitulation: Attacks are viewed as confirming external hostility, reinforcing the need for sustained asymmetrical tools and proxy operations to signal resolve, even if it leads to prolonged conflict rather than collapse (forms of asymmetry and attrition).

Historical precedents suggest this rarely leads to regime submission, instead fostering adaptation or internal power contests.

Overall, the doctrine prioritizes endurance and counterpressure over reform, with outcomes potentially ranging from stabilized hardline rule to protracted instability, depending on internal cohesion and external pressures.

Bottom line: Settle in for a sustained conflict. History, cultural and societal norms, political dynamics, ability to suffer, and the idea they are the “chosen” people are all elements that must be considered, along with many other factors.

Iran has crossed a significant threshold. Following confirmed strikes on banking infrastructure inside Iran, Iranian military sources are now threatening retaliatory action against US and Israeli financial centers across the region, with specific signals pointing toward tech sector targets. This represents a deliberate strategic shift from military-to-military engagement toward targeting civilian economic infrastructure, a move that places ordinary American workers, employees of major technology companies, directly in the crosshairs of a regime at war.

This escalation is not a sign of Iranian strength. It is the signature of a losing force making a desperate play.

Regimes that are winning wars fight on the battlefield. They do not threaten banks, financial centers, and technology campuses populated by civilian workers. The decision to escalate toward economic and civilian targets is a calculated gamble by Tehran, an attempt to generate enough global economic disruption and political pressure to force Washington and Jerusalem to stand down before the military situation deteriorates further.

It will not work, but it must be recognized for what it is.

Iran’s air defense architecture has been severely degraded since strikes began on February 28. Their missile and drone stockpiles are being systematically reduced. Proxy networks across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen are fractured or operating under significant constraint. The transition in the supreme leadership with Mojtaba Khamenei installed only days ago creates internal uncertainty at the command level. These are the conditions that produce exactly this kind of escalatory threat: loud, broad, and designed to intimidate rather than defeat.

Threatening US tech sector targets is significant for one specific reason.

It signals Iran is willing to accept international condemnation for targeting civilian economic infrastructure in exchange for the psychological and political impact of threatening American workers on American soil or in American-affiliated facilities abroad. That is a terrorism calculus, not a military one.

Iran is making a massive, desperate move because they are losing and they know it. The targeting of financial centers and technology infrastructure is designed to change the psychological terrain of this conflict when they can no longer change the physical terrain.

Desperation dressed as escalation is still desperation. Do not be deceived by it.

5th Generation Warfare at its most defined level

The ongoing military conflict in Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, involves a coalition led by the United States and Israel conducting airstrikes and operations aimed at degrading Iran’s military capabilities, including its ballistic missile program, nuclear sites, and leadership structures. The strikes have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other high-ranking officials, escalating into a broader regional war.

Iran has retaliated with drone and missile attacks on U.S. bases, embassies, and allied infrastructure across the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Bahrain.

The conflict has drawn in proxies and allies, with no clear end in sight, though U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested it could last around four weeks.

Primary Opposing Sides

Side 1: Iran and Its Allies (Axis of Resistance)

• Iran (Islamic Republic): The central target, led by remaining IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) elements and military leadership. Iran has launched widespread retaliatory strikes, closed the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global oil flows, and deployed advanced drones, including first-person view (FPV) models for the first time.

Internal pro-regime forces are clashing with anti-regime protesters, adding a domestic dimension that could evolve into civil unrest.

• Hezbollah (Lebanon): Actively involved, with Israeli strikes targeting their positions in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has entered the conflict, firing on Israeli forces and contributing to the regional escalation.
• Iranian-Backed Militias: Groups like Shiite militias from Iraq have deployed fighters into Iran to suppress protests and support the regime.

These include broader proxy networks across the Middle East, such as those in Yemen (Houthis, though less prominently mentioned in recent reports) and Syria, united against U.S. and Israeli presence.

• Broader Support: Russia and China have reportedly sided with Iran diplomatically, opposing Western intervention and potentially providing indirect support.

Sunni militant groups, like those historically opposed to Israel, have shown some alignment with Shia proxies in this context.

This side focuses on asymmetric warfare, including missile barrages and proxy attacks, aiming to overwhelm defenses and disrupt energy supplies.

(This article was written By Peter Huessy and Stephen Blank and appeared in the RealClearDefense. What the Arms Control Community Gets Wrong About Arms Control – RealClearDefense)

In an ideal world a binding arms control treaty governing numbers and types of deployed and stored nuclear weapons, proclaiming, and enforcing strictly agreed to mutual verification procedures would be a wonderful thing.  But we do not live in that world nor is it likely to appear anytime soon.  The New START Treaty expired on February 5 and there is not even a negotiation in sight let alone a viable treaty.  Predictably the arms control community blames the Administration for this.  Angela Kane, the former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and Under-Secretary-General for Management in the United Nations, wrote that, civil society urged the Trump administration to accept Vladimir Putin’s proposal to continue observing the numerical limits of that treaty after expiration.

That may be true in Europe and among the arms control lobby here.  But they assuredly do not speak for whatever she means by the term civil society here and in Europe. Indeed, treaty extension is a bad idea, and the Administration rightly refused Putin’s offer. Washington got it right. Putin’s offer was a typical Russian ruse.  Notably it said nothing about verification, and it came from a government that has systematically broken every arms control treaty that it has ever signed.  It is an axion of successful arms control that unless both sides can verify a treaty’s observance that treaty is worthless.

In the meantime Russia has used chemical weapons in Ukraine, provided them to the Assad government, conducted biological warfare against opponents at home and abroad – most recently – Alexei Navalny – and probably against U.S. diplomats abroad, the notorious Havana Syndrome being a case in point.  Russia violated the Budapest accords on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament by seizing Crimea in 2014 and then invading again in 2022, actions that violated eight solemn international treaties.

As Dr. Blank wrote in 2023, Russia’s post-2014 aggression does not merely target Ukraine. Instead, it deliberately assaults the very idea of international order, particularly that of a European security order.  Indeed, Putin, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Nikolai Patrushev and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proclaim the collective West is at war with Russia.  Russian nationalist political scientist Sergei Karaganov openly says that “We are at war with the West. The European security order is illegitimate.”

As part of its assault on international order Russia violated the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) by conducting nuclear weapons tests in 2019.  At the same time, Russia’s Oreshnik missile, a prototype of which appeared approximately 15 years ago, was developed in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Furthermore, the Oreshnik prototype, the Rubezh missile, was developed in violation of the New START Treaty, since, given its range, it can be classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Russia is also seeking to deploy a nuclear weapon in space in violation of previous treaties.  Apart from all these treaty violations for which no penalty was exacted, Moscow regularly threatens Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. with nuclear strikes for supporting Ukraine.  The latest such threat against. Estonia occurred on February 22.  Finally by moving nuclear weapons to Belarus, funding North Korean nuclear programs, and transferring missile, satellite, and nuclear submarine technology to Pyongyang Moscow has violated the Non-Proliferation treaty and a host of UN resolutions.

Neither is Russia alone, China’s breathtaking and utterly unconstrained nuclear buildup represents a growing threat to both the U.S. and Russia not to mention India, Japan, Australia, and virtually every other state in Asia.  China now has a nuclear triad but because no treaty constrains it, it is also apparently developing a new generation of low-yield “mini-nukes” to give it the future option of limited nuclear warfare.  It violated the CTBT in 2020 despite being a signatory to the treaty.  Thus, it too cannot be counted on to uphold a treaty without strict verification and enforcement mechanisms.

It is hard to imagine either American or European governments let alone civil society, however it is defined, resuming an unverifiable treaty with Russia and/or China under such conditions of intolerable disadvantage,  a phrase coined in 1999 by members of the Clinton Administration.  As Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin wrote in 1960-61, “the aims of arms control and the aims of a national military strategy should be substantially the same.”  And a more recent commentary observes, “This principle established national security as the dominant goal of arms control, not the reduction of arms per se.”

Unfortunately, Ms. Kane and the arms control community have evidently forgotten this crucial distinction.  Arms control is not and cannot be a moral crusade for unilateral disarmament or global zero.  Experience shows that Moscow negotiates only when it fears a U.S. technology buildup or when one, as is now beginning, takes place.  Neither will China be moved by moralism and what amounts to American self-deterrence.  But it might be moved by a genuine American buildup to parry its threats.  Otherwise, nuclear proliferation will inevitably become a more realistic option as China pushed in a secret 1982 Politburo meeting.  Indeed, at the first sign of the fraying of our alliances in Asia and Europe those countries’ nuclearization  instantly returns to their agendas as is now happening. Regardless of claims made on behalf of a nebulous civil society, Western populations expect their governments to defend them against threats and history shows us that only when we build do our enemies negotiate.